



General Assembly

Distr.: General
21 March 2011

Original: English

Sixty-fifth session

Agenda item 53

Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report is submitted in response to resolution 64/266, in which the General Assembly endorsed the proposals, recommendations and conclusions of the 2010 report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/64/19), which noted that the civilian reintegration of ex-combatants continued to pose particular challenges, requiring concerted efforts to help rapidly jump-start the economy in order to create employment opportunities for ex-combatants and the wider community.

In the present report, the Secretary-General introduces revised policy and guidance related to the United Nations approach to the reintegration of ex-combatants and associated groups, but notes large gaps in their implementation. Worldwide, adult ex-combatants typically receive up to one year of economic reintegration assistance, most often consisting of vocational training, however the majority of programmes lack the comprehensive and multidimensional support necessary to achieve sustainable reintegration. There is therefore a need for multidimensional reintegration programmes, including economic, psychosocial, political and security components; the need to enlarge targeting principles towards community-based reintegration approaches; and the need to develop stronger linkages with the reintegration of other returnees and refugees. The reintegration of ex-combatants and associated groups must be coherently linked and aligned with larger national employment and income generation programmes, private sector development initiatives and poverty reduction strategies, providing a bridge between immediate recovery initiatives and longer-term development as early as possible. While this requires a scaling up of current reintegration efforts, the United Nations should not spare efforts or take risks by undertaking short-term programmes, as the cost of not funding sustainable programmes is invariably higher than providing adequate reintegration from the outset.



An update on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration at the Headquarters and field levels includes the support provided to peace operations, as well as other in-country support provided by United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. Recent experience has demonstrated that a dedicated capacity at Headquarters has greatly helped in providing operational backstopping and integrated guidance, which in turn has ensured the quality of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes and their alignment with the overall peace process and recovery initiatives. The Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration has continued to facilitate an integrated approach to programme planning and implementation, in addition to its work on developing guidance.

The Secretary-General makes recommendations under the following headings for improving the United Nations approach to the reintegration of ex-combatants:

- (a) Assessment, monitoring and evaluation
- (b) Length and breadth of programmes
- (c) “Delivering as one”
- (d) Building capacity
- (e) Regional dimensions.

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I. Introduction

1. In resolution 64/266, the General Assembly endorsed the proposals, recommendations and conclusions of the 2010 report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/64/19), which noted that the civilian reintegration of ex-combatants continued to pose particular challenges, requiring concerted efforts to help rapidly jump-start the economy in order to create employment opportunities for ex-combatants and the wider community. The report further requested that the Secretary-General conduct a thorough review within the next year on how the United Nations approached the issue, and make the appropriate linkages with the wider issues of the return and reintegration of the displaced and economic recovery, ensuring that they are consistent with national priorities. The present report therefore provides an update on progress made in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration with a particular focus on the reintegration of ex-combatants.

II. Recent developments

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes in the field

2. Over the past five years, the United Nations has continued to support national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts, with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations taking the primary lead in disarmament and demobilization in peacekeeping settings and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) taking a leading role in reintegration. In its resolution 1769 (2007), the Security Council established the United Nations-African Union Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), mandating it to support the early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, which contains provisions for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. This brought the number of current peacekeeping operations with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration mandates to four, the others being the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). Additionally, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is mandated to undertake related programming in community violence reduction. The Secretary-General is also pleased to note that in this period, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme in Liberia, as part of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), officially concluded on 21 July 2009 after processing a caseload of 101,495 ex-combatants.

3. During this period, there has been an increase in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration provisions within the mandates of special political missions, including the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), which carried forward the programme started under its peacekeeping predecessor, the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB). Furthermore, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), have all been mandated to provide support to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities and have recruited specialists in this field. In addition, the United Nations Mission in

Nepal (UNMIN) supported the discharge and rehabilitation of disqualified Maoist army personnel.

4. United Nations agencies, funds and programmes continue to support various aspects of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes in countries across the globe. UNDP supports programmes in 22 countries and territories¹ while the International Organization for Migration (IOM) provides support to programmes in nine countries.² Additionally, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) continues to support programmes for the release and reintegration of children associated with armed forces or armed groups in 15 countries and territories.³ The International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Health Organization (WHO) also provide specialized services in support of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes worldwide.

5. The environments in which many disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes are taking place are becoming increasingly varied and complex. Many settings involve a greater level and diffusion of violence against unarmed civilians, often perpetrated by undisciplined armed elements, such as militias and gangs, operating at the subnational level. In the peacekeeping context, this complexity has resulted in peacekeepers employing a wider range of confidence-building and peacebuilding tools to respond to emerging challenges of contemporary peacekeeping. This evolution can be illustrated by the reorientation of MINUSTAH disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts towards a comprehensive community violence reduction programme, including provision of employment opportunities to former gang members and at-risk youth pursuant to Security Council resolution 1702 (2006). Darfur and Somalia present equally complex environments, where new programmes are currently being planned. In these situations there are no comprehensive or inclusive peace agreements, little access to many target groups and security concerns; all of which were traditionally considered prerequisites for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The practices applied in these complex environments, which are currently categorized by UNDP and other agencies under headings such as "small arms and light weapons control", "armed violence reduction" and "community security and social cohesion", were summarized in a 2010 report prepared by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations entitled "Second generation disarmament, demobilization and reintegration practices in peace operations".⁴ The scale and complexity of the work has also required increasing and better coordinated support capacities at field and headquarters levels from UNDP and other agencies, funds and programmes.

¹ Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Indonesia, Iraq, Kosovo (all references to Kosovo in this report shall be understood to be in the context of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999)), Nepal, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Uganda. In Haiti and Somalia programmatic focus is on community violence reduction.

² Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Uganda.

³ Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Iraq, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Uganda.

⁴ Available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/ddr/ddr_062010.pdf.

Developments at United Nations Headquarters

6. At United Nations Headquarters, the United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, which has 20 members⁵ and is co-chaired by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNDP, has continued to be active in its mandate to improve the coherence and performance of the Organization in the area of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, launched in December 2006 by the Working Group along with a web-based resource centre (www.unddr.org), consolidate guidance on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, providing a United Nations integrated approach to the planning, management and implementation of programmes. In 2009, additional guidance was provided on the linkages between disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes and security sector reform and transitional justice. The Working Group completed the revision of the reintegration guidance in 2010 and is currently in the process of updating and expanding guidance on children, youth⁶ and ex-combatants with disabilities, as well as developing training and knowledge management programmes with the assistance of the European Union.

7. Within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section was created as a dedicated capacity in the newly created Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, further to General Assembly resolution 61/279 on strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to manage and sustain peacekeeping operations. The Section provides support on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to peacekeeping operations and to missions and offices led by the Department of Political Affairs, as requested and feasible, in coordination with the Department of Political Affairs and other United Nations entities.⁷ As an integral part of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section is well placed to provide an integrated approach consistent with other Office components, including police, justice and corrections, mine action and security sector reform. The Section, which consists of seven Professional staff members, is currently supporting over 460 staff in the field in planning and implementing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes. Critical to this is the involvement of the Section in the country-specific integrated mission planning process and development of integrated strategic frameworks, to ensure activities are tied to the objectives of the mission and the United Nations country team at all stages.

8. In addition to the work of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNDP and others, the Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding Fund and Peacebuilding Support Office have become key stakeholders in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration arena since their establishment in 2006. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration has been identified as a key peacebuilding priority in three of the countries on the Commission agenda (Burundi, Central African Republic and Liberia). Additionally, the Peacebuilding Fund has provided welcome financial support to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes in the Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan.

⁵ See the annex to the present report for a full list of members.

⁶ Within the United Nations system, youth/young people are identified as those between 15 and 24 years of age.

⁷ ST/SGB/2010/1.

While funding has generally been used for reintegration programmes, some has gone towards disarmament and demobilization, most notably shorter-term reinsertion programmes. The majority of funding for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, however, comes from other bilateral and multilateral sources.

9. The need to address the different vulnerabilities and capacities of women, men, girls and boys within disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes is now widely recognized, although there continues to be a significant number of women and girls who remain “hidden” from such programmes. In order to track the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) in situations of armed conflict and post-conflict environments, the Security Council has endorsed a set of indicators as laid out in the report of the Secretary-General on women and peace and security of 28 September 2010 (S/2010/498), including an indicator to measure the overall proportion of female ex-combatants and women and girls associated with armed forces and groups who are included in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, as well as how programme benefits are meeting their needs and demands. In another report on women’s participation in peacebuilding, of 7 September 2010 (A/65/354-S/2010/466), the Secretary-General recommended specific measures to ensure women’s equal participation in all stages of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration — from the negotiation of peace agreements and the establishment of national institutions to the design and implementation of programmes.

10. Over the past five years, several documents have been released which have helped shape and guide United Nations involvement in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. In 2006 and 2009 respectively, the Secretary-General released a second report on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (A/60/705) and a report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (A/63/881-S/2009/304). Additionally, under the guidance of UNICEF and the Government of France, 95 Member States have to date endorsed the Paris Commitments to protect children from unlawful recruitment or use by armed forces or armed groups and the Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups, which were launched in February 2007. These documents provide guidance on the recruitment, release and reintegration of all children associated with armed forces or groups regardless of their role.

An integrated approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

11. While in the past, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration assisted by the United Nations has often been fragmented, significant progress has been made, although many challenges still remain. In 2004 and 2005 respectively, pilot integrated units were created within MINUSTAH and UNMIS, comprising personnel from the peacekeeping operations and UNDP to increase impact and ensure joint planning and coordination.

12. While integration at the programmatic level continues to be a valuable tool in furthering programme coherence and enhanced leverage vis-à-vis national counterparts, different business models and organizational mandates, corporate cultures and financial and administrative approaches have created significant challenges to structural integration. These obstacles led to the dissolution of the integrated unit in Haiti in 2007, although integration continues to be applied at the programmatic level. The integrated unit in the Sudan still exists but has experienced

significant management challenges, which are currently being addressed. The experiences from these two pilot cases are currently being reviewed with a view to drawing lessons learned and enhancing future collaboration between peacekeeping operations and UNDP.

13. While further consideration is needed to enhance future opportunities for, and benefits of, structural integration, a key lesson is that some positive aspects of integration can be achieved through joint planning and programming. This lesson has been further confirmed through experience gained in the Côte d'Ivoire 1,000 micro-projects programme, which provides reinsertion assistance to ex-combatants, and is jointly supported by UNOCI and UNDP. Additionally, the reintegration, rehabilitation and recovery programme in Liberia, and in particular the emergency employment programme, has benefited from the common strategy created by UNMIL, UNDP, WFP, the World Bank and the Ministries of Public Works and Labour.⁸

Other notable developments

14. A second conference on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and stability in Africa, organized by the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, was held in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in June 2007. In May 2009, the Government of Colombia hosted the First International Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Congress in Cartagena de Indias. The Congress provided a forum for over 1,500 practitioners to share knowledge, experiences and good practices with colleagues from around the world.

15. The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, led by the World Bank, which was an attempt to address disarmament, demobilization and reintegration regionally in the greater Great Lakes region of Africa, closed in 2009. The Program brought together 43 partners, including seven country Governments, 13 donors, 11 United Nations entities, a number of regional organizations and numerous non-governmental organizations. Over the seven years of the Program, 279,263 adult combatants were demobilized through national programmes and special projects, 244,597 ex-combatants received reinsertion assistance and 232,107 received support for economic reintegration. In addition, 53,880 children associated with armed forces and groups were assisted in being reunified with their families and reintegrated into their communities. The Program has been succeeded by the Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program, which assists countries in the Great Lakes region of Africa to transition from demobilization and reintegration activities to broader recovery and development.

⁸ Although the emergency employment programme was carried out outside the conventional disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, it afforded the opportunity to address reintegration challenges, as well as to respond to critical infrastructure needs and security demands in post-conflict Liberia.

III. Review of reintegration

A. Scale and complexity of reintegration

16. In 2010, United Nations agencies, funds and programmes were supporting reintegration programmes in 18 countries and territories,⁹ providing assistance to an estimated 257,000 ex-combatants (of whom approximately 10 per cent were female), 9,000 women associated with armed forces and groups, as well as 11,393 children associated with armed forces and groups (8,624 male and 2,769 female). Over the past five years, the United Nations has completed reintegration programmes in four countries (Angola, Liberia, the Niger and Timor-Leste), which have provided reintegration support to approximately 234,000 participants. During the same period, the United Nations began supporting new reintegration processes in nine countries and territories (Afghanistan, Chad, the Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Nepal, Nigeria, Somalia and Sri Lanka). The largest reintegration programme ever supported by the United Nations is in the Sudan, where some 180,000 ex-combatants will undergo reintegration, following the relevant provisions in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

17. Reintegration is particularly complex due to the nature of the post-conflict environment, often characterized by weakened governance institutions, lack of social cohesion, poorly functioning economies and the wide spectrum of economic, social, psychosocial, political and security interventions required. Reintegration often takes place in the aftermath of protracted conflicts, such as in Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Sudan, where wars lasted for more than a decade. In such contexts, ex-combatants and associated groups who have spent a major part of their lives in armed forces and groups may face enormous difficulties in adapting to civilian life. Nevertheless, ensuring the success and sustainability of reintegration in such contexts is crucial, as poorly reintegrated ex-combatants may be at a high risk of rejoining armed groups and criminal gangs and continuing to pose a threat to security and the overall peace process.

18. Regional aspects of post-conflict environments have also presented challenges to reintegration programmes, particularly in the attempt to undertake coordinated approaches with multiple actors, including Governments, United Nations entities and other participating organizations. Key regional issues affecting the reintegration of ex-combatants include the flow of small arms and light weapons; trafficking in natural resources; cross-border recruitment, including that of children; and the repatriation and reintegration of foreign ex-combatants in their countries of origin. Additionally, it is important to ensure cross-border linkages with the reintegration of returning refugees and to harmonize multiple reintegration programmes within a single region so as to avoid combatants crossing into other countries in the hope of receiving better reintegration assistance. The role of the African Union in such efforts has been of increasing importance, and the United Nations stands ready to continue assisting the development of its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration capacity.

⁹ Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Indonesia, Kosovo, Liberia, Nepal, Nigeria, Serbia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Uganda. This list includes reintegration programmes supported by the International Organization for Migration.

B. Reintegration guidance

19. National Governments and institutions have the primary responsibility for reintegration, while the United Nations plays a decisive but supporting role. In order to better equip practitioners to respond to existing and emerging challenges of achieving sustainable reintegration, the Inter-Agency Working Group worked from 2008 to 2010 to strengthen the reintegration guidance in the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards in close consultation with practitioners from United Nations departments, agencies, funds and programmes, national commissions and other national authorities, donors and relevant international non-governmental organizations. As a result, strengthened and more detailed reintegration guidance has been issued in the areas listed below.

Planning and assessments

20. Effective and sustainable reintegration depends on early planning and all-encompassing assessments, which enable the identification of realistic time frames, the human and material resources needed and funding requirements.¹⁰ Not only must assessments be early and thorough, economic, social, political and security factors affecting the context of the programme must be consistently reappraised to accurately gauge what programme support and resources are necessary. Among the myriad complexities of post-conflict environments, planners must account for situations in which fighting over territory, migration or transportation routes and economic activities (including illegal natural resource extraction and piracy), all threaten to perpetuate armed violence and destabilize fragile peace environments. Adequate and comprehensive linkages between programmes for ex-combatants and wider reintegration and recovery efforts are also required for sustainable reintegration, particularly as ex-combatants and other returnees may compete for scarce resources, such as land, water and economic opportunities. Planning and assessments should also make ample use of data and analysis disaggregated by age and sex, in order to identify and plan for the specific needs of women, men, girls and boys.

Reintegration approaches

21. The Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards recognize that community-based approaches are central to achieving sustainable reintegration linked to recovery and long-term development. Programmes should move as quickly as possible from individual, ex-combatant-focused reinsertion or reintegration to community-based reintegration; or, where possible, immediately adopt a community-based approach. Strategies that have been piloted in different reintegration programmes are now consolidated in the Standards, such as (a) targeting ex-combatants and conflict-affected or vulnerable groups within the same reintegration programme; (b) involving ex-combatants in socio-economic activities that have great potential for benefiting the community as a whole; and (c) providing resources for the community to jump-start socio-economic activities that have the potential to reintegrate ex-combatants and associated individuals, together with other conflict-affected and vulnerable groups. Inclusive reintegration

¹⁰ All funding references related to reintegration refer to voluntary contributions made to United Nations agencies, funds and programmes.

strategies that target children associated with armed forces or groups, together with conflict-affected and vulnerable children on a one-to-one basis, are indispensable for ensuring successful outcomes, as they significantly reduce the risks of stigmatization and reprisals. This approach is also useful for reaching female ex-combatants and women or girls associated with armed forces and groups who do not want to join, or are prevented from joining, official disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes.

Towards multidimensional reintegration

22. In most countries, economic aspects, while central, are not sufficient for the sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants. Serious consideration of the social and political aspects of reintegration, tailored to the specific country context, is crucial for the sustainability and success of reintegration programmes. High levels of violence and atrocities, including sexual and gender-based violence committed and suffered by ex-combatants and associated groups in many conflicts, also require social reintegration interventions, such as reconciliation, psychosocial support, mental health counselling and clinical treatment and medical health support, including support for those affected by HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases. Community participation and community-based programmes also foster social reintegration and reconciliation, which in themselves can be catalytic for employment and income generation. Conversely, children's reintegration programmes, which have historically been strong in social interventions, should address the economic needs of working age participants (15-17 years old, depending on national legislation), who are often heads of households and expected to contribute to the family income.

23. At the individual level, political reintegration should include support for ex-combatants and associated groups to become full-fledged citizens, capable of claiming rights and fulfilling duties, including those related to participation in political processes, such as elections and community-based decision-making. Depending on the country context, this may involve supporting participants in acquiring valid identification documentation, seizing leadership and representation opportunities in decision-making bodies and receiving civic and peace education, including capacity-building related to democratic development and human rights.

Policy alignment

24. While acknowledging challenges related to diverse reintegration and recovery programme approaches, the guidance recommends adequately linking programmes for the reintegration of ex-combatants with national policy frameworks, such as wider reintegration, recovery and employment generation. The guidance on reintegration contained in the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards is now aligned with the three-track approach of the United Nations policy for post-conflict employment creation, income generation and reintegration (2009)¹¹ and framed under the guidance note on early recovery (2008).¹² This policy alignment will contribute to increased opportunities for

¹¹ Available from http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---ifp_crisis/documents/publication/wcms_117576.pdf.

¹² Available from http://www.humanitarianreform.org/humanitarianreform/Portals/1/cluster%20approach%20page/clusters%20pages/Early%20R/ER_Internet.pdf.

achieving sustainable reintegration for ex-combatants and other conflict-affected groups. Coordination with other security programmes, such as small arms and light weapons control, armed violence reduction, community security, security sector reform and rule of law programmes are also recognized as important.

Emerging guidance

25. Closer attention should be paid to the linkages between reintegration and natural resources management.¹³ It is recognized that natural resources often play a role in fuelling conflicts and undermining peacebuilding efforts. Armed groups have frequently relied on the exploitation of natural resources to finance war efforts and to attract recruits. A better understanding of the complex relationship between conflict and natural resources, including how it can be addressed to support the reintegration of ex-combatants and associated groups, can contribute to the sustainability of reintegration programmes.

C. Review of reintegration practice

26. The reintegration of ex-combatants and associated groups is a long-term process that takes place at the individual, community, national and regional levels, and is dependent upon wider recovery and development. This process has generally been led by national Governments and institutions. A reintegration programme cannot match the breadth, depth or duration of a long-term reintegration process, making the concept of national ownership critical. However, lessons learned from recent programmes suggest that most contexts require a minimum period of three years of United Nations reintegration assistance to effectively serve as a bridge to broader recovery and development.

27. A review of current reintegration programmes supported by United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, conducted at the end of 2010, reveals large gaps between the agreed-upon United Nations standards, expected to be reasonably applied in a given specific country context, and on-the-ground implementation. Worldwide, adult ex-combatants typically receive up to one year of economic reintegration assistance, most often consisting of vocational training, but the majority of programmes lack the comprehensive and multidimensional support necessary to achieve sustainable reintegration.

Gaps in planning and assessment

28. Few ongoing reintegration programmes have benefited from comprehensive assessments to inform their design and determine their success. The reintegration guidance acknowledges the importance of seizing opportunities emerging from wider conflict or recovery dynamics within each country context. This includes the capacities of potential participants, community networks, social capital, market absorption opportunities and institutional capacities. Without proper assessment,

¹³ Members of the Inter-Agency Working Group, together with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) have begun to develop a module under the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards on the linkages between disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and natural resources, which will build on guidance developed in 2010 through the United Nations-European Union Partnership on Natural Resources, Conflict and Peacebuilding.

blueprints focusing on economic reintegration and disregarding the social and political needs of participants, tend to be transposed from country to country, often resulting in a reintegration strategy ill-suited to the specific country context.

Narrow targeting

29. The majority of adult reintegration programmes provide individual, ex-combatant-focused support. One of the reasons for this is the pressure to focus efforts on those deemed the greatest security threat. Although ex-combatant-focused interventions may provide immediate stability, the absence of a well-articulated transition towards community-based approaches can undermine chances for longer-term sustainable reintegration into receiving communities. Targeting former combatants alone may fuel resentment from other conflict-affected and vulnerable groups who often do not receive sufficient assistance and therefore present a risk of becoming spoilers of the peace process. Such reintegration approaches are resource intensive, but ensure the sustainability of interventions. A few reintegration programmes have piloted or are piloting approaches that target ex-combatants and conflict-affected or vulnerable groups on a small scale, including Liberia, Indonesia (in the province of Aceh) and the Congo. Preliminary results indicate such programmes will be more sustainable economically and socially than reintegration programmes focused on individuals, as they create space for coexistence and reconciliation.

Achieving a multidimensional approach

30. The 2010 review of reintegration shows that while all of the adult reintegration programmes have an economic focus, few programmes provide meaningful social reintegration support, such as in Colombia and Rwanda. Yet, ex-combatants and associated groups are vulnerable to antisocial behaviours, substance abuse and continued violence against themselves or others, all of which become significant obstacles to their sustainable reintegration. The reasons for the under-prioritization of social assistance, particularly in contexts of extreme economic hardship, lie largely in the lack of knowledge and capacities of programme staff on the ground.

31. As noted earlier, little attention is paid to the political reintegration of ex-combatants and associated groups. Although some programmes have supported ex-combatants in acquiring national identification documentation and providing civic and peace education, support in this area is thus far fragmented. An example of political reintegration is the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme promulgated by the Government in 2010, which expressly recognizes the need to address the political reintegration of anti-government elements as a major stated objective of the programme. At the group level, the armed groups to which ex-combatants belonged may make the transition to becoming a political party. This was the case in Burundi where the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy transformed itself into a political party, and in Indonesia (in the province of Aceh) where former Free Aceh Movement officials occupied key positions in the provincial government after taking part in the peace negotiations.

Addressing specific needs groups

32. **Women and girls.** Most reintegration programmes supported by United Nations agencies, funds and programmes continue to face tremendous challenges reaching female ex-combatants and women and girls formerly associated with armed forces and groups. A key obstacle to their participation is the fact that many women and girls do not want to reveal, or are prevented from revealing, their past association with armed forces or groups out of fear of stigmatization by their communities. Two ongoing reintegration programmes, one in the Congo and the other in Indonesia (in the province of Aceh) are showing some success in reaching female ex-combatants, women formerly associated with armed forces and groups, and other vulnerable conflict-affected women in such a way that past association with armed forces and groups is not apparent to the communities involved.

33. **Children.** The specific needs of younger boys and girls associated with armed forces and groups are different from those of older children between the ages of 15 and 17. While social and psychosocial components of children's reintegration programmes were found to be strong, few programmes are taking into account the different economic needs of these two categories. For the former, emphasis should be placed on schooling, potentially combined with some economic support to the family. For the latter, emphasis should be on vocational training and placement in income-generating activities, recognizing that some individuals may have family provider obligations and taking into account the child's own preferences. The latter should not exclude the child from also benefiting from informal schooling. Pilot economic reintegration programmes for a total of 8,895 working-age children formerly associated with armed forces and groups and other vulnerable children have been successfully undertaken in Burundi, Colombia, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Philippines, Rwanda and Sri Lanka.

34. **Youth.** Similar programmatic nuances also ought to be considered in adult programmes with regards to the needs of youth aged 18 to 24. After conflict, youth often find themselves trapped in a vicious cycle of violence, poverty and social and political exclusion. Reintegration programmes supported by the United Nations need to break the stereotypes of youth as "spoilings", by providing opportunities for young people to be involved in reconstruction and community development throughout the reintegration process. The vast majority of reintegration programmes are not currently adopting strategic plans specifically for youth, or providing them with targeted assistance.

35. **Ex-combatants living with disabilities.** The real number of ex-combatants living with disabilities (physical or psychological) is largely unknown and information is very much dependent on the nature of the conflict. In most countries, ex-combatants who acquire disabilities during combat are simply excluded from armed forces and groups over the years. Few ongoing reintegration programmes have developed strategies to address the specific needs of ex-combatants with disabilities, in order to provide for their rights and required adaptations as laid out in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol. Providing specific services is challenging for programmes, particularly where national disability laws and plans are not in place when the reintegration programme is occurring. Support to disabled ex-combatants who are dependent on long-term health care by informal care providers (often women and girls) is even more challenging to offer in post-conflict contexts.

36. **HIV services.** A number of ex-combatants are estimated to be living with HIV, although the exact figure is difficult to ascertain as statistics are unavailable because of a lack of services and the stigma surrounding the disclosure of a person's serostatus. Strategies for integrating HIV services for participants that start during demobilization and continue during the reintegration phase have only been undertaken in eight countries and regions to date: northern Sudan, southern Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire, Colombia, Indonesia, Liberia, Nepal and the Niger. These activities include implementing HIV public information and awareness campaigns, providing referrals for voluntary confidential counselling and testing where appropriate, screening and treatment for sexually transmitted infections, providing information on treatment for opportunistic infections, training ex-combatants to become "change agents" assisting in their communities with HIV prevention activities and providing support for ex-combatants living with HIV and, where feasible, referral for antiretroviral treatment within the national health-care system.

Human and financial resources

37. The challenges involved in putting ex-combatants and associated groups onto a sustainable reintegration path are enormous and require timely and sustained resources. The total funding received for reintegration during 2010 was approximately \$265 million, sourced from bilateral and multilateral voluntary contributions.¹⁴ Addressing the reintegration needs of ex-combatants and associated groups requires scaling up reintegration efforts as well as adequately linking it with wider returnee reintegration and recovery programmes. Given the scale and complexity of reintegration and the high occurrence of continued or renewed violence in the post-conflict phase, the United Nations cannot afford to continue to undertake short-term, narrow programmes. The cost of not funding more holistic sustainable reintegration programmes is invariably higher than adequately funding programmes from the outset.

38. The scaling up of reintegration programmes will require results-based monitoring and evaluation mechanisms at country and global levels, carried out by the United Nations as well as external actors. Reintegration programmes achieve their goals when participants are self-reliant, able to generate income and are not inclined to return to violence. However, most programmes are not in a position to consistently report on such results because monitoring and evaluation continues to be under-prioritized, even if the majority of programmes claim to have adopted a monitoring and evaluation strategy or plan.

39. Reintegration programmes supported by the United Nations are time-bound by nature, while national responsibilities will continue over a longer period of time. Therefore, sustainable reintegration requires an exit strategy to be devised, coupled with national capacity development interventions early in the planning stages. Exit strategies adopted for reintegration programmes in the past have included: (a) offering reintegration services through national structures from the start; (b) devolving gradual implementation to national structures; and (c) forging immediate linkages with wider reintegration, national recovery and employment programmes so they can assist reintegration efforts from the start.

¹⁴ Assessed funding is only applicable to disarmament and demobilization; all funding for reintegration is voluntary.

D. Linkages with wider reintegration, recovery and peacebuilding

40. The multiple dimensions of the reintegration of ex-combatants need to be carefully assessed and designed in light of other wider reintegration, recovery and peacebuilding strategies and programmes. These country-specific frameworks and processes will shape the reintegration programme, its approaches and components.

Economic linkages

41. The economic components of the reintegration of ex-combatants and associated groups must be coherently linked and aligned with larger national employment and income generation programmes, particularly for returnees, private sector development initiatives and poverty reduction strategies. Furthermore, the economic aspects of reintegration should be strengthened through new and innovative approaches, such as modern technologies in agriculture and partnerships with the private sector.

42. The United Nations system is developing a preliminary framework for supporting a more coherent, predictable and effective response to the reintegration of displaced populations, which provides an opportunity for building bridges between this framework and the reintegration of ex-combatants. As reintegration programmes increasingly adopt community-based approaches, including inclusive targeting, opportunities for joint programmes on the ground will increase. Many wider reintegration and recovery programmes that are currently supported by UNDP, IOM and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are already benefiting ex-combatants and associated groups. However, there are currently no tracking mechanisms capable of determining the number of ex-combatants and associated groups who have benefited, nor the stabilization and security impact of such programmes.

43. One of the primary obstacles to economic reintegration is the inability of thousands of ex-combatants abruptly released into the labour market to compete with other conflict-affected populations and returnees for scarce jobs and livelihood opportunities. As noted above, guidance on the reintegration of ex-combatants is now aligned with the United Nations policy for post-conflict employment creation, income generation and reintegration, and its three-track approach. As United Nations efforts move towards supporting the scaling up of track-based national employment, income generation and reintegration programmes specifically targeting conflict-affected populations, including women and youth, opportunities for joint collaboration with ex-combatant reintegration programmes will increase. Linkages between the reintegration of ex-combatants and track-based employment programmes are currently being planned in Burundi, and are also to take place in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Nepal.

44. Integrating natural resource management into disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is particularly important given the role that natural resources often play as a source of revenue for conflict activities. While more than 80 per cent of programmes support the reintegration of ex-combatants into agriculture, where access to land is fundamental, some programmes have also started to explore income-generating opportunities in ecosystem rehabilitation, reforestation, forestry, conservation and even ecotourism through value chain approaches and partnerships with the private sector. For example, in Colombia and Indonesia (in the province of

Aceh), reintegration options for ex-combatants have been offered through projects supported by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) that promote economic livelihoods through trade products derived from native biodiversity.

45. Much more challenging has been the need to provide alternative and profitable reintegration opportunities to ex-combatants involved in high-value and illegal resource exploitation (e.g. minerals). In Liberia, offering reintegration opportunities to ex-combatants has enabled the Government to repossess rubber plantations and regularize the management of the rubber sector. Addressing the involvement of ex-combatants in the illegal exploitation of natural resources requires not only promotion of alternative livelihoods but also the strengthening of State authority over natural resource management.

Social and political linkages

46. There are currently no wider frameworks or policies designed to coherently bring together United Nations support for addressing the social dimensions of post-conflict situations. However, there are national programmes that contribute to restoring the social fabric with support from United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, such as health and education programmes, disability programmes, youth and children programmes, HIV programmes, gender programmes and transitional justice and reconciliation. The social components of reintegration programmes should build on opportunities generated by such national programmes. However, practice shows that ex-combatant reintegration programmes tend to work in isolation from the national framework in question. The reintegration programmes for ex-combatants in Colombia and Rwanda are distinct examples where attempts to build on existing national services and programmes were effectively planned and implemented.

47. Regarding the political and security aspects of reintegration, there is room to ensure more systematic linkages with small arms collection and armed violence reduction, rule of law and transitional justice programmes. In contexts such as Colombia, Liberia and Sri Lanka, disarmed ex-combatants have themselves been exposed to armed violence and threats coming from law enforcement officials, reprisals by the armed groups from which they may have escaped, persecution by former commanders, and re-recruitment. Such needs have led reintegration programmes including in Liberia and Southern Sudan to develop return and protection coordination strategies coordinated with rule of law and transitional justice programmes.

48. Transitional justice measures are increasingly part of the political package agreed to by the concerned parties to end a conflict. Subsequently, it is not uncommon for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes and transitional justice measures to coexist in the post-conflict period. This overlap can create tension, but if well managed, the relationship between these two types of initiatives may also contribute to achieving the long-term shared objectives of reconciliation and peace. For example, creating links between locally based justice processes and truth commissions on the one hand, and community-based reintegration strategies on the other, may foster acceptance of returning ex-combatants among reintegration communities. Moreover ex-combatants may play a direct role in reparations programmes, either by providing direct reparation

when they have individual responsibility for violations, or, when appropriate, by contributing to reparations projects aimed at addressing community needs.

49. Creating linkages between the reintegration of ex-combatants and the absorption of large numbers of ex-combatants into the security services is also important, as has been the case in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Kosovo. Security sector reform, including the integration of ex-combatants into the regular armed forces, provides one option for employing ex-combatants, reducing the number of those needing to be reintegrated. However, clear criteria and vetting procedures are required so as to ensure that individuals with records of human rights violations and those accused of war crimes are not allowed to enter national security forces. Excessive integration into the security sector may also be unrealistic in relation to the absorptive capacity of these institutions, as well as financial limitations and perceived security requirements. While disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes often begin without a broader security sector reform framework in place, decisions taken by the parties to the conflict to define the parameters of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme will have future security sector reform implications.

IV. Observations and recommendations

50. The United Nations contribution to national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts has continued to grow, involving a wide range of actors. The past five years have seen the completion of a number of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, including in Liberia and Burundi¹⁵ as well as reintegration programmes in Angola, the Niger and Timor-Leste. At the same time, the challenging contexts of today's post-conflict environments require improved and innovative approaches such as community violence reduction programmes in peacekeeping settings and the adoption of community-based reintegration approaches.

51. The importance of national ownership must also be reiterated, as political will and the commitment of national actors are prerequisites for successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Recipient countries must take the lead in defining a vision for peacebuilding by linking reintegration with national policies related to economic, social and political recovery. At the same time, it is clear that in the aftermath of conflict, national actors are confronted with many priorities and different programmatic interventions. It is incumbent upon all involved to provide national stakeholders with the required expertise to identify priorities and articulate a road map for a successful transition from conflict to peace.

Assessment, monitoring and evaluation

52. Effective and sustainable reintegration depends on early planning and solid assessments, which guide the establishment of realistic time frames and identification of the financial and human resources required. This includes early and flexible tools and funding mechanisms in support of reintegration opportunity

¹⁵ Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration continued to be supported by BINUB, following the closure of ONUB.

mapping, local labour market surveys, private sector development analysis and psychosocial services identification. Assessments need to be conducted in a more comprehensive and systematic manner for better programme planning and design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. **The Secretary-General therefore recommends that easily accessible start-up voluntary funding for reintegration be made available for the necessary assessments and formative studies, including through the deployment of integrated assessment teams to ensure that reintegration programmes are based on solid premises and anchored in a good knowledge of the context and situation on the ground.**

Length and breadth of programmes

53. The results of the 2010 review of reintegration programmes supported by the United Nations have brought to light a clear need for the Organization to reorient its approach towards sustainability in light of the recently revised guidance. Undertaking sustainable reintegration is a lengthy process, taking at least three years, as opposed to the one year of support received on average to date. At the same time, there is a need to expand flexibly the scope of reintegration, which is at present largely focused on economic activities for adult participants and social reintegration for children associated with armed forces or groups. Multidimensional programmes, which address the economic, social, political and security aspects of reintegration using community-based approaches will require additional and sustained human and financial resources in order to be successfully implemented.

54. Sustained funding and the timely disbursement of pledges remains one of the single most important issues that will enable reintegration programmes to succeed, yet most programmes lack consistent and predictable funding. This acts as a destabilizing factor in programmes and the larger peace process. **The Secretary-General calls on post-conflict Governments to demonstrate political will and ownership of the reintegration process by also making financial and in kind contributions to ensure the implementation of multidimensional and more sustainable reintegration programmes.** As noted above, the reintegration of ex-combatants and associated groups is a long-term process that requires long-term funding made available throughout all stages of the process, from the outset or emergency phase until reintegration is absorbed into other national recovery and development programmes supported by the United Nations. **The Secretary-General therefore also calls on Member States to reflect on their voluntary funding patterns with a view to providing timely and sustained funding to longer and more multidimensional reintegration programmes.**

“Delivering as one”

55. The Secretary-General reaffirms his commitment to ensuring that all actors within the United Nations system “Deliver as one” through an integrated approach; this will be particularly relevant in planning for Somalia and for the Sudan after the referendum. It must be acknowledged that the United Nations has experienced some programmatic shortcomings in ensuring a smooth transition from demobilization to reintegration owing to lack of a coordinated approach, including costly parallel structures. The establishment of a multi-year common framework that includes multi-year financing strategies for reintegration would enable contributing agencies,

funds and programmes to participate in more coordinated planning, avoiding gaps and overlaps as well as multiple high-cost administrative structures, and contributing to maximization of resources and better linkages to broader recovery programmes. **The Secretary-General therefore recommends that Member States, together with relevant United Nations actors, establish multi-year, country-specific funding strategies to support comprehensive and integrated reintegration programmes, which should be closely aligned with relevant peace processes, recovery and peacebuilding planning and activities.**

56. New additions to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, including guidance related to the linkages between disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform, as well as transitional justice, and the revised guidance on reintegration, aligned with United Nations guidelines on post-conflict recovery, have strengthened it considerably. **It would be beneficial if Member States and other multilateral partners who may be called upon to work alongside the United Nations on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes would associate themselves with, and be guided by, the principles contained in the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards to ensure maximum interoperability among actors.**

Building capacity

57. Recent experience has demonstrated that a dedicated capacity at Headquarters has greatly helped in providing operational backstopping and integrated guidance, which in turn has ensured the quality of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes and their alignment with overall peace processes and recovery initiatives. However, recruitment of personnel continues to pose a major challenge to programmes. Timely recruitment and retention of qualified specialists for the field will remain our priority. One means to do so is to increase the pool of available disarmament, demobilization and reintegration personnel through training. The United Nations is working with the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Training Group, which comprises Member State training institutions and other partners who train personnel on the United Nations approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, as encompassed in the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards. **The Secretary-General calls on relevant Member States to continue to support the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Training Group.**

Regional dimensions

58. The regional aspects of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes continue to pose challenges, not least in terms of political frameworks, programming and funding arrangements. In order to address these challenges, Governments, United Nations entities, regional organizations and other implementing partners will be required to improve communication and information-sharing so as to facilitate coherent and unified responses. The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, led by the World Bank, was a notable effort in this direction. The African Union also has a key role to play, and the United Nations looks forward to supporting the African Union as it works to build a

dedicated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration capacity. **Based on the continuing trend of cross-border armed groups, the international community must continue to forge ahead, utilizing new and innovative approaches to meet the complex demands such situations require. Additionally, better links need to be made with the return and reintegration of refugees and other returnees, making efforts to harmonize multiple programmes within a single region.**

59. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes are complex in the best of circumstances, particularly because of the need to create effective linkages with other reintegration and recovery processes under way. In today's world, the challenges have become even more complex, necessitating increased innovation and more coordinated support among all actors involved. I continue to strongly believe that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration serves as one of the most crucial post-conflict blocks in the immediate aftermath of conflict and beyond. In the 20 years since the first peacekeeping operation with a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration mandate was established in Central America, the United Nations has seen disarmament, demobilization and reintegration become a central tool for countries emerging from conflict. The United Nations can and should continue to support disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in order to pave the way for sustainable peace, recovery and development.

Annex

Membership of the Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

1. Department of Peacekeeping Operations*
2. Department of Political Affairs
3. Department of Public Information
4. Office for Disarmament Affairs
5. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
6. Office of the Special Adviser on Africa
7. International Labour Organization
8. International Organization for Migration
9. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
10. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict
11. Peacebuilding Support Office
12. Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)
13. United Nations Children's Fund
14. United Nations Development Programme*
15. United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
16. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
17. United Nations Institute for Training and Research
18. United Nations Population Fund
19. World Food Programme
20. World Health Organization

* Working Group Co-Chairs.