

Individual Contract

Letter of Contract N° IC/2016/031

**Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme  
(APRP)**

**Final Evaluation Report**

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The team wishes to emphasise that the contents of the report, including any errors or misunderstandings, are its alone.

## ABBREVIATIONS

AGE	Anti-Government Element
APRP	Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
CBR	Capacity Building for Results
CPJ	Consultative Peace <i>Jirga</i>
CRP	Community Recovery Programme
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
CTA	Chief Technical Advisor
DDR	Demobilisation, Disarmament, Reintegration and Reconstruction
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DRC	Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission
FOCS	Financial Oversight Committee Secretariat
FY	Fiscal Year
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GMIC	Government Media Information Centre
HPC	High Peace Council
IDLG	Independent Directorate of Local Governance
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
JS	Joint Secretariat for Peace and Reintegration
LM	Line Ministry
MAIL	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoBTA	Ministry of Border and Tribal Affairs
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MoEd	Ministry of Education
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoHRA	Ministry of Haj and Religious Affairs
MoIA	Ministry of the Internal Affairs
MoPW	Ministry of Public Works
MoLSAMD	Ministry of Labour, Social affairs, Martyrs and the Disabled
MTEF	Medium Term Economic Framework
MTR	Mid-term Review

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MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDS	National Directorate of Security
PIP	Programme Implementation Planning
PO	Programme Officer
QIP	Quick Impact Project
RF	Results Framework
SGP	Small Grants Programme
TA	Transitional Assistance
TCA	Technical Cooperation Assistance
TF	Trust Fund
TL	Team Leader
TM	Team Member
ToR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### 1. Context

The APRP was designed and launched in a context of deepening conflict, as measured by the number of civilian casualties recoded by UNAMA. Furthermore, as additional UNAMA data demonstrate, the conflict deepened throughout the course of the programme's implementation, underlining the challenge posed to implementing a reintegration programme in the midst of an ongoing, 'hot' conflict. The socio-political context was further complicated by national elections, including the need to replace the President, the incumbent having completed his constitutional two terms. Together with the extended contestation of the election result and the US-brokered negotiations leading to a unity Government, approximately 20 months elapsed since the date the elections were announced and the installation of the new Government and appointment of Ministers and replacements for the HPC head and CEO of the JS, during which time no major decisions were possible.

### 2. Design and Relevance

Relevance discusses the extent to which the project design fit the socioeconomic and socio-political realities of Afghanistan at the time of its design and now.

The main design problem of the APRP project has to do with a contested assumption that it was possible to have a reintegration program without a peace agreement. The design defined peace as the absence of conflict. Instead, broader sustainable definition that took into consideration and built interventions based upon both government projects but also structural and policy reforms.

Based on number of false assumptions, the APRP did not present a logical progress from activities to outputs and outcomes. The Results Framework was inadequate and was not utilized as a project management tool. Arguably, had it been, it would have been adjusted to the experienced reality and proved utilitarian over the project's life.

### 3. Efficiency

Efficiency's assesses the contribution of resource (human and financial) utilisation to the achievement of results/outputs. First, if the level of disbursement is taken as the measure of resource utilisation efficiency, the APRP has been relatively efficient. Influences on this included the complexity of the process and the number of stages through which Window B disbursement requests proceeded (including the need to reimburse Window C expenditure), especially when compared to those required by Window A. But, if one includes the wider picture, e.g. including the staffing costs, then the evaluators believe that the APRP's structure was unnecessarily resource intensive: there appears no need for 11 LM cell staff in MoPW, MRRD, MoLSAMD each, or, at the project's end, for 718 salaries to be paid from project funds.



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Third, UNDP provided significant TCA support, the influence of which on GoIRA/JS counterparts appears to have been limited<sup>1</sup>. Having said this, the evaluators' own experience is that GoIRA frequently is reluctant to appear reliant on international TA. In as politically sensitive an area as peace and reintegration, this was likely heightened so that any TCA would have experienced challenges. This, despite the TCA team being headed by a CTA, may also reflect the subsequent later reliance on UNVs, who, however well qualified, are often negatively perceived as 'learning their trade' as opposed to having positive experience and knowledge to offer.

Finally, UNDP's project management appears to be somewhat like the 'curate's egg', good in parts. Certainly, the deployment (and replacement) of TCA represents efficient management; however, its utility is in serious question so it may have been more efficient to pursue different recruitment. Second, UNDP must bear significant responsibility for the reporting shortcomings: the project document indicates that preparation and submission of quarterly and annual reports to donors, based on the M&E data recorded in Atlas, was the project management's responsibility, not the TCA's. Had all aspects of this been fulfilled (i.e. the utilisation of ATLAS, the alignment of reporting with the RF's indicators, the revision of the indicators in the light of experience, and the Programme Manager preparing the reports based on the ATLAS information), the inadequacy of activities reporting could have been addressed far earlier<sup>2</sup>.

Another missed management opportunity was the failure to link the AWP<sup>3</sup> approach with the LMs' total dependence on APRP resources for the CRPs. At the very least, effective project management would have brought this to donor's attention by mid-2011 (no CRP plans being received for that year) and allowed early initiation of burden-sharing negotiation. At the very least, this may have avoided the sudden cessation of non-NSP project activities at the end of 2013.

#### 4. Effectiveness

Effectiveness considers the contribution of the activities undertaken to the outputs achieved, essentially answering the question were the activities appropriate to achieving the expected results/outputs.

Broadly speaking, the APRP achieved a level of effectiveness. The reintegration of nearly 11 000 ex-combatants, during an ongoing and expanding 'hot' conflict is, in itself, no mean feat. Nor is the disarmament of these ex-combatants and the removal of their weapons from circulation something to be disregarded. Secondly, there is clear evidence of quality of life gains both to ex-combatants (through skills enhancement, employment (albeit, mostly seasonal and temporary), as well as both SGPs and CRPs within communities. The evaluation was informed, for example, that SGPs provided access to

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<sup>1</sup> The evaluators have been informed that TCA was largely ineffectual and unable to influence policy and strategy. Key individuals were reported to have blocked/ignored TA initiatives.

<sup>2</sup> As noted, the programme manager's efforts to ensure that disaggregated data (by gender, reintegrees, area, etc.) was included in the reports was insufficient to move beyond activity to output and outcome reporting.

<sup>3</sup> Itself, problematic as it undermined a budget support modality in favor of what was project support.

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school for girls and clean water for communities, in one of which it was reported that the incidence of water-borne disease had reduced sharply, with an accompanying decline in child morbidity.

Such gains, while admittedly significant, however, have limited long-term effect. Providing TA for six months is important; however, there must be questions surrounding what had been gained when the TA ran out and the recipient is returned to the same position as he was when he resorted to the insurgency in order to 'put five breads on the table for my children'. Nor do the benefits of a school for girls or a shallow well mean much when there are no teachers or resources to maintain the well. In other words, the gains were essentially short-term and required building upon rapidly to change an ex-insurgent back to the peaceful citizen he once was.

In other respects, the APRP was less effective. Two outputs focused on developing capacity at national and provincial levels to manage the entire process, including the finances, effectively. This may well have expected too much of the teams that were assembled, particularly at provincial level. This placed substantial responsibility on the PJSTs, which many appeared not to possess the necessary capacity to meet.

In this regard, the roles played by the Regional Program Coordinators and, once appointed, the Regional Financial Advisors was critical. Without their commitment to the project, it appears questionable whether such gains as were achieved would have been possible. Clearly, therefore, they were a major contribution to achieving effectiveness.

The project's M&E was inefficient, but even more ineffective. While it proved impossible to recruit the Independent Monitoring Agent, this does not explain the absence of M&E in the project. The units that were established pursued an audit function, reacting to possibilities of fraud and corruption and ensuring that resources were utilized in accordance with work plans. This is clearly desirable and necessary, but reveals an absence of understanding of M&E's function, which is to learn from experience in order to improve performance in the future. This role is as relevant at local as national levels but, with the exception of requests to RPCs to provide stories/case studies that illustrated the APRP's successes, there was no attempt to develop experience-based learning through the project. The absence of this seriously undermined the achievement of effectiveness.

## 5. Impact

Any impact assessment now is necessarily tentative and, generally, indicative of directions and possibilities at best, not least since no baseline was created against which it could be measured.

GoIRA interlocutors were generally positive about the project's impact, emphasising need, including the attitude change achieved since Autumn 2010. Key influences included the APRP's communication strategy, implemented through the media, religious leaders, and civil society; tangible benefits to communities were also cited, as were the near 11,000 ex-combatants, which included significant figures from the Taliban leadership, including the former Taliban Finance Minister, that had joined the process,

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as well as the removal of a substantial number of light arms from circulation and general access. The HPC engaged in 30 direct negotiations as a result the project, including subsequent negotiations with *Hezbi- Islami* surrounding their reintegration in the country<sup>4</sup>, and the 2000 community projects implemented that created thousands of jobs.

In terms of sustainable and tangible benefits for local communities, ex-combatants etc., the project results were meager: the humanitarian packages and community level projects were small and not sustained limiting a long-lasting positive effect. There is an absence of information on the reintegrees' situation, no system exists to track them. Insurgency continues and impacts on key project actors: 45 PPC members reported receiving threats of violence and death, 225 new reintegrees were killed. At best, what one is able to say, therefore, is that the jury remains out on the level of impact achieved.

## 6. Sustainability

Sustainability is best assessed *ex post*. However, like impact, some preliminary indications are possible of determination. The APRP was not designed to be sustainable. Had it been, the substantial superstructure that it established, together with the inflated salary bill would not have consumed such a substantial part of the project resources.

Some aspects of the project's components may be sustainable in the medium-term, subject to there being widespread consensus of their value and ownership of the institutions, notably the HPC and the PPCs. Both groups will require administrative support. Provided they are substantially restructured, including right-sizing, with salary structures in line with public sector norms, both the JS and the PJSTs are capable of sustainability in the medium- to long-term. As with Impact, the jury remains out on the sustainability of such gains as were achieved through the APRP.

## 7. Conclusions and Recommendations

The APRP programme and the UNDP support project was complex, politically ambitious, multi-sectorial and multi-stakeholder. Added to this was the insecurity stemming from an on-going war. UNDP undertook to report on development outcomes, over which it had no political control. Neither did the project's donors demonstrate realism as time passed. Initially driven by a collective political interest in supporting the government; a more 'business as usual' approach brought demands for accountability and evidence of results. The sudden withdrawal of funding put the effectiveness of the project even more at risk. In the end, the project intervention was desirable, but that it suffered from inadequate design. It is possible that it could have reached some of its objectives in the absence of the bloated structures it established, although realism dictates that any achieved objectives would have had minimal impact on the overall goal of achieving peace.

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<sup>4</sup> An estimated 20 000 households (140 000 – 200 000 family members), in addition to c. 20 000 armed combatants.

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## Recommendations

**Design** should take into account the following principles:

Reintegration initiatives should acknowledge and seek to mitigate the security risks to those who participate

Providing economic incentives ignores the reasons why many people fight and why many are angry with and distrustful of the government. Poverty helps to fuel the conflict; but unresolved grievances, foreign support for the insurgency and other local tensions also contribute to instability. Reintegration and reconciliation efforts will be superficial and unsustainable without addressing these.

Reintegration and reconciliation initiatives should be rooted in a program of structural and policy reform that addresses the underlying drivers, including corruption, of the insurgency.

Before any reintegration project is finalised, an adequate baseline and needs assessment is required.

Consensus mechanisms are needed for developing programme based on needs of wide range of stakeholders and for promoting widespread ownership of the result. This requires wider consultation with stakeholders on concrete issues.

**Programme Content** might include:

Support HPC nationally – subject to HPC clearly defining its role, function and methodology

Support PPCs targeting local reconciliation

Support necessary administrative support for both HPC and PPCs: the very limited administrative support provided to ARTF is relevant in this respect

Review the number of salaried positions supported in the security ministries.

All salaries that are paid should be compatible with public service scales and definitely not in excess of CBR scales

Ensure Transitional Assistance is provided for vetted reintegrees/reconciles for a minimum six month bridging period

GoIRA's National Development Strategy will address socioeconomic development, including job creation. This can be expected to contribute to support for a new programme. Some international donor organisations may choose to support this national thrust through bilateral agreements with individual Line Ministries. Desirably, such support should be through budget support agreements, which will provide predictability to financial flows. Donors may wish to include performance-based incentive tranches along with basic budget support through their bilateral agreements.

This implies that a successor to the APRP could include:

- A smaller HPC in charge of launching national peace campaign and regional PPCs that would mirror those in provinces.
- A much smaller JS that will only support the HPC as needed

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The activities could be limited to

- Possibly facilitating peace negotiations
- Creation of a national, inclusive peace movement
- Developing and launching a peace campaign incorporating all stakeholders
- A Peace education campaign, including school-based peace education
- Peace messaging through the *ulema*, civil society and the media
- Dispute resolution and Reconciliation at the local level.

### A Possible Role for UNDP

There appear three areas where UNDP would add value to a peace programme.

**Social peace:** UNDP might accompany national and local stakeholders through technical assistance, advising, sharing of experiences from other countries, sponsoring campaigns, conducting an sharing studies, trainings etc.

**Political peace:** UNDP, if mediation experiences, could help with building the capacity of provincial peace councils, governors etc. in 1) mediation, 2) grievance resolution, 3) rendition of justice, 4) abiding by human's rights and 5) ensuring protection and participation of women.

**Economic peace:** UNDP support LMs through commissioning studies of vulnerability of populations and their potential security risks, and then advising the creation of targeted poverty eradication and economic development projects, which target vulnerable groups on a case-by-case, region by region approach.

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## 1. Introduction

### 1.i Background

The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) was developed on the basis of recommendations of the 1600 broadly representative Afghan delegates to the Consultative Peace Jirga of June 2010 with the aim to reach a political settlement and put an end to violence. APRP was initiated, led and implemented by the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), with the purpose of extending an open hand to the Taliban and other insurgent groups, offering them a dignified and respectful way to renounce violence, and peacefully re-integrate into their communities. APRP is pursued through an integrated three-pronged approach; reintegration for peace and security, community security including demobilization and weapons management and development for peace and sustainability.

The APRP was developed as a flexible and simple umbrella framework for funding reconciliation and national and local peace and reintegration activities from the Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund. UNDP supported the APRP working towards the achievement of the following main outputs:

1. Two windows of the Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund are effectively managed;
2. APRP central structures effectively deliver planning, monitoring, coordination and reporting on key components of APRP;
3. Subnational structures of APRP effectively deliver key components at the local level;
4. Contributions made to sustainable peace and reintegration in provinces through financial and programmatic support to the Line Ministries' community recovery programmes (Terminated on 31 December 2014); and
5. Effective management of APRP delivery ensured through UNDP technical and operational support.

The Programme delegated to Afghan people, through Government and civil society, leadership and responsibility for building peace in their country. The three-stage framework outlined the process for peace and reintegration process and the Government's planned priority activities during the process. The Programme was not a linear approach to peace building, rather being open and responsive to opportunities that arose. But, the framework outlined the Government processes and Programme's flow to promote negotiation and to consolidate peace. Peace was promoted through a combination of bottom up and top down approaches. Success required 'top down' political commitment and technical and financial assistance through the High Peace Council (HPC) from the capital. But, the APRP also incorporated 'bottom up' assessments of the possibilities for peace and reintegration, and the initiation of confidence -building, negotiation and grievance resolution measures.

### 1.ii Context


In 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush demanded that the Taliban hand over Osama bin Laden and expel al-Qaeda; bin Laden having been wanted by the United Nations since 1999. The Taliban declined to extradite him unless given what they deemed convincing evidence of his involvement in the 9/11 attacks and declined demands to extradite other terrorism suspects apart from bin Laden. Dismissing

the request as a delaying tactic, the US, supported by the UK, and subsequently internally by other forces, including the Northern Alliance, launched Operation Enduring Freedom on 7 October 2001. The United Nations Security Council (December 2001) established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to assist the Afghan interim authorities with securing Kabul. At the Bonn Conference in December 2001, Hamid Karzai was selected to head the Afghan Interim Administration, which after a 2002 *loya jirga* in Kabul became the Afghan Transitional Administration. In the popular elections of 2004, Karzai was elected president of the country, now named the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

NATO became involved as an alliance in August 2003, taking the helm of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and later that year assumed leadership of ISAF with troops from 43 countries. NATO members provided the core of the force. One portion of U.S. forces in Afghanistan operated under NATO command; the rest remained under direct U.S. command. Taliban leader Mullah Omar reorganized the movement, and in 2003, launched an insurgency against the government and ISAF. Though outgunned and outnumbered, insurgents from the Taliban, Haqqani Network, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin and other groups have waged asymmetric warfare with guerilla raids and ambushes in the countryside, suicide attacks against urban targets and turncoat killings against coalition forces. The Taliban exploited weaknesses in the Afghan government, among the most corrupt in the world, to reassert influence across rural areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan. ISAF responded in 2006 by increasing troops for counterinsurgency operations to "clear and hold" villages and "nation building" projects to "win hearts and minds".

Fig. 1 shows that civilian deaths rose and fell in the course of this period but were on an upward trend

Fig. 1: Civilian Deaths, 2001 – 2010




Source: Watson Institute, Brown’s University, Cost of War, 2014

From 2006. Fig. 2 clearly shows that, despite the ISAF ‘surge’ implemented by the force’s US-led command, the major responsibility for the increased civilian mortality were AGEs, who increased the utilisation of IEDs and increasingly targeted civilians.



Fig. 2: Civilian Deaths,



Source: UNAMA Annual Reports, various years

In May 2012, NATO leaders endorsed an exit strategy for withdrawing their forces. In May 2014, the United States announced that "[its] combat operations [would] end in 2014, [leaving] just a small residual force in the country until the end of 2016". As of 2015, tens of thousands of people have been killed in the war. Over 4,000 ISAF soldiers and civilian contractors as well as over 15,000 Afghan national security forces members have been killed, as well as nearly 20 thousand civilians. In October 2014, British forces handed over the last bases in Helmand to the Afghan military, officially ending their combat operations in the war. On 28 December 2014, NATO formally ended combat operations in Afghanistan and transferred full security responsibility to the Afghan government, via a ceremony in Kabul.

Throughout the period, under discussion, various efforts were undertaken to support those AGEs that sought to withdraw from the armed conflict. Initially undertaken as classic DDR programmes, they were followed as of 2004 by the DIAG incentive-based disarmament programme.

The rising death toll (Fig 2 and 3) contributed to a rising demand for a resolution to the ongoing conflict within the Government and its international supporters, given effect during the 2010 London Conference<sup>5</sup>. The announced CPG took place as planned and the resulting Government programme,

<sup>5</sup> The Afghan government was to set up a "national council for peace, reconciliation and reintegration". This new institution would oversee the channeling of development funds to provide alternative livelihoods to lure insurgent fighters away from the Taliban. This programme would be financed by an international fund, to which \$140m was pledged to cover the first year. At the same time, the government was to reinvigorate peace overtures to more senior Taliban members, with the help of Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah.

Karzai planned to hold a peace council, a *Loya Jirga* in the Spring of 2010, to which tribal elders from around the country would be invited, including those with Taliban links. Karzai pledged that peace deals would not affect basic human rights, including women's rights, which he said "shall never be compromised". At the conference, president Karzai declared: "We must reach out to all of our countrymen, especially our disenfranchised brothers, who are not part of al-Qaida, or other terrorist networks, who accept the Afghan constitution." The Afghan government pledged to hold the



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the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme, was prepared by the National Security Council and the D & R Commission and finalized in July 2010. The Government's APRP document envisaged a total budget of US \$782 151 711 over a five year period, despite donor indication at the London Conference of an available \$140 million. International commitments to the Government programme were to be disbursed through three funding Windows: Window A managed by the World Bank Trust Fund, commitments totaling US \$64 440 000; Window B, managed by UNDP, commitments totaling US \$144 767 000; and Window C, a bilateral aid agreement between the UK and Estonia and the GoIRA, with total commitments of US \$24 267 000.

The APRP project document's, as developed by UNDP (15 July 2010), Outcomes were

- Capacity in state and non-state institutions increased to contribute to overall stabilization and peace-building.
- Successful implementation of key components of APRP
- Peace and Reintegration processes delivered through existing national programmes.

UNDP would provide project management and source the TCA to ensure the necessary capacity development in state and non-state institutions. The FOCS in the MoF, as the Government body responsible for trust fund management, was accorded oversight of the programme's finances. An HPC was established to pursue and promote negotiations with AGEs at local level and the Taliban national political leadership, which was to be supported by the JS. This latter was also given responsibility for day – to – day APRP management, its monitoring and evaluation, and oversight of the implementation of the proposed small grants programme (a continuation of the earlier QIPs). Four line Ministries, MAIL, MoLSAMD, MoPW, and MRRD, would implement CRPs, intended to establish the necessary economic opportunities to restart development in the country, while NSD/MoIA and MoD would support the reintegration aspects of the programme, supporting the verification of ex-combatants identity and their disarmament. Notwithstanding, as Fig. 3 shows, the overall conflict intensified.


The registration period for presidential nominations was open from 16 September 2013 until 6 October 2013. A total of 27 candidates were confirmed to be running for office. However, on 22 October Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission disqualified 16 of the candidates, leaving only 11 in the race. Incumbent President Hamid Karzai was not eligible to run, having completed two terms. By April 2014 three candidates had given up the race and decided to support some of the eight remaining candidates. Opinion polls showed Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani as the front-runners.

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[Peace Jirga](#) in the Spring of 2010, to which village elders from across the country, including some with Taliban ties, were to be invited.

Fig. 3

### Civilian Deaths and Injuries January to June 2009 - 2014



Source: UNAMA - Civilian Deaths and Injuries - January to June 2009-2014.

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Presidential elections were held in Afghanistan on 5 April 2014, with a second round held on 14 June. The results of the first round election had Abdullah in the lead with placed Ghani behind him and a second round election required on 14 June, which would determine the new leader of Afghanistan. Preliminary results of the run-off were expected on 2 July and the final result on 22 July but widespread accusations of fraud delayed these results. The European Union sent 6 observers in Kabul, Balkh and Herat provinces. This Berman, head of the EU election assessment team, called for an in-depth review of the electoral fraud claims and said that necessary steps would be taken to clean it. Abdullah accused Karzai of conspiring in the rigging of the elections. On August 24, Karzai met with the two candidates, and told them they should rapidly conclude the audit process. The inauguration ceremony was currently set for September 2, 2014, one month after it was scheduled by the UN. He also said that the inability of the candidates to compromise on the results had led to Afghanistan deteriorating. In spite of Karzai's insistence that he was stepping down on September 2, he remained in office because of security concerns. The election results remained in dispute, despite a proposal by the United States (Secretary of State Kerry visited Kabul on two separate occasions to broker a power-sharing deal) that the candidates agree to a power-sharing deal, which was initially agreed to. The UN-led audit failed to sway Abdullah as he insisted the audit team could not explain a million extra votes counted in the run-off. Ghani supporters insisted they wanted to do a deal and were leaving the door open to negotiations. On 19 September 2014, the Independent Election Commission named Ashraf Ghani the winner with 56.44% of the vote to Abdullah's 43.56%, the actual results being announced later in the year. Abdullah and Ghani promptly signed a power-sharing agreement, with Ghani being named president and Abdullah taking on the Chief Executive Officer position in the government; the deal was signed in front of the presidential palace, with incumbent president Hamid Karzai and US Secretary of State Kerry in attendance.

With the announcement of the election, Government initiatives virtually ceased in the country. And although Ghani, when announcing the agreement, observed that he and Abdullah were 'completing each other's sentences in front of Kerry' (Guardian, 8 August 2015), agreeing the new Government's composition proved far more problematic. *Inter alia*, posts, including that of HPC chairperson and JS CEO, went unfilled, anything beyond routine decision-making ground to a halt, and the announcement of the new Government's composition proceeded at a snail's pace (For example, the proposed Minister of Defense was only presented for parliamentary ratification in February 2016 and the HPC chair and JS CEO, subsequent to significant donor pressure, including stopping all HPC salaries, were only appointed in the same month.)<sup>6</sup>. The effect on the APRP was largely to bring everything other than structural support to a halt.

## 1.2 Methodology

This section outlines the methodological approach adopted by the evaluation. In choosing the approach, the evaluation was guided by the DAC 2012 Guidance [Development Evaluation News, November 2012].

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<sup>6</sup> Given that every position had to be negotiated between the two parties in the Government, this was hardly surprising.

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## 1.2.i Approach

The evaluation pursued the TOR through:

- Documentary review (A list of consulted documents is presented in Annex 3).
- Interviews with key stakeholders – UNDP, Other donors
- Representatives of Government stakeholders: HPC, JS, Line Ministries, Security Ministries, Provincial authorities,
- CSOs, Local Authorities
- Field visits to a sample of programmes/projects undertaken (as security issues permitted)
- Stakeholder consultation and validation

In accordance with the guidance provided during the initial meeting with UNDP, the evaluation, while addressing all aspects of the APRP, pursued issues relating to the APRP structure, its efficiency and effectiveness, together with an assessment of whether such a management structure should inform a new programme, under discussion in the current PIP phase. In accordance with the request in the initial and subsequent discussions with UNDP, the consultants prepared a brief final report that includes recommendations based on the evaluation's findings for any emerging new programme.

The TOR envisaged a three-phased approach, viz:

- Inception phase
- Desk-research phase
- Fieldwork phase

In accordance with the TOR, the team will pursue the envisaged three-phase approach.

### **I Inception phase**

An **inception report** outlining:

- a. Methodology: to the extent possible, the team adopted participatory approaches,
- b. Activities,
- c. responsibilities (See Table 2)
- d. work plan (Fig. 1) and milestones will be produced and discussed,
- e. expansion of EQs identified in the TOR.

The draft Inception Report was submitted on 13 April and the final version, incorporating comments from UNDP, on 20 April.

### **II Desk study phase**

During this desk phase, the evaluation team conducted a detailed

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- (i) review and analyse all relevant documents (Annex 3) (While the TOR noted that this should have been completed in the Inception Phase, the contractual reality was that, with the exception of the TL, the other team members had not been contracted at the time of the IR and, although the national consultants had received the documentation made available, the international consultant, as of 19 April, had not. Furthermore, a shared and detailed review was necessary to finalise a shared understanding on the evaluation approach.
  - (ii) summarised the information already gathered and limitations, and identify issues still to be covered
  - (iii) developed the (participatory) tools (semi-structured interviews, focus groups, etc.) to be applied in the field phase (Kabul and the sample of provinces), together with all preparatory steps already taken
  - (iv) developed a detailed work plan for the field phase, taking into account the time available and security-acceptable flight schedules. This resulted in a departure from the proposal contained in the Inception Report, this being discussed with the UNDP Programme Manager and team.

### **III Field phase**

The evaluation team developed and discussed with UNDP and key stakeholders

- an indicative list of provinces to be visited, including focus group discussions with individual project beneficiaries, where possible. Arising from this, the national consultants visited and/or met with project representatives and beneficiaries from Nangahar, Khandahar, Zabul, Herat, Baghdis, Balkh, and Jawzhan (seven provinces); representatives of Kabul, Laghman and Logar met with the evaluation team in Kabul, bring the total to 10 provinces (29%).
- Programme structures assessed included HPC, JS, National and Provincial Peace Councils, Provincial Joint Secretariat teams, and the relationship between the Technical Assistance and the Afghan structures, the efficiency of the flow of funding in the course of the programme's life were analysed.

The evaluation team held a debriefing meeting outlining the preliminary conclusions and recommendations on 17 May.

#### **1.2.ii Geographical coverage**

Geographical coverage outside of the capital was based upon security advice provided to the team at the time of the field mission and the approved flight schedules within the timeframe available. Initial discussions on the possibility of an extension to the national consultant's contract to permit additional provincial visits were held, the decision to be finalised once the initial data analysis was completed.

##### **1.2.ii.a Selection of Sample**

The sample was based upon available key Government and donor stakeholders, as well as indicative sample of programmes financed in the course of the five-year (2010 – 2016) implementation period. The team's focus was on the contribution of the activities supported to the goals of peace building and

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the contribution of ex-combatants' reintegration to this. The sample of identified provinces is discussed above; project beneficiaries, both of the SGPs and CRPs (including VET trainees and Public Works Corps members), were interviewed in focus groups.

### 1.2.ii.b Risks

The major risk confronting the achievement of the TOR related to the shifting socio-political and security situation in Afghanistan and the related security implications, particularly in respect of the team's visits to a sample of provinces<sup>7</sup> and movement in Kabul. Initially, it was proposed that the national consultants, having undertaken the requisite SAFE training<sup>8</sup>, should pursue a triangular geographic approach. As discussed above, the available time for provincial visits was impacted by security-approved flights. This required that the provincial visits be scaled back in the first instance to five provinces (10 provincial teams interviewed) with UNDP facilitating three additional provinces travel to Kabul. Subject to the need for additional data, UNDP would consider an extension of the national consultant's contract for additional provincial visits. In total, the national consultants visited Additional risks include access to key informants in the field and their safety, as well as possible political interference in the process.

### 1.3 Outline of the Report

The report is structured in accordance with standard OECD DAC criteria. In Section 2, it discusses the programme's design and relevance including an assessment of the logframe. This is followed in Section 3 by a discussion of Efficiency and, in Section 4, of Effectiveness. Section 5 makes a preliminary assessment of Impact, followed by consideration of programme Sustainability in Section 6. Section 7 outlines the consultants' conclusions and recommendations arising from the foregoing analysis.

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<sup>7</sup> SAFE Training for internationals is scheduled for mid-April and mid-May, neither dates being suitable for the international consultants on this assignment. The mid-April training slot takes place before either international consultant is contractually in-country, while the mid-May slot occurs too late to be feasibly taken up in time for the internationals participation in the planned provincial visits.

<sup>8</sup> UNDP has ensured that the SAFE training schedule for nationals, including the offer to undertake special courses, will guarantee that the national consultants complete the training before the team launches the field mission, commencing 24 April.

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## 2. Relevance

Relevance discusses the extent to which the project design fit the socioeconomic and socio-political realities of Afghanistan at the time of its design and now. It asks how appropriate were the problem analysis, the intervention logic, and risk analysis? What adaptations are desirable in the light of experience?

### 2.1 The Context

The APRP was introduced at a politically opportune time, and was relevant to the context of when it was designed in 2010. As such, even though it was a project to support reintegrees through development interventions, it was mostly a political project to gain support for the Government's peace agenda. This subtext made the project relevant to the context but not effective in terms of reaching objectives that were more political than realistic.

After winning reelection in 2009, President Karzai was discouraged by the criticism waged by the American administration about the election process and disillusioned that his international coalition partners would be genuinely able to eradicate the safe heavens that were propping up the Taliban in Pakistan. He placed reconciliation with his Taliban 'brothers' at the top of his agenda, having lost confidence that the Taliban could be defeated militarily, including with the help of coalition forces. At the January 2010 London Conference, he asked the international community to support his government's peace plan and in June 2010, he convened the Consultative Peace Jirga, bringing together sixteen hundred largely handpicked delegates, who gave him a strong mandate for talks with the Taliban. The "peace Jirga" ended by backing an amnesty and job incentives to induce militants to give up arms. . If the end goal was to diminish the number of insurgents in the field, the strategy also fit well the agenda of the Americans by 2010 who by then were preparing to deploy more troops as part of a surge and welcomed a chapter way to defeating/reintegrating Taliban fighters. The idea represented a good political compromise on all sides.

On July 20, 2010, the government introduced the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) at the International Kabul Conference, where it received overwhelming support from the representatives of seventy countries and international organizations. Later that year, the government established the High Peace Council (HPC) to open a dialogue with the Taliban and guide and oversee the APRP's implementation. A Joint Secretariat was set up in 2010 to provide implementation support to the HPC<sup>9</sup> and UNDP designed a project to support the APRP, which came at the heel of its past programmes to support the demobilization process (such as the Afghanistan New Beginnings Program). When it negotiated its engagement, UNDP was strongly encouraged by the donor pool and the NATO mission to take up management responsibility of APRP.

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<sup>9</sup> See Annex 8.



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The programme was designed by the government, with little indication of content support by UNDP in its design phase. There is also no indication of the design being consultative, involving civil society, women's groups etc. The only vetting system was the broad recommendations of the *Loya Jirga*, and the experience, if not necessary the lessons learned, of past initiatives on reintegration and reconciliation by UNDP.

### 2.1.a Knowledge about the Context

Because the project was designed on the basis of a programme that had been presented to donors at the London Conference and was vetted by the *Loya Jirga*, it did not bother to conduct a needs assessment, a baseline or provincial context analysis on which to base its interventions. The interventions were instead designed to implement a political vision, and not necessarily one based on concrete knowledge about the needs. Action research was not included for a variety of reasons, all of which have to do at the end of the day, with the question of lack of willingness and commitment to go from the realities on the ground: Not enough time nor resources were dedicated to a proper analysis before the design of the project. For example, the team's provincial visits provided no mention of conflict sensitivity (Do no harm) analysis.

One of the main challenges of evaluating the projects at the local level (whether through community Recovery Projects or through Small Grant Projects) from the perspective of peace building was the lack of conflict analysis from the start. With a conflict analysis and baseline, it would have been necessary to determine region by region what the conflict factors and dynamics would have been and how the projects directly impacted the outcomes. As the Mid-term Evaluation (MTE) conducted in December 2012 had already noted, no formal Conflict Analysis or opportunity mapping exercise, or even formal needs assessment had been carried out at the national level, nor any provincial analytical studies of local factors and players.

The lack of conflict analysis/baseline has to do with resources and timing. However, there was also no political commitment to carry one out at the onset, hence to clarify who was weighting whom in each region, knowledge that would have complicated the tendency to put all grievances under the broad chapeau of the "Taliban" and not shed light on potential capture by different factions. UNDP also did not have the technical resources to carry out such an analysis at the provincial level. However, it could have done so, utilising the experienced Regional Programme Coordinators (RPCs) or collaboration with UNAMA that does such analysis at the national and provincial levels, although this possibility was affected by differences in culture, bottlenecks in information sharing and challenges of coordination at the regional/provincial level. The evaluation team was told that better streamlining of UNDP and UNAMA activities are being put in place in the recent past only.

The Mid-term Evaluation (MTE) had suggested back in 2012 to undertake Conflict Analysis, Opportunity Mapping Studies or Provincial Conflict analysis Profiles (PCAP) for each province in order to help make APRP decisions more strategic. Guidelines were sent to provinces to collect data on analytical maps and was suppose to be compiled in July 2013 with the help of NDS, ILDG, RPCS and UNAMA. Such an



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analysis however was not shared with the Evaluation Team. When she joined the JS as part of UNDP's Technical Assistance in 2015, the Peace building and Development Specialist saw the need to adjust the projects to peace building objective and start by having a proper needs assessment conducted. She developed a list of types of SGP projects that could be conducive to sustainable peace on the basis of needs assessments through the RPCs and PJSTs in the region. The assessment and recommendations in terms of guidelines to guide the communities to identify their needs was however removed from the SGP instruction package by the JS leadership. Where there was information, it was not used strategically.

## 2.2 Relevance to Past Approaches to Reintegration and Reconciliation

The APRP was introduced as a continuation or alternative to two streams of government-led, donor-supported initiatives: Stream 1: DDR and reintegration and Stream 2: Political reconciliation and negotiation.

### 1. Reintegration before demobilization: Lessons had been integrated from DDR and DIAG?

On the reintegration front, APRP came at the heel of the Government-led UNDP-supported Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) initiative and the subsequent Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups in Afghanistan (DIAG) that had contributed to the collection of weapons.

The DDR of Afghan military forces ran from 2002-2006, supported by the Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) of UNDP with \$150 million in funding from international donors. An estimated 60 000 former combatants were disarmed and provided with agricultural support, vocational training etc. However, the program had minimal lasting impact, was often obstructed or co-opted by warlords or criminal elements, and few participants are believed to have been genuine ex-combatants. By 2005, at the completion of the DDR process, there were still an estimated 1 800 armed bands consisting of up to 100 000 individuals.

The \$36 million DIAG program was created in 2005 and implemented under UNDP management between 2006 and 2011 as the successor of the DDR. DIAG was intended to disband those remaining armed groups in the areas of the country not covered by DDR and outside the control of the central government in Kabul. The initiative aimed at offering community projects, worth upwards of \$150,000 each, in exchange for the handover of weapons and a pledge to demobilize. By the time it was integrated into the APRP in 2011, DIAG no longer dealt with criminal groups but only armed insurgent groups and became the implementer of the reintegration programme. By then, DIAG lacked donor support and community projects had proved to be insufficient incentives, even though the program claimed to have disbanded several hundred groups. It was questionable how many of these represented organized armed groups at all.

The impact of past DDR and DIAG programs has not been tangible: Illegal armed groups continue to be a primary obstacle to peace in Afghanistan. While each program claims to have incorporated lessons

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from its predecessors, many technical shortcomings and flaws in design recurred across programs which continued through APRP.

Lesson learned and incorporated:

APRP incorporated the lesson that complete disarmament cannot happen before reintegration. With ongoing security, weapons in the hands of reintegrees represented a security guarantee against the ongoing threats by the Taliban and other anti-government (AGE) groups. In the special case of Afghanistan where war was ongoing, reintegration should come before disarmament and demobilization, reversing the conventional sequence.

Lesson unlearned or neglected:

The main reason that the DDR programs implemented since 2001 have fallen short in Afghanistan was the adverse political and security context rather than any flaw in the programs *per se*. A political settlement is a prerequisite for DDR: without a peace deal that includes all parties, including the Taliban leadership, the Haqqanis, Hizb-i-Islami and the main former Northern Alliance factions, it is unlikely that any DDR program will yield major results. The lack of peace agreement and lack of security guarantees would create disincentives for many commanders to disarm.

Lack of security for the reintegrees means that by joining the program, they risk their lives. APRP, like its predecessors, did not clarify what types of security guarantees would be provided to those who join the process. It mentioned that they would be able to reintegrate into the communities, but the program and the project never had enough resources – or intention - to appoint guards to protect the reintegrees. No reintegrees interviewed viewed were satisfied with security support they could access.

The piecemeal approach targeting different armed groups in different programs at different times has not worked. Each of the different programs targeted different groups. This had to do with the lack of a unified conflict analysis to identify who the AGEs were and where they were operating. Disarmament is unlikely to work without a settlement that includes all armed groups. The problem is not only disarming Taliban foot soldiers and commanders, but also strongmen and warlords, and their followers, many of which are not technically Anti-Government Elements (AGE) because they are in the government. As the Evaluation Team was told by an informant involved in the weapons collection program, it is not enough to collect weapons from Taliban members when strongmen in the government together with their followers all circulate with their arms. Their weapons also need to be collected.

There are also questions over what a program to collect weapons and reintegrate fighters can accomplish among a rural population that is heavily armed at the individual and household level by tradition and where porous borders with Pakistan mean that any arms collected could be easily replenished. Given the small number of weapons collected, there are also indications that fighters tend to hide their guns and not surrender all that they have.

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It remains unclear as to how the reintegrated fighters could be absorbed into the ANP or ALP. The Evaluation Team was told that the absorption depended on objective criteria (such as age) but that decisions had been left to the local level representatives of MOI, MOD and NDS. However, given the lack of trust, it is unlikely that the reintegrees would be able to join official government forces, leaving former fighters idle, and dangerous.

In the meantime, a process of re-arming and establishing paramilitary, semi-irregular groups as part of a framework and discourse of “community defence” forces, through the Afghan Local Police (ALP) referred to as Arbaki, could create tensions at the local level and would certainly erode the objectives of DDR and DIAG and APRP in seeking the de-militarization of Afghan society.

1) Reconciliation, negotiation and political outreach

On the political, negotiation front, the APRP came to replace the reconciliation initiative named Tahkim-e- Solh (PTS) (established in 2005) implemented by an Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission led by former president Sebghatullah Mujadidi, then Speaker of *Mishrano Jirga*, the upper house of the Afghan National Assembly. Initially based in Kabul, the PTS later expanded to open field offices in twelve provinces in the south, southeast and east of the country regions where the threat of the insurgency was highest. The PTS was abandoned and instead, the APRP established an HPC in 2010, administratively supported by the JS.

The PTS boasted to have reconciled 7 106 militants and arranged the release of 763 prisoners from prisons and detention centres. However, it too had no tangible impacts on the reduction of violence and insurgency. The PTS had failed to make headways in the peace process and gain political support.

The PTS faced a number of critical challenges: it did not have a publically available strategic direction, guidelines and known procedures, leaving the actual work at the discretion of individual officials in the field. There was a lack of public knowledge on actual budgets and working procedures of the Commission. Additionally, it was poorly managed, beset by allegations of corruption, and was eventually abandoned by donors. Other criticism included allegations that insurgents joined the process in order to get an official letter only to be able to move around freely without really giving up their causes; and that the program had either reached nor targeted, the main insurgents actively involved in combat, the majority of those reconciled not being involved in recent conflicts.

By the time the APRP led to the creation of the HPC with the JS as administrative support office, there were hopes for outreach to Taliban leadership abroad. While a more direct role for outreach with leaders that mattered was established, the linkages between the national level initiative and the field level reintegration was unclear. Furthermore, given that many of the representatives of the HPC were former Alliance members, or there was interest to work and show results in areas that were safe, many of the projects of the APRP were directed towards the north and north-west, where donors like the Germans, Italians and Spanish also had their presence, eventually moving the focus away from the originally envisaged insecure areas.

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## Lessons learned and applied by APRP

The APRP project designed and implemented by UNDP put more emphasis on developing an SOP on how to operate for the HPC and the JS. How much this SOP was publically available or disclosed enough to prevent allegation of incompetence and corruption however was not sufficient.

The APRP tried to target more closely those that were involved in conflict or fighting. However, it remains unclear to the Evaluation Team who these fighters were: Taliban members or local groups fighting on behalf of ethnic leaders of the north. It is for this reason that the appellation of “Taliban” became increasingly changed with AGE, even though by 2015, technically these were not AGEs but local militias of government warlords.

## Lessons unlearned or neglected

The work of negotiations and mediation at the national level required expertise, which went beyond UNDP’s traditional mandate. Not being involved in mediation and reconciliation at the national, UNDP’s role focussed on the efficient disbursement of, and accounting for, funds for technical development projects or the disbursement of salaries. Yet, the projects were not straight cut development oriented one and had to be directly linked to the peace building agenda, the nature of which remained unclear to all involved parties.

The SOP of the HPC and the JS was not publically available. The Evaluation Team was even told by a member of the HPC about the lack of knowledge of members about the budget available through the JS and allocations.

There was no clear communication strategy made available to HPC members and especially not communicated directly with the larger public. Communication and outreach strategies at the field/province level were left up to PPCs using traditional methods with the *ulema*.

## 2.3 Problems with Assumptions about Peace building Models and Modality

The main assumption of APRP was that by providing monetary incentives, the rank and file of the insurgents could be persuaded to peel away from the insurgency, putting pressure on the leadership whom would then be more ready to sit in negotiations with the government. The model of peace building was based on a narrow understanding of peace as the absence of conflict (negative peace), and not as positive sustainable peace that would require good governance, development, human rights, justice etc.

This narrow conception of peace (in terms of reintegration) from below, meeting peace (in terms of negotiations) from above, formed the basis of the theory of the change of the APRP program and the UNDP project. However, the very theory of change was based on wrong assumptions to begin with,

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assumptions that deserve critical scrutiny. The questionable nature of the assumptions underpinning the APRP is elaborated upon in Annex 4.

## 2.4 Relevance and Rationale of the HPC Structure

When the High Peace Council was established, it was supposed to replace the Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission that had implemented the failed PTS. Initially encompassing 68 members supposedly chosen by the 2010 *Loya Jirga*, the number rose to 73 by 2015. However, a number of design problem plagued the effectiveness of the HPC, not least being its size<sup>10</sup>.

Besides the membership of the HPC, two other structural problems, which stemmed from the initial design, damaged the potential of the HPC: the first concerned their role and the second, the resources available to them.

As far as their role was concerned, given questions over their competence and marginalization within government, they were ineffective initially in the role as mediators. According to one senior informant, it would have been better to bypass the creation of an HPC and rely on existing structures within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the NDS or the NSC to prepare the ground for negotiations in a more subtle, behind the scenes manner. A structure such as the HPC was too large to maintain confidentiality around sensitive information.

The second design problem related to the creation of a JS to support the HPC in the implementation of the decisions of their members; in reality, because of the strong personality and connections of the JS leadership (in the person of Massoom Stanikzai), and the finances the JS controlled, the implementing structure was the real power<sup>11</sup>. The position of the HPC was further weakened by the interregnum occasioned by the Presidential election, the contested results and the lengthy US-brokered negotiations required to establish the Unity Government; in this connection, the HPC and JS experienced over 12 months delay in the appointment of their respective chief executives with Pir Seyyed Ahmad Gailani, an influential, elderly Sufi leader who would most likely play the role of moral authority.

The HPC leadership gap further damaged its effectiveness and its legitimacy and concerned Window C donors, withdrawal of whose support was threatened in February 2016, which accompanied by press

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<sup>10</sup> The council's 68 members were not initially chosen on the basis of their influence with Afghan tribes or their skills as neutral mediators. Rather, they were handpicked<sup>10</sup> to appease and then divide the non-Pashtun political opposition (former Northern Alliance leaders) and broaden the political base among the President's Pashtun constituents<sup>10</sup>. Membership was a way to legitimize support for the Karzai Administration. Some HPC members were established Taliban sympathisers, known to serve a Taliban agenda rather the Government's interests. The representation of women on the HPC, despite the considerable advocacy efforts in the run up to and during the *Loya jirga* of the AWN, was symbolic; the Evaluation Team was told, for example, that female members were not allocated cars (symbolic but nonetheless illustrative since male members had access to armored 4/4s), and had only a marginalized role in making suggestions (their views seldom, if ever, being sought).

<sup>11</sup> Notwithstanding the unquestioned challenges experienced, the evaluation was informed that the HPC was instrumental in facilitating the exit to transfer of loyalties to GoIRA of at least six senior members of the *Queta Shura*, including the former Finance Minister; one recent *Queta Shura* member, who had initiated preliminary discussions with an HPC representative in Dubai was assassinated immediately on his return home in Pakistan.

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reports that the HPC members were effectively 'foreign agents'. In early 2016, the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG), comprising Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and the US, reawakened hopes for more direct talks with the Taliban; revamped at the same time, the HPC membership was decreased from 70 to 50, the new composition comprising a more ethnically and politically balanced grouping than a strong team of negotiators. Even though the HPC is more inclusive now of women and ethnic groups (such as the Hazaras), it seems likely to remain as a side show to the peace process, not least because it has no legal status.

## 2.5 The UNDAF and UNDP Country Programme

The UNDAF, 2010 – 13 outcome was: Capacity in state and non-state institutions increased to contribute to overall stabilization and peace-building. The APRP's outcome indicators were directly drawn from the Country Programme Results and Resources Framework, including baseline and targets. As such, the APRP was fully in line with the UNDAF and Country Programme.

## 2.6 Flexibility and Change

For the reasons outlined above, the initial design of APRP was relevant at the time of the writing to the political context, but a political context that was based on false assumptions that together were not likely to reach the desired outcomes. Since the project was implemented, a number of new factors came to impact on the project, many of which had not been taken into account from the beginning. These included:

- 1) The changing paradigm and support about negotiations at the geopolitical level. This means that while APRP was a way to nationalize the talks with the Taliban (or in other words put the Afghan Government in the drivers' seat), by the end of the project, the support of other countries such as Pakistan the US and China were seen as necessary for negotiations. The return of external actors/guarantors downplayed the importance of the HPC and local structures at the field level that could impact negotiations.
- 2) The 2013 elections which resulted in huge delays until a coalition government was announced became the major force major that led to lack of confidence and disinterest among donors who consequently withdrew their support. The stalemate meant that disbursements stopped before the end of the project, dealing a heavy blow to the fulfillment of the projects' objectives.
- 3) The impact of rising insecurity was also not foreseen in the APRP project design, which put all of its baskets on the hopes for a success of tow down and bottom up peace process.
- 4) Donor fatigue and demands for transparency, accountability etc. led to dwindling funds with donors, a factor that should have been taken into consideration from the beginning. While the assumption was that APRP project initiatives will start with donor money but eventually be cost-shared by the government, neither the Karzai nor the Ghani Government did much in terms of preparing for burden sharing.

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At the operational level, a number of other elements could have been better planned to better fit the context of unpredictability: While the NDS may have known the potential number of reintegrees, given that they had started paying them one year in advance, this number was not properly communicated to the line ministries so that they could plan their interventions in the regions where expected to receive most reintegrees.

The project was also designed on the expectation that most of the reintegrees will be from the volatile regions of the south and East. However, most of the projects were implemented in the north and west. This factor had to be taken into consideration from the start.

## 2.7 Risks

The project document included a Risk Matrix. This was found to be inadequate by the MTR, which recommended that a Risk Analysis should be carried out. The JS response to the MTR's recommendations stated that this was completed. TCA requests to review it were rejected on grounds of security and it was also not shared with the Evaluation Team.

## 2.8 The Results Framework

Like logical framework analysis, Results Frameworks (RF) should reflect a logical progression from planned activities through Outputs to Outcomes. The APRP project RF was developed in accordance with the UNDP Country Programme and Resource Framework, 2010 – 13 and the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) of the same period. According to the UNDAF, the priority outcomes were 'Good governance, peace and stability', [incorporating] 'stabilization process....strengthened through effective integrated United Nations support to the Government and communities [and the] 'institutions of democratic governance are integrated components of the nation-state'. UNDP's Country Programme's intended outcome was that 'the capacity of state and non-state institutions was increased to contribute to overall stabilization and peace building'.

Within this context, the APRP's intended outcome (as set out in the July 2010 project document) was that 'critical institutions provide the enabling environment for peace and reintegration at the sub-national level'. This reflected the twin-track strategy GoIRA developed in the wake of the London Conference and the CPG, the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme, July 2010, which sought to address peace-making at the national (through the HPC) and local levels (PPCs and encouraging reintegration). What is lacking, however, as a peace building project, is an explicit statement of change to describe the desired/expected future socio-political situation. This change would address a root cause of conflict, such as improved perceptions about security situation, improved inter/intra group relationships, increased momentum for peace, etc. There is also no plausible theory of change within and beyond the program logic, to say nothing of a testable and credible TOC. Successive Outcomes (*viz.* 'Successful implementation of key components of the APRP' and 'Peace and Reintegration processes delivered through existing national programmes' are necessary conditions for achieving the primary outcome; as such, they are possibly misnamed; in a logframe, for example, they would be

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termed Results, not the immediate objective or Purpose.

Setting that to one side, the RF established three Outputs for Outcome 1 and one each for Outcomes 2 and 3. Two of the three outputs that aim to promote the achievement of Outcome 1 are, however, essentially the same: thus Output 1.1 – Capacity for the implementation of peace and reintegration programmes in critical institutions developed (the indicator being the result of an activity, which, actually establishes the unknown baseline) – and Output 1.2 – Capacity for the delivery of peace and reintegration processes in the sub-national APRP governance structures developed – focus on institutional and organisational capacity building, which could as easily be expressed as a single output or result. Logically, one requires the necessary capacities within Government and programme management to deliver the programme; splitting this into two Outputs/Results is redundant. Output 1.3 addresses the necessity of communication of project purpose – peace and reintegration – and the associated mental shift within the population as a whole (both combatants and civilian community members) in order to accept the reintegration of ex-combatants within their communities.

Outputs 2.1 and 2.2 focus on the reintegration of ex-combatants; but it should be noted that Output 2.2 also focuses on organisational and institutional capacity development. Together with Output 3, ‘Peace and reintegration processes delivered through existing national programmes’, arguably Outputs 2.1 and 3 forms the meat of the peace-building project and are logical steps to achieve the overall outcome (purpose).

Finally, one output rarely contributes in any significant way to achieving one outcome, suggesting in this case the absence of an overall logical sequence in the RF.

Having noted this, however, there is a consistent problem with the indicators for all the outputs. Before turning to indicators for the Outputs, it is important to emphasise that there were hardly any targets and/or milestones for each province or in respect of the project, in general. This limited measuring progress towards Outcomes in a major way. The confusion between an output indicator and activity (Output 1.1) has already been noted. Furthermore, those for Outputs 1.2 and 1.3 are essentially the same - # of media campaigns; but, this only reports on an activity not the results of that activity, i.e. increased public awareness of the desirability of and means to peace. The inappropriateness of identified indicators continues in Outcome 2’s outputs: for example, measuring successful implementation of the APRP needs much more than numerical measurements since reintegrees require more than the initial process (disarmament and registration); key indicators for the success of this Output (as for the Outcome) include the number of jobs, self-employment opportunities created, a satisfactory level of personal physical and economic security and so on.

Much the same comment can be made with regard to the Outcome 3 indicator<sup>12</sup>; disbursements may be a measure of financial support to line ministries but they do not contribute to the project

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<sup>12</sup> It is also important to note that the Baseline is incorrect. LM national programmes existed: MAIL, MoLSAMD, MoPW and MRRD all had pre-existing programmes, MAIL’s Agricultural Conservation Corps, MoPW’s Public Works Corps, MoLSAMD’s TVET programme and MRRD’s NABP, NRAP and RuWATSIP) (and other donors) already supported.



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outcome/purpose. Rather it is the function for which the disbursements are made (e.g. # Reintegrees/Community Members engaged in national programmes; # benefitting from satisfactory levels of personal security; and # with permanent jobs) are far more telling indicators of progress towards peace and security.

Furthermore, means of verification for each indicator were not proposed. As things turned out (see below), this was a probable contributory factor to the project reporters' emphasis on reporting activities, rather than Outputs/Results.

Perhaps the clearest demonstration of the Results Framework's weakness is the reality that it was ignored. The project's reporting, first, established its own five outputs, which bore little, if any, relation to those identified in the RF. Second, in general, even the inadequate indicators identified in the RF were generally ignored, perhaps, unsurprisingly, since the reporting structure outlined in the project document does not appear to have been implemented. Indeed, all the evidence provided to the evaluation demonstrated that first, a project-wide M&E system that was Results Framework responsive was never designed, not least since the respective secretariats (FCOS and JS) either did not have M&E capacity at the start of the project or the Technical Assistance provided (in the case of the FOCS) did not address their M&E design needs.

## 2.9 Conclusions

The main design problem of the APRP project has to do with a contested assumption from the beginning: that it would be possible to have a reintegration program in the absence of a peace agreement.

The design was based on a definition of peace that is the absence of conflict. Instead, it should have taken broader sustainable peace into consideration and built interventions in the context of not only projects of the government but reforms and policies.

Because it was based on number of false assumptions, the APRP project was not a logical path from A to B. The design therefore did not contribute to attitude change because it was based on wrong assumptions.

The Results Framework was inadequate and was not utilized as a project management tool. Arguably, had it been, it would have been adjusted to the experienced reality and proved utilitarian over the project's life.

### 3. Efficiency

Efficiency discusses the contribution that the utilisation of available resources, financial and human, made to the achievement of the envisaged outputs. This section addresses the resource requirements identified, the resources made available and their utilisation. In the first instance, the focus is on financial resources; subsequently, human resources and management structures are discussed.

#### 3.1 Financial Resources

GoIRA's identified financial resource need totaled US \$782 151 711 and is set out in Annex 4, Table 1. The overwhelming majority of this (65.3%) was identified as needed to support peace and community recovery consolidation.

Annex 4, Table 2 identifies the total donor resource mobilization (and utilisation) across the three APRP windows. In total, donors committed 29.9% of GoIRA's self-identified needs<sup>13</sup>. Overall total utilisation totaled 28.5% of the estimated need; utilisation of Window A (managed by the World Bank-managed ARTF) amounted to 76.4% of committed and received funds; Window B utilisation equaled 91% of committed resources and 94.3% of received resources; for Window C, utilisation was 85.5% of committed resources and 89.6% of those received.

In Mid-July 2010, UNDP presented the Window B project document (total budget \$221 205 252) to the Government of Japan for consideration of part funding (US \$50 million), with an unfunded budget of \$171 205 252 (Annex 5, Table 3). Table 1, below, outlines the share of the proposed project budget by Outcome area to end 2014 and provides the evaluation team's estimated division share between salary and project activities based on the description in the project budget.

Table 1: % Share of APRP Project Budget by Outcome (Window B)

Outcome	% Share of Budget <sup>14</sup>	Of which <sup>15</sup> , (a) Salaries (b) Activities
1. Critical institutions provide the enabling environment for peace and reintegration at the national level	16.5	a. 51.1 b. 50.7
2. APRP Joint Secretariat	57.9	a. Unclear – possibly as

<sup>13</sup> But this was not necessarily into a central pool for general use. The Italian and the Spanish funds were allocated specifically to the provinces where their NATO contribution was based. Furthermore, the Italian allocation was specifically for road construction through NRAP-MRRD. PRT staff were assigned to the same area to specify the activities and manage the budget and implementation. They were interacting with the community where their PRTs were located.

<sup>14</sup> Totals may not add up to 100 because of rounding.

<sup>15</sup> Totals may exceed 100 because of rounding.


successfully implements key components of APRP		much as 54.3 b. Unclear – possibly c. 36.8
3. Peace and Reintegration processes delivered through existing national programmes for community recovery	7	a. No transparency – lump sum support to four line ministries b. No transparency – lump sum support to four line ministries
Programme Support	17.9	a. 100 b. 0
TOTAL	99.3	a. 68.5 (excluding Outcome 3) b. 29.2 (excluding Outcome 3)

Granted the evaluation team had the benefit of hindsight when reviewing the project document budget, nonetheless, it is clear that a substantial part of the proposed budget would be absorbed through administration and salary costs. In fact, the actual outturn saw more resources allocated to reintegree and community support activities than appeared envisaged within the budget. It is also worth emphasising that the budget in the project proposal bore little relation to the reporting criteria adopted once project implementation had begun. In the first instance, the project budget detailed three outcomes and programme support; the annual reports reported in terms of five outputs, one of which was programme support (the evaluation team questions this inclusion as an output). The discussion in this section now turns to a focus on the efficiency of the expenditure on resources.

### 3.2 Resource Utilisation

Annex 5, Tables 4 – 19, provide detailed information on resource utilisation by donor (cumulative over the project period, 2010 – 2015), by output and by output and donor (to 2014). Expenditure by Donor and Output, 2015 was not provided in the 2015 annual report. Fig. 4, below, shows that following an initially slow start, which is to be expected, expenditure increased sharply before achieving in excess of 90% of total donor resources available to the project.


Fig. 4: Total Expenditure by Year



Source: Annual Reports, various years

Fig. 5 shows expenditure of individual donors' disbursed resources by year.


Fig. 5: Expenditure of Individual Donors' Contributions by Year



Source: ibid

All donors are included for each year despite some not making resources available at different points in time. Furthermore, it is important to emphasise that not all donors contributed to each output area. Fig. 6 shows expenditure by donor (excluding management costs) per output and in total.

Fig. 6: Donor Expenditure by Output



Source: ibid

Fig. 6 clearly shows that support for national programmes [line ministry programmes (CRP) and small grants (SGPs)] were funded between 2012 and 2014 inclusive, reflecting donors refusal to provide further on-budget (CRP) support post end 2013 and the withdrawal of SGP support for new projects at the same time<sup>16</sup>.

Some comment on the abrupt donor withdrawal of funding is apposite in a peace building operation<sup>17</sup>. First, the evaluation team has received reports that, on average, the withdrawal of on-budget support to the four LMs has resulted in a reversal of such gains as were achieved: for example, the evaluation team was informed that an average 20% - 30% of saplings planted have died as payment to reintegrees in the Agriculture Conservation Corps for their care, in particular irrigation, ended and, understandably, they stopped work. Similarly, the initial survey of the MoLSAMD VET training reported that around half

<sup>16</sup> It was envisaged that new concept notes in one province would be presented to the Technical Committee. In the event, no new SGPs were identified. Ongoing SGPs were completed in the course of the year, with the exception of three cancelled because of procurement irregularities.

<sup>17</sup> The Karzai government's refusal to sign the Bi-lateral Security Agreement (BSA) impacted the Program. When BSA signature was refused all donors ceased mobilizing funds, thus the budget approval process for 2014 couldn't get through as it used to be. ISAF had led no need more funding and abolishing the community recovery. UNDP management argued strongly with ISAF and Donors against abolishing the community recovery programs, suggesting that in the absence of the CRP, UNDP might not have an interest in continuing.


were either self-employed or had identified paid employment. A planned follow-up survey, however, was not possible since no funding for this was available.

Additionally, the 200 reintegrees, employed in the Public Works Corps in Kunduz subsequent to the salaries (US \$200/month) ended when donor funding ended, some rejoined the Taliban, under threat of death if they did not. In other provinces, Nangahar, for instance, reintegrees are without income and defense, approximately 17 and nine having been respectively killed and injured by insurgents as traitors. This points to the core of the challenge, which is the need for sustained follow-up of the status of reintegrees, at least for 24 months in the opinion of the Afghan security ministries. It has been suggested to the evaluation team that since project funding has stopped, as many as 18% of reintegrees have returned to the Taliban, or possibly moved on to Daesh.

The point is not that donors should not expect burden sharing on the part of GoIRA; indeed, in the evaluation’s opinion, such burden sharing is a necessity if peace-building is to be sustainable. The issue, rather, is the timing of the insistence of burden-sharing. As noted already, it is clearly important for sustainability and ownership that GoIRA accept a rising share of the cost burden of peace-building and, in particular, the necessarily associated economic development, but the time to negotiate this is at the outset of a peace-building project, not after 60% of the implementation period has passed. In principle, discussion of burden-sharing should take place in the course of project design; certainly at the very start of implementation and should reflect a declining share of donor support over the project’s life with (for example) donors financing no more than 15% - 20% in the project’s final year.

Ongoing project expenditure related to support to reintegration and the project’s management structures, including salaries, and management support provided through UNDP. Fig. 7 provides an overview of spending by outputs as defined in the Annual Reports.


Fig. 7: Expenditure by Year



Source: ibid

Fig. 7 suggests resource utilisation efficiency over the project’s life, utilisation commencing slowly, expanding quickly in 2012 and 2013 (reflecting support for both SGPs and CRPs) and maintaining resource utilisation in excess of 75% for the final four years of the project. Fig. 8, however, differentiates according to individual Outputs.

Fig. 8: Expenditure by Output Area and Year



Source: ibid

As can be seen, Fig. 8 clearly reveals the steep increase in CRP/SGP expenditure between 20-11 and 2012, its utilisation of in excess of 90% of available resources in 2012 and 2013. Subsequent to the Window B donors, decision to cease support for on-budget CRP expenditure (and effectively new SGPs) at the end of 2013, support for funding this Output declined to 77% of available resources in 2014 before ceasing completely in 2015. In general, financial resource utilisation has been in line with budgetary allocation and has absorbed the substantial amount of available resources.

This relatively efficient resource use overall was significantly improved by the appointment of the six Regional Financial Associates (RFAs) from mid-2013. Their appointments were in response to significant challenges (according to the RFAs, JS and FCOS personnel with whom the evaluation team interacted) between 20% and 30% of all advances) experienced in relation to reconciliation of advances; in the absence of the reconciliation of 80% of the advance to a province, further funds release was not possible. The result was that funds were blocked<sup>18</sup> and activities unable to proceed, even when the advance received for a particular activity had been reconciled fully. This was largely because separate accounts and budget lines were not deemed feasible<sup>19</sup>, the result being that

<sup>18</sup> A variety of factors contributed to this; in some cases, remote provinces lacked infrastructure (e.g. a postal service) that led to substantial delays in delivery of receipts/accounting. In others, security considerations resulted in the same result. In most cases, however, the cause was the lack of capacity at provincial level.

<sup>19</sup> In some instances, this was likely the reality since managing multiple bank accounts would have created its own challenges.

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unreconciled totals from other province-based activities resulted in all funds being blocked. The RFAs appointment, commencing mid-2013, contributed significantly to resolving the reconciliation challenge, most having been successfully resolved by mid-2014.

By contrast, the three Outputs related to project management maintained levels of resource utilisation throughout the project's life, probably reflecting the heavy investment in recurrent expenditure (salaries, consultants, etc.) in all three Outputs (See Table 1 above).

### 3.3 Management

The project management structure effectively established a significant superstructure, drawing on existing GoIRA institutions (e.g. FOC in the MoF) and newly established ones (HPC and its secretariat support), substantial TA provided through UNDP, and oversight functions drawn from GoIRA, UNDP and the contributing donors.

#### 3.3.i Structure

The project was managed according to National Implementation Modality (NIM) of the UNDP. The GoIRA designated a Chief Executive Officer (National Project Director) to lead and implement the agreed project activities. UNDP provided technical assistance for the overall management of the trust fund. Other necessary support from the UNDP Country Office was provided as needed.

##### 3.3.i.a Project Board

A Project Board was established to provide overall guidance, policy support, coordination, as well as review the project progress, approve work plans and take necessary decisions to implement the project activities in a timely manner. The project board consisted of the CEO, the Ministry of Finance, UNDP and contributing donors and operated in close coordination with the Peace and Reintegration Sub-Committee of the standing committee on security of JCMB.

It is worth noting that UNDP co-chaired the Board when issues concerning Window B were under discussion. It was able to be in attendance at Board meetings discussing issues concerning Windows A and C but did not chair these.

##### 3.3.i.b Project Management


APRP-UNDP support was implemented under the governance and management structure of APRP. The UNDP Trust Fund Window was managed through a Trust Fund Manager, contracted by UNDP, who in the day-to-day management was accountable to the APRP management. Decision making on financial resources allocation took place through the Financial Oversight Committee.

UNDP provided technical assistance through the establishment of project support teams to assist the GoIRA in the management of the technical assistance and funding mechanisms with sound accountability systems.



UNDP’s DIAG project structure was collapsed gradually into APRP-UNDP Support to broaden DIAG and arms collection processes further and incorporate them into larger peace building efforts. A management specialist was recruited to analyze and provide inputs for the merger of the DIAG project with APRP. ANBP’s existing capacity is deployed to ensure an immediate start of the programme, without suffering detrimental time loss for recruitment and procurement. Support was implemented under UNDP fast track procedures for procurement and recruitment, to enhance the flexibility and delivery speed of the project.

Fig. 9: Project Management Organogram



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### 3.3.i.c Funding Mechanism

UNDP received funds from contributing donors through standard agreements, contributions being for all or specific components. UNDP transferred the received funds into the (then) Government-established new account, the APRP-UNDP Support Account. Disbursements were in accordance with annual work plans and Financial Oversight Committee decisions. APRP-UNDP Support was subject to annual audits in accordance with UNDP rules and regulations. The Financial Oversight Committee had discretionary decision-making decisions on project approval and funding in accordance with the ToR of Financial Oversight Committee.

Funds were able to be channelled to vendors and other implementing partners including, but not limited to, NGOs, Civil Society Organizations and other UN agencies; UNDP made disbursements directly. Funds were also channeled to the PPRA for utilization through the Provincial Reintegration Committee. On-budget expenditure (i.r.o. the four Line Ministries) were through Ministry of Finance (MoF). Advances could also be provided to the APRP Joint Secretariat for activities requiring direct funding.

### 3.3.i.d Description of the Funding System

At the outset, it is important to emphasise that Afghanistan operates its budgetary cycle in line with a Medium-term Economic Framework (MTEF) approach. In terms of this, the MoF estimates income (including that from donors) and expenditure over a five year period and develops a detailed budget in respect of the next fiscal year (FY). Within the planning period as each FY passes, MoF expands the budgetary cycle into the future, while producing detailed income and expenditure plans for the next FY.

Within this context, the APRP required stakeholders to develop annual work plans (AWPs) as the basis for requesting funding for the project's activities. Individual work plans, including funding requirements for CRP and SGP projects, having been prepared, were then submitted for approval: CRP and SGP requests were submitted to the Technical Committee (TC) of the FOC for review; if approved by the TC, they were then forwarded to the FOC for approval. Once approved, the resource requirements of the AWP and CRP/SGP proposals were communicated to UNDP for release of the funds. In essence, therefore, the APRP process meant that budgetary availability was unpredictable, affecting the MTEF process<sup>20</sup>.

It also impacted the appropriateness of the budgetary planning cycle: ideally, budgetary planning should commence and be completed within the final quarter of the preceding FY; this ensures that resources can be voted at the start of the new FY and be available to the LM when the implementation cycle is expected to commence, thereby permitting achievement of implementation targets within the envisaged (Spring – Autumn) implementation time frame. The APRP approval process meant that budgetary release of funds was usually out of kilter with this due to the different layers of approval required.

An additional complication was the agreement between Window B and Window C (Window C was a

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<sup>20</sup> This process was required for all recipients of Window B, including for those LM 'on-budget' activities.

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direct bilateral agreement between GoIRA and DFID). Window C operated on the basis of reimbursement of expended funds. According to the agreement reached (as reported by the JS), Window B would meet Window C's obligations and then present a request for the reimbursement of the disbursed funds. While reimbursement took place within a reasonable time frame, the effect, nonetheless, was to delay the possibilities of Window B disbursements as the process required UNDP, as Trust Fund Manager, to be informed both of the payments and the arrival of the reimbursements. The net effect was to add time to the disbursement process.

The contrast with Window A's cycle could not be greater<sup>21</sup>. NSP's disbursement procedure was unique<sup>22</sup> in Afghanistan as the project has its own bank account, which is managed by GIZ on behalf of the ARTF. Because of this a number of individual initiatives were possible. First, the NSP permitted MRRD to retain a float (c. US \$80 million), which could be drawn down to finance approved community development projects in the identified districts<sup>23</sup>. Second, NSP was a bottom up approach; Window B activities were top down. NSP supported the establishment of accountable, District Development Committees. A participatory needs assessment approach, overseen by the elected DDCs, prioritized community projects, that which topped the list being submitted for NSP funding. Since the NSP was a country-wide programme (the exceptions being those districts with extreme security classification) and had a weekly disbursement target in excess of us \$1 million, project approval was swift. MRRD, because of the US \$80 million float in a distinct MRRD account with the Central Bank, disbursed pre-financing equivalent to 90% of project costs. Two GIZ international TA, recruited to manage the ARTF accounts, reviewed financial reports of projects funded and replenished the MRRD float; approvals for reimbursements took place, on average within three - four weeks of receiving the all necessary documentation of the float's disbursements from MRRD<sup>24</sup>. GoIRA's intention to bring any successor<sup>25</sup> to the NSP within the mainstream makes replication of the model highly unlikely.

### 3.3.i.e Conclusions on the Management Structure and Arrangements

The evaluation was informed that UNDP's management of the project was directly affected by its inability to influence the programme's overarching political imperatives as perceived both by GoIRA and

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<sup>21</sup> A couple of points with regard to the NSP's links to the APRP are apposite. First, NSP was an already established, donor-funded project and managed through the ARTF through an international contract with GTZ (now GIZ IS); the USAID commitment to NSP pre-dated the APRP. Second, NSP had an already established bottom-up approach based on community-based needs identification and rapid disbursement of 90% of required funds. Because of this, MRRD was reluctant to engage with APRP but, under pressure from GoIRA and ISAF, agreed the CRIP. In terms of this, NSP would support projects, utilizing the standard NSP model, in those districts in which there was a significant reintegree presence. The APRP security ministries would provide this information to MRRD.

<sup>22</sup> GoIRA is currently seeking to incorporate NSP into standard procedures, i.e. funds to be channeled through the MoF.

<sup>23</sup> Under the CRIP, NSP agreed to finance community-identified projects within districts identified as priorities in terms of the numbers of reintegrees who had joined the APRP. All other NSP procedures – Community Development Committees, community-based needs identification and prioritization, proposal submission, etc. – remained the same as those for all NSP projects.

<sup>24</sup> Subsequent to President Ghani's decision to centralize all procurement in the Office of the Presidency, this time frame approximately doubled, to the frustration of the Fund Managers and the World Bank.

<sup>25</sup> NSP, in its current form, is being wound up with the process being expected to be completed at the same time (June 2016) as the WB's SDRP 2 closure.

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by the project's donors. This is underlined by the organisation's co-chairing of Board discussions surrounding Window B activities but side-lining in discussions of other programme funding channels, as well as political imperatives and motivations. Furthermore, the funding structure established negatively impacted the planning cycle and resulted in delayed decision-making and disbursements that negatively affected programme efficiency, especially when compared to the Window A disbursement procedures.

CRP funding through Window B was supposedly 'on-budget'. In reality, rather than budget support, the process reflected a project-based approach, which added to delayed responsiveness to reintegrate priorities in terms of establishing their and their families economic security, and encouraging community acceptance of the reintegration of fighters through community projects that resulted in improved socioeconomic conditions (clean water, sanitation, infrastructure supporting improved communications, access to education and health care, etc.) for the community as a whole<sup>26</sup>. The evaluation was informed that, in at least four provinces visited/interacted with by mid-point in the evaluation, ex-combatant groups, numbering between at least 20 and 30 each, had still not seen any community-based project activity that would contribute to their enhanced acceptance within their wider communities. Given that their, and their families', personal security was largely dependent on such acceptance and group protection, this was an important disincentive for recruiting additional AGEs to the programme.

### 3.3.ii Staffing

The above conclusion in relation to the significant salary burden is borne out by analysis of the APRP detailed budget<sup>27</sup>, which had been subject to significant reductions of salaried positions. In total, the evaluation team identified in excess of 800 salaried positions<sup>28</sup>, administrative overheads (including salaries) comprising 83.8% of the Window B total operations budget for the two quarters<sup>29</sup>. At the time of the evaluation (Window C having taken on the salaries of JS staff), salaries and allowances are paid to 132 PJST staff, 221, PJST support staff, 62 PPC staff, and 743 PPC members allowances<sup>30</sup>. In addition, salaries were paid to staff of the MoIA APRP cell (40 personnel, including two Generals, two Colonels, one Colonel's deputy, four Majors, 10 Captains, three lieutenants, 13 Sergeants and four Cleaners), IDLG APRP cell (four), MoD APRP cell (84 personnel, including Generals (8) and Colonels (27), drivers (46), administration, cleaners and operations (1 each) and FOCS personnel (eight). Sixty-two NDS salaries are paid from Window C, as are 10 HPC salaries (six members and four staff) and, from 2015, all JS salaries. Fig 7, below, provides an overview of the Window B TA, salary and incentive payments in December 2015. Full details are appended at Annex 5.

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<sup>26</sup> A comment from the GIZ managers of the NSP regarding the APRP in this regard is apposite. While acknowledging that they had limited information about the project, they had heard that 'the APRP was amongst the worst disbursement performers' and that this possibly was due to 'a lack of understanding about the MoF's requirements'.


<sup>27</sup> April – September 2016.

<sup>28</sup> Note, this information does not include Transitional Assistance to be paid to Reintegratees.

<sup>29</sup> Window C's expenditure on administrative overheads (including salaries) comprised 62.5% of its total budget for the two 2016 quarters.

<sup>30</sup> Not included in the total.

Fig. 10: TA, Salary and Incentive Payments by Recipient (December 2015)



Source: JS information

Fig. 10 reinforces the substantial financial burden in respect of salaries and incentive payments. However, the burden was substantially increased by the fact that the salaries paid to public servants generally, including those benefitting from the World Bank’s Capacity Building for Results (CBR) scheme that targeted high performing public servants in key ministries. The 2012 Annual Report notes the Minister of Finance’s insistence that the APRP should apply a unified salary scale such as that of the CBR programme. However, the 2013 Annual Report identified such an adjustment as a risk, noting ‘some staff may choose to leave APRP or become de-motivated, resulting in staffing gaps’, reflecting the reality that APRP scales were seriously out of kilter with national public sector scales. The most significant medium-term impact of this divergence is the total absence of even short-term sustainability should donor support cease. According to the detailed budget for the quarter ending March 2016, 718 public service complement posts were paid through the APRP budget.

3.3.iii Monitoring Framework and Evaluation

M&E was to be in accordance with the UNDP User Guide. This meant that:

- A quarterly quality assessment was expected to record progress towards the completion of key results, based on quality criteria and methods captured in the Results Framework. In fact, as a review of the reports produced demonstrates, only activities were reported; as such, no evidence of results has been reported. Examples of the substantial changes in reporting, drawn from three Annual Reports, is appended at Annex 6.

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- An Issue Log, activated in Atlas<sup>31</sup> and updated by the Project Manager, was to facilitate tracking and resolution of potential problems or requests for change. No project staff received training in Atlas.
  - A risk log, activated in Atlas and regularly updated through reviews of the external environment potentially affecting the project implementation. No national project staff received Atlas training.
  - Project Progress Reports (PPR), based on the Atlas information, submitted by the Project Manager to the Project's Board through Project Assurance, using the standard report format used by the Country Office. No national project staff received training in Atlas; nor were reports developed by the UNDP project manager although the evaluation was informed that between 2012 and end-2014, the UNDP project manager monitored the reports and sought to ensure that they included disaggregated (e.g. number of female beneficiaries and reintegrees) were included<sup>32</sup>. Quarterly reports submitted detailed activities undertaken, not progress towards outputs, to say nothing of outcomes.
  - Project lessons-learned log activated and regularly updated to ensure on-going learning and adaptation within the organization, and facilitate the preparation of the Lessons-learned Report at the end of the project. Donors reported that no such report had been received. Neither did the evaluation team receive any such regular report; instead, the evaluation team was requested to identify and report on the lessons learned in order to inform the development of a possible new project.
  - A Monitoring Schedule Plan, activated in Atlas and updated, to track key management actions/events<sup>33</sup>. No project staff received training in Atlas. As FOCS and JS staff were responsible for monitoring, it appears unlikely that such a plan was activated in Atlas.
  - Quarterly Progress Reports (QPR), based on the Atlas data, prepared by the Project Manager and shared with the Project Board and donors. QPRs, shared with donors, focused on reporting activities (as did all reports).
  - Periodic project management meetings and meetings with partners and stakeholders conducted as required.
  - Regular, scheduled monthly monitoring visits by rotating senior staff from central office to regional offices, as well as by the quality assurance team assigned by the Project Board. Both FCOS and JS staff, as well as LM staff, conducted monitoring visits. These were seldom coordinated for joint missions<sup>34</sup> and while reports were shared, there appears to have little, if any, cross-fertilisation/learning from the missions.

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<sup>31</sup> The Atlas system was not used by the project. The TCA team had access to the system but no data was entered into it. As a result, the project document intentions remained that and were ineffective in monitoring and reporting.

<sup>32</sup> The evaluation notes that the need for the project manager to do this comments negatively on the efficiency and effectiveness, not to mention the technical understanding and knowledge, of the TCA team and the CTA head.

<sup>33</sup> The plan to input data into UNDP's Atlas system was not implemented. Instead, the responsible individual in the FCOS proposed an Excel-based reporting template to collect information; the informant was unsure whether the proposal was reviewed by the embedded TCA. JS only established its M&E unit and system in 2013 (in accordance with recommendations of the MTR), the main function of which was to check reports/suspicion of misuse of funds. Because of this, monitoring was reactive, not systematic. Following the appointment of the UNV M&E TCA at the start of 2015, he developed an Excel-based set of reporting criteria, which he attempted to use for reporting.

<sup>34</sup> The evaluation was informed that there were three joint missions over the project's life.

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- Annual Review Report will be prepared by the Project Manager<sup>35</sup> and shared with the Project Board and the Outcome Board. Annual reports, like the QPRs, focused on reporting of activities; as such, while accounting for resource utilisation, they contributed little, if anything, to understanding project progress in terms of outputs and outcomes.
  - Annual Project Review, driven by the Project Board, involving other stakeholders and based on the above report, carried out during the fourth quarter of the year or soon after, to assess the performance of the project and appraise the Annual Work Plan (AWP) for the following year. In the last year, this review will be a final assessment. This review was to focus on the extent to which progress is being made towards outputs, and that these remain aligned to appropriate outcomes. Since annual reports addressed activities, any annual review was seriously limited in its ability to assess ‘the extent to which progress is being made towards outputs, and that these remain aligned to appropriate outcomes’.

Window A (NSP) supported community projects had the same M&E model as all NSP projects. This was community-based, independent of the CDCs, and utilized participatory tools, including social audits. Their reports were provided to the NSP unit in MRRD and onward to the international NSP Trust Fund Management Team, both of which used these as verification for the disbursement of the 10% funds balance and the replenishment of the MRRD’s float account. In addition, the ARTF commissioned independent evaluations of NSP projects, which verified a sample of projects undertaken.

In effect, the evaluation team’s view is that M&E was ineffective both as a project management tool and means of assessing progress towards achieving identified outputs, to say nothing of the project’s outcomes. Based on the information provided to the evaluation team, this reflected the almost total absence of support provided to both the FOCS and JS M&E teams, at least until the start of 2015. For example, the TCA embedded in the FOCS provided no training to the staff responsible for M&E, its sole contribution being a vaguely remembered initial review of the reporting framework that responsible FOCS staff developed although anyone with knowledge of M&E understands that data gathered should be reviewed against what is required (in terms of the project’s Results Framework) and the framework adapted to meet any gaps that are identified.

Similarly, it is noteworthy that the JS M&E unit was only established in 2013 following the MTR’s recommendations, which reported at the end of 2012. In this connection, it is necessary to emphasise that UNDP embedded a substantial TA team within the JS, which was led by a Chief Technical Advisor (CTA). The fact that the MTR noted the absence of an M&E functional unit within the JS and recommended its establishment, is an critically important implied comment on the quality of the TCA support (in 2015, UNDP recruited a UNV to provide M&E capacity assistance) provided by this team. But, equally, it is a highly critical implicit comment on UNDP’s project management, as is the generally inadequate quality of the reporting’s focus on activities rather than outputs and their contribution to outcomes.

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<sup>35</sup> In fact, the reporting was carried out by the TCA team, not the UNDP project manager, whose role was to review the reports submitted by the CTA.



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### 3.3.iv. Monitoring & Evaluation Team

The project M&E teams, subsequent to their establishment<sup>36</sup>, monitored activities although no evaluation, beyond the independent mid-term review, was conducted. The M&E team was responsible for

- undertaking field monitoring of programme activities; and
- Conducting performance assessments, impact assessments, periodic reviews and evaluations.

In this latter respect, the M&E teams seriously underperformed, but perhaps not to the same extent as the international, embedded TCA team, which failed to provide early guidance and support to the national teams in terms of what data and information to collect so as to be able to report on outputs and outcomes. Furthermore, the lack of appropriate TCA support is underlined by the failure to set up an M&E function within the JS from the project's outset. The M&E teams in the FCOS and JS were responsible, supposedly, for collecting, managing and analysing data against programme success indicators, themselves weak, and report on them regularly<sup>37</sup> but failed to do this, except in respect of activities undertaken (i.e. they monitored resource utilisation against the approved activities). This is borne out in the reporting for which the TCA under the CTA took responsibility<sup>38</sup>, content of which changed almost annually (Annex 6). In the evaluators' opinion, achievement of an efficient M&E function was made even more problematic by the absence of any baseline data collection.

### 3.3.v Independent Monitoring Agent

An independent Monitoring Agent (MA) team was envisaged. However, it proved impossible to recruit one, as it proved impossible to recruit a national accountancy firm or qualified accountant. This proved an important gap in oversight function for most of the project period.

### 3.3.vi Conclusions on M&E Efficiency

The foregoing has highlighted a variety of shortcomings in terms of the M&E systems' establishment, the support they received, and the outputs they produced. As a result of these, the quality of reporting provided was poor, focusing on activities undertaken rather than the activities contribution to the achievement of planned outputs<sup>39</sup>. Nor is there any evidence of an attempt to demonstrate the outputs achievement (e.g. the reintegration of 11 000+ ex-combatants) to the establishment of peace, even at a local level.

In part, this may stem from the apparent confusion surrounding the definition of 'peace' reflected both in

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<sup>36</sup> FOCS had M&E officers from the outset; by contrast, the JS only established and staffed an M&E unit following the MTR, which recommended that one should be set up.

<sup>37</sup> In fact, the evaluation was informed that the JS M&E team understood that its primary purpose was to check resource use in order to address suspicion of fraudulent or inappropriate financial resource use, an audit, not an M&E function.

<sup>38</sup> This reflected then current practice within the UNDP Country Office; the evaluation has been informed that this has since changed.

<sup>39</sup> The UNDP project manager's efforts, sometimes successfully, to ensure reporting of disaggregated data did little, if anything, to address this.



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GoIRA's programme, the project document and by those responsible for the project's implementation. At best, this understanding may define peace as the absence of war/conflict, in other words 'negative peace'. However, in the evaluation's view, the major cause for the M&E challenges experienced lay in the inadequate TCA support provided; in the absence of necessary guidance relating to the quantitative and qualitative data that should be collected in order to demonstrate the activities' contribution to the achievements of the project's outputs, M&E staff fell back on accounting for resource expenditure by reporting on activities alone.

### 3.4 Conclusions

Efficiency's assessment is dependent on how one measures it. First, if the level of disbursement is taken as the measure of resource utilisation efficiency, the APRP has been relatively efficient. Influences on this included the complexity of the process and the number of stages through which Window B disbursement requests proceeded, especially when compared to those required by Window A. However, if one includes the wider picture, e.g. including the staffing costs, then the evaluators believe that the APRP's structure was unnecessarily resource intensive: there appears no need for 11 LM cell staff in MoPW, MRRD, MoLSAMD each, for example.

Third, UNDP provided significant TCA support, the efficacy of which appears to have been limited for GoIRA/JS counterparts<sup>40</sup>. Having said this, the evaluators' own experience is that GoIRA frequently is reluctant to appear reliant on international TA. In as politically sensitive an area as peace and reintegration, this was likely heightened so that any TCA would have experienced challenges. This, despite the TCA team being headed by a CTA, may also reflect the subsequent later reliance on UNVs. A clear example of this relates to the successively different reporting frameworks presented in the annual reports, which, as noted, bore little, if any relation to the RF, which itself was weak.

Finally, UNDP's project management appears to be somewhat like the 'curate's egg', good in parts. Certainly, the deployment (and replacement) of TCA represents efficient management; however, its utility is in serious question so it may have been more efficient to pursue different recruitment. Second, UNDP must bear significant responsibility for the reporting shortcomings: the project document indicates that preparation and submission of quarterly and annual reports to donors, based on the M&E data recorded in Atlas, was the project management's responsibility, not the TCA's; however, the reality was that the TCA team, under the leadership of the CTA, prepared the quarterly and annual reports, as was current practice in the Country Office at the time. Had all aspects of the project document's requirements in this respect been fulfilled (i.e. the utilisation of ATLAS, the alignment of reporting with the RF's indicators, the revision of the indicators in the light of experience, and the Programme Manager preparing the reports based on the ATLAS information), the inadequacy of activities reporting could have been addressed far earlier<sup>41</sup>.

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<sup>40</sup> The evaluators have been informed that TA was largely ineffectual and unable to influence policy and strategy. Key individuals were reported to have blocked/ignored TA initiatives.

<sup>41</sup> As noted, the programme manager's efforts to ensure that disaggregated data (by gender, reintegrees, area, etc.) was included in the reports was insufficient to move beyond activity to output and outcome reporting.

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Similarly, another missed management opportunity was the failure to link the AWP<sup>42</sup> approach with the LMs' total dependence on APRP resources for the CRPs. At the very least, effective project management would have brought this to donor's attention by mid-2011 (no CRP plans being received for that year) and allowed early initiation of burden-sharing negotiation. At the very least, this may have avoided the sudden cessation of non-NSP project activities at the end of 2013.

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<sup>42</sup> Itself, problematic as it undermined a budget support modality in favor of what was project support.

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## 4. Effectiveness

Effectiveness considers the contribution of the activities undertaken to the outputs achieved, essentially answering the question were the activities appropriate to achieving the expected results/outputs. Furthermore, what results, expected and unexpected, were achieved? The discussion of Effectiveness is organised by the Output areas identified in the annual reports.

Outputs 1 and 2 essentially addresses efficiency and is discussed under that heading. Specific aspects, including the Communications strategy and its efficacy are discussed below.

### 4.1.i Output 3: Subnational structures effectively deliver key components

Vetting Process of Reintegrees: Potential reintegrees generally were identified through Security Ministry<sup>43</sup> actors at provincial level, acting either individually or in concert. Once identified, the evidence presented to the evaluation was that initial discussions surrounding the conditions under which the individual or group would join the APRP process took place. Subject to a satisfactory resolution of these, the Security Ministries would collectively vet the proposed reintegrees, determining whether or not they were AGEs. Once this was completed and agreement that the proposed group, in fact, were AGEs and that they were committed to joining the programme, the reintegration moved ahead to their disarmament<sup>44</sup> followed by the biometric identification of the individual reintegrees. This stage could be time consuming, since collecting biometrics required expertise, but once completed, the ex-combatants were registered and provided with identification that proved that they had renounced violence and were participants in the APRP. At the same time, reintegrees became eligible to receive the promised, initially three and subsequently six months TA (Af 13 500/month for ex-commanders and Af8 500/month for fighters). TA was also linked to the weapons, functional or inactive) surrendered<sup>45</sup>; those who joined the programme but did not surrender a weapon, were not eligible to receive TA. TA was provided initially as a subsistence package, including food, but this proved very problematic to distribute. As a result, TA was converted to the cash payment above. In the overwhelming majority of cases, TA transfers were done electronically.

Fig. 11 and 12, below, provides an overview of the number of reintegrees by province over the period 2011 – 15 inclusive. Fig 12 gives information on the overall reintegration target, the number of commanders reintegrated and the number of TA packages provided. Figs. 13 and 14 show the overall number of reintegrees killed and injured and the numbers of mortalities and injuries by province.


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<sup>43</sup> Ministry of Interior, National Directorate of Security, Ministry of Defense.

<sup>44</sup> According to the MoD, slightly under half of the light weapons surrendered were functional. The rest were inactive or unserviceable.


<sup>45</sup> Based on weapons management SOP, a group joining the peace program should have 85% operational weapons; this is due to the fact that there is IEDs makers/planter, intelligence workers, radio operators and cooks in an armed group. These needs to be identified/ confirmed in vetting process by security departments.

Fig. 11: Total APRP Reintegrees by Province




Source: Annual Reports, JS Data

Fig. 12: Reintegration, Commanders, Disarmament and TA Achievements by year




Source: Annual Reports

Fig. 13: Total Reintegreees Killed and Injured



Source: JS Data

Fig. 14: Reintegree Deaths and Injuries by Province



Source: JS Data

According to the JS, compensation for deaths and injuries of reintegreees was payable, respectively Afs 100 000 and Afs 50 000. JS data records payments to relatives totalling Afs 78 million in respect of 78 murders and injuries.

**4.1.ii Transitional Assistance Packages**

In total, 10 816 reintegreees received TA over the project’s five year life, well in excess (55.3%) of half in the first two years. Over the remaining three years numbers reflected a roughly constant recruitment (Fig.12). In the first instance, TA packages were envisaged as a subsistence package intended to

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enable the reintegree to adapt to civilian life. Distribution proved impossible, especially for those who resided away from urban centers. As a result, the TA was provided in cash (Af13 500 and Af8 500 respectively for commanders and fighters); efforts were quickly introduced to ensure payment of TA was carried out electronically but, as is still the case with LOFTA, some payments had to be made through trusted agents because of remoteness of recipients. Reintegrees became eligible for TA once they had completed the biometric process, which excluded ex-combatants, such as the *circa* 100 reconciles in Kandahar, who the CDC independently recruited to the APRP and who did not undergo the biometric identification process. Other problems associated with TA reported to the evaluation team by ex-combatants included non-receipt of TA (they were informed there was no money)<sup>46</sup>. Ex-combatants also complained that promises (mostly land for agriculture, but also permanent employment) had not been met: a number of ex-CIP participants, for example, asked what they and their followers were supposed to do now that they had no means of subsistence and the community projects, which had been promised<sup>47</sup> were not delivered and enhanced risks to them at personal and family levels (Figs. 13 - 14).

#### 4.1.iii PPCs and PJST Support

Field visits revealed a number of negative observations concerning the structure and the quality of the PPC structures.

- Interviewees in many provinces reported that the PPC lacked educated, influential, neutral, and well respected people.
- In Balkh, the PPC structures was not affective as the selection of the members was purely based on recommendations and not as per the needs of the communities. The Governor of Herat, a member of the APRP program steering committee, believed that the structure of APRP needed to be revised and strong, influential and effective people to be brought on board as PPC members who can truly negotiate with higher level Taliban and persuade them to join the peace process.
- In Jawzjan, only limited Ulema were appointed as PPC members but involving Ulema and religious figures would, it was believed, ensure more people would join peace process.
- In Zabul, the PPC was mainly composed of warlords and powerful people. They don't have the political imperative to bring peace and people of Zabul were unhappy about their performance and achievements: the reintegration of 30 or so Taliban had little effect on security situation. The interlocutor's view was that "in the beginning it was good but now every day becomes worse than before". Moreover, the respondent was unaware of any other PPC achievements as there was no transparency and communication about the work of PPC. Women were not welcomed to get any information beyond public awareness raising.

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<sup>46</sup> The evaluators were informed that in at least four provinces there were also a number who wished to join the programme and had indicated their intention to do so but were in limbo as there was no money for TA.

<sup>47</sup> And, which are critically important to ease the path of communities' acceptance of the reintegrees and be willing to form part of their defense to increase their personal security.

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- In Kandahar, the formation of PPC and its membership did not follow the SOP for creating PPCs. Well connected individuals influenced the formation of PPC, demonstrating a preference for a tribal representative structure. [He introduced two persons from bigger tribes, and one person from smaller tribes to the PPC.] The then governor of Kandahar also introduced his own preferred representatives: Ulema, women representatives (4), CSO representative, and tribal leaders with authority and influence were introduced by the governor. The HPC itself introduced some. Finally, 39 persons were introduced to the PPC, the majority of whom were the former Jihadi commanders who had fought the Taliban for several years. After the elections, a former Jihadi commander loyal to Jamiat-e-Islami was elected as the head of PPC. The Secretary of the PPC was an unqualified person imposed on the PPC. [Since January 2016, a woman has been assigned as the secretary of the Kandahar PPC]. Despite women being culturally excluded from leadership positions, PPC members believed that since it's a transitional period of APRP having a woman as the secretary of the PPC would present a positive image of the province.
  - PPC members' incentives were very low. No one felt responsible and accountable to PPC leadership. A smaller but more structured PPC with better incentives (a salary) might be more effective.
  - In Herat, the PPC was perceived to be ineffective in and unqualified<sup>48</sup> to lead and manage the peace processes. PJST informants asserted that several PPC members were uninterested in the peace process and blocked reintegration<sup>49</sup>. Also, PPC members never attempted to resolve the clear lack of coordination among the security agencies.
  - Other criticisms included: the PPC was an ineffective structure to lead and manage the peace process.
    - The role of Ulema was limited to public awareness raising and de-radicalization.
    - There were five other religious leaders in the PPC who were not working for the government but were spying for the Taliban to win their protection.
    - The management structure was too dense in PPC and most of the committees were not functioning. Most of the power and influence was at the hands of farmer warlords and affiliates of strongmen in the government. There was a lot of funds misuse in the project and PPC operations.
    - The PPC was an imbalanced structure in many regions visited.
    - Power was held by the PPC head. Women were not consulted in the meetings or on the activities of the PPC. PPC head was opposing women's activities and would create problems for women members to go to districts. Arghandab district governor was not supportive and would even threaten women for their activism on promoting peace. In the future, Women's role should be more clear and authoritative. There are three women in Zabul PPC and "all of

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<sup>48</sup> They didn't have the capacity to assess the effectiveness of SOPs and propose policy recommendations.

<sup>49</sup> It was claimed that some benefitted from sustaining the conflict.

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us were ready to go to districts for public awareness raising especially women". However, we were not supported by the Program. We used the facilities of women's affairs department to reach out to district centers and schools for public awareness raising. She claims that most of the problems are in the capital. She believes that the main reason for lack of support for women led initiatives were the presence of opponents in PPC and government.

- By contrast, the Mazar PPC was praised for helping communities and local solve their conflicts through peaceful manner and people communities welcomed peace program

PJSTs performed support functions for PPCs and comprised a support team leader, finance/administration officer, operations officer and a secretary/administrative support. Their principal function was to facilitate the PPC's activities, including ensuring the availability of funding necessary for members activities. In addition, they supported the development of SGPs and the provision of information to support LMs in the implementation of CRPs. Furthermore, they served as contact points for reintegrees with enquires concerning TA, training and access to promised SGPs/CRPs. Recruitment to positions was subject of political influence from the governor's office (which was expected) and the result was that some staff members were less than efficient. They also experienced significant capacity challenges, particularly in respect of financial management, which led to significant reconciliation backlogs and resulted in the recruitment of the six RFAs. Once appointed, the RFAs, working with PJST counterparts, were able to resolve the overwhelming majority of reconciliation issues, indicating that the challenges, in most cases, originated in capacity short falls rather than corruption.

#### 4.1.iv Commanders Incentive Programme (CIP) and Peace Advocates

Peace Advocates, like the Commanders' Incentive Programme, was introduced in 2015<sup>50</sup> in part to address the lack of employment opportunities available to ex-combatants but, more importantly, to utilise their status to present the argument for peace and reconciliation. In the course of 2015, a total of 1005 outreach activities were conducted by Peace Advocates, reintegrated AGE commanders, and PJST with a particularly strong engagement during peace week. This level of engagement was both substantial and significant and is to be applauded.

At the time of the evaluation, this activity area had ended; however, CIP participants and Peace Advocates with whom the evaluation interacted expressed positive views about their engagement; not the least important of these was the strong sense of self-worth that their promotion of peace and the APRP as a vehicle to achieve this had instilled in them. They were also appreciative of the opportunity their involvement presented them to achieve a level of economic security, which the project's conclusion had brought to an end as well. The strategic decision to use ex-combatants to present the arguments against violence as a means to resolve conflict and as a way of life demonstrated innovative thinking in the project but also successfully addressed concerns surrounding ex-combatants lack of economic, as

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<sup>50</sup> The first mention of the CIP and Peace Advocates sub-component is in the 2015 Annual Report and follows the complete cessation of employment opportunities through skills development (MoLSAMD's VET training) and employment (Agricultural Conservation Corps and Public Works Corp, as well as employment on SGPs).



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well as personal security.

Having said this, it is notable that peace advocacy was not the only utilisation of former commanders and their fighters. Information gathered in the course of field visits strongly indicated that the security ministries, at least, had another functional purpose for reintegrees, effectively establishing viable groups as a militia.

The evaluation interviewed one of the commanders from Panjwai District of Kandahar. He was a member of Hafiz Majeed front. He joined the peace process in 2011. He belongs to Pashtoon Noorzai tribe. He joined the peace process because a Noorzai tribal leader (who was also the then police chief of Helmand province) persuaded/ convinced him to join the peace process and that his security and livelihoods will be insured. He currently receives the salary of the CIP from APRP and has also stated that he is employed by National Directorate of Security.

He uses his network of former fighters (who are not active Taliban any more) to gathering information on IED locations, smugglers of narcotics, and culprits of terror activities. Most often the information has led to successful prevention of security incidents and capture of Taliban fighters. He showed photos and videos of capture Taliban fighters/ IEDs, and narcotics on his iPhone. He has made 150 person renounce violence but none of them have gone through the vetting process. If they go through the vetting process, their identities will be disclosed and will become targets for the Taliban.

In his view, the security institutions have failed to ensure protection of reintegrates he states that "if the government protects the reintegrates more prominent and influential Taliban commanders are keen to join the peace process". He also believes that the government is neither willing nor able to protect the reintegrates. Since joining the peace process, he has been personally attacked three times with car bombs. He has lost cousins and friends in the attacks. He has also suffered a right arm injury that has left his arm disabled. He has not received the compensation promised by the government or the any costs for his treatment. He also claimed that there are several influential people in the provincial government who have influence over Taliban and can facilitate their return to Peace process but instead ask the Taliban to protect them (the government officials) from other Taliban groups.

He has not benefited from any of the projects implemented under the APRP. According to him the NSP wastes money and doesn't help the people in the communities. A mosque has been constructed in Panjwai district and has made a lot of people happy about the government. He thinks that funds shouldn't be spend through CDCs and Maliks in insecure areas because only a small portion of the funds are actually used in the intended projects.

Other interviews with ex-combatants indicated that the above experience is not unique or, necessarily specific to the province (see Annex 7).


4.2 Output 4: Contributions made to sustainable peace and reintegration in provinces

4.2.i Small Grant Projects (SGPs)

Effectively, the SGPs were the APRP equivalent of earlier QIPs. Fig 15 provides an overview of the numbers of SGPs by province in the period to end March 2016. Following a slow start in 2011, SGP identification and approval picked up in 2012 and 2013. At the end of 2013, APRP donors announced the cessation of funding support (Fig 8 above). As a result, it was decided that those SGPs that had been approved, or were already underway, would be completed and, in 2014, one province would be able to submit Concept Notes for consideration by the Technical Committee<sup>51</sup>.

The Technical Committee agreed that there should be two value ceiling tiers for SGPs: Tier 1, the majority of approved projects, had a US \$25 000 ceiling; the Tier 2, which were mostly significant infrastructure development projects (e.g. schools for girls, and a *Madrassa*<sup>52</sup>), ceiling was US \$250 000. Tier 1 SGPs included clean drinking water, minor infrastructure (e.g. culverts), and sanitation. SGPs were largely coordinated with the concerned line ministries, only those proposals were accepted which were in line with provincial development plan and district development plan. Line ministries were consulted for it and it was made sure that they have Tashkeel and maintenance plan for the selected projects in the future.

Fig. 15: SGPs by Province (to March 2016)




Source: JS Data

<sup>51</sup> In the event, the Concept Notes submitted were too poor in quality to permit approval and no new SGPs were approved after the end of 2013.

<sup>52</sup> In response to the evaluation team’s enquiry, the informant stated that its construction meant that children no longer had to cross into Pakistan’s tribal areas to receive Islamic instruction, where they would be subject to radicalization influences. Given reports of the extent of radicalization reported emerging through *madrassas* in Pakistan’s tribal regions, the evaluation accepts the potential benefit of this construction.

Fig. 16: Average Cost/Beneficiary



Source: JS Data

Where they were implemented, the SGPs (like the NSP projects implemented through Window A) were positively received and reported to have a utilitarian function and positive impact. The evaluation is aware of reports of ex-commanders welcoming the presence of schools for girls ('my daughters and other girls from our village attend') and women commenting positively on the availability of clean water closer to households, resulting from the construction of shallow wells. In general, clean drinking water projects benefit women and girls disproportionately, not least because of the fact that they free up women and girls time for other activities, some of which may be gainful. In addition, the evaluation was informed that in one district where shallow wells had been constructed, the incidence of water-borne diseases, in particular diarrhea, had decreased significantly.

No SGP projects were designed for women specifically since they were supposed to be community wide. Arguably, projects specifically targeting women within communities would have had substantial advantage as they would have ensured that women's specific concerns were taken into consideration. However, a significant proportion of interviewees believed that specific projects were designed according to women's abilities, their status in society, the resources allocated and the culture of participation that was predominant in particular districts.

Complaints about SGPs were that they had not been implemented. Reintegreees, with whom the evaluation interacted, clearly understood that their implementation made a significant contribution to their and their families' personal security and, possibly more importantly, reacceptance in their


communities. And, ordinary combatants, expected their commanders to ensure that part of their collective return package included projects that benefitted the wider community into which they were to be reintegrated. One ex-commander described the link between his and his family’s personal security and his community, which had received a SGP explicitly: ‘I live with my tribe and they defend me from attack’.

The cessation of funding of SGPs (and CRPs, see below) seriously affected the APRP. The decision contributed to rising levels of personal risk for reintegrees, increased their sense of betrayal<sup>53</sup>, but it also decreased potential for future reintegration since it sent a very clear message to fighters that they could not trust the promises made by Government agents.

**4.2.ii The Community Recovery Projects**

In terms of the APRP programme (and the project document), additional economic incentive in support of reintegration would be provided through four LMs existing programmes. Window A, which channeled World Bank-managed ARTF resources through the MRRD, supported community programmes (similar to the identified SGPs, but through a bottom-up approach) in terms of the CRIP in communities with a significant reintegree presence. Figs , below, set out Window B-funded CRPs. MRRD supported three programmes (NABD, NRAP and RuWATSIP); MAIL projects were principally in the area of reforestation, principally of pistachio seedlings, labor provided by reintergrees and community members, MoLSAMD supported VET training for reintergrees or their nominees, while MoPW established the Public Works Corp to repair and maintain road infrastructure. Fig. 17 - 24, below, provides an overall average cost/beneficiary and the number of individual LM projects. Information on CRP projects contribution in the provinces visited is appended in Annex 7.

Fig. 17: CRP Projects Overview



Source: JS Data


<sup>53</sup> The evaluation was informed that knowledge of the failure to live up to promises made was widely known, reintergrees being taunted that they couldn’t return to the insurgency as they would be killed and yet got nothing by giving up arms, so no one saw them as necessary/important.

## 4.2.ii.a MRRD

In addition to the NSP projects implemented as priorities in accordance with the CRIP agreement in districts with significant reintegree populations, MRRD received support for two additional ongoing programmes (NABD and NRAP<sup>54</sup>) and for an additional programme (RuWATSIP).

Figs. 18 - 20, below, provide an overview of the support provided by programmatic area between 2012 and 2014 through the APRP.

Fig. 18: MRRD NABD CRPs




Source: Annual Reports

Over the APRP implementation period, 335 reintegrees (7%) of a total 4 707 beneficiaries directly benefitted from the NABDP activities, comprising 46 projects in 13 provinces. The total number of indirect beneficiaries was 140 687.

<sup>54</sup> Both existing recipients of UNDP support.


Fig 19: MRRD CRPs (NRAP)



Source: Annual Reports

NRAP provided no direct benefit to reintegrees, there being a total 12 093 direct and 859 191 indirect beneficiaries of the programme, which was implemented in 10 provinces through 16 projects. NRAP's contribution to APRP effectiveness lay in the extent to which reintegrees, their families and the communities in which they were reintegrated were indirect beneficiaries. No evidence exists that this was the case so it appears likely that even if they were, there was no publicity around the link.

Fig 20: MRRD CRPs (RuWATSIP)




Source: Annual Reports

The total number of direct reintegree beneficiaries of RuWATSIP projects was five, below 0.1% of the 6 500 direct beneficiaries. The 44 projects implemented in 15 provinces benefitted 1 200 people indirectly. If accurately reported, RuWATSIP’s contribution, like that of NRAP’s, to APRP effectiveness was so marginal as to be effectively non-existent.

4.2.ii.b MAIL

Fig 21: MAIL CRPs



Source: Annual Reports

MAIL established the Agricultural Conservation Corps, which provided seasonal employment for reintegrees in the areas in which reforestation, fruit orchard planting, irrigation and cold storage activities were implemented in 2012 and 2013. Table 2 below, provides a summary of the contribution the four project areas made to APRP effectiveness.

Table 2: MAIL Projects, 2012 - 13


Activity	# Reintegree Beneficiaries	# Direct Beneficiaries	# Indirect Beneficiaries	# Projects	# Provinces
Reforestation	1 705	17 846	484 646	116	16
Fruit Orchards	345	3 679	775 033	35	19
Irrigation (Canal cleaning)	133	3 058	101 801	37	10
Cold Storage	3	59	17 640	8	2
Total	2 186	24 642	1 379 120	196	47

Source: Annual Reports

According to MAIL, in excess of 1 200 ha was reforested with pistachio saplings. According to information provided to the evaluation, all irrigation of the saplings ended when funding stopped at the end of 2013. As a result, the saplings survival rate is doubtful; the evaluation has been informed by respondents in some provinces that 30% of the saplings had died, in another the evaluation was told that 100% were dead. Information in this connection was requested from the Ministry at the invitation of the Deputy Minister Finance and Administration. At the time of writing, beyond a verbal statement by the Natural Resource Management Directorate that all the saplings were alive, no other information was forthcoming.

4.2.ii.c MoLSAMD

Fig 22: MoLSAMD CRPs



Source: Annual Reports

MoLSAMD commissioned VET training through NGO providers in 19 provinces (2012) and 15 (2013). Despite their being 34 VET training intervention supports, the training offered did not cover all the provinces in which there were reintegrees. As part of the contract with the training provider, the course content had to be determined through a market-needs analysis (to ensure that the training provided was relevant) and was moderated by the MoLSAMD VET training unit (to ensure content quality). In total, 4 288 people received training, 2 652 (61.8%) being reintegrees or nominated family members. Training subject areas were traditional and did not demonstrate any innovative thinking. Subjects included tailoring, carpentry, embroidery, carpet weaving, beauticians, vehicle/motorbike repair, metal work, plumbing, electric equipment and electronics repair, mobile repair, plumbing, house wiring and electricians.




In 2014, MoLSAMD conducted a tracer survey of 1,620 trainees (30%) in 12 provinces (Kunar, Faryab, Samangan, Baghlan, Kunduz, Takhar, Badakshan, Herat, Farah, Helmand, Kandahar and Saripul). The results found that over 75% of trainees were employed when the study was conducted. Unfortunately, the correlation between the skills obtained during training and their current employment was not determined in a statistically verified manner. This lack of statistical correlation is borne out by anecdotal evidence to the evaluation: one ex-commander joked that were the doors in the JS office to be broken, because of the carpentry training and tools he had received, he would be able to repair them. However, when asked if there was much demand for a carpenter in his home district, he replied he did not use his training professionally since he was the Imam in the community’s mosque.

All the CRPs brought some benefits, although possibly those with the most were those which created salaried employment or increased the prospects of securing this through skills development. Having said this, however, it is important to note that while the VET training provided through MoLSAMD increased skills and provided tools to graduate trainees, most emerged from the training into self employment; and their success in this regard is unknown as there has been no follow-up investigation of their status after 2014, since there ‘was no money’ for a second follow-up survey.

4.2.ii.d MoPW

Fig 23: MoPW CRPs



Source: Annual Reports

Over the three years, 2012 – 14 inclusive, MoPW employed 2 304 people in the Public Works Corp, 2 118 (91.9%) of whom were reported to be reintegrees. In this connection, anecdotal evidence that the evaluation received suggested that some reported reintegrees were not; regardless of the veracity of the identity of PWC employees, they were all locally recruited. Table 3, below, sets out the number of provinces and kilometres of roads maintained between 2012 and 2014.

Table 3: Road Maintenance through APRP

Year	# Provinces	Kilometres Maintained
2012	6	438 (+ 2 provinces for which no information available)
2013	8	1 500
2014	9	1 400

Source: Annual Reports

The total recorded length of maintained roads over the three years was 3 338 km. In addition to the direct benefits gained through waged employment, the improved communications would have benefitted agricultural and other producers in the provinces, who would have been able to move their goods to market (local and district) more efficiently and with less damage. This last suggests that they may have been able to achieve higher prices for their products. The evaluation received information that suggested that some reintegrees were unhappy at the nature of work provided through the Public Works Corp; however, enquiry of the MoPW indicated that, while initially recruitment was into direct labor positions, advancement to supervisory and gang management positions was possible and that ex-commanders often made rapid advancement.

**4.3 Output 5: Effective management of APRP delivery ensured through UNDP technical and operational support.**

UNDP procured Technical Cooperation Assistance by embedding a unit led by a CTA within the JS. Additional international support was placed in the FOC. In addition, the project benefited from the support of six Regional Programme Coordinators, national UNDP staff with considerable experience in the field. In 2013, the six Regional Offices were strengthened through the recruitment of Regional Financial Advisors, who were recruited to address the serious financial reconciliation problems most provinces experienced, demonstrating the ongoing absence of province-level financial management capacity and the APRP’s failure to successfully build this in the preceding three to three and a half years (see Efficiency, Section 3 above).

The Evaluation Team found the quality and quantity of UNDP TA, especially through international experts, poor and erratic/inconsistent. The main problems were related to:

- Division of responsibility: The project supported a national programme that emphasised nationally ownership and responsibility. This meant that the division of responsibility and accountability of various functions and activities between the Government and, supposedly,

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UNDP. In fact, UNDP effectively delegated its responsibilities in this respect to the CTA and his TCA team, which was dependent on GoIRA unit reports, the originators of which were accountable to the government through the JS or FOC.

- The timeliness of support: The international TCA team members were initially embedded in national structures, although, for security reasons, physically separated. The period of their inputs was also erratic, making establishing relations of trust, always a challenge in Afghanistan, more difficult. Some TCA were also recruited too late to be able to perform effectively: the Peace and Development Advisor took up her position in March 2015, too little time to contribute meaningful and effective policy suggestions, let alone secure change. TCA was also marginalized from decision making structures when embedded in JS or the FOC. Lastly JS did not perceive the necessity of three years international TCA, a not unusual position for government authorities<sup>55</sup>.
- Lack of proper matching between expertise and demand: The team was informed that TCA did not extend itself beyond its specific TOR, even where skills existed; for example the TCA working with the FOC reportedly had M&E experience but did not build FOC capacity in this regard, instead editing English in letters to Embassies and other recipients.
- Marginalization: The JS Technical Cooperation Assistance was relocated to the HPC office for security reasons, their presence in the JS office being time limited. Subsequent to the CTA's departure, the recruited UNVs (M&E and Peace Advisor) were relocated to UNOCA. Lack of physical proximity poses challenges for hands on support. As frequently occurs in Afghanistan, TCA advice (e.g. guidelines to revise the Small Grants Projects' modality, linking SGPs more directly to peace outcomes) is often marginalized; in the example cited, the suggestions were extensively revised and subsequently ignored.
- Flexibility: The incompatibility of UNDP's and GoIRA procedures doubled the amount of work. ATLAS, for example, was supposed to be used but it is incompatible with the government's MIS. As a result, financial reports had to be decoded from the Government system, entered manually into Excel in an ATLAS compatible format, manually checked and then dispatched to UNDP programme manager. The risk of human error was considerably magnified.
- Lack of capacity building in content issues: At best, there were very limited efforts to build the capacity of stakeholders and staff in conflict analysis, peacebuilding project implementation, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding project gender mainstreaming. The staff of the project staff would have benefitted from regular trainings, which UNDP could have organized.

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<sup>55</sup> It is well known amongst international consultants and consulting firms working on capacity development and development projects in Afghanistan that the president's view, for example, is that consultants are unnecessary and only in the country for the money.

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The support provided by UNDP Regional Programme Coordinators and Regional Finance Advisors was mostly evaluated as extremely positive in most provinces visited. They were ready to provide support and technical support whenever needed. A number of comments derived in the course of fieldwork (underline this) See also Annex 7):

- All three PJST members denied their participation in any form of formal trainings (workshops, seminars, etc.) related to their job descriptions that were provided by the UNDP. They recommended provision of capacity building trainings related to their jobs.
- All three interviewees also didn't recall any form of "on the job" training or feedback provide by the UNDP technical advisors/ regional program staffs. The ME focal point stated that "the development section has been closed, I have been assigned in the ME but I don't know my TOR yet- nobody told me what to do".
- Logistical issues and challenges were not addressed on a timely manner. For instance, internet connections in Kandahar and other regional provinces are very slow. We have raised this issue several times but we any solution seems far sighted.
- The stake and role of women was never a priority for PPC/PJST supported by UNDP in Kandahar (and the south region). UNDP could have influenced PPC members and decision makers in PJST to more actively mainstream gender in APRP. There was no woman in PJST structure.

#### 4.4 Structural Effectiveness

The main output of the project was the creation of a complicated superstructure and bloated bureaucracy, dependent on external funds, to follow up on APRP in new but also existing national institutions (See Efficiency, Section 3)

The HPC structure established was too big to be effective. The 63 (and eventually 70) members were chosen mostly for their representation and loyalty rather than their skills in peacebuilding or negotiation<sup>56</sup>. The large numbers were justified at the onset because the government needed to pull support from among its own ranks, among tribes, ethnic groups, etc. The 33 Peace Committees, each consisting of up to 30 people, were competing for the trust of local communities with CDCs, local authorities etc.

Interlocutors emphasise the need to reconstruct the HPC to a maximum 40-50 members. Administrative support will clearly be necessary but, in the absence of a development component, the JS can be dramatically reduced in size. Nor, given resistance to a reintegration component, in any APRP

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<sup>56</sup> The JS observes that it is a good concept that all HPC/PPC members should be chosen based on skills and capacity to be able carrying out negotiation, but still we have time and distance to reach the level to go beyond of traditional, personnel, ethnic and language boundaries, the ground realities will hardly allow us to make technical decisions. In broad terms, the evaluation agrees but, having been selected, conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding training would have addressed this issue. Its absence suggests that considerations of political representivity carried greater weight in identifying members.

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successor does there appear any need for the extensive links with the Security Ministries, to say nothing of the Line Ministries more generally. What is clearly necessary would be GoIRA to appoint a coordination focal point to ensure that those Ministries active in support of, but not engaged in a day – to – day manner in, the peace process are aware and able to provide support as and when necessary.

#### 4.5 UNDP's Overall Role

UNDP, by supporting a complicated structure where it could have no influence on the politics behind the scenes or effectively prevent waste of money, put its reputation at risk. The rationale may have made sense then for why such a programme was designed by the Government, and why support was provided by donors, but the questions remains as to why UNDP got involved to the extent it did.

Under pressure from both the international donor community and GoIRA, UNDP, as one informant who was aware of negotiations informed the evaluation, was essentially forced into engaging in a project that was ultimately more political than development oriented. When it negotiated its engagement, UNDP was strongly encouraged by the donor pool and the NATO mission to take up management responsibility of APRP to act as executing agency of a complicated project. In addition, the Government wanted to use the services of UNDP, perceiving it as a neutral agency that could reinforce accountability and transparency vis-à-vis donors. However, given that the project was highly political in the sense that it was designed and executed with the interests of political stakeholders in mind, UNDP did not have much space to maneuver or influence decisions or strategic decisions. As the informant told the Evaluation Team, donors were asking UNDP to report on things that it did no have any influence over.

To this was added the rush and pressure of showing results in terms of numbers to appease the military coalition, one of the stakeholders of the project. ISAF was constantly putting pressure on the project to show results and ISAF commanders were often the “unsolicited” interface between the project and donors, bypassing the role of UNDP (See Annex 8). Furthermore, when UNDP wanted to make an intervention or a suggestion, it was often told by the JS leadership and others not to involve itself in politics. The project being as political as it was, and UNDP content oversight being as weak as it was, there was little space for UNDP to put forth its added value, the developmental approach.

Having said this, UNDP's management sought to intervene when it perceived negative results of decisions. Once such occasion occurred following the Karzai government's refusal to sign the Bi-lateral Security Agreement (BSA) impacted the Program. When the then GoIRA refused to sign the BSA, all donors ceased to mobilise funds. Directly resulting from this the 2014 budget approval process couldn't get proceed as usual. Contrary to past practice, ISAF did not lead further resource mobilization or oppose the abolishment of the CRP. To its credit, UNDP management argued strongly with ISAF and the APRP donors against abolishing the CRP, including suggesting that in its absence, UNDP might not have an interest in continuing.

The question remains as to whether UNDP should continue to be involved in such a highly political,

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rather ineffective and even counterproductive project. In the opinion of the Evaluation Team, the idea behind a project that distributes assistance on the basis of a political gamble contradicts the principles of “do no harm” and can even put the beneficiaries at higher risk in current circumstances. But if UNDP can negotiate better, the peace process can definitely benefit from a developmental approach to which the organization can add value.

There are 4 areas where UNDP could possibly have a role in such a project:

1. As an executive agency dispersing salaries and procurement for new or existing institutions.  
=> This is not the preferred role that UNDP should carve itself, if it become at the detriment of the organization’s reputation.
2. As a political agency that could support the peace process in areas such as justice, transition justice, good governance etc.  
=> However, negotiations with the Taliban, which should be the start of the peace process, requires mediation efforts which are beyond the mandate of UNDP and should be left to UNAMA.
3. As an organization that could support bridges between civil society, women’s organizations, the media, the Ulema and religious leaders with institutions involved in the peace process; in other words, as a way to build capacity and dialogue for launching a peace campaign.  
=> This is definitely something that UNDP should consider. With its networks with civil society organizations etc., UNDP can build the capacity of the HPC and the Provincial Peace Councils in designing, implementing a sustained “peace campaign.” Given the lack of a proper peace movement in Afghanistan, the contribution of UNDP would be welcomed, useful and laudable.
4. As a development organization that could support livelihoods projects that could directly or indirectly lead to confidence building at the field level.  
⇒ UNDP has a lot of experiences working with communities in divided societies. It could do well placing its resources in identifying vulnerable populations in different parts of the countries, and building resilience for communities. Vulnerability would also include the potential to become radicalized, hence the contribution of these projects would be to peacebuilding without having to target specifically a controversial population, that of reintegrees.

#### 4.5.a Donor Engagement

The challenges related to lack of funding predictability are discussed in the efficiency section; it is important to also note that the effectiveness of the programme was also affected by what donors’ expectations. Donors held the government and UNDP accountable for a poorly designed project even though they had agreed to support it in the first place because, as they told the Evaluation Team,

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they could not be seen as not supporting the government politically in the first place. They expected the UNDP to deliver on things that the organization had no influence on. Priorities have changed in major donor capitals, in part arising from slow economic growth and, more recently, the emergence of Europe's migration challenge. Donors emphasise the need for a more coherent GoIRA strategy, as well as a limited and better structured programme, more concrete, tangible results and better reporting and communication from UNDP.

## 4.6 Gender Inclusiveness

'The state of being male or female (typically used with reference to social and cultural differences rather than biological ones)'.

### 4.6.i Introduction

Practitioners generally agree that gender dynamics form a resource for peacebuilding but one which peacebuilders generally use insufficiently (El-Bushra, 2012). El-Bushra's research identified a broad typology of peacebuilding programmes, based on three different approaches to gender:

Type 1: **gender-blind approaches**, in which the possibility of differential outcomes for men and women, or of outcomes that impact on relations between them, is either not acknowledged or considered to be incidental;

Type 2: **approaches developed in the frame of UN Security Council Resolution 1325**, in which it is axiomatic that women are more vulnerable and marginalised than men, and which apply gender analysis with the specific aim of counteracting this tendency for the betterment of women and of society more broadly;

Type 3: **gender-relational approaches**, which take a context specific relational gender analysis as their starting point and which aim at better benefit sharing generally, on the assumption that this leads to more peaceful outcomes for all.

The 2012 stocktaking confirmed that peacebuilding can be more effective if built on an understanding of how gendered identities are constructed through the societal power relations between and among women, men, girls, boys and members of sexual and gender minorities. This 'gender-relational' approach moves away from equating gender with women (and girls) and deeper as it examines the interplay between gender and other identity markers, such as age, social class, sexuality, disability, ethnic or religious background, marital status or urban/rural setting. While obviously requiring more nuanced and better-researched interventions, it also allows for more effective and sustainable targeting of programming.

Myrttinen *et al* (2014) advanced the stocktaking, identifying four lessons to inform the design of peacebuilding interventions, *viz.*

- i. Understanding the context: Gender analysis should be seen as key in the preparation of



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peacebuilding programmes and policy development, and requires the investment of time and resources. A gender-relational approach to peacebuilding implies a broadly based description of how gender roles and relations work in each particular context, including how gender difference intersects with other identities. It also involves an assessment of how these roles and relations influence a society's propensity for violent conflict, the extent to which these gender roles and relations might themselves be shaped by violent conflict, and the opportunities they present for transformative change.

- ii. Identifying who to work with and how: A gender-relational approach suggests a broad range of possible interventions; and enables a sharper focus on groups of people (wider than women), who are particularly vulnerable, as well as on those whose attitudes and practices most need to be changed and those most amenable to change. Through this, it allows policies and interventions to be targeted more precisely and more effectively implemented and evaluated. This means that men's potential vulnerability, as well as that of sexual and gender minorities, might be revealed by a relational gender analysis although programming that assumes vulnerability to be associated with women and children often overlooks this<sup>57</sup>.
- iii. Identifying best ways of working: A gender-relational approach means understanding how gender relations and identities influence peace possibilities in a given situation, as well as facilitating transformational change based on that understanding. International experience suggests that approaches resulting in positive transformations often are characterised by inclusivity, dialogue and empowerment. Such initiatives involve women and men, young and old, powerful and powerless, and capture a wide variety of perspectives and knowledge: dialogue is one of their main methods, promoting capacities for dialogue and creating the necessary spaces, to enable potentially conflicting components of a community to move forward in concert. They are also designed and managed in such a way that programming is driven by some of the women, men and sexual and gender minorities most directly affected by violent conflict, empowering them to promote sustainable change.
- iv. Applying a gender-relational approach to different sectors and themes: Programming across all areas of work in peacebuilding situations both informs and intensifies a relational analytic approach, which can be mainstreamed across all sectors. This means that gender change goals should be as prominent, and taken just as seriously in implementation, monitoring and evaluation, as 'sectorial' goals alongside which they sit.

#### 4.6.ii The APRP

Having reviewed the APRP documentation, the evaluation's view is that the project fits within Type 2 of the above. As such, the evaluation would have expected activities and outputs intended to address the particular vulnerabilities of women and children together with an overall policy framework to promote this.

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<sup>57</sup> Depending on context, a gender-relational analysis might focus on the particular vulnerabilities or strengths of young, rural, widowed women in a particular location; elderly, lower-class urban men; or educated, well-connected female political change-makers.



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#### 4.6. iii APRP Gender Policy

Although the APRP commenced implementation in the final quarter of 2010, the programme formally issued its gender policy in September 2011. The policy emphasizes the importance of

....the balanced representation of women in the peace and reintegration institutions<sup>58</sup>.

The aim of the policy is to ensure that

....both men and women are reached at the national and sub-national levels, while also addressing impediments that hinder women from an equal participation in the peace process.

Amongst the impediments to be addressed are

- Ensuring women's participation in the decision-making processes by including their interests and needs in the peace programmes; and
- Mainstreaming gender in local peace processes at the community level.

As part of the effort to address these, the JS established a Gender Unit.

#### 4.6.iv Women's and Men's Knowledge of and engagement with the APRP

In 2014, the Afghan Women's Network, with support from the European Commission and CARE International, carried out research into the extent to which Afghan women had been included within the APRP-led peace process. The research objectives were:

- To establish the extent to which Afghan men and women were aware of the APRP and its gender policy;
- To understand if and how women in communities are included within the APRP; and
- To provide recommendations for a more inclusive and gender responsive APRP.


#### 4.6.v The Research

Fieldwork was conducted during August and September; geographically, the 417 respondents (250 men and 167 women) were drawn from 27 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, an average 15 respondents were interviewed per province. Figs. 24 - 26 show the breakdown of respondents by province, urban or rural locality, and age and gender.

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
<sup>58</sup> Civil-Military Fusion Center (April 2012): The Peace Process and Afghanistan's Women, [http://www.operationspaix.net/data/document/7025~v~The Peace Process and Afghanistan's Women Part II.pdf](http://www.operationspaix.net/data/document/7025~v~The%20Peace%20Process%20and%20Afghanistan's%20Women%20Part%20II.pdf)

Fig. 24: Respondents by Province




Source: AWN, December 2014

Fig. 25: Urban/Rural Location of Respondents



Source: ibid


Fig 26: Respondents by Age and Gender



Source: ibid

Fig. 27 demonstrates a strong bias in favor of tertiary education amongst respondents, which may skew the results.

Fig. 27: Respondents by Gender and Education




Source: ibid

#### 4.6.vi Research Results

Figs 28 - 29 demonstrate the key results of the research in terms of public knowledge of the APRP and the JS by gender and education, and occupation, as well as public perceptions of the programme's achievements.


Fig. 28: Knowledge of APRP by Gender and Education



Source: ibid

To some extent, one would have expected that higher educated respondents would have knowledge of Government programmes that potentially directly impact on their life opportunities. It would have been more informative had primary and no formal education level respondents been included.

Fig. 29: Knowledge of the APRP by Occupation



Source: ibid

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The field visits (Annex 7) provided perspectives on the public's awareness of the APRP, possibly from a broader section of the communities:

- The publication of newsletters and promoting peace messages through local radio and TV channels as major achievements of the PJST. They have organized roundtable discussion in 12 out of 16 districts of Kandahar province with religious leaders, tribal elders, and youth. Some of the major outcomes of the public outreach efforts were "that foreigners were happy/satisfied about their work and that 1300 Taliban fighters have renounced violence and stayed home without going through the vetting process". This assertion couldn't be verified objectively. The idea of assessing the impact of awareness raising activities was a surprise to one interlocutor. He said he was never asked to undertake any assessment of the Public awareness nor was their sufficient capacity to within the JS/PPC to lead one. As a general concern, funds were insufficient for public awareness raising and most of the time he would use his personal connections to get air time on radio and TV about PJST's public awareness raising efforts.
- No baseline for public raising plan was set. Also, no pre- test and post-test of the awareness raising activities was conducted. This means that effectiveness of public raising activities cannot be understood
- Despite having an annual public awareness-raising plan, there was no budget for such activities. However, he managed to conduct 240 activities in the past five years without any budget. The PJST only had funds for "peace week" in September of each year. PJST public awareness raising activities were intermittent which raised questions about the effectiveness of the activities. The focus of public awareness raising activities has also been on the quantity of activities, rather than the quality and effectiveness of the activities.
- Religious leaders (Ulema) were not supportive to promote non-violence, tolerance, and acceptance through mosques in Shindand, Kushk-e-Kuhnaa, and Rabat Sangi districts. According to an interlocutor, Ulema in these districts were demanding of financial incentives to preach for peace.
- Other challenges that affected the PJST public awareness raising section included: public awareness raising is a strenuous job with several tasks and sub-tasks, which exceeds the limits of one person. Sufficient media equipment (ie. Cameras) were not provided.
- The public awareness raising focal point had not received training on Peacebuilding, Peace advocacy, or impact assessment. UNDP was requested to provide these trainings but to no avail.

#### 4.6.vii Perspectives on women's role

Afghan CSOs widely shared an assumption that women's PPC roles were merely symbolic and not of any particular consequence. And, while most CSOs demonstrated awareness of the APRP gender policy, they did not perceive PPCs adopting adequate steps towards implementing it. Specific information amongst community elders, teachers, university students and medical doctors about the policy was in short supply; most assumed that it was limited to female representation in the PPCs. Most

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respondents knew that few women were represented in their respective PPCs; and the generally shared opinion was that female PPC members lacked the necessary influence to affect decisions made in the peace process and the broader APRP mission.

For their part, PPC members were mostly unaware of the gender policy's content. Some provinces reported that women had more active roles in PPC activities, including visiting female family members of active AGEs to try and persuade them to convince male AGE relatives to join the peace process. In many provinces, women were also active in APRP awareness raising initiatives to increase public knowledge about the programme and the peace process generally. In other provinces, particularly in the south and east, the socio-cultural environment made such public engagement impossible; however, even here female PPC members, often supported by the few female HPC members, engaged female community members, frequently under the leadership umbrella of women elders, in support of the APRP.

Notwithstanding these efforts, possibly because of the limited number of women involved, CSOs in the provinces did not perceive the APRP having a significant impact on women's lives in their communities. To the extent that they benefitted directly, this was mainly as recipients of VET training intended to give women the skills necessary if they were to have the chance to provide an income for themselves and their families. Other training, which benefitted women included literacy courses. Indirectly, women benefitted from SGPs, in most cases through securing access to clean water closer to their homesteads.

Tellingly, provincial DOWA representatives were unaware of benefits to women through the CRP activities undertaken under the APRP umbrella. There were limited exceptions to this, some DOWA representatives drawing attention to VET and literacy training opportunities while, in Paktia, DOWA representatives pointed to the APRP support for the provision of healthcare services from which women and their families were able to benefit.

Nationally, the evaluation was informed that the presence of female members of the HPC was positive. HPC women members participated in a number of international experience-based training opportunities, including participation in visits to North America and Europe, as well as conflict-affected countries in Latin America and East Asia. However, interlocutors expressed the view that their presence on and participation in the HPC was largely symbolic, not least because they were seldom invited to offer opinions and suggestions. Symbolism is frequently an important indicator of value: it was pointed out to the evaluation that while male HPC members had access to armored 4X4 Land Cruisers for official duties, the women deputy and advisors had to make use of their own Toyota Corollas and drivers for transport. Neither, unlike senior male colleagues did they have access to guards.

#### 4.6. viii. Participation of Women in HPC and APRP

Women's role in the project was symbolic. The HPC had nine women members as a result of extensive advocacy by the AWN, amongst others; at the time of the final evaluation, there were three female members of the executive board and 11 women amongst the 50 HPC members (22%); in addition of the

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four advisors to the HPC, two are women<sup>59</sup>. Notwithstanding this increased membership, HPC members in general do not have access to the budget, including female members of the executive board. The project required that PPCs had a minimum quota of three female members. Participation, however, remains male-dependent, since without it, for female members, including those in the HPC, finding space to express their views and opinions is a challenge; the challenge is greater at provincial level. A Gender Officer was established in the JS. A portion of the annual budget to set aside exclusively for women's groups, and organizations to do social outreach and community recovery activities.

Nationally, the evaluation was informed that the presence of female members of the HPC was positive. HPC women members participated in a number of international experience-based training opportunities, including participation in visits to North America and Europe, as well as conflict-affected countries in Latin America and East Asia. However, interlocutors expressed the view that their presence on and participation in the HPC was largely symbolic, not least because they were seldom invited to offer opinions and suggestions. Symbolism is frequently an important indicator of value: it was pointed out to the evaluation that while male HPC members had access to armored 4X4 Land Cruisers for official duties, the women deputy and advisors had to make use of their own Toyota Corollas and drivers for transport. Neither, unlike senior male colleagues did they have access to guards.

While women organized a number of meetings with civil society, media, parliamentarians political parties etc propagating the need for a peace process, at the end of the day, the direct role of women in peace negotiations and reconciliation at the local level was very dismal. The leadership of HPC and JS paid lip service to the inclusion of women but were not necessarily making efforts to allocate specific gender budget, involve women in negotiations etc. While some women had participated in indirect talks with the Taliban, there were no efforts to use them for a peace movement, for example through making use of their potential as mothers for example in order to influence combatants etc.

The female advisor of the HPC mentioned that they have no visibility on what was being spent on women in projects. Although no specific projects were designed as a strategy for women, Some MRRD projects were implemented for women in Darzaab district Jawzjan Province, which basically included Vocational Skills Trainings such as Tailoring, Embroidery, Rug Weaving, shallow wells for drinking water and other projects which had an impact on improving women situation and enabling women to persuade male members of their families joining government and becoming Re-integrates.

- The deputy director of women affairs explained that women role was lower in Peace program and was only restricted to awareness rising campaigns and no particular projects were implemented for women through APRP.
- The role of women in peace talks was limited although women could have played key role in extending peace negotiations with insurgent families and female members of PPC were only conducting awareness rising and outreach activities within the limited areas to educate women and men on the importance of peace and encourage women play vital role in bringing peace amongst communities and oppositions.

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<sup>59</sup> Posts are allocated for two male and two female advisors.

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- The Director of Women affairs of Nangarhar explained that, although she is the member of Nangarhar PPC but she has not been given the opportunity to express her ability and to do more for peace program.
  - She explained that, Women participation in APRP program was symbolic and nothing much is done for women. The other female member of PPC is based in Kabul and do not visit Nangarhar province as she is very old and cannot participate in meetings.
  - No capacity building efforts were made for women or PPC members throughout the program. But the women affairs department did its best in awareness rising about peace amongst communities and women. As a result of our commitment and hard work for peace program the Achin District Wells projects was the recommendation of women.
  - The Director of Women affairs explained that one female PPC member in Laghman was killed while 2 both PPC heads of Kunar and Nuristan provinces were killed by AGE groups.
  - All APRP project activities were implemented without any consultation with women members of PPC and the program was not effective as women could have played big role in peace talks and convincing women to encourage their male members to join peace and stop fighting.

Given global focus on the plight of women in Afghanistan, and international efforts to prepare plans on Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, a number of donors, in particular, Spain, invested resources and attention for gender issues. A Plan of Action for the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 was prepared for Afghanistan to which HPC and PPCs had contributed. The Plan however had no implementation mechanisms and no budget yet, and was mainly symbolic.

#### 4.7 Public Information and Communications

All peacebuilding programme are dependent on widespread approval at policy and public levels for its success and, in this respect, the APRP was no exception. The evaluation was informed that despite the APRP originating at the highest policy levels of GoIRA, there remained significant opposition amongst policy-makers and advisors. Opposition was broadly characterised as stemming from those who believed that only a military solution would end the conflict; however, the evaluation has also been informed that opposition to the APRP was far more nuanced and had more to do with the means (specifically the 70-strong HPC) rather than the overall goal. Understandably, therefore, there would have been groups within the wider public who shared such reservations; but, the general public's knowledge of this would have been limited.

Government sought to address this lack of knowledge through an extensive effort to first, secure widespread support for the direction of peace policy, and subsequent to the determination of the programme outline, to communicate the proposed approach widely. In the first instance, GoIRA sought public endorsement through a *loya jirga*, which was held in Kabul at the start of 2010 and attended by 2000+ people, approximately 10% of whom were women, following lobbying by the Afghan Women's Network. The CPJ broadly endorsed the government's proposed approach and provided



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recommendations that informed the APRP programme document, based on which UNDP developed the project proposal to donor organisations.

With the adoption of the APRP as the Government's programme and the establishment of the APRP structures (HPC, JS, PPCs, PJSTs, etc.), the APRP commenced an outreach programme to communicate (i) the importance of peace for Afghanistan and (ii) the approach and strategies that the APRP pursued. Key to the APRP communication strategy were the national and provincial *ulema*, who actively cooperated in communicating the peace message (as well as the legitimacy of GoIRA) throughout the country. Nationally, the *ulema* leadership conducted 179 workshops and meetings in which the trust of the peace message was communicated to provincial *ulema* and imams. Furthermore, based on provincial visits, *ulema* were active participants in PPCs and engaged actively in communicating the need to support the peace and reintegration process pursued under the APRP. Furthermore, PPC members utilized the media (local and national television and radio, as well as the print media) to communicate the message and information about the APRP.

The HPC and JS also sought the support of civil society. The AWN, for example, was active in the preparations of the *loya Jirga* that endorsed the APRP approach, including lobbying for an expansion of female participation in the CPJ. The network, through its membership, was also active in providing confidence building support to female members of PPCs to encourage them to be more active in the PPCs and the overall peace building process. The AWN also reached communities in remote areas and had peace talks with the female members of opposition families to education them on the importance of peace and encourage them to persuade their male members to join peace. CSOs were widely involved in peace advocacy, peak periods being especially in the course of peace week, when particular efforts were made. All six APRP regions reported extensive engagement in peace advocacy by civil society. As AWN research has shown (Figs. 30 - 1), below, this approach was largely successful in communicating information about the APRP, albeit less so about the JS.


#### 4.7.i Perceptions of Success

The AWN perceptual study<sup>60</sup> also questioned respondents about the APRP's contribution to the achievement of peace in Afghanistan. Figs 31 and 32 reveal that the public perception was significantly negative in this respect.

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
<sup>60</sup> *Op cit*, 2014.

Fig. 30: Public perception by age of APRP's Successful contribution to Peace



Source: *Op cit*, 2014

Fig. 31: Overall public perception of APRP contribution to Peace



Source: *ibid*

Given the absence of a peace agreement, the rising incidence of AGE-inspired violence and civilian casualties (Fig. 1), this perception is unsurprising. And it appears likely to have been reinforced by the demonstrable lack of personal security experienced by reintegrees (Figs. 13 and 14).

The field work provided positive feedback was the positive role of women in raising awareness about the peace process.

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- Women PPC members were generally involved in public awareness raising activities in provincial capital and districts. Despite insufficient support and funding from the APRP for public awareness raising, women members of the PPC would travel to districts and arrange public gatherings and meetings with women from the communities, women Madrasa students, and other stakeholders. On several occasions, the women members have spent money from their pockets to organize meetings
  - Their role was limited to public awareness raising activities. They have reached out to women in hospitals, schools, and public gatherings on peace. However, the impact of the efforts was "little". [Although no impact assessment was ever carried out].
  - The Kandahar PPC have reached out to 4000-5000 women on the importance of peace, reconciliation, and non-violence in 12 districts of the province. According to Mrs Yousufi, women have the potential to persuade women to renounce violence. However, no formal assessment was carried out to assess the effectiveness public awareness raising efforts or the link between women's raised awareness and level of reintegrates/ radicalization.
  - Public awareness raising has helped to capture women's voices on the causes of ongoing violent conflicts and opportunities for peace. A female interlocutor recalls that most women she has met in the districts consider poverty and unemployment as the main reasons for ongoing conflict. Girls are not allowed to go to school in rural areas. Most women in rural districts of Kandahar are illiterate and do not have any income generating skills to support their families. Some women have told her that since they cannot provide food for their children they have to enroll them in Madrsas. In most cases Madrasa students are radicalized and do not turn out as intended by their parents. Again, no baseline and follow up assessments were available to understand the poverty-radicalization link.
  - The deputy directorate of Haj considers the role of women in promoting peace very important. He emphasized that the women's role should be enhanced in line with cultural and contextual realities of Kandahar. More women should be involved in promoting peace and education on women's rights. One of the results of increased education on women's right has been a constant reduction in "giving bad"- or forced marriage of women in exchange of settling murder disputes.

#### 4.8 Conclusions

Broadly speaking, the APRP achieved a level of effectiveness. The reintegration of nearly 11 000 ex-combatants, during an ongoing and expanding 'hot' conflict is, in itself, no mean feat. Nor is the disarmament of these ex-combatants and the removal of their weapons from circulation something to be disregarded. Secondly, there is clear evidence of quality of life gains both to ex-combatants (through skills enhancement, employment (albeit, mostly seasonal and temporary), as well as both SGPs and CRPs within communities. The evaluation was informed, for example, that SGPs provided access to school for girls and clean water for communities, in one of which it was reported that the incidence of water-borne disease had reduced sharply, with an accompanying decline in child morbidity.

Such gains, while admittedly significant, however, have limited long-term effect. Providing TA for six months is important; however, there must be questions surround what really had been gained when the

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TA runs out and the recipient is returned to the same position as he was when he resorted to the insurgency in order to 'put five breads on the table for my children'. Nor do the benefits of a school for girls or a shallow well mean much when there are no teachers or resources to maintain the well. In other words, the gains were essentially short-term and needed to be built upon rapidly to change an ex-insurgent back to the peaceful citizen he once was.

In other respects, however, the APRP was less effective. Two outputs focused on developing capacity at national and provincial levels to manage the entire process, including the finances, effectively. This may well have expected too much of the teams that were assembled, particularly at provincial level: the PPC members were selected because of their positions within the wider community, not their management skills. This placed substantial responsibility on the PJSTs, which many appeared not to possess the necessary capacity to meet.

In this regard, the roles played by the Regional Programme Coordinators and, once appointed, the Regional Financial Advisors was critical. Without their commitment to the project, it appears questionable whether such gains as were achieved would have been possible. Clearly, therefore, they were a major contribution to achieving efficiency in the project.

The project's M&E was grossly inefficient but even more ineffective. While it proved impossible to recruit the Independent Monitoring Agent, this does not explain the absence of M&E in the project. The units that were established pursued an audit function, reacting to possibilities of fraud and corruption and ensuring that resources were utilized in accordance with work plans. This is clearly desirable and necessary, but reveals an absence of understanding of M&E's function, which is to learn from experience in order to improve performance in the future. This role is as relevant at local as national levels but, with the exception of requests to PRCs to provide stories/case studies that illustrated the APRP's successes, there was no attempt to develop experience-based learning through the project. The absence of this seriously undermined the achievement of effectiveness.

In conclusion, therefore, the evaluation has found evidence of some effectiveness, as well as some ineffectiveness. However, the achievement overall effectiveness was at best seriously undermined and, at worst, blocked by the absence of M&E that contributed to experiential learning through the project's implementation.

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## 5. Impact

It is also important to note that no baseline was created against which impact could be measured. Despite its ambition and comprehensiveness, the APRP lacked strategic vision; and the UNDP project, created to support it, sought to achieve developmental objectives within the context of a highly politicised project.

Notwithstanding, GoIRA interlocutors were generally positive about the project's impact: informants emphasised the need for the project, and, critically, the attitude change towards peace negotiations, evidenced since the project's commencement in Autumn 2010. Key influences on this was the APRP's communication strategy, implemented through the media, religious leaders, and civil society; tangible benefits to communities were also cited, as were the near 11,000 ex-combatants that had joined the process. Furthermore, the HPC engaged in 30 direct negotiations as a result the project, including negotiations with *Hezbi- Islami* surrounding their reintegration in the country<sup>61</sup>, and the 2000 community projects implemented that created thousands of jobs. The sustainability of these gains is another question.

National interlocutors pointed to the country's on-going insecurity, which actually increased following the start of implementation that negatively affected the achievement of impact across all phases of the project cycle: identification, implementation, and monitoring, as well as the associated communication challenges, which posed financial reconciliation and subsequent disbursement challenges. Regardless of the reality insecurity was present from the outset, and was an identified major risk, did not appear to be taken into account many respondents.

If measured through improvements to quality of life for recipients of TA, project-linked salaries (Agricultural Conservation Corps, Public Works Corps, to say nothing of those directly employed through the project), it appears reasonable to judge impact positively, subject to the *caveat* that for most beneficiaries, it was of limited duration. But if impact is about sustainable and tangible benefits for stakeholders, i.e. local communities, ex-combatants etc., the project results were meager, the humanitarian packages and community level projects small and unstained to have a long lasting positive effect. This is underlined by the absence of information on the reintegrees' situation, no system exists to track them. In addition, 45 PPC members, key local actors in the project, received threats of violence and death, 225 new reintegrees killed; one project impact was to endanger the lives of its members and stakeholders.

Such impact as may have been achieved was limited: publically, no prominent commanders or members of the *Rahbari Shura* (leadership council) or *Quetta Shura* joined the APRP. However, the evaluation was informed that several prominent *Quetta Shura* members, including the Taliban's former Finance Minister, had entered the peace programme through the APRP, while another, who was in the process of entering, was discovered and assassinated on his return home immediately after meetings in Dubai; for security reasons, nothing has been made public. Most who joined publically were either

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<sup>61</sup> An estimated 20 000 households (140 000 – 200 000 family members), in addition to c. 20 000 armed combatants.

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fighters or their immediate commanders or local armed groups whose links with the Taliban cannot be substantiated. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the reintegration achieved has had no positive impact on local or national security<sup>62</sup>.

There were reports of improvements in the security situation in several areas. In Balkh, the program had an impact as it allowed access for other development projects in targeted areas. Previously insecurity prevented other development actors entering some districts, but with the Taliban joining Peace program and becoming reintegrees, the security situation in targeted areas improved for other development actors to gain access. The evaluation was informed that the APRP changed people's perception of government and they were now willing to allow government and donor communities access their communities and fully supported the implementation of development projects, a significant reversal of the earlier refusal to allow access or implement any project.

In Kandahar, the APRP was also said to have resulted in improved security and peace. For instance, Yalghaam, was a stronghold of Taliban in Panjwai district. There is a big tree under which local leaders of Taliban would carry out executions and torture of the hostages. Following the takeover of the government, a big gathering was organized under the same tree to discuss peace and reconciliation. It is often accessible now and PJST/PPC continue to use it as a medium for promoting peace in the area. Currently, a girl's primary school (classes) operates under the same tree.

Having said this, the causal links between security improvements and the APRP are weak, especially in the absence of any assessment to determine this. As was the case symbolically in Kandahar, more areas are now under the government control now as a result of military operations and the tree used as a symbol of government power.

More negatively, the evaluation received reports that many villagers complain that the reintegration program, particularly recruiting members of the Taliban and *Hezb-e Islami* into the Afghan Local Police Program, has legitimized existing criminals and warlords, who rob and harass people, impose arbitrary taxes, and murder opposing voices.

Generally, international opinion was, at best, skeptical about long-term sustainable impact on positive peace; more negative international opinion was that the APRP was dysfunctional to the peace process. One donor noted that the reintegration process meant access to intelligence from some of the returnees and a cost-effective way to remove insurgents from battlefield. It is important to underline that the project had more activities than outputs and even less evidence of outcomes. What is evident is that the number of civilian deaths has risen since the project started.

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<sup>62</sup> It is too early to say what the effect of the reported success of *Hezbi- Islami* reintegration might have in terms of establishing a momentum towards peace.

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## 6. Sustainability

Assessments of sustainability as this point in time is problematic for the same reasons as the assessment of impact, *viz.* sustainability is best assessed *ex post*. However, like impact, some preliminary indications are possible of determination.

At the outset, it is important to state that the APRP was not designed to be sustainable. Had it been, the substantial superstructure that it established, together with the inflated salary bill would not have consumed such a substantial part of the project resources. Given the state of GoIRA finances, not least the substantial donor contribution to the country's development budget (100% donor financed in 2010) and operating expenses (in FY 2010, donors contributed *c.* 35% of operating expenses)<sup>63</sup>, including ongoing domestic revenue mobilization challenges, the scale of APRP administrative and salary overheads under GoIRA's inability to absorb such costs.

The project had gambled on the possibility that there would be a peace deal, stabilizing the situation and eventually leading to more (or a reducing) need for reintegration. It had made however no specific plans for a government financial contribution to the donor-supported APRP project, in particular the continuation of the large and substantive line ministry projects (NSP, Public Works etc.). Donor support stemmed from GoIRA's fragility, which they wanted to be seen supporting. Now, possibly stemming from changed or lower priorities in this regard, less support is expected. Neither had the project delineated an exit strategy. Apparently, it was designed as if it would form part of subsequent phases that would require implementing an ever-expanding APRP.

Given this, however, some aspects of the project's components may be sustainable in the medium-term, subject to their being widespread consensus of their value and ownership of the institutions. First, while the APRP established a bloated HPC, it is conceivable that a scaled down version might be able to be absorbed within the national budgetary framework. Complementing the HPC at the national level, the PPCs too, provided there is a move towards members receiving honoraria (as opposed to incentives/salaries) in return for support to local mediation, conflict mitigation and resolution, based on traditional roles, within and between families, communities, tribes and ethnic groups, demonstrate potential for sustainability.

Both groups will require administrative support. Provided they are substantially restructured, including right-sizing, with salary structures in line with public sector norms, both the JS and the PJSTs are capable of sustainability in the medium- to long-term. However, both the above strongly suggest that in the short- to medium term ongoing support of both institutions and their support services will be dependent on external support<sup>64</sup>.

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<sup>63</sup> World Bank, ND-Afghanistan-National-Budget-RONNA-HarmonieWeb.pdf: 'ARFT contributed \$310m to wages and operations & maintenance (O&M) expenses in FY 2010'.

<sup>64</sup> Notwithstanding this, it is important to acknowledge that much the same can be said in respect of the national budgetary position and that the international community's support to Afghanistan is expected to remain of critical importance for the country's Government's survival.

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While national and local economic development is possibly more achievable utilizing domestic resources, such investments will be limited for the foreseeable future; GoIRA revenue collection will continue to be challenging, particularly in the event of a protracted (even low-intensity) conflict. Nonetheless, subject to the predictability of resource availability, GoIRA line ministries focused on investments in socioeconomic development are capable to sustainably contributing to improvements in communities living conditions.

But, for sustainable interventions to be implementable and to make a contribution to national and local peace building, sustainable conflict analysis and appropriate policy response development is necessary. This potentially represents the greatest challenge to the sustainability of the institutional framework that the APRP pioneered. The evaluation identified a number of challenges in this area from which lessons, including embedding an understanding of the meaning of sustainable peace, need to be inculcated in national and local policy-making.

In conclusion, therefore, the jury remains out on the sustainability of such gains as were achieved through the APRP.



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## 7. Conclusions and Recommendations

The APRP programme and the UNDP support project was complex, politically ambitious, multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder. Added to this was the insecurity stemming from an on-going war. As a result, answering whether the project was ultimately effective is not straightforward.

UNDP undertook to report on development outcomes, over which it had no political control; nor is it likely to be able to exercise such control in any successor project. It may want to reconsider focusing on projects where it can have added value as a development actor or suffer the potential risk to its reputation and credibility. UNDP's potential added value was in terms of policy advice and technical capacity building on peacebuilding and development/security projects. It should not be just an execution agency. Improved frequency, quality, clarity, reliability of communication with donors and stakeholders is necessary.

Neither did the project's donors demonstrate realism as time passed. Their contribution to the project reflected collective political interest in supporting the government; but, with the passage of time, and a changing the political imperative, a more 'business as usual' approach brought demands for accountability and evidence of results, which were not met. Withdrawing funding put the effectiveness of the project even more at risk.

In the end, the project intervention was desirable, but that it suffered from inadequate design. Having said this, it is possible that it could have reached some of its objectives without a bloated system, sustaining hundreds of salaries, although realism dictates that any achieved objectives would have had minimal impact on the overall goal of achieving peace.

### 7.1 Lessons Learned

A number of lessons discerned from this project may be considered in future designs in order to be more effective. They include:

- Any future APRP type approach requires greater clarity structure and include more concrete, tangible results, clear benchmarks that could be monitored and reported on periodically and a communication plan.
- It should concentrate on achieving smaller relevant objectives; incorporating existing line ministry projects should be accompanied with an element of management control as well as for ensuring peace-related outcomes.
- The possible impact of insecurity must be factored in to achieve effective implementation of activities, M&E in the field, including oversight. Insecurity affecting implementation differently, distort overall results.
- Aligning interventions as much as possible to target the same beneficiaries would provide a more holistic benefit. For example, vocational training choices offered could be better correlated with the actual jobs.

- The beneficiaries of the programs need to be better tracked, and not limited to the time they are participating in a project.
- More realistic and predictable donor support is necessary; but premised on early burden sharing with GoIRA in order for proper handover to take place.
- Staff and beneficiaries of the projects need to receive capacity building support not only in project and financial management, but also on conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity, peace building, etc.

## 7.2 Recommendations

Discussion of recommendations is divided into three sub-sections. In sub-section I, the design and outline content are proposed; sub-section ii proposes the areas that a comprehensive peace policy should address. Sub-section iii sketches an outline of the APRP successor. Specific recommendations arising from the field visits, which are often province-specific, are contained in Annex 7.

### 7.2.i Design and Outline

#### Design

Reintegration initiatives should acknowledge and seek to mitigate the security risks to those who participate

Trying to buy off insurgents or to win the loyalty of communities with aid projects ignores the reasons why many people fight and why many Afghans are angry with and distrustful of the government. While poverty is helping to fuel the conflict, it is critical to acknowledge that unresolved grievances, foreign support for the insurgency and other local tensions also contribute to instability. Without addressing these issues, reintegration efforts will be superficial and unsustainable.

Reintegration and reconciliation initiatives should be rooted in a program of reform that addresses the underlying drivers of the insurgency.

Knowledge is key. Before any reintegration project is designed, there should be adequate baseline and needs assessment from the beginning.

Consensus mechanisms are needed for developing programme based on needs of wide range of stakeholders. This requires wider consultation with stakeholders on concrete issues. Facilitating partners and participating communities should also be consulted about the potential risks of and their concerns about participating in such activities

Lessons from past reintegration and reconciliation initiatives in Afghanistan need to be properly studied and not repeated.

#### Programme Content

Support HPC nationally – subject to HPC clearly defining its role, function and methodology  
 Support PPCs targeting local reconciliation

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Support necessary administrative support for both HPC and PPCs: the administrative support provided to ARTF is relevant in this respect

Review the number of salaried positions supported in the security ministries

All salaries that are paid should be compatible with public service scales and definitely not in excess of CBR scales

Ensure Transitional Assistance is available for vetted reintegrees/reconciles for a six month bridging period

GoIRA's National Development Strategy will address socioeconomic development, including job creation. This can be expected to contribute to support for a new programme. Some international donor organisations may choose to support this national thrust through bilateral agreements with individual Line Ministries. Desirably, such support should be through budget support agreements, which will provide predictability to financial flows. Donors may wish to include performance-based incentive tranches along with basic budget support through their bilateral agreements.

#### Recommendations for future reintegration programs

- A peace agreement is necessary to guarantee the security. The peace agreement should also have binding provisions to deal with local grievances, justice, etc.
- Provide security for the reintegrees
- Include all groups and not just loosely-defined (or undefined) AGEs.
- Conduct a proper mapping of armed groups
- Conduct labor market assessments to see what sustainable projects can be implemented as part of peace building initiatives.
- Jobs are not enough: Armed groups need to be re integration into politics, security forces or civil society.
- Mechanisms need to be put in place to avoid the capture of such projects just for an ID that would allow reintegrees to freely circulate.
- Settle the question of the Arbakis. On the one hand, integrating reintegrees into the local police and army may provide long term jobs but there will always be a problem of loyalty and lack of trust. Setting the reintegrees up against the local ALP Arbakis would mean creating local militias that could increase insecurity and conflict.

#### Recommendations for future political reconciliation programs

- The role of the HPC needs to become clearer vis-à-vis potential negotiations in the future. Even though President Ghani is more directly involved, or involves other entities like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a political role for the HPC is still necessary to get buy-in, especially among non-Pashtuns who are seeing more conflicts in the north involving a variety of groups: Local militias, Taliban, Central Asian fighters such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, as well as members of Daesh/ISIS).
- The focus of the future APRP program could be on reconciliation at the local level. This would mean that while high level negotiations could continue under different formats (quadrilateral etc.)

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and by different institutions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc.), there is still a need for an HPC to develop and conduct a Peace Campaign.

- Such a campaign could involve civil society, the media, ulama and women's groups more closely and more widely.

### 7.2.ii Implementing an Outline Content

Three types of interventions for 'peace' might be envisaged. Although these need GoIRA simultaneous pursuit, UNDP, with donor support, has a limited role only in some of them. A sustainable successor APRP requires, beyond management structures and funding mechanisms, three objective streams achievable through specific interventions:

1. Political peace at the National Level, negotiations pursued by GoIRA through NSC/NDS/MFA. In this framework, the HPC has a symbolic or facilitating role in peace negotiations. It is important to emphasise that the HPC has no legislated, executive role and, therefore, is not in a position to negotiate effectively on behalf of GoIRA. At the local Level, it is proposed that Reconciliation is emphasised, through grievance resolution, mediation, and rendition of justice between families, communities, tribes and ethnic groups. In this, there is a clear role for PPCs and local governors/governance structures.

2. Social/cultural Peace: National and local level

This requires developing and implementing a Peace Campaign. Conditional on this being effective are peace building training, peace education in schools, civil society group mobilization, including the media, in support of peace, and intra-regional religious leaders' exchanges.

3. Economic Peace requires economic security (as well as health and food security) for all segments of the population (recruitment disincentive) [not just as a 'bribe' to draw insurgents in]. This necessitates a massive campaign for economic recovery based on investing on human capital, job creation. Other aspects include an overall policy Jobs for Peace, but not for combatants only, with more focus on vulnerable groups, including youth.

### 7.2.iii Sketching the approach

This implies that a successor to the APRP could include:

- A smaller HPC in charge of launching national peace campaign and regional PPCs that would mirror those in provinces.
- A much smaller JS that will only support the HPC as needed

The activities could be limited to

- developing and launching a peace campaign with all stakeholders, reconciliation
- possibly facilitating peace negotiations
- Peace education campaign, including school-based peace education

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- Peace messaging through the media
  - Creation of a peace movement.
  - Dispute resolution at the local level
  - Reconciliation at the local level

The international donor community has indicated that it will not support reintegration at this point in time. Government's poverty eradication and job creation strategies should be informed through HPC-organised studies and campaigns, as well as those of international partners (including, as appropriate, UNDP), into linkages between poverty and violence. National and regional development projects are desirable to target specifically vulnerable groups through existing development projects, implementation of which should be through normal line ministries, which benefit from HPC advice not duplicated unsustainable structures.

### A Possible Role for UNDP

There appear three specific areas where UNDP could provide added value to a peace programme.

**Social peace:** UNDP might accompany national and local stakeholders through technical assistance, advising, sharing of experiences from other countries, sponsoring campaigns, conducting and sharing studies, trainings etc.

**Political peace:** UNDP, if mediation experiences, could help with building the capacity of provincial peace councils, governors etc. in 1) mediation, 2) grievance resolution, 3) rendition of justice, 4) abiding by human's rights and 5) ensuring protection and participation of women.

**Economic peace:** UNDP support LMs through commissioning studies of vulnerability of populations and their potential security risks, and then advising the creation of targeted poverty eradication and economic development projects which target vulnerable groups on a case by case, region by region approach.

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## **Annexes**

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## Annex 1 – Terms of Reference

### INDIVIDUAL CONSULTANT PROCUREMENT NOTICE / TERMS OF REFERENCE

**Title of Individual Consultant:** International Consultant (Programme Evaluation Expert)

**Project title:** Afghanistan Peace & Reintegration Programme (APRP) Project

**Duration of assignment:** 9 Weeks (With maximum 30 working days)

**Duty station:** Home & Kabul, Afghanistan

Proposal should be submitted through the UNDP Roster no later than 15 March 2016.

**Budget available for this IC:**

#### BACKGROUND

Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) was developed on the basis of recommendations of the 1600 broadly representative Afghan delegates to the Consultative Peace Jirga of June 2010 with the aim to reach a political settlement and put an end to violence. APRP was initiated, led and implemented by the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), with the purpose of extending an open hand to the Taliban and other insurgent groups, offering them a dignified and respectful way to renounce violence, and peacefully re-integrate into their communities. APRP is pursued through an integrated three-pronged approach; *reintegration for peace and security, community security including demobilization and weapons management and development for peace and sustainability.*

The APRP is a flexible and simple umbrella framework for funding reconciliation and national and local peace and reintegration activities from the Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund. The Programme delegates to Afghan people, in Government and civil society, leadership and responsibility for building peace in their country. The three stage framework below outlines the process for peace and reintegration and the Government's planned priority activities for the process. The Programme is not a linear approach to peace building. The Government is open and responsive to opportunities that arise. However, the framework does outline the Government processes and Programme's flow to promote negotiation and to consolidate peace. Peace is promoted through a combination of bottom up and top down approaches. Success requires 'top down' political commitment and technical and financial assistance through the High Peace Council (HPC) from Kabul. In addition, the APRP incorporates 'bottom up' assessments of the possibilities for peace and reintegration, and the initiation of confidence -building, negotiation and grievance resolution measures. The APRP has implemented the following three-stage peace and reintegration process:

**Stage One – Social Outreach, Confidence-Building, and Negotiation:** Provincial and district leaders conducted outreach to individuals and their communities that demonstrate their intent to join the peace process and facilitated confidence-building activities, negotiations and grievance resolution among the Government, communities, victims and ex-combatants as necessary. In addition, the Programme funded technical and operational assistance for the development of peace-building capacity at the national, provincial and district levels, assessments and surveys in priority areas, strategic communications, oversight, monitoring and evaluation, conflict and grievance resolution, as well as human rights monitoring and free and responsible debate. Negotiations and grievance resolution activities focused on issues that generate violence and directly impede reintegration.

**Stage Two – Demobilization:** Those who joined the peace process were demobilized through a social and political process that began with an initial assessment, bio-metrics, vetting and weapons management and registration. Immediate humanitarian assistance was provided, where necessary. According to Afghan law, once the individual formally agrees to live within the laws of the country, accepts the Constitution and renounces violence and terrorism, he is eligible to receive political amnesty. The demobilized combatant was then registered in the APRP and received an APRP identification card guaranteeing freedom of movement and freedom from arrest for past armed actions against the Government. Some ex-combatants could simply return home; however, in some cases it was important to consider local security, and to consolidate peace and the process of community recovery. Therefore, delivery of community security (either through the ANSF or Ministry of Interior's Public Protection Force), was an important measure for many districts and villages where reintegration occurred. In addition, a special Government committee would be formed under the HPC, supported by the Joint Secretariat (JS), to manage detainee releases and their reintegration back into normal life.

**Stage Three – Consolidation of Peace:** Following the political and security processes of the first two stages, a standard needs assessment tailored to the requirements of the APRP was used to assist communities, districts and provinces to select from a 'menu of conflict recovery options.' These options were supported by the various national programmes of the executing ministries of the JS. The menu of options would include: National Community Recovery (through Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development - MRRD); integration to the Afghanistan National Security Forces (Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense); vocational and literacy training (through Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled and Ministry of Education), religious mentoring and education (Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs); and enrollment in a Public Works Corps or Agriculture Conservation Corps (Ministry of Public Works and Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock). National Community recovery involved all members of the community -- not just ex-combatants.

APRP commenced its operations in August 2010. During the first six months, the Programme mainly focused on establishing structures required for the implementation of the programme. The main activities during the period were establishment of provincial organizational structures, namely Provincial Joint Secretariat Teams (PJSTs) and Provincial Peace Committees (PPCs). Moreover, APRP leadership, donor countries, and partners established a Technical Committee (TC), chaired by the JS, responsible for evaluating and approving funding proposals, and a Financial Oversight Committee (FOC), chaired by Ministry of Finance (MoF), tasked with final approval of the budget.

While APRP is a Government-led initiative, National Implementation Modality (NIM), that is technically and operationally supported by UNDP. UNDP also oversees the APRP Trust Fund with funding contributions from several donors. In addition, Line Ministries (LMs) are also partners and responsible for the programme to engage communities in development activities that strengthen and support reintegration, social cohesion and community recovery. The activities implemented by LMs focus on wage employment and vocational training for reintegrees and community-based development projects. Further to LMs, Security Ministries are also partners and responsible for the mobilization process that includes vetting, biometrics and weapons management. APRP covers the entire territory of Afghanistan having its JS in Kabul, PPCs in 33 provinces and PJSTs in all 34 provinces. APRP



is led by the HPC, which is comprised of 52 members who provide overall political and policy guidance and leads political negotiations; they are technically supported by the JS. In total, approximately 1800 Afghans receive financing from APRP through the security ministries for demobilization, vetting, biometrics and weapons management activities, the HPC, JS, PPCs and PJSTs for national and provincial peace outreach activities, negotiation, reintegrees' relocation and religious leaders' mobilization.

The APRP intends to spend approximately USD 136,000,000 during a period of nearly six years (August 2010 – March 2016) through UNDP's Window B. There are two windows of funding for APRP. Window B channels resources directly from the donors through UNDP to the APRP JS and MoF. Window C channels donor support through a bilateral agreement between the United Kingdom and GIROA directly to the APRP JS. In addition to Window B management, UNDP also provides technical and operational support to the APRP and the management of Window C. UNDP has supported the APRP in working towards the achievement of the following main outputs:

- 6. Two windows of the Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund are effectively managed;**
- 7. APRP central structures effectively deliver planning, monitoring, coordination and reporting on key components of APRP;**
- 8. Subnational structures of APRP effectively deliver key components at the local level;**
- 9. Contributions made to sustainable peace and reintegration in provinces through financial and programmatic support to the Line Ministries' community recovery programmes (Terminated on 31 December 2014); and**
- 10. Effective management of APRP delivery ensured through UNDP technical and operational support.**

Since the establishment of the APRP, there have been achievements towards reconciliation, peacebuilding and reintegration. All structures are functioning at both national and provincial levels. As of 31 December 2015, 10974 ex-combatants renounced arms and joined the peace programme. Of the total number of reintegrees, 1,039 are commanders or leaders. Transitional Assistance (TA) packages of cash assistance have been distributed to 10,858 reintegrees. The total number of weapons collected or registered by APRP from reintegrees has been 8,442. Only in 2015, 1,462 ex-combatants were biometrically enrolled; included in this number of reintegrees were 168 commanders joining the Programme. A total of 1,496 Transitional Assistance (TA) packages of cash assistance were distributed to reintegrees and the total number of weapons collected by APRP from reintegrees was 1,110 in 2015.

Despite these achievements, there have been challenges as well. Lack of a peace agreement and slow progress on peace talks has been one of the most critical programme challenges since Programme's inception. This has made all aspects of implementing APRP more challenging. Furthermore, APRP is faced with a leadership vacuum due to vacant positions of HPC Chairman and JS Chief Executive Officer. The appointment of new leadership for APRP has been a critical pending issue for many months. This has had an impact on the performance of APRP at the national and provincial levels due to the lack of direction, guidelines and timely decision making.

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## **Current Context**

The Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) meetings involving Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States and China are regularly held to advance the Peace and Reconciliation process in Afghanistan. The QCG members have indicated their commitment to a robust effort to eliminate all forms of terrorist groups, regardless of their national origin, operating in their respective territories. They have agreed that friendly, mutually respectful and cooperative relations between the member states of QCG are necessary to create an enabling environment for the peace process in Afghanistan, which will help ensure the security, stability, prosperity, and interests of the region. So far, four rounds of QCG meetings have been held in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The next QCG meeting is expected in the first week of March 2016, and it is anticipated that the first direct Peace Talks with the Taliban will begin in this meeting.

The leaders of the National Unity Government of Afghanistan officially announced the chairman and members of the High Peace Council and its secretariat on 23 February 2016. The new leadership and members of the High Peace Council include Jihadi leaders, religious scholars, political figures, tribal elders and elite women which clearly demonstrates national consensus around the peace process. On behalf of the government of Afghanistan, the new leadership of the High Peace Council will involve in the Peace Talks with the Taliban.

## **Evaluation Purpose**

It has been three years since the mid-term evaluation of the APRP, and the project will conclude 31 March 2016. Therefore, a comprehensive final evaluation of its activities that examines the overall performance and relevance of the APRP interventions as well as UNDP's Support to APRP project contributions is needed to take place.

The effectiveness and efficiency of UNDP's involvement and its added value to APRP should be assessed including UNDP's technical and operational support and oversight control mechanisms.

The overall performance of the APRP and whether it was implemented as intended and identified results and indicators have been achieved will also be assessed. The evaluation should also examine which factors proved critical in helping or hindering change, and if the original assumptions remained relevant over the course of implementation.

The evaluation will examine not only the impact of the APRP programming since 2010, and UNDP's support to APRP, but equally important it will provide future direction to the GIRoA and international community by drawing upon lessons learned, assessing the current context in Afghanistan related to peace and development, and make recommendations for future consideration. Recommendations may focus on specific activities, governance arrangements and operations, stakeholders and capacities as well as suggestions for further exploration and assessment. In looking to the future, the evaluation should examine both technical programmatic areas as well as structural and operational issues including capacity development needs. It should provide direction to both for the broader GIRoA programme for peace and development and how UNDP may remain an effective partner.

The findings and conclusions of the APRP Final Evaluation shall be shared with GIRoA, HPC, JS, donors, and UN organizations.

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## SCOPE OF WORK AND DELIVERABLES

### Scope of Work:

The Evaluation Team will be required to look at all of the Programme's components, structures and implementing partner capacity both HPC and JS at central and sub-national levels. The Evaluation Team will also look at activities of the APRP including Small Grant Projects (SGPs), delivery of TA packages, strategic communication and outreach, grievance resolution, gender mainstreaming, vetting process, reintegration, and community recovery programming. In addition to evaluation of the specific outputs, the evaluation team should explore the overall structure of the APRP and provide comments and recommendations to be considered for future design. Tasks of the Evaluation Team are outlined below under each of the Project's outputs:

### **OUTPUT 1: All two windows of the Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund are effectively managed;**

- **Fund Management:** The Team will assess the efficiency and effectiveness of fund disbursement and management, collation and consolidation of fund expenditure information, preparation of the Monthly Trust Fund summary reports, and regular financial monitoring of line ministries undertaken by the Financial Oversight Committee Secretariat (FOCS).

### **OUTPUT 2: APRP central structures effectively deliver planning, monitoring, coordination and reporting on key components of APRP;**

- **Decision-making apparatus:** The TC and Financial Oversight Committee are the Programme's two decision making bodies. The evaluation should determine the effectiveness of the decision making apparatus, including the processes of submission and approval of the annual work plans and budgets.
- **Programme Planning & Result Management:** The Evaluation Team should also assess the effectiveness of the overall planning and results management mechanisms, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) systems in place, data collection for process as well as impact monitoring. The Programme's reporting systems will have to be evaluated and recommendations made for improvement and future planning.
- **Trust Fund Mechanism:** How effective and efficient was the Trust Fund mechanism (with initial three Windows of Funding)? Was it designed in a way that responded to the needs of the project efficiently? What were the obstacles and problems with this mechanism? What are recommendations for a future funding mechanism for APRP?
- **Overall human capacity:** The evaluation will inform the Programme's partners about the level of human resources' capacity both from the perspective of structures, functions, numbers and substantive technical understanding of the assigned tasks, especially at the regional and provincial level. The evaluation should assess if the APRP and UNDP management structures and administrative support frameworks created an enabling environment for the Programme's delivery.
- **Understanding of APRP contribution to the peace process:** The Evaluation Team will assess the understanding by the various stakeholders including the beneficiaries, the line ministries, the provincial teams, of the APRP contribution and linkages to the overall peace process that is being undertaken in the current political environment of Afghanistan.

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- **Strategic communication and outreach:** The Team will assess the effectiveness of the Programme's strategic communication and outreach activities and provide a set of recommendations for improvement in this area. These recommendations could guide future planning for a new or extended programme.

**OUTPUT 3: Subnational structures of APRP effectively deliver key components at the local level;**

- **Vetting Process of Reintegrees:** The Team is expected to evaluate the SOP on vetting, and provide feedback whether the process was comprehensive, effective and exclusive. The Team should also analyze implementation of vetting and bio-metric procedures to determine gaps in the SOPs, or in its implementation, or in both, and provide recommendations for filling any such gaps.
- **Transitional Assistance Packages:** The Team will look at the content, effectiveness and efficiency of delivery of TA packages, and their overall contribution to the goal of sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants.
- **Small Grant Projects (SGPs):** The Evaluation Team will have to look at the overall SGPs implementation processes and procedures as well as effectiveness and efficiency. The evaluation should help in identification of strengths and weaknesses of SGP initiatives and provide recommendations for the future programme designs.
- **PJST Support:** The Team will look at the PJSTs' structure, effectiveness and delivery of its support to the PPCs and other components of the sub-national programme. The team will also investigate if all planned PJSTs are operational and functioning sufficiently as per their TORs.
- **PPC Outreach:** The Team will look at the PPCs structure, effectiveness and delivery of the provincial level outreach component. The team will also investigate if all PPCs are operational and functioning sufficiently as per their TORs.
- **Commanders Incentive Programme (CIP):** The Team will look at the content, effectiveness and delivery of the CIP and their overall contribution to the goal of sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants.
- **Peace Advocates:** The Team will look at the content, effectiveness and delivery of the Peace Advocates component.

**OUTPUT 4: Contributions made to sustainable peace and reintegration in provinces through financial and programmatic support to the Line Ministries' community recovery programmes;**

- **Reintegration and Community Recovery Programming:** The Evaluation Team will have to undertake in-depth evaluation of reintegration efforts focusing on social, economic and political reintegration of the reintegrates, including the approaches used for reintegration. In addition, the Team should evaluate the various community recovery initiatives undertaken as part of APRP as to how community recovery activities were linked to APRP objectives.

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**OUTPUT 5: Effective management of APRP delivery ensured through UNDP technical and operational support.**

- **UNDP Support:** The Evaluation Team will assess UNDP's technical and operational support to APRP JS in order for it to lead and coordinate the implementation of APRP activities at the center and provincial levels.

**Evaluation Reference Guidelines**

The evaluation should use the following reference guidelines when providing answers to the evaluation questions, which could be refined in the inception report:

**Relevance**

- The Programme's concept and design, both structurally and the activities, within the context of Afghanistan
- To what extent the immediate objectives, results and indicators of the Project have been attained and how effective has been the support to the Afghan institutions

**Effectiveness**

- The clarity of the Project objectives, the relationship between the inputs, outputs, and activities are logical and commensurate with the needs and resources allocated to the Project; the measurement and capturing of the results derived
- Assessment of the impact of external factors on the Project's work plan, schedule and the overall management arrangements; project achievements beyond the planned outputs
- Assessment of the Project as a NIM with APRP JS as an implementing partner

**Efficiency**

- The quality and timeliness of the implementation of activities and the responsiveness of the project to adapt and respond to changes and challenges; an analysis of the risks and expectation management.
- The cost efficiency of the project; has the intended objectives, results and indicators been achieved in a cost-efficient manner.
- International partners' role in the peace process including funding, implementation of activities, communication and overall coordination.
- Whether the various structures, including FOC Secretariat, Line Ministries, Security Ministries and Directorates, and the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) were or remain the most efficient and sustainable structures for programme implementation.
- Whether the benefits accruing from the investments made under the Project enabled the JS and PJSTs to enhance their capacities to facilitate technical and operational support to HPC and PPCs and if enough and well devised efforts have been made to ensure capacities will be maintained in the post project situation.

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### **Sustainability:**

- Sustainability of the results achieved with focus on capacities built and ability of the institutions to operate with reduced, or even no, international technical assistance in the future.
- Extent to which the project has built the long term sustainability of the JS in independent budgeting capability, human resources, audit and procurement.
- Extent to which the sub-national structure remains relevant given the establishment of other sub-national government structures, changing national and regional context for peace and other emerging but related issues such as migration, insecurity, etc.
- Possible scope of future support including exit strategy and recommendations on how best the Project could maximize the transfer of its activities and resources to the JS and PJSTs in a phased way.

### **Gender:**

- The Team will assess the gender sensitivity of programme activities, and provide recommendations as to how gender mainstreaming, especially the role, inclusion and empowerment of women, and taking account of UNSCR 1325, international standards and norms, can be further developed in all aspects of the programme from equitable women's inclusion in peace committees and related structures and activities, including negotiations between local government and their armed opponents, to community recovery.

### **UNDP's added value:**

- What was the added value of UNDP under this project?
- To what extent does UNDP play a role in relation to its Peace and Development principles and its mandate in this regard in the past and what future prospects ?

### **Evaluation Questions**

The evaluation questions should be reviewed and expanded upon in consultation with the Evaluation Team during the inception period. The questions should include, but are not limited to the following:

- Was the initial design of APRP intervention relevant at the time of writing and does it remain so today?
- Was the Programme's Theory of Change correct and does it continue to remain so?
- Has APRP been delivered in an effective and efficient manner making the best use of the resources available?
- Has APRP successfully delivered on the results as identified under each of the Project's outputs? What were the major factors that influenced the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?
- Were the organizational structure, management, planning and implementation processes effective and efficient?
- What were the intended and unintended aspects of the program related to the political, security and developmental dimensions of peace building?

- What were gender mainstreaming challenges and achievements? How did JS, supported by UNDP, ensure that women are included in the peace processes at the national as well as local level?
- How effective were the Project's governance arrangements? To what extent has there been collaboration and communication among UNDP, donors and JS at the central level, and UNDP Regional Teams, PPCs, and PJSTs at the provincial level in supporting the peace process?
- How effective was the overall APRP structure at the provincial level? What was the added value of the PPCs compared to existing formal government structures at the provincial and district level? Can PPCs' mandate and role be carried out by the existing formal structures?
- Has the recent changes in the scale of funding to APRP affected the Programme's ability to achieve its goals? What has been the overall consequence (positive or negative)?
- What would be the key recommendations (at both operational and strategic level) in regards to the future of APRP?
- How effective was the support of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Force Reintegration Command (FRIC) in supporting the startup and operations of the APRP sub-national programme.
- How effective and efficient was UNDP's support in each of the various areas where UNDP was involved (UNDP support at the national and regional level, operational and technical level).
- Was the oversight role provided by the UNDP Country Office effective? Were there oversight control mechanisms in place and was UNDP successful in fulfilling this function?
- How effective and efficient were the lines of reporting between UNDP and APRP, and how clear was the division of responsibilities and accountability of various functions and activities between the Government and UNDP.
- What has been the impact of the chosen modality (NIM) of project implementation?

## Methodology

The evaluation approach and method should likely yield the most reliable and valid answers to the evaluation questions within the limits of resources. The methodology will include:

- **Desk Study:** The Evaluation Team should examine all relevant APRP documents. The desk review should explore other Peace and Development initiatives globally and within the region, including UNDP, as a basis for future advice and relevant lessons learned and best practices.
- **Development and finalization of methodology:** The Evaluation team will design and finalize the tools for collection of data. This will be done in close consultation and discussion with the APRP teams including JS and UNDP.
- **Field Visits:** The Team should study the work of PCC and PJSTs in few representative

provinces. The Team should also interview with the Provincial Governor, interested civil society organizations, women’s groups, UNAMA, and other international personnel (donors).

- **Interviewing stakeholders:** The Team should pay particular attention to the interviewing of stakeholders, reintegrees, and their communities, especially vulnerable groups in local communities, such as women and ethnic minorities, and local authorities. Furthermore, senior management and other key focal points in the JS and APRP, senior management and other key focal points in UNDP, key managerial and advisory staff in APRP UNDP Support Project, and representatives of all donor partners contributing to APRP need to be interviewed.
- **Interviewing line ministries:** The Team should hold interviews with line ministries officials at central and sub-national level of MRRD, MAIL, MoLSAMD, MoPW, IDLG, and MoI.
- **Review and finalization of report:** The draft of the evaluation report will be shared with all stakeholders for feedback/ comments and inputs incorporated as applicable in the final report.

#### **Expected Outputs, Deliverables and Timelines:**

The international consultant will work under the supervision of a team leader in achieving the following deliverables.

<b>Deliverables/ Outputs</b>	<b>Description of Deliverables/ Outputs</b>	<b>Target Due Date</b>	<b>Review and Approvals Required</b>
<b>Desk Review and Evaluation Work Plan</b>	A work plan specifying the start and end date of the evaluation to identify how and when the evaluation team is going to conduct the evaluation.	8 Apr 2016 (6 working days)	Rule of Law & Human Security Unit reviews and approves the work plan.
<b>Evaluation Inception Report</b>	An inception report should be prepared by the Evaluation Team before going into the full-fledged data collection exercise. It should detail the Evaluation Team’s understanding of what is being evaluated and why, showing how each evaluation question will be answered by way of: proposed methods, proposed sources of data and data collection procedures. The inception report should include a proposed schedule of tasks, activities and deliverables, designating a team member with the lead responsibility for each task or product. Prior to preparing the report, a detailed report format should be submitted for UNDP’s	14 Apr 2016 (4 working days)	Rule of Law & Human Security Unit reviews and approves the inception report.



	approval.		
<b>Presentation</b>	of preliminary findings	12 May 2016 (20 working days)	Rule of Law & Human Security Unit reviews the presentation and provides feedback.
<b>Draft Evaluation Report</b>	A draft report for review and inputs of all programme partners	20 May 2016 (6 working days)	Rule of Law & Human Security Unit reviews the draft report and provides feedback.
<b>Workshop</b>	A half-day workshop for all relevant stakeholders at central level where the evaluation team presents and seeks consultation on its findings and recommendations	23 May 2016 (1 working day)	
<b>Final Evaluation Report</b>	A final report of no more than 50 pages plus annexes to be submitted to UNDP.	27 May (3 working days)	Rule of Law & Human Security Unit reviews the final report and approves.

The Team Leader will guide the work of the international consultant and will seek its support in any or some of the above mentioned areas of work.

## WORKING ARRANGEMENTS

### Institutional Arrangements:

UNDP Afghanistan Country Office, led by the Rule of Law and Human Security Team will be responsible for overall coordination and facilitation of the evaluation team activities besides giving logistical support to the mission with support from partners such as Joint Secretariat. The consultants will work under the day to day guidance and support of the UNDP Rule of Law and Human Security Programme and report to the Head of Unit. UNDP will be the overall responsible for the evaluation.

The CO or ROLHS project will provide office space and internet facility, logistical and other support service including transport and security applicable to UNDP international personnel.

### Duration of the Work:

The estimated time for the conduct of this evaluation is 30 working days over a period of two months and is scheduled to start in April 2016. The payments are made in accordance with the actual days of work with satisfied deliverables. A tentative time table is outlined below that could be amended in consultation with UNDP. All the following activities should be undertaken under the supervision and guidance of the evaluation team leader.

1. Desk review (3 working days; 10%), **Home based.**
2. Finalization of the evaluation design and methods and preparing the detailed inception report (2 working days; 7%), **Home based.**
3. In-country evaluation mission (visits to the field, interviews, questionnaires) – (19 working days; 62%): this also includes participation in a three-day security training if the consultant(s) are required to visit the field outside Kabul City, **Kabul based.**
4. Stakeholder meeting and presentation of the preliminary findings (1 working day; 3%), **Kabul based.**
5. Analysis of the information collected and preparing the draft report (4 working days; 15%), **Home based.**
6. Incorporating comments and finalizing the evaluation report (1 working day; 3%), **Home based**

**Duty Station:**

The duty station will be home and Kabul based depending on the needs of the office. The consultant will be required to work under the evaluation team leader during the in-country mission for a period of 4 weeks.

**REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPERIENCE AND QUALIFICATIONS**

Academic Qualifications:

- Advanced university degree in relevant disciplines (e.g., international relations, peace and conflict studies, political science, social science, Law and related fields)

Years of experience:

- The international consultant must have a minimum of 8-years of work experience in the areas of programme management, peacebuilding, reintegration, community recovery, reconciliation, and institutional strengthening.
- Experience in organizational management, structures and systems, operations, capacity development, reporting, and monitoring is desired but not essential.
- Experience in working internationally at the national and sub national human security sphere

Competencies:

- Demonstrates integrity by modelling the UN’s values and ethical standards
- Promotes the vision, mission, and strategic goals of UNDP
- Displays cultural, gender, religion, race, nationality and age sensitivity and adaptability
- Treats all people fairly without favouritism

Special skills requirements

- Proven knowledge of evaluation methods
- Deep knowledge of the political, cultural, and economic contexts of Afghanistan, or similar regional context

## PRICE PROPOSAL AND SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

The contractor shall submit a price proposal as below:

- **Daily Fee** – The contractor shall propose a daily fee, which should be inclusive of his professional fee, local communication cost and insurance (inclusive of medical health insurance and evacuation). The number of working days for which the daily fee shall be payable under the contract is **30 working days**.
- The contractor shall propose a Living allowance at the Kabul applicable rate of USD 181 per night for his/her stay at the duty station. The number of nights for which the Living allowance shall be payable under the contract is **27 nights**. The contractor is NOT allowed to stay in a place of his choice other than the UNDSS approved places. UNDP will provide MORSS compliant accommodation in Green Village (GV) to the contractor. The payment of GV accommodation shall be made directly to GV by the contractor.
- **Travel & Visa** – The contractor shall propose an estimated lump-sum for home-Kabul-home travel (economy most direct route) and Afghanistan visa expenses.

The total professional fee, shall be converted into a lump-sum contract and payments under the contract shall be made on submission and acceptance of deliverables under the contract in accordance with the schedule of payment linked with deliverables.

## EVALUATION METHOD AND CRITERIA

### Cumulative analysis

The award of the contract shall be made to the individual consultant whose offer has been evaluated and determined as:

- a) responsive/compliant/acceptable, and
- b) Having received the highest score out of a pre-determined set of weighted technical and financial criteria specific to the solicitation.

\* *Technical Criteria: weight 70%*

\* *Financial Criteria weight 30%*

*Only candidates obtaining a minimum of 49 points (70% of the total technical points) would be considered for the Financial Evaluation*

The offer will be evaluated by using the Best Value for money approach (combined scoring method). The Technical Proposal will be evaluated on 70%. Whereas the Financial Proposal will be evaluated on 30%.

Criteria	Weight	Maximum obtainable Points
<b>Technical</b>		
Advanced university degree in relevant disciplines (e.g., international relations, peace and conflict studies, political science, social science, Law and related fields)	10%	10
Experience in working internationally at the national and sub national human security sphere	25%	25
Proven knowledge of evaluation methods	20%	20
Experience in Afghanistan, with a specific focus on conflict transformation and peacebuilding	5%	5

processes			
Deep knowledge of the political, cultural, and economic contexts of Afghanistan, or similar regional context,	10%	10	
<b>TOTAL TECHNICAL SCORES</b>	<b>70%</b>	<b>70</b>	

### **DOCUMENTS TO BE INCLUDED WHEN SUBMITTING THE PROPOSALS.**

Interested individual consultants must submit the following documents/information to demonstrate their qualifications **in one single PDF document**:

- 1) Duly accomplished **Letter of Confirmation of Interest and Availability** using the template provided by UNDP (Annex II).
- 2) **Personal CV or P11**, indicating all past experience from similar projects, as well as the contact details (email and telephone number) of the Candidate and at least three (3) professional references.
- 3) **Technical proposal**:
  - a. Brief description of why the individual considers him/herself as the most suitable for the assignment
  - b. A methodology, on how they will approach and complete the assignment.
- 4) Sample of **Self-Authored Publication** of relevance to this assessment
- 5) **Financial proposal** that indicates the all-inclusive fixed total contract price, supported by a breakdown of costs, as per template provided (Annex II)

**ANNEXES** (to be downloaded from UNDP Afghanistan Website, Jobsite section: [www.undp.org](http://www.undp.org)):

- ANNEX I - Individual Contractor General Terms and Conditions
- ANNEX II – Offerors Letter to UNDP Confirming Interest and Availability for the Individual Contractor Assignment

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## Annex 2: Persons Met

### 1. UNDP

Douglas Keh, Country Director

Renaud Meyer, Country Director, Nepal (former APRP Project Manager)

Jocelyn Mason, Deputy Country Director (Programmes)

Dawn Del Rio, Head, Rule of Law and Human Security Programme Unit

Ahmad Rashid Watanpahl, Programme Officer, APRP

Getachew Firew Habtu, Financial Management Specialist, APRP

Mohammad Shafi Rahimi, former Regional Programme Coordinator, Mazar

Zia Ahmad Karimi, Regional Programme Corrdinator, South

### 2. Donors

Franziska Johanna Albrecht, Third Secretary, Federal Republic of Germany

Kyoko Okano, Second Secretary, Embassy of Japan

Jacob K Choi, Political Military Affairs, United States of America

Dania Cossa, Programme Manager, Italy

Daniel Losada, Counsellor, Spain

Bart de Bruijn, Kingdom of the Netherlands

David Ashley, UK Embassy

Jeniffer, UK Embassy

### 3. National Stakeholders

Mohammad Ayub Rafiqi, CEO, Joint Secretariat

Farhadullah Farhad, Deputy CEO, Joint Secretariat

Abdul Rahman Hamid, Head of Strategic communication and Outreach, Joint Secretariat

Maj General Shamsul Rahman, MoD DIAG Ops General Director, Ministry of Defence

Col Fazel Rabi Qiam, DIAG Ops, Ministry of Defence

Maihan Lutfi, Fund Manager, FOC Secretariat, Ministry of Finance

Rahmatullah Hamraz, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, FOC Secretariat, Ministry of Finance

Abdul Rachid Hamin, Director, APRP, Independent Directorate of Local Government

Shahib Farid Raaid, Director, NSDP, Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and the Disabled

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Sayed Hamdard, Finance, Administration and IT, APRP Unit, Ministry of Public Works

Kyyber Farahi, Operations Director (Ag.), Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development

Suliaman Kakar, Deputy Minister, National Security Council

Mohammad Perez Omer, Advisor to Deputy Minister, NSC

Abdul Qadeer Jawad, Deputy Minister Finance and Administration, MAIL

#### **4. Provincial Stakeholders**

##### **1. Nangarhar**

Malik Nazir, Nangarhar PPC Head

Maulavi Abbas, PPC Secretary

Abdul Raziq, PJST Focal Person for Operations

Mohammad Jafar, Former PJST Focal person for Development

Ataulhaq Bashiri, Planning Manager Department of Agriculture

Hedayatullah Saboon, Head of Public Works Corps, MOPW

Maulavi Haqqani, Head of Haj and religious Affairs Department and Member of PPC

##### **2. Khandahar**

Mohammad Omar Satai: Head of PJST

Latif Hassani: Operations Focal Person (PJST)

Humayon Lalai: Development and M&E Focal Point (PJST)

Abdul Qodus Baaes: Public Awareness Raising Focal Point (PJST)

Mrs. Jamila Yousufi: Secretary of PPC

Mr. Ahmad Shah Rosha: Director of Agriculture Kandahar

Mr. Naqibullah Monib: Agriculture Promotion Manager

Mr. Haji Agha: Panjwai District Agriculture promotion manager

Mr. Dost Mohammad: Arghandab District Agriculture promotion manager

Mr. Toriallai: Horticulture Manager

Mr. Haji Noor Agha: Deputy Director of Haj and Religious Affairs Kandahar

Mr. Mullah Shamsullah: Reintegratee and CIP

##### **3. Logar**

Assadullah, PPC Head

Khair Mohammad, PJST Head

Shamsulhaq, PJST Administration/Finance Officer

Said Abraham, PJST Demobilisation Officer

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Mohammad Usman, PJST Public Information Officer  
Zafar Khan, PPC Member  
Mohammad Dawod, PPC Member  
Fazal Haq, PPC Member  
Mohammad Nabi, Peace Advocate  
Mohammad Rafiq, DDA Head  
Najibullah, Reconcilee  
Mohammad Nasim, Reconcilee  
Abdul Hamid, Reconcilee  
Molavi Mohammad Umar, Reconcilee

#### 4. Kabul

M.Din Khaber, PPC Head  
Mohamad Tahir, PPC Deputy  
Abdul Malik, PJST Head  
Mohabatullah, PJST, Administration/Finance Officer  
Mashal, PJST, Demobilisation Officer  
Abdul Latif, PPC Member  
Abdul Rasheed, PPC Member  
Abdul Mohamood, PPC Member  
Janat Gul, PPC Member  
Abdul Azim, PPC Member  
Sayed Omar, PPC Member  
Mohamad Yaqoub, PPC Member  
Shalizi Didar, PPC Member  
Faqeer Mohamad, Peace Advocate  
Yar Mohamad, Reconcilee, CIP  
Selaab, Reconcilee, CIP  
Mohamad Razaq, Reconcilee, CIP  
Momin Khan, Reconcilee, CIP  
Ali Khan, Reconcilee, CIP

#### 5. Laghman

Redigul, PPC Head  
Said wali khan, PJST Head  
Rafi uddin, PJST Admin/Finance Officer  
Mohammad Asef, PJST Demobilisation Officer  
Ab Wahed, PJST Public Information Officer  
Ab Hakeem, PPC Member

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Ab wahab, PPC Member  
Fazlullah, PPC Member  
Said Alam, PPC Member

#### **6. Zabul**

Jamila Yousofi: Director of Women's Affairs, Zabul province  
Abdul Ghani Tokhi, Head of PJST, Zabul  
Mohammad Hasim Grani, Head of PPC, Zabul  
Nisar Ahmad Wafa, operations focal point PJST, Zabul  
Mohammad Rasool Khan, MoLSAMD, Head  
Abdul Rahim Menawal, Programme Officer, MRRD  
Haji Mohammad Daud, DDA, Beneficiary  
Haji Rohi Mohammad, DDA, Beneficiary  
Haji, Tribal Elder, Beneficiary  
Lala Shereen, Reintegree  
Sher Mohammad, Peace Advocate  
Abdul Rashid Hakimozi, Administration/Finance Officer, PJST,  
Roqya Asakzai, Head, Ministry of Women's Affairs

#### **5. CSO**

Rahmatullah Rahmat, Planning Officer, the Halo Trust  
Zekria Payab, Deputy Director Operations, Organisation for Mine Clearance and  
Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR)  
Hasina Safi, Director, Afghan Women's Network and Advisor, HPC



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## Annex 3: Documents Consulted

APRP Document, July 2010

APRP Annual Reports, 2010 – 2015

APRP Final Report, March 2016

APRP JS Monthly and Bimonthly Reports, 2011 – 2013

AWPs, 2010 – 2016

APRP – Line Ministries MOUs

APRP Monitoring Tools

PJST Monitoring Tools

Final Report, Independent Thematic Review on Gender for the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), March 2014

Judy El-Bushra: Gender in Peacebuilding: Taking Stock, International Alert, June 2012

Henri Myrtilinen, Jana Naujoks and Judy El-Bushra: Rethinking Gender in Peacebuilding, International Alert, March 2014

Afghan Women's Network: Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme: An Assessment of Women's Role in and Public Awareness of the Peacebuilding Efforts post 2010

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## Annex 4: Assumptions underpinning the APRP

Assumptions underpin all project design. In some instances, the assumptions are so important that, if incorrect, they undermine the whole design. In this case, they are known as killer assumptions.

Assumption 1: The elephant in the room: reintegration can happen in the absence of a peace agreement

Reintegration that is planned and implemented within the framework of larger peace process can have positive dividends in terms of social, political, economic and security outcomes. But in the absence of an overall peace process, reintegration is likely to be ineffective at best and even dangerous at worst, exacerbating insecurity for reintegrees and for the country over the long term. Where there is no peace, activities can actually pose significant risk to those who participate in the projects.

Unlike the context of reintegration in countries such as Sierra Leone and Aceh Province in Indonesia where similar reintegration initiatives have taken place, the fact that Afghanistan continues to be in the midst of a conflict means that many of the projects designed could have actually created more risks, something that proved right and will be discussed further in the paper.

Reintegration was seen as treason putting the new reintegrees once they had surrendered their arms, in danger<sup>65</sup>. There was also no recourse to justice foreseen in the strategy. The APRP makes reference to local peace jirgas and victims rights groups, under the coordination of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), but the project did not provide further details on how justice was to be pursued at the local level, leaving implementation at the mercy of local authorities.

Assumption 2: a Peace Agreement paving the way for top down peace was imminent

The main design problem of APRP was the killer assumption that a reintegration program in the absence of a peace agreement was possible. When the program was designed in 2010, talks about talks with the Taliban, albeit informally, had started and it was expected that under the pressure of a number of international players (the US, Saudi Arabia etc.), the Taliban would eventually come to the negotiating table.

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<sup>65</sup> In Balkh, CIP commanders played vital role in ensuring security of Highways and persuading other groups to join Peace program but received inadequate support through the program, including no protection, being responsible for themselves, using their own through their personal and un-registered weapons. Most of Balkh's districts do not have local police and government is weak, The Reintegrees operated as security units, including providing protection to government officials during their visits but in turn received no government security support from the authorities.

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The expectation in 2010 was that an olive branch and amnesty could be extended to Taliban leaders and mid level commanders who would accept the Constitution, coupled with reintegration incentives to low-level rank and file. Even though the proposal for reconciliation received backing by the 1,600 delegates at the *loya jirga*, the consensus was not clear cut.

- First, at the time of design of APRP in 2010, there was and is no evidence that the Taliban wanted to reconcile, or were ready to agree to any deal<sup>66</sup>. There was/is also no public evidence of any specific Taliban political demands or any willingness to negotiate out of weakness<sup>67</sup>. Furthermore, the extent of Pakistani influence to bring them to the negotiating table, even if it had the intention to do so was unclear. Beyond their demand for the withdrawal of foreign forces, Taliban demands and objectives have not been clearly enunciated. Talks have therefore remained at the level of talks about talks, and statements on behalf of the Taliban by international middle-men. On the eve of the 2010 *loya jirga*, the Taliban issued a statement saying that the jirga did not represent the Afghan people and was aimed at securing the interest of foreigners. Another insurgent group, Hizb-i-Islami, led by ex-Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, called the conference a "useless exercise"<sup>68</sup>.
- Second, peace was required not only with the Taliban but also with the opposition. The opposition political leadership boycotted the *loya Jirga*; many opposition leaders were Northerners and did not want negotiations with the Taliban. After 2010, fearing a backstage deal between Karzai and the Taliban, ethnic minority leaders began rearming militias in fear of a Taliban comeback, hardly a positive augur for a peace process.
- Third, GoIRA never clearly enunciated the Human and Women's Rights red lines that had to be accepted, leaving civil society and women's groups particularly skeptical and vulnerable<sup>69</sup>. No reference to human or women's rights is made in the APRP documents.
- Fourth, The US support for talks in 2010 was contradictory since the surge (an additional US 33,000 troops to the 68,000 already in Afghanistan) started in the same year. Top generals resisted negotiations, believing that the focus should be on military gains in advance of political discussion. And, following the US administration's decision to pursue talks (February 2011), the approach was cautious and the role of the Karzai government unclear<sup>70</sup>.

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<sup>66</sup> Arguably, there is little, if any, evidence of a desire to reach a peace agreement in 2010.

<sup>67</sup> According to UNAMA, the expansion of the conflict has reinforced the position of those within the Taliban who advocate a military victory.

<sup>68</sup> By the time of the evaluation, peace talks and reintegration with Hekmatyar were projected to result in a significant impact on peace negotiations and contribute to improving the situation in the country.

<sup>69</sup> GoIRA argued that the requirement to accept and abide by the Constitution addressed this.

<sup>70</sup> The first meeting took place in Germany on November 28, 2010 when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton sent a State Department official to meet with the Taliban leader's chief of

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- Finally, the Evaluation Team was informed of numerous examples underlining that the absence of consensus among senior government officials, including members of the security enclave, largely around the peace process initiation modalities<sup>71</sup>.

Assumption 3: peace could be a possibility or supported bottom up

The third killer assumption was that reintegrating former fighters would put pressure on the insurgent leadership; and that reintegration involved economic incentives because fighters' motivation to join the insurgency was economic insecurity and poverty, which could be addressed through economic development.

- In the absence of adequate conflict mapping, there was no evidence of the linkages between field commanders in the regions where the APRP was working and the *Quetta Shura*. In the regions where the APRP became most active (the North and West), AGEs were likely to be followers of strongmen/warlords, IMU fighters, or even Afghans belonging to splinter groups, without necessarily possessing direct links to the high level leadership. The movement was never a cohesive, unitary organization but an amalgamation of factions with competing agendas and beliefs.
- Second, in the absence of a needs analysis among the potential reintegrees, the assumption that they were solely motivated by poverty was disputable. It neglected other potential motivations for radicalization, such as ideological ones (fighting for constituting a *Sharia*-based rule), grievance with government officials, or grievances with the occupation, or simply revenge against the death of family members killed in drone attacks, often the case in the South. True, the majority of fighters were, and are, not ideological radicals, but many are motivated by a complex mix of reasons: disillusionment towards the government and widespread corruption, anger at the presence of international forces or even loyalty to ethnic leaders. In addition, the APRP discusses combatants' need to 'return home', but the insurgency is homegrown in many areas<sup>72</sup>.

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staff. In the consequent meetings held with the Taliban and the Americans, President Karzai felt increasingly marginalised.

<sup>71</sup> This apparent absence of consensus reportedly persisted during implementation. NDS and MOI competed for their admin costs by introducing illegal armed groups as Taliban fighters. There was also speculation that they had leaked information to Taliban about CIPs, Peace advocates, and PPC members, which resulted in death of the latter. They were accused of delaying the vetting process to an extent that made the some of the real Taliban rejoin their ranks, after showing willingness to join the process. Provincial governors in Kandahar, Zabul, Badghis, and Herat, at best, reluctantly supported the program.

<sup>72</sup> Field visits through up a diversity of views of the origins of the conflict. In Nangarhar, interlocutors believed that the main reason of violence was neither poverty nor unemployment. The primary motive of Taliban is to sabotage the government, which they compare the current government with the Najibullah government of 1980s since foreign troops are present, Islamic *sharia* and rules are not practiced, and the Ulema are not respected. Taliban leadership supported by Pakistani ISI exploit Madrasa students and

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- The APRP 's bottom-up peace model also failed to sufficiently address the fact that many strands of the insurgency receive significant support from foreign fighters or have links with organised criminal networks. In reality, no matter how much international assistance supports paying the insurgents to disarm, it cannot compete with the sums available through organised crime (drugs, people smugglers) and international *jihadi* groups (Al Qaeda and, now, the ISIS/Khorasan group).

Assumption 4: stability could be build through community level resilience

Closely related to the above, was the assumption that economic opportunities would create peace not just for the reintegrees but also for the communities that would be prepared to integrate them in their midst: limited economic development would address community needs, stabilising the local situation. In effect, community development would encourage community members to accept ex-combatants presence in their communities and serve to encourage the community to guarantee their personal well-being.

However, this assumption also had serious fallacies and implications for long-term stability in Afghanistan:

- First, it distorted and the politicised development aid. Communities received aid not on the basis of need but on their ability to produce and turn in ex-combatants.
- Second, this model could have led to perverse incentives, in terms of which communities, districts or provinces that enjoy greater security could feel that they are receiving less aid. The evaluation team was informed that the economic incentives available to reintegrees may have led to an increase in youth recruitment to the insurgency simply to enable them to join the programme and access economic benefits.
- Third, by relying on the CDCs, the APRP may have tried to utilise pre-existing community decision-making structures to avoid duplication but it politicised them, something that they had tried to avoid from the beginning of the NSP program in order to ensure their security and legitimacy.
- APRP also proposed holding new CDC elections. It states that in cases where a CDC already existed, either “membership could be expanded (through re-elections) to include ex- combatants” or “the community priorities that are identified could also reflect the needs of ex-combatants whether elections take place or not.”

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Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Addressing these these causes increases the possibility of poverty reduction, not the other way round.

In Kandahar, the PJST Head asserted the maintenance of tribal dominance and political power were the main reasons for continued violence. Poverty and lack of employment were the least important reasons of Taliban insurgency. The recent inter-group fighting following a recent *fatwa* of Saudi clerics also indicate that they are fighting for dominance over each other.

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The idea of organizing re-elections, particularly in the absence of an effective disarmament process was a way to endanger the CDCs further.

- Finally, the APRP hoped that it could sustain humanitarian packages and short-term incentives, without necessarily being able to create jobs in the long term for the country.

## Annex 5: Budget and Expenditure Tables

Table 1: Indicative Budget

S/NO	Description	Total Cost US \$
	ProgSramme Cost	
1.1	Phase One: Activities for Social Outreach, Negotiation, and Confidence BBuilding	32,310,000
1.2	Phase Two: Activities to Deliver Demobilization	149,267,100
1.3	Phase Three: Activities to consolidate Peace and to support Community Recovery	510,931,000
1.4	Presidential Discretionary Peace and Reconciliation Fund	50,000,000
2	Program Management and Operation Cost	39,643,611
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>782,151,711</b>

Source: APRP Programme Document, GoIRA, July 2010

Table 2: APRP Trust Fund Summary Overview, Fiscal Years 2010 – 2015 (1390 – 94) inclusive

Donor	Committed <sup>73</sup> (US \$ '000s)	Received (US \$ '000s)	Expenditure (US \$ '000s)	Balance (US \$ '000s)
<b>Window A</b>				
Australia	11 970	11 970		
Finland	2 470	2 470	49 258	15 182
USA	50 000	50 000		
Sub-total	64 440	64 440	49 258	15 182
<b>Window B</b>				
Denmark	7 962	7 962	7 962	0
Germany	39 536	39 536	39 517	19
Italy	5 684	5 684	5 582	102
Japan	52 056	52 056	52 056	0
Japan Supplementary	15 000	15 000	15 000	0
Republic of Korea	9 000	4 000	1 000	3 000
Netherlands	2 500	2 500	2 500	0
Spain	6 667	6 667	4 915	1 751
UNDP (Accrued Interest)	1 363	1 363	1 269	95
USA	5 000	5 000	1 943	3 057
Sub-total	144 767	139 767	131 743	8 024
<b>Window C</b>				
Estonia	43	43	43	0
United Kingdom	24 224	18 661	18 628	34
Sub-total	24 267	18 704	18 671	34
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>233 474</b>	<b>222 911</b>	<b>199 672</b>	<b>23 240</b>

Source: APRP Financial Summary, 10 March 2016

<sup>73</sup> Rounded; totals may not add up.

Table 3: Multiannual Budget (Window B)

Outputs	Activities	Inputs	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total
Outcome 1:	Critical institutions provide the enabling environment for peace and reintegration at the sub-national level							
Capacity for the implementation of peace and reintegration programmes in critical line ministries developed	Comprehensive document outlining capacity needs of Governmental institutions involved in APRP is produced	Consulting company/team undertakes capacity needs assessment	500,000					500,000
	Assessed capacity needs are developed in the seven relevant ministries	Consultants, logistical requirements, equipment, training	4,000,000	4,000,000	4,000,000			12,000,000
	The Joint Secretariat is supported	Equipment and staff costs for the JS	2,096,324	1,096,324	1,096,324	1,096,324	805,252	6,190,548
Capacity for the delivery of peace and reintegration processes in sub-national APRP governance structures developed	Provincial P&R committees support the APRP process at provincial level	Management, operations, training, negotiation and peace building skills, and logistical requirements of Peace and Reintegra	2,000,000	3,000,000	3,000,000	1,800,000	600,000	10,400,000



		tion Committe es in four provinces						
	Mobile P&R teams participat e in the reintegrat ion process at the local level	Provincial mobile teams: operation s, training, and logistical support	330,75 0	396,90 0	330.75 0	198,45 0	66,150	1,323,0 00
APRP has the capacity to deliver its Strategic Communic ations Programm e	Funding of key media initiatives	National public informati on	50,000	60,000	50,000	30,000	10,000	200,000
		Informati on and strategic communi cation	600,00 0	720,00 0	600,00 0	360,00 0	120,00 0	2,400,0 00
		National and regional conferenc es	750,00 0	900,00 0	750,00 0	450,00 0	150,00 0	3,000,0 00
	Assistanc e for political and social outreach and formation of civil society dialogue	Sub national outreach and confidenc e building through state and non- state mechanis ms	637,00 0	764,40 0	637,00 0	382,20 0	127,40 0	2,548,0 00
Outcome 1	Sub-total		10,964 ,074	10,937 ,624	10,464 ,074	4,316, 974	1,878, 802	36,561, 548
Outcome 2:	Successful implemen tation of key compone nts of APRP							
Ex- combatant s are demobilize d and reintegrat	Districts stabilized by implemen tation of weapon	Demobiliz ation activities: vetting, vetting registrati	13,396 ,000	20,075 ,200	15,396 ,000	8,037, 600	1,679, 200	58,584, 000

ed, and weapons are managed	management and demobilization of ex combatants	on, weapons management and immediate care and support						
Critical institutions have the capacity to deliver on Alternative Livelihood Programmes	System for delivery of reintegration packages established	Provisions for vocational training, deradicalization, literacy courses, training stipends, job support and placement	10,289,926	30,747,911	15,289,926	4,373,956	1,457,985	62,159,704
Sub-total	Outcome 2		25,535,926	53,043,111	32,535,926	13,521,556	3,507,185	128,143,704
Outcome 3:	Peace and Reintegration Process delivered through existing national programmes							
Existing national programmes of line ministries and national institutions supported	Consolidation of Peace and Community Recovery	Funds provided for development and infrastructure projects		To be	Allocated	as per donor	preference	
			15,000,000					15,000,000
	Development of agricultural conservation initiatives	Assistance to agricultural conservation corps						

Sub-total	Outcome 3		15,500,000					15,500,000
Programme Support	UNDP provides support to APRP	APRP – UNDP support operations and management	5,500,000	10,000,000	10,000,000	10,000,000	4,000,000	39,500,000
Programme Support	Sub-total		5,500,000	10,000,000	10,000,000	10,000,000	4,000,000	39,500,000
TOTAL			57,000,000	73,980,735	53,000,000	27,838,530	9,385,937	21,205,252

Source: APRP Project Document, January 2016

Table 4: Income and Expenditure by Donor, December 2010

Donor	Received (US \$ equivalent)	Expenditure (US \$ equivalent)
Denmark	5 391 928	0
Germany	13 605 442	0
Italy	5 683 656	0
Japan	52 055 941	738 245
Netherlands	2 500 000	0
Spain	6 459 948	0
Total	85 696 915	738 245

Source: Annual Report, 2011

Table 5: Income and Expenditure by Donor, December 2011 (cumulative)

Donor	Received (US \$ equivalent)	Expenditure (US \$ equivalent)
Denmark	5 391 928	257 266
Germany	13 605 442	2 107 597
Italy	5 683 656	0
Japan	52 055 941	7 852 265
Netherlands	2 500 000	0
Spain	6 459 948	0
Total	85 696 915	10 217 128

Source: ibid

Table 6: Output Expenditure (2011)<sup>74</sup>

Output	Budget (AWP 2011)	Budget (AWP 2011 revised)	Expenditure	%
1. PRTF efficiently managed	800,000	290,000	244,674	84
Management cost (7%)	56,000	20,300	17,127	84
Sub-total	856,000	310,300	261,801	84
2. JS coordinates implementation APRP80	9,107,394	4,259,285	3,386,762	80
Management cost (7%)	637,518	298,149	237,073	80
Sub-total	9,744,912	4,557,434	3,623,835	80
3. APRP field activities to facilitate	16,429,299	7,101,097	2,964,155	42

<sup>74</sup> Management costs are reported at 7% across all budget lines, including in respect of Output 5, UNDP Technical Support for Coordination of APRP.

peace at the local level				
Management cost (7%)	1,150,051	497,077	207,491	42
Sub-total	17,579,350	7,598,174	3,171,646	42
4. Community recovery and stability through national programmes	27,601,919	7,723,400	378,306	5
Management cost (7%)	1,932,134	540,638	26,481	5
Sub-total	29,534,053	8,264,038	404,787	5
5. UNDP Technical Support and Coordination for APRP	3,657,114	2,502,000	1,884,782	75
Management support (7%)	255,998	175,140	131,941	75
Sub-total	3,913,112	2,677,140	2,016,813	75
TOTAL	61,627,427	23,407,086	9,478,882	40

Source: ibid

Table 7: Expenditure by Donor and Output, 2011

Outputs	Denmark	Germany	Italy	Japan	TOTAL
Output 1: P & RTF efficiently managed	-	-	-	244,674	244 674
Output 2: JS coordinates implementation of key APRP components	-	752,078	-	2,634,684	3 386 762
Output 3: APRP field activities undertaken successfully to facilitate peace at local level	-	1,217,639	-	1,746,516	2 964 155
Output 4: Community recovery and stability achieved through national programmes	240,435	-	-	137,871	378 306
Output 5: UNDP Technical support and coordination successfully provided for APRP	-	-	-	1,884,872	1 884 872
General Management Service Fee	16,831	328,217	-	465,403	810 451
TOTAL	257 266	2 297 934	-	7,114,020	9 669 220

Source: ibid

Table 9: Income and Expenditure by Donor, December 2012 (cumulative)

Donor	Received (US \$ equivalent)	Expenditure (US \$ equivalent)
Denmark	5 391 128	3 421 555
Germany	26 027 802	4 840 930
Italy	5 683 656	0
Japan	52 055 941	23 735 064
Korea	1 000 000	1 000 000
Netherlands	2 500 000	1 392 686
Spain	6 666 667	0
Total	99 325 994	34 390 235

Source: Annual Report, 2012

Table 10: Output Expenditure (2012)<sup>75</sup>

Output	Budget (AWP)	Expenditure	%
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<sup>75</sup> Management costs (7%), reported in 2011, were not reported again in annual reports.

	2012)		
1. PRTF efficiently managed	605 621	310 329	51
Sub-total	605 621	310 329	51
2. JS coordinates implementation APRP	4 515 980	3 885 115	86
Sub-total	4 515 980	3 885 115	86
3. APRP field activities to facilitate peace at the local level	11 704 812	11 032 264	94
Sub-total	11 704 812	11 032 264	94
4. Community recovery and stability through national programmes	15 825 505	14 612 880	92
Sub-total	15 825 505	14 612 880	92
5. UNDP Technical Support and Coordination for APRP	5 152 148	4 549 637	88
Sub-total	5 152 148	4 549 637	88
TOTAL	37 803 616	34 390 325	91

Source: ibid

Table 11: Expenditure by Donor and Output, 2012

Outputs	Denmark	Germany	Italy	Japan	Korea	Netherlands	TOTAL
Output 1: P & RTF efficiently managed	-	-	-	310,239	-	-	310 239
Output 2: JS coordinates implementation of key APRP components	-	981,818	-	2,903,297	-	-	3 885 115
Output 3: APRP field activities undertaken successfully to facilitate peace at local level	-	3,859,112	-	5,780,466	-	1,392,686	11 032 264
Output 4: Community recovery and stability achieved through national programmes	3,421,555	-	-	10,191,325	1,000,000	-	14 612 880
Output 5: UNDP Technical support and coordination successfully provided for APRP	-	-	-	4,549,737	-	-	4 549 737
TOTAL	3,421,555	4,840,930		23,735,064	1,000,000	1,392,686	34 390 235

Source: ibid

Table 12: Income and Expenditure by Donor, December 2013 (cumulative)

Donor	Received (US \$ equivalent)	Expenditure (US \$ equivalent)
Denmark	7 961 741	4 222 840
Germany	26 027 802	17 380 502
Italy	5 683 656	4 129 344
Japan	52 055 941	17 803 939
Korea	1 000 000	1 000 000
Netherlands	2 500 000	768 859
Spain	6 666 667	1 866 537
Total	101 895 808	46 818 029

Source: Annual Report, 2013

Table 13: Output Expenditure (2013)

Output	Budget (AWP 2013)	Expenditure	%
1. PRTF efficiently managed	497 025	374 025	75
Sub-total	497 025	374 025	75
2. JS coordinates implementation APRP	5 938 826	4 872 498	82
Sub-total	5 938 826	4 872 498	82
3. APRP field activities to facilitate peace at the local level	13 420 985	11 010 812	82
Sub-total	13 420 985	11 010 812	82
4. Community recovery and stability through national programmes	27 445 012	24 861 580	91
Sub-total	27 445 012	24 861 580	91
5. UNDP Technical Support and Coordination for APRP	6 677 294	5 114 675	77
Sub-total	6 677 294	5 114 675	77
TOTAL	53 979 412	46 189 021	86

Source: ibid

Table 14: Expenditure by Donor and Output, 2013

Outputs	Denmark	Germany	Italy	Japan	Netherlands	TOTAL
Output 1: P & RTF efficiently managed	-	-	-	374,025	-	374,025
Output 2: JS coordinates implementation of key APRP components	-	2,817,766	-	1,925,870	-	4 743 636
Output 3: APRP field activities undertaken successfully to facilitate peace at local level	769,825	2,828,700	957,089	- 44 570	786,859	5 297 903
Output 4: Community recovery and stability achieved	3,452,015	6,843,320	3,172,255	4,982,456	-	18 423 046

through national programmes						
Output 5: UNDP Technical support and coordination successfully provided for APRP	-	4,890,176	-	223,987	-	5 114 163
TOTAL	4,222,840	17,380,502	4 129 344	17,802,939	786 589	33 952 773

Source: ibid

Table 15: Income and Expenditure by Donor, December 2014 (cumulative)

Donor	Received (US \$ equivalent)	Expenditure (US \$ equivalent)
Denmark	7 961 741	7 961 741
Germany	39 535 469	36 169 851
Italy	5 683 656	5 090 417
Japan	67 055 941 <sup>76</sup>	60 885 738 <sup>77</sup>
Korea	1 000 000	1 000 000
Netherlands	2 500 000	2 500 000
Spain	6 666 667	2 907 700
UNDP	1 365 536	1 268 506
Total	131 769 010	120 191 452

Source: Annual Report, 2014

Table 16: Output Expenditure (2014)

Output	Budget (AWP 2014)	Expenditure	%
1. PRTF efficiently managed	354,537	359,537	101
Management cost (7%)			
Sub-total	354,537	359,537	101
2. JS coordinates implementation APRP	4,287,824	3,479,084	81
Management cost (7%)			
Sub-total	4,287,824	3,479,084	81
3. APRP field activities to facilitate peace at the local level	14,284,205	8,380,901	59
Management cost (7%)			
Sub-total	14,284,205	8,380,901	59
4. Community recovery and stability through national programmes	14,490,503	11,229,571	77
Management cost (7%)			
Sub-total	14,490,503	11,229,571	77
5. UNDP Technical Support and Coordination for APRP	5,631,929	5,948,862	106
Management support (7%)			
Sub-total	5,631,929	5,948,862	106
TOTAL	34,049,079	29,395,095	75

Source: ibid

<sup>76</sup> A supplementary allocation of US \$15 000 000 was committed and provided in year to 2014.

<sup>77</sup> Of which US \$11 227 960 was sourced from the supplementary allocation disbursement.

Table 17: Expenditure by Donor and Output, 2014

Outputs	Denmark	Germany	Italy	Japan <sup>78</sup>	Korea	Netherlands	Spain	UNDP	TOTAL
Output 1: P & RTF efficiently managed	-	12,845	-	346,689	-	-	-	-	362 534
Output 2: JS coordinates implementation of key APRP components	-	1,548,019	-	1,927,008	-	-	4,057	-	3 475 027
Output 3: APRP field activities undertaken successfully to facilitate peace at local level	-	4,907,532	471,702	2,140,218	-	-	413,481	104,389	8 0373 22
Output 4: Community recovery and stability achieved through national programmes	60,079	1,776,447	539,371	6,745,927	-	320,455	623,625	1,163,666	11 229 570
Output 5: UNDP Technical support and coordination successfully provided for APRP	-	3,595,578	-	2,352,885	-	-	-	-	5 948 463
TOTAL	60,079	11,840,820	-	13,902,998	-	320 455	1 041 163	1 268 055	29 052 916

Source: ibid

Table 18: Income and Expenditure by Donor, December 2015 (cumulative)

Donor	Received (US \$ equivalent)	Expenditure (US \$ equivalent)
Denmark	7 961 741.46	7 961 740.99
Germany	39 535 469.00	39 516 490.57
Italy	5 682 656.00	5 528 086.53

<sup>78</sup> Includes supplementary allocation



Japan	67 065 278.20 <sup>79</sup>	67 140 462.55
Korea	4 000 000.00	999 999.89
Netherlands	2 500 000.00	2 499 999.67
Spain	6 666 667.10	4 915 363.39
USA	5 000 000.00	1 942 697.15
Total	139 775 822.76	131 857 399.24

Source: Annual Report, 2015

Table 19: Output Expenditure (2015)

Output	Budget (AWP 2015)	Expenditure	%
1. PRTF efficiently managed	226,800	252,312.86	111.2
Sub-total	226,800	252,312.86	111.2
2. JS coordinates implementation APRP	2,088,480	1,358,929.93	65.1
Sub-total	2,088,480	1,358,929.93	65.1
3. APRP field activities to facilitate peace at the local level	8,834,041	6,081,669.21	68.8
Sub-total	8,834,041	6,081,669.21	68.8
4. Community recovery and stability through national programmes <sup>80</sup>	-	-	-
Sub-total	-	-	-
5. UNDP Technical Support and Coordination for APRP	3,898,801	3,972,982.14	101.9
Sub-total	3,898,801	3,972,982.14	101.9
TOTAL	15,048,122	11,665,894.14	77.5

Source: ibid

Expenditure by Donor and Output, 2015 is not provided in the 2015 annual report.

<sup>79</sup> Includes supplementary US \$15 000 000.

<sup>80</sup> Support for CRP programmes was ended effective 2014, GoIRA line ministries being expected to absorb all on-budget programme costs. Effectively, this resulted in cessation of all CRP projects.

## Annex 6: Window B payments in respect of TA, Salaries and Incentive Payments (December 2015)

Transitional Assistance, 2015

<i>S/O</i>	<i>Province</i>	<i>Commanderr</i>	<i>Soldier</i>	<i>RD</i>	<i>Amount in Afs<sup>81</sup></i>
1	Badakhshan	10	60	1	3,705,000
2	Badghis	25	127	0	7,887,000
3	Baghlan	6	44	1	2,555,000
4	Balkh	1	11	2	636,000
5	Bamyan	3	0	0	234,000
6	Farah	8	42	0	2,563,000
7	Faryab	1	14	0	718,000
8	Ghazni	1	2	3	15,000
9	Ghor	4	56	0	2,992,000
10	Helmand	1	6	7	471,000
11	Herat	5	28	0	1,656,000
12	Jawzjan	16	182	0	10,015,000
13	Kabul	1	4	2	292,000
14	Kandahar	1	3	39	807,000
15	Kapisa	0	1	0	48,000
16	Khost	0	0	43	645,000
17	Kunar	15	92	0	5,485,000
18	Kunduz	3	12	1	707,000
19	Laghman	1	13	0	567,000
20	Logar	2	5	47	924,000

<sup>81</sup> US \$1 = Af 68

21	Nangarhar	50	307	6	18,521,000
22	Nimruz	1	10	0	558,000
23	Nuristan	8	55	0	3,216,000
24	Paktika	1	5	0	98,000
25	Paktya	0	3	0	144,000
26	Parwan	2	18	0	558,000
27	Samangan	1	15	0	774,000
28	Saripul	6	29	0	1,860,000
29	Wardak	0	8	5	439,000
30	Zabul	1	1	0	110,000
<b>Total</b>		<b>174</b>	<b>1153</b>	<b>157</b>	<b>69,200,000</b>

#### PJST Staff (December 2015) Salaries

##### Afghanistan Peace and Re-integration Program (APRP)

##### Provincial staff salaries

Provinces	Number of Staff	December Salary	Estimated Annual Salary
Badakhshan (1) بدخشان	7	4,270.00	51,240.00
Badghis (2) دغيس با	7	5,400.00	64,800.00
Baghlan (3) بغلان	7	5,575.00	66,900.00
Balkh (4) بلخ	7	5,150.00	61,800.00
Bamyan (5) باميان	4	3,325.00	39,900.00
Daykundi (6) دايکندي	4	3,225.00	38,700.00
Farah (7) فراه	7	5,400.00	64,800.00
Faryab (8) فارياب	6	4,150.00	49,800.00

Ghazni (9) غزنی	4	2,575.00	30,900.00
Ghor (10) غور	7	5,500.00	66,000.00
Helmand (11) هلمند	7	5,975.00	71,700.00
Herat (12) هرات	9	7,900.00	94,800.00
Jawzjan (13) جوزجان	7	4,825.00	57,900.00
Kabul (14) کابل	7	4,720.00	56,640.00
Kandahar (15) کندهار	8	7,375.00	88,500.00
Kapisa (16) کاپیسا	7	4,975.00	59,700.00
Khost (17) خوست	7	4,750.00	57,000.00
Kunar (18) کونړ	6	4,925.00	59,100.00
Kunduz (19) کندز	9	5,800.00	69,600.00
Laghman (20) لغمان	7	4,750.00	57,000.00
Logar (21) لوگر	7	4,820.00	57,840.00
Nangarhar (22) هار ننگر	7	5,725.00	68,700.00
Nimruz (23) نیمروز	6	4,595.00	55,140.00
Nuristan (24) نورستان	7	4,820.00	57,840.00
Paktika (25) پکتیکا	7	5,025.00	60,300.00
Paktya (26) پکتیا	7	5,075.00	60,900.00
Panjsher (27) پنجشیر	1	450.00	5,400.00
Parwan (28) پروان	7	4,900.00	58,800.00
Samangan (29) سمنگان	6	4,350.00	52,200.00
Saripul (30) پل سر	6	4,650.00	55,800.00
Takhar (31) تخار	7	5,150.00	61,800.00
Uruzgan (32) اورزگان	6	4,400.00	52,800.00
Wardak (33) وردک	7	5,300.00	63,600.00
Zabul (34) زابل	5	3,120.00	37,440.00
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>162,945.00</b>	<b>1,955,340.00</b>

PJST Support (December 2015) Salaries

Afghanistan Peace and Re-integration Program  
(APRP)  
Support staff for  
PJST

Row Labels	Count of Monthly	Sum of Monthly2	Estimated Annual Salary
Badakhshan بدخشان (1)	7	1570	18840
Badghis بادغيس (2)	7	1570	18840
Baghlan بغلان (3)	7	1570	18840
Balkh بلخ (4)	8	1820	21840
Bamyan باميان (5)	5	1100	13200
Daykundi دايکندي (6)	7	1570	18840
Farah فراه (7)	5	1130	13560
Faryab فارياب (8)	7	1570	18840
Ghazni غزني (9)	1	220	2640
Ghor غور (10)	7	1600	19200
Helmand هلمند (11)	3	690	8280
Herat هرات (12)	9	2040	24480
Jawzjan جوزجان (13)	7	1570	18840
Kabul کابل (14)	7	1570	18840
Kandahar کندهار (15)	14	3200	38400
Kapisa کاپيسا (16)	7	1570	18840
Khost خوست (17)	10	2230	26760

Kunar کنر(18)	7	1570	18840
Kunduz کندز (19)	7	1570	18840
Laghman لغمان (20)	7	1570	18840
Logar لوگر (21)	7	1570	18840
Nangarhar ننگرهار(22)	7	1570	18840
Nimruz نیمروز(23)	7	1570	18840
Nuristan نورستان(24)	6	1320	15840
Paktika پکتیکا (25)	6	1350	16200
Paktya پکتیا(26)	7	1570	18840
Parwan پروان(28)	4	910	10920
Samangan سمنگان(29)	7	1570	18840
Saripul سرپل(30)	7	1570	18840
Takhar تخار (31)	7	1540	18480
Uruzgan اورزگان(32)	6	1350	16200
Wardak وردک(33)	7	1570	18840
Zabul زابل (34)	4	910	10920
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>221</b>	<b>49670</b>	<b>596040</b>

PPC (December 2015) Incentives

Afghanistan Peace and Re-integration Program  
(APRP)

Provincial Peace Council's Incentive payment

Provinces	Number of PPC members	November and Dec Payment	Annual Amount
Badakhshan	28	6,720.00	40,320.00
Badghis	20	4,800.00	28,800.00
Baghlan	23	5,520.00	33,120.00
Balkh	27	6,480.00	38,880.00
Bamyan	24	5,760.00	34,560.00
Daikondi	18	4,320.00	25,920.00
Farah	21	5,040.00	30,240.00
Faryab	20	4,800.00	28,800.00
Ghazni	15	3,600.00	21,600.00
Ghor	23	5,520.00	33,120.00
Helmand	27	6,480.00	38,880.00
Heart	23	5,520.00	33,120.00
Jawzjan	22	5,280.00	31,680.00
Kabul	25	6,000.00	36,000.00
Kandahar	26	6,240.00	37,440.00
Kapisa	23	5,520.00	33,120.00
Khost	19	4,560.00	27,360.00
Kunar	27	6,480.00	38,880.00
Kunduz	22	5,280.00	31,680.00
Laghman	22	5,280.00	31,680.00
Logar	23	5,520.00	33,120.00
Nangarhar	38	9,120.00	54,720.00
Nimruz	18	4,320.00	25,920.00
Nuristan	22	5,280.00	31,680.00
Oruzgan	17	4,080.00	24,480.00

Paktia	27	6,480.00	38,880.00
Paktika	21	5,040.00	30,240.00
Parwan	23	5,520.00	33,120.00
Samangan	23	5,520.00	33,120.00
Sarepul	25	6,000.00	36,000.00
Takhar	25	6,000.00	36,000.00
Wardak	21	5,040.00	30,240.00
Zabul	21	5,040.00	30,240.00
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>759</b>	<b>182,160.00</b>	<b>1,092,960.00</b>

#### Independent Directorate of Local Governance Salaries

##### Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program APRPSCD/IDLG Staff list

No	Name	Position	Salary in USD	Month	Total Salary in USD	Remarks
1	Abdul Rashid Hamim	Program Director	4,470	12	53,640	
2	Engineer Shamsudin Waseeq	Regional Coordinator	2,700	12	32,400	
3	Mohammad Naeem Ibrahimi	Admin/Finance Specialist	2,470	12	29,640	
4	Bilal Ahmad	M&E and Reporting Specialist	2,470	12	29,640	
5	Ahmadullah	Cleaner	400	12	4,800	
6	Ahmad Jawad	Driver	400	12	4,800	
			<b>12,910</b>		<b>154,920</b>	



National Directorate of Security Salaries

<b>NDS BUDGET-2016 (1395) in USD</b>							
<b>HUMAN RESOURCES EXPENSES (Salaries)</b>							
<b>NO</b>	<b>RANK</b>	<b>POST</b>	<b>UNIT</b>	<b>UNIT per MON.</b>	<b>COST per MONTH</b>	<b>MONTHS</b>	<b>ANNUAL TOTAL</b>
1	Head Office	General	1	1100	1100	12	13,200
2	1st Deputy	General	1	900	900	12	10,800
3	2nd Deputy	Colonel	1	900	900	12	10,800
4	Coordinator	LIEUT. COLONEL	1	900	900	12	10,800
5	Coord. Deputy	MAJOR	1	550	550	12	6,600
6	Gen. Mge. Cent Zo	COLONEL	1	700	700	12	8,400
7	Deputy of Cen. Zo	LIEUT. COLONEL	1	600	600	12	7,200
8	Field Staff Cen. Zo	MAJOR	1	550	550	12	6,600
9	Gen. Mgr SE Zo	COLONEL	1	700	700	12	8,400
10	Deputy Est. Zo	LIEUT. COLONEL	1	600	600	12	7,200
11	Field Staff Est. Zo	MAJOR	1	550	550	12	6,600
12	Gen Mgr SE Zo	COLONEL	1	700	700	12	8,400
13	Deputy SEZo	LIEUT. COLONEL	1	600	600	12	7,200
14	Field Staff SE Zo	MAJOR	1	550	550	12	6,600
15	Gen Mgr We Zo	COLONEL	1	700	700	12	8,400
16	Deputy We Zo	LIEUT. COLONEL	1	600	600	12	7,200

17	Field Staff We Zo	MAJOR	1	550	550	12	6,600
18	Gen Mgr SW Zo	COLONEL	1	700	700	12	8,400
19	Deputy SW Zo	LIEUT. COLONEL	1	600	600	12	7,200
20	Field Staff SW Zo	MAJOR	1	550	550	12	6,600
21	Gen Mgr NR Zo	COLONEL	1	700	700	12	8,400
22	Deputy NRZo	LIEUT. COLONEL	1	600	600	12	7,200
23	Field Staff NR zo	MAJOR	1	550	550	12	6,600
24	Gen Mgr Ne Zo	COLONEL	1	700	700	12	8,400
25	Deputy NE Zo	LIEUT. COLONEL	1	600	600	12	7,200
26	Field Staff NE Zo	MAJOR	1	550	550	12	6,600
27	Admin. Chief	LIEU. COLONEL	1	650	650	12	7,800
28	Admin. Staff	MAJOR	1	550	550	12	6,600
29	Secretariat	MAJOR	1	550	550	12	6,600
30	Personnel Manager	LIEUT. COLONEL	1	650	650	12	7,800
31	Analysis manager	LIEUT. COLONEL	1	650	650	12	7,800
32	Analysis staff	MAJOR	2	550	1100	12	13,200
33	chief finance officer	LIEUT. COLONEL	1	650	650	12	7,800
34	finance Staff	MAJOR	1	550	550	12	6,600
35	Logistic Manager	LIEUT. COLONEL	1	650	650	12	7,800
36	Operat. Care	LIEUT.	1	650	650	12	7,800

	Manager	COLONEL					
37	Operat. Care Staff	MAJOR	1	550	550	12	6,600
38	Cleaner	LEVEL 9/4	1	350	350	12	4,200
39	Cleaner	LEVEL 3	4	320	1280	12	15,360
40	Driver	LEVEL 2	6	350	2100	12	25,200
41	Office Cook	LEVEL 2	1	350	350	12	4,200
42	Guest house cook	LEVEL 2/9	1	350	350	12	4,200
43	kitchen cleaner	LEVEL 3	1	320	320	12	3,840
44	guards	GUARD	10	320	3200	12	38,400

#### FCOS Salaries

Financial Oversight Committee Secretariat HR list					
S/N	Name of LOA Contract Holder	Position	Salary as per month	Month	Total in USD
1	Maihan Lutfi	Trust Fund Manager	3,450	12	41,400
2	Khalid Najibi	Admin/ HR Specialist	2,547	12	30,564
3	Rahmattullah Hamraz	M&E Specialist	2,547	12	30,564
4	Talha Warsaji	Senior Finance officer	2,335	12	28,020
5	Baktash Akhgar	Finance Officer	1,558	12	18,696
6	Abdul Haleem	Driver	381	12	4,572
7	Abdul Qodos	Driver	381	12	4,572
8	Ahmad Sayed	Cleaner	268	12	3,216
			<b>13,467</b>		<b>161,604</b>

Ministry of Interior Salaries

<b>MOI PEACE UNIT'S STAFF STAFF TABLE AS PER FY 2016 (1395)- USD</b>						
<b>NO</b>	<b>RANK</b>	<b>NUMBER OF STAFF</b>	<b>MONTHLY SALARY AMOUNT IN USD</b>	<b>TOTAL MONTHLY SALARY IN USD</b>	<b>Month</b>	<b>TOTL in USD</b>
1	GENERAL	1	1200	1200	12	14,400.00
2	GENERAL	1	910	910	12	10,920.00
3	COLONEL	3	550	1650	12	19,800.00
4	COLONEL'S DEPUTY	1	400	400	12	4,800.00
5	LIEUTENANT	3	500	1500	12	18,000.00
6	MAJOR	4	450	1800	12	21,600.00
7	CAPTAIN	10	400	4000	12	48,000.00
8	FIRST SERGEANT	11	305	3355	12	40,260.00
9	CLEANERS	4	245	980	12	11,760.00
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>38</b>	<b>4960</b>	<b>15795</b>		<b>189,540.00</b>

Regional Programme Coordinators

No.	Post Title	Region/Office	Incumbent (Name)	Status (Vacant/Filled)	Type of Contract	Grade	Estimated Monthly Budget	Estimated Annual Budget
<b>Regional Office Coordinators</b>								
1	Regional Office Coordinator - Kabul	Central Region	Ghulam Ahmad Zareh	Filled	Service Contract	SB3-3	2,892	34,705
2	Regional Office Manager - Herat	Herat	Ramin Shahriari	Filled	Service Contract	SB5-5	6,165	73,985
3	Regional Office Manager - Jalalabad	Jalalabad	Abdul Wakil	Filled	Service Contract	SB5-3	5,133	61,599
4	Regional Office Manager - Kandahar	Kandahar	Zia Ahmad	Filled	Service Contract	SB5-3	5,649	67,792
5	Regional Office Manager - Kunduz	Kunduz	Abdul Rouf Qazizada	Filled	Service Contract	SB5-1	4,101	49,213
6	Regional Office Manager - Mazar	Mazar	Mohammad Shafi Rahimi	Filled	Service Contract	SB5-4	5,649	67,792
<b>Sub Total</b>							<b>29,591</b>	<b>355,087</b>

Regional Financial Advisors

No.	Post Title	Region/Office	Incumbent (Name)	Status (Vacant/Filled)	Type of Contract	Grade	Estimated Monthly Budget	Estimated Annual Budget
<b>Regional Office Coordinators</b>								
1	Finance Associate	Central a	Humaira Karimi	Filled	Service Contract	SB3-1	2,463	29,554
2	Finance Associate	Herat	Mohammad Owais Azizi	Filled	Service Contract	SB3-1	2,463	29,554
3	Finance Associate	Jalalabad	Mohammad Haroon Shahab	Filled	Service Contract	SB3-1	2,463	29,554
4	Finance Associate	Kandahar	Jawid Noor	Filled	Service Contract	SB3-1	2,463	29,554
5	Finance Associate	Kunduz	Abdul Nasir Haidari	Filled	Service Contract	SB3-1	2,463	29,554
6	Finance Associate	Mazar	Ghulam Rasool	Filled	Service Contract	SB3-1	2,463	29,554
<b>Sub Total</b>							<b>14,777</b>	<b>177,325</b>

Source: Details from JS

## Annex 7: Illustrations of Changes in Reporting

	Small Grants - Tier 1	Small Grants - Tier 2	MRRD/NABDP	MRRD/NRAP	MAIL	MoLSAMD (TVET)	MOPW (Corp)
Community Recovery Project Beneficiaries (M/F)	12592	74	0	0	2073	400 (230/170)	0
Community Recovery Project Reintegree and Families Beneficiaries (M/F)	94	10	0	0	389	40	0
Indirect Beneficiaries	0		0	0	0	2400	0
Projects under design (#)	12	4	0	0	18	12	0
Projects in procurement (#)	20	2	0	0	0	4	0
Ongoing projects (#)	4	1	0	0	25	1	0
Provinces (#)	9	2	0	0	4	1	0
Districts (#)	16	3	0	0	7	3	0
Communities with reintegrees (#)	23	3	0	0	n/a	n/a	0

Source: Annual Report, 2011

	Small Grants - Tier 1	Small Grants - Tier 2	MRRD/NABDP	MRRD/NRAP	MMRD/RuWATSIP	MAIL	MoLSAMD (TVET)
Community Recovery Project Beneficiaries (M/F)			4628	6358	6500	13371	2562
Community Recovery Project Reintegree and Families Beneficiaries (M/F)			274	0	5	1023	1278

Indirect Beneficiaries			60133	14907	700	1083113	23040
Projects under design (#)							
Projects in procurement (#)							
Ongoing projects (#)			26	7	24	88	15
Provinces (#)			7	4	8	22	15
Districts (#)							
Communities with reintegrees (#)							
Community Recovery Project Beneficiaries (M/F)			4628	6358	6500	13371	2562

Source: Annual Report, 2013

	Small Grants - Tier 1	Small Grants - Tier 2	MRRD/NABDP	MRRD/NRAP	MMRD/RuWATSIP	MAIL	MoLSAMD (TVET)
Community Recovery Project Beneficiaries (M/F)						2867	0
Community Recovery Project Reintegree and Families Beneficiaries (M/F)						805	
Indirect Beneficiaries						1202465	
Projects under design (#)							
Projects in procurement (#)							
Ongoing projects (#)						66	
Provinces (#)							
Districts (#)							
Communities with reintegrees							



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(#)							
Community Recovery Project Beneficiaries (M/F)						2867	0

Source: Annual Report, 2014

	Small Grants - Tier 1	Small Grants - Tier 2	MRRD /NAB DP	MRR D/N RAP	MAIL	MoLSA MD (TVET)	MOP W (Corp )
Community Recovery Project Beneficiaries (M/F)	12592	74	0	0	2073	400 (230/170)	0
Community Recovery Project Reintegree and Families Beneficiaries (M/F)	94	10	0	0	389	40	0
Indirect Beneficiaries	0		0	0	0	2400	0
Projects under design (#)	12	4	0	0	18	12	0
Projects in procurement (#)	20	2	0	0	0	4	0
Ongoing projects (#)	4	1	0	0	25	1	0
Provinces (#)	9	2	0	0	4	1	0
Districts (#)	16	3	0	0	7	3	0
Communities with reintegrees (#)	23	3	0	0	n/a	n/a	0

Source: Annual Report, 2011

	Small Grants - Tier 1	Small Grants - Tier 2	MRRD /NAB DP	MRR D/NR AP	MMR D/Ru WAT SIP	MAIL	MoLSA MD (TVET)
Community Recovery Project Beneficiaries (M/F)			4628	6358	6500	13371	2562
Community Recovery Project Reintegree and Families Beneficiaries (M/F)			274	0	5	1023	1278
Indirect Beneficiaries			60133	14907	700	1083113	23040
Projects under design (#)							
Projects in procurement (#)							
Ongoing projects (#)			26	7	24	88	15
Provinces (#)			7	4	8	22	15
Districts (#)							
Communities with reintegrees (#)							

Community Recovery Project Beneficiaries (M/F)			4628	6358	6500	1337 1	2562
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Source: Annual Report, 2013

	Small Grants - Tier 1	Small Grants - Tier 2	MRRD /NAB DP	MRR D/NR AP	MMRD/Ru WAT SIP	MAIL	MoLSA MD (TVET)
Community Recovery Project Beneficiaries (M/F)						2867	0
Community Recovery Project Reintegree and Families Beneficiaries (M/F)						805	
Indirect Beneficiaries						1202 465	
Projects under design (#)							
Projects in procurement (#)							
Ongoing projects (#)						66	
Provinces (#)							
Districts (#)							
Communities with reintegrees (#)							
Community Recovery Project Beneficiaries (M/F)						2867	0

Source: Annual Report, 2014