

# UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

## EXTERNAL MID-TERM EVALUATION REPORT OF THE DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION, REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME IN LIBERIA

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Written by : Christian Bugnion, director, Subur Consulting S.L., external consultant and Team Leader,

Luc Lafrenière, UNDP BCPR, Geneva

Sam Gbaydee Doe, external consultant, ESCU-UNMIL

Hirut Tefferi, external consultant, UNICEF

Cerue Garlo, consultant, Gender Activist for Peace and Human Rights

with participation and thanks to :

Erin McCandless, UNMIL M&E Head,

Alessandro de Blasio, EC M&E TA

Isaac Roland, resource person, NCDDRR

*Disclaimer : This report only reflect the authors opinion and does not necessarily reflect the views of the commissioning agency*

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of acronyms and abbreviations	3
Definitions	4
Acknowledgements	5
Brief history and update of the DRRP	6
I. Executive summary	8
II. Methodology and evaluation purpose	15
III. Main Findings	18
IV. Evaluation criteria	43
V. Lessons learned	49
V. Conclusion	50
VI. Recommendations	51
Annexes :	
1. TOR	
2. Map	
3. List of interviews and mission agenda	
4. Bibliography	
5. Stakeholder meeting notes on evaluation methodology 20 June 2006	
6. Power point presentation on evaluation methodology 26 June 2006	
7. Evaluation findings Power point presentation 14 July 2006	
8. Update on the evaluation process from the Team Leader to team members	
9. JIU/NCDDRR statistical report	

## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
BCPR	Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery
CAFF	Children Associated with Fighting Forces
CBR	Community Based Recovery
CESD	Community Empowerment & Skills Development Inc
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CWC	Child Welfare Committee
DAI	Development Alternatives Inc.
DEX	Direct Execution
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DDC	District Development Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DDRRP	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programme
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
EC	European Commission
GOL	Government of Liberia
ICC	Interim Care Centre
IP	Implementing Partner
JIU	Joint Implementation Unit
JOP	Joint Operational Plan
LOIC	Liberia Opportunities Industrialization Centre
LNP	Liberia National Police
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MIS	Management Information System
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
NAO	National Authorising Office
NCDDRR	National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NTGL	National Transitional Government of Liberia
PAC	Project Approval Committee
PK	Peace Keeping
P&P	Programme and Policy
RBM	Results Based Management
RRR	Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Recovery
SF	Strategic Framework
TA	Technical Assistant
TCC	Technical Co-ordinating Committee
TSA	Transitional Safety Allowance
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General (United Nations)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia (established by Security Council resolution 1509 of 19 September 2003)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

**DEFINITIONS** from UNDP Practice Note, based on DPKO working definition

Disarmament: Collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosive and light and heavy weapons of combatants & often civilian

Demobilisation: The formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces and other armed groups. The first stage of demobilisation may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose. The second stage of demobilisation encompasses the support package provided to the demobilised, which is called reinsertion

Reinsertion: Is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilisation but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is a short-term material and or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year.

Reintegration: Is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often necessitates long-term external assistance.

*Definitions for Evaluation Criteria from the OECD/DAC glossary and TOR*

Relevance: The extent to which the objectives ... are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies

Efficiency: A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results. UNDP BCPR specifies efficiency as : to what degree the outputs achieved derive from efficient use of financial, human and material resource

Effectiveness: A measure of the extent to which the objectives have been achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.

Impact: Positive and negative, primary and secondary effects produced by an intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.

Sustainability: The continuation of benefits from an intervention after it has been completed. For UNDP BCPR, a measure of the long-term impacts and durability of interventions.

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## **Brief history and update of the DDDR Programme**

United Nations Security Council resolution 1509 (2003) of 19 September 2003 established the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) on 1 October 2003. Within thirty days of adoption of the resolution UNMIL was requested to produce an Action Plan for the overall implementation of a Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation (DDRR) for all armed parties; with particular attention to the special needs of child combatants and women; and addressing the inclusion of non-Liberian combatants.

In October 2003, a multidisciplinary team comprising representatives of the United Nations, donors and NGOs developed an Action Plan for the Liberian Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programme (LDDRRP) which was based on a previously-elaborated Strategy and Implementation Framework.

Under the Action Plan it was proposed that disarmament and demobilization would take place at cantonment sites to be established in the areas of the three armed factions (the former Government of Liberia (ex-GOL), Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). The cantonment sites would open simultaneously and operate concurrently. It was expected that the process would target 38,000 combatants and proceed in phases with 1,000 combatants being taken into a site at a time. They would be divided into groups of 250 to go through the various steps of the process, including handing over weapons, which were to be destroyed in situ, receiving basic orientation, and undergoing interviews for reintegration. Each group of ex-combatants was expected to stay at the cantonment sites for three weeks.

On discharge, the former combatants were to receive an initial stipend of \$150 to cover their resettlement expenses. They were then to be transported to their respective resettlement areas where they would be placed on interim reintegration projects for a period of three months, pending commencement of the long-term reintegration programme. Upon completion of these stopgap reintegration activities, the ex-combatants were to receive a second stipend of \$150 as the final payment in their \$300 reinsertion package. The LDDRRP envisaged that the NTGL and its partners would provide long-term reintegration projects for the combatants. It also included special arrangements for child and female combatants.

Under the Action Plan, the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR) would provide policy guidance to a Joint Implementation Unit (JIU) which has primary responsibility for implementation of the DDRR programme. The NCDDRR was co-chaired by Guyde Bryant, Chairman of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) and the SRSG of UNMIL. Staff for the JIU were to be provided by UNMIL, OCHA and UNDP. The Plan gave 7 December as the start up date for the DDRR

The programme Strategy and Implementation Framework (SF) defined the objectives, contents and procedures of the programme. It was prepared by the Draft Interim Secretariat comprising UNDP, UNMIL, the World Bank, USAID, UNICEF, UNHCR, OCHA and World Vision and was finalised on 31 October 2003.

The objectives of the LDDRRP were defined as :

“The overarching objective of the DDRRP is *the consolidation of peace* through comprehensive disarmament, demobilisation and sustainable reintegration of all ex-combatants into civilian society.

The immediate objective is *to consolidate national security* as a precondition for facilitating humanitarian assistance, restoration of civil authority, promotion of economic growth and development.”

Initially started with UNDP core funding, the contributions into the UNDP Trust Fund have now exceeded US\$ 71 million. According to senior management the funds actually available are sufficient to cover the outstanding reintegration caseload. The DDRRP is expected to finalise its operations by the end of June 2007, and to administratively close the programme by the end of December 2007.

The caseload has exploded to 101,873 participants eligible for reintegration benefits, for an initial 103,012 disarmed. The difference is accounted for by the number of validated participants versus those screened at Camp Schieffelin (at the time the database was not yet operational) and also a small provision of spontaneous reintegration estimated at 2% by JIU.

At the time of the evaluation there remains 41,920 participants eligible for reintegration benefits, of which 19,409 are under direct responsibility of the UNDP TF and the remaining 22,511 are to be covered by parallel programmes.

## I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### The mandate

1. The DDRP was executed as part of the overall mandate of UNMIL and as foreseen by the CPA. While DDR proved to be one of the priorities, UNMIL's mandate as defined by the UN Security Council Resolution 1509 of 19 September 2003 was articulated around four different axes : a) support for implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement; b) Protection to United Nations staff, facilities, and civilians; c) Support for Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance, and d) Support for Security Reform<sup>1</sup>. The DDR process was a part of the Implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement under point 3. f). The DDR process did not unfold according to the necessary technical requirements as the time-frame for the political agendas did not support the time-frame for the technical support structures to be in place.

### Programme Design

2. A common Programme Strategic and Implementation Framework (SF) was developed in early October 2003 and finalised by 31 October 2003 as a result of a collaborative process driven by the SRSG and UNDP.
3. The design was comprehensive in scope, covering all areas and attributing clear roles and responsibilities, and had a specific strategy for each target group (women, children, disabled etc.). It is the first UN integrated DDR framework produced.
4. The SF also contained some weaknesses : it did not define the key terms, such as "reintegration", "rehabilitation" or programme objectives, such as "national security" and "peace". It did not establish benchmarks or indicators to measure success. It did not foresee any mechanism for tracking assumptions.

### Disarmament

5. The disarmament and demobilisation process started in Monrovia on December 7, 2003 with a peacekeeping force of some 5,000 but only started in the counties on 15 April 2004 when the full force of 15,000 was deployed. Disarmament was officially completed country-wide on November 4, 2004.
6. By the end of the DD process, 103,912 persons had been disarmed and had received a DDRP card with the corresponding entitlements (e.g. twice a US\$ 150 TSA –Transitional Safety Allowance- payment). 28,312 weapons had been collected by the end of the exercise, comparatively one of the lowest weapon to man ratio in recent DDR history (0,28). However criteria in Liberia included ammunition and UXO, substantially changing the ratio. In other countries (e.g. Afghanistan) only serviceable weapons are accepted, so the evaluation has used the smallest common denominator to compare Liberia to other country where DDR operations have taken place to allow for comparison.
7. The DDR Programme started on 7 December 2003 with the first disarmament taking place at Camp Schieffelin. The incidents at Camp Schieffelin which left nine dead could have and should have been avoided. The evaluation team was unable to obtain any evidence which supported the rushed time-frame for the start of the disarmament on 7 December 2003 at Camp Schieffelin. Evidence that the technical support structures were not ready for the exercise have been gathered by the

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<sup>1</sup> S/RES/1509/(2003) "3. *Decides* that UNMIL shall have the following mandate: Support for Implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement ... (includes points a) through i), Protection of United Nations Staff, Facilities and Civilians (point j), Support for Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance ... (points k) through m) and Support for Security Reform (point n) through s))", pages 3 and 4.

evaluation from various sources. Documentary evidence seems to indicate that the time-frame was established in view of a donors' conference scheduled for December 2003.

8. The Camp Schieffelin incidents could have had a very negative impact on the rest of the programme. Luckily this did not occur, but the decisions that were taken at Camp Schieffelin had lasting consequences on the DDRP and the manner in which the rest of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process was carried out. In terms of disarmament, Camp Schieffelin clearly yielded the highest weapon take of the entire disarmament exercise, with 10,312 weapons for 12,770 participants. The ratio is of 0.81 weapon per person. The high weapon ratio is partly the result of participants' understanding that the programme was designed as "one weapon per person" to be eligible.

### Timeliness

9. In terms of timeliness the DDR process started four months after the signing of the peace agreement, placing Liberia in 5<sup>th</sup> rank of the fastest starting DDR processes of 17 countries surveyed. In terms of the length of the DD process, Liberia is shorter, with a DD phase lasting less than 12 months, than the average 16 months of other DD operations<sup>2</sup>.

### Demobilisation

10. The length of the stay in cantonment sites was originally planned to be 30 days for adults. Children followed a different procedure, as all under-aged were taken to Interim Care Centres (ICC) for a duration which varied from a few days up to three months (depending on the delay and feasibility of family reunification). In the Joint Operation Plan (JOP) the stay was shortened to three weeks, while in practice the stay was further reduced to five days per adult participant.
11. The range of services as provided in the SF were provided to the participants interviewed, with one notable exception: Women did not have a lead agency to cater for their needs (despite UNIFEM having been nominated in the SF as the lead agency for women in the process) beyond the DD phase and as such lacked adequate and differentiated reintegration assistance.
12. There was no handbook or manual to ensure a common approach by Implementing Partners (IPs) at the different sites. Therefore demobilisation services were not standardised. The services were generally deemed to be good by interviewees.<sup>3</sup>

### Psycho-social counselling

13. Counselling sessions were found to be particularly useful. However unlike for Children Associated with Fighting Forces (CAFF) who benefited from a continuation of the counselling through the community based Child Welfare Committee (CWC) after their stay in ICC, adults were left on their own once they were discharged from the cantonment sites. Psycho-social counselling together with reconciliation were two very necessary components which received insufficient attention and support.

### Rehabilitation

14. Despite the title of the programme, rehabilitation was never developed for adults as a component. It was not defined by the programme, and simply got lost in the

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<sup>2</sup> Barcelona School of Peace, ECP, Barcelona, Analysis of DDR Programmes existing in the world in 2005, February 2006, Albert Caramés et al., p. 9

<sup>3</sup> Although no handbook was produced to guide the implementing partners, however, the JOP delineated the scope of tasks and services expected from the IPs and agencies. They were also outlined in the TORs for engaging the agencies. Therefore, differences in demobilization services in various sites were more on quality of administrative capability and managerial capacities of the different agencies, which reflects their differentiating experience over time.

operation, without any specific programmatic reality. Eventually some reinsertion projects did include a rehabilitation component, but this was not standardised.

### Reintegration

15. Reintegration projects started in June 2004, only three months after disarmament and demobilisation were re-started in April 2004, and six months before the end of the DD phase. This is a major accomplishment and needs to be highlighted. A total of 57,080 participants have received or are currently enrolled in reintegration projects according to the JIU. This includes parallel programmes not under the UNDP TF. Of these 43,425 are covered by the UNDP TF. This is a rapid response and shows programme flexibility to adapt to changing conditions. 99% of the reintegration projects fall in three categories: formal education, vocational skills training, agriculture.
16. The programme has 101,873 participants eligible for reintegration assistance. Of these there remain 41,920 still awaiting reintegration assistance. Of these, 19,409 are under the UNDP TF and 22,511 are to be covered by parallel programmes.
17. Economic reintegration was the focus of the programme as social reintegration was largely left aside. The assumption that economic reintegration leads to social reintegration does not hold true. The lack of attention to the social dimension, in particular as regards both to reconciliation and psycho-social support, was a major gap. Once adult participants were discharged, community and religious leaders were left up with the task of facilitating reconciliation, while the DDRRP provided very little support to the social aspects and no additional psycho-social support than the one received during the five days at the cantonment sites.

### Vulnerable groups

18. Vulnerable groups had each a comprehensive strategy developed in the SF. However in the actual implementation, only children, through UNICEF and their partners network, were actually able to receive specialised attention as a specific programme target category. Women did not benefit from a specific programme tailored to their needs during the reintegration phase. During DD women were largely treated as men during the process, with two exceptions: separate quarters were provided at cantonment sites (together with CAFF), and some specific gender projects were undertaken (e.g. UNFPA). But women, especially those who did not fight, had more difficulties during screening to be admitted in the programme, especially during the first phase of DD (3,2% of the caseload, versus 29% in phase III)<sup>4</sup>, and there was no pro-active network of partners working around the women's issue or their reintegration in civil society as there was for children.

### Results

#### *a) caseload*

19. The original planning figure of 38,000 programme participants rose to over 103,000 people despite documented evidence from UNDP calling for caution in the rapidly expanding numbers. Minutes of TCC and PAC meetings show donor awareness to the rapidly expanding caseload. It is unclear why no limit was set on a maximum number. Lists of combatants provided by two of the three factions indicate that the caseload would clearly have been within the original target figure had the lists been validated at the end of January 2004.
20. The DDRRP did not request any programme planning update to guide the actual implementation based on a different scenario (JOP minimum pre-conditions) and different assumptions (SF clause 2.7 points i and v). As a result the reintegration phase was done largely on the basis of ad hoc decisions, looking essentially at

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<sup>4</sup> see figures on Statistical Report from JIU included as annex and table in the body of the report under III Main Findings b) disarmament

economic reintegration as a quick intermediary transitional measure, designed to buy peace, rather than as a comprehensive reintegration measure. A number of activities originally foreseen in the SF were simply not undertaken (result four of annex A, economic fund annex C, Social reintegration annex D, Assistance to women Annex E).

21. A major success has been the very high rate of enrolment in formal education, with some 38,535 people who expressed their wish to return to formal education from the 101,873 who expressed their desire for reintegration assistance (or 38% of the total caseload). This is probably the highest turnout in formal education of any DDR process and indicates that interest in pursuing formal education is not limited to school age children, contrary to what was previously believed. However this high enrolment will put pressure on government to facilitate access to the labour market for an increased graduated students mass. The evaluation had no time to judge the quality of the education given. As students were taking their final examinations, the evaluation also had no data to judge how well programme participants had fared as compared to the other students enrolled.
22. The DDRRP has developed an excellent management information system (MIS), very useful for validation of data. However insufficient resources were placed for its monitoring and evaluation function. As a result during the presentation of the preliminary evaluation findings in Monrovia some questions were raised regarding the actual attendance of programme beneficiaries in formal education. The M&E unit, together with IPs, must be able to adequately report on attendance for each project and monitor any potential abuse. (The attendance criteria to be eligible for the stipend is set at 75% of class time or vocational training) A recent survey of M&E DDR practices among 11 countries has shown that M&E units are generally insufficiently resourced, both in financial terms and regarding the number of skilled staff, for the M&E requirements of DDR programmes.<sup>5</sup>

*b) security*

23. The immediate objective of the DDRRP was to “consolidate national security...”. Yet the evaluation team was unable to find within JIU or UNMIL a specific unit or person who could provide supporting data showing that progress was in fact being made in that sense. JIU does not have security data. In UNMIL separate units each work on their own part of the process, with a crime information unit (which has been changing its reporting procedure and contents since 2004, currently placed at the LNP HQ), a JMAC (Joint Mission Analysis Cell) which as the name indicates is supposed to be “the focal point for fusion of information from all sources”<sup>6</sup>, plus other units such as the UNSECOORD, which records some of the security incidents involving UN personnel. But there does not seem to be a focal point able to provide a comprehensive picture of the state of “national security” in Liberia and provide supporting data. Certainly this critical information should be centralised in one office.
24. In this context the evaluation team used therefore the available statistics from three sources, given the absence of a comprehensive database on national security indicators : a) trauma injuries of combatants based on hospital records, b) weapons collection information based on JMAC information, c) crime statistics based on CIVPOL information (which is supposed to include LNP statistics).
25. Based on some quantitative statistical evidence (e.g. hospital records of combatants trauma cases) and qualitative information collected, the evaluation concludes that the programme has contributed to consolidating national security. However it is clearly largely due to the deployment of 15,000 peace keepers and cannot be attributed to the DDRRP alone. By identifying a programme objective

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<sup>5</sup> C. Bugnion, Survey of M&E DDR practices, UNDP BCPR, September 2006

<sup>6</sup> Mark Malan, KAIPTC paper no 7, August 2005

- which is the sum of different factors most of which are outside the programme's control, the DDRRP makes evaluating its contribution to national security difficult.
26. The command structure amongst a majority of ex-combatants still exists, although weakened. It will be difficult to break the chain of command as long as alternative livelihood opportunities are not being developed. It is particularly important that DDRRP makes good on its promises for reintegration benefits (payment of stipends, handing out of toolkits) as implementation delays favour the mediation of former commanders as spokespersons on behalf of programme participants.
  27. Therefore the DDRRP must ensure timely payment of stipend as a number of examples of rioting and lock-in of UN and IP staff have taken place because payment promises were not kept. This is a security threat and both IPs and UNDP must ensure the timely preparation, release and payment of the stipend and supply of toolkits. This puts added pressure on a stronger monitoring capacity of the implementing partners, as some have shown weaknesses in their project performance.
  28. Given the current capacity at field level and the rather lengthy procedure from the time a reintegration project proposal is submitted by IPs until it is actually approved and financed by JIU/UNDP, the evaluation concludes that it will be unlikely that the reintegration of the remaining caseload of 19,409 to be covered directly under the DDRRP and the additional 22,511 to be covered by parallel programmes will be completed within the life of the programme, with a programmatic end date in June 2007 and a closing of the programme by December 2007. Failure to cover the remaining caseload on time constitutes an additional security threat as unkept promises amongst programme participants have often led to rioting.

*c) Overall appraisal*

29. The DDRRP has been undertaken in a complex and difficult environment, and was initiated under a transitional government. Now that elections have successfully been held and a democratically elected government is in office, there are a series of challenges which must be addressed by the different players : NCDDRR, JIU/UNDP, UNMIL RRR. At the same time new opportunities arise as the democratically elected government has appointed a new leadership within NCDDRR that should be able to proactively steer the DDRRP forward to its completion while the government is developing a national framework for recovery and development that may provide the basis for an exit strategy of the NCDDRR in the close future.
30. JIU/UNDP should cover the remaining caseload of reintegration assistance participants expected to number 19,409 individuals. It is difficult to change the programme mid-way through its implementation without causing some form of resentment which may lead to security threats if participants are seen to be benefiting differently from the same programme. Therefore in view of avoiding any additional conflict the evaluation recommends that a specific field mission takes place to identify how best the DDRRP should continue and develop its exit strategy, and present its conclusions to NCDDRR/UNDP/JIU/UNMIL/UNICEF. However there should be a linkage with the communities insofar as the actual number of participants shows under subscription of programme participants (e.g. 13,505 attended the first 20 reintegration projects versus a target of 18,675 according to JIU figures). Therefore some thought should be given as to the possibility of having communities contribute a number of participants based on transparent community-based self selection criteria. NCDDRR should be closely consulted and define with the JIU on the manner into which the DDRRP should continue its programming.
31. The DDRRP does not have an exit strategy. It must look for a manner of integrating itself into the wider national recovery framework. At the time of the evaluation such as framework is still not entirely developed. However by the end of 2007 and of the DDRRP it is essential that other comprehensive development packages be put in

- place to create the connection for longer term sustainable reintegration of programme participants and that of the general population.
32. The DDRP does not foresee any benchmarks or success indicators. As a result focus is placed on outputs, and therefore in undertaking the activities, rather than on the actual outcome of the programme. This leaves an open question as to the programme's level of success. As a long-term framework the NCDDRR will need to go beyond output measures to consider outcome and impact measures. We recommend that the NCDDRR review the current design of the DDRP and develop M&E framework including both qualitative and quantitative impact indicators.
  33. The DDRP has further not given working definitions of the terms used as programme objectives. The interpretation of the terms is left up to the evaluation team. And yet these definitions are critical to identify what are the parameters against which the programme needs to be evaluated. The DDRP should immediately develop, as part of its exit strategy, the benchmarks and success indicators it intends to accomplish by the end of 2007, so that the final evaluation may be able to use some of the programme specific tools used to plan the activities, rather than having to struggle to find relevant data and information on which to evaluate the programme results.
  34. Despite a difficult context, some major constraints, and a number of shortfall and weaknesses, the programme has been able to operate to a satisfactory level in regards to its immediate objective. Some improvements are suggested in the recommendation section for the remaining programme life cycle.

#### NCDDRR

35. NCDDRR is currently undertaking its own internal review exercise, coupled with a comprehensive financial audit. The new government has somewhat modified the NCDDRR (Executive Order N° 4) and has appointed a new leadership structure with a view to fomenting ownership and participation in the DDR process. How much can be done by the new NCDDRR will depend essentially on two aspects : 1) the result of the financial audit, 2) the support and credibility of the new structure in leveraging resources and showing actual management and implementation capacity.
36. While it is not a part of the TOR to evaluate the NCDDRR it should be recognised that the new team has a great challenge ahead. On the one hand it must already project its short-term goals for the end of the DDRP, and see how some transfer of responsibilities can be undertaken in this programme. The evaluation recommends that M&E capacity and responsibility be transferred over to the NCDDRR for the remainder of the DDRP, subject to satisfactory financial audit and a proper plan from NCDDRR detailing activities and resources necessary for the next 18 months. This M&E responsibility should be extended to include parallel programmes funded by USAID and the EC as well as the child component placed under UNICEF responsibility, as in the current DDRP no oversight of these components have been given to the JIU or NCDDRR, resulting in a lack of centralised and coordinated overall monitoring of DDR projects.
37. Over the longer term, in agreement with the President's remarks at the NCDDRR Consultative Forum on July 6-7, 2006, the NCDDRR should be considering its phasing out as the focus of efforts should be shifting to national recovery, reconstruction and development instead of targeted assistance to specific groups. In accordance with good practice in DDR it is important that the ex-combatants be treated as rapidly as possible, subject to security constraints and threats, as civilians, as part of the demobilisation and sustainable reintegration exercise. In this manner community-based programmes are able to offer equitable opportunities to all people, rather than favouring a specific group over another. Therefore over the

- medium-term, the NCDDRR should also develop its exit strategy and merge its activities into the wider national recovery/development plan.
38. Another main challenge is to maximise synergies amongst the primary stakeholders as some difficulty has been found in terms of articulating efforts and undertaking both a clear division of labour and of responsibilities between JIU/UNDP/UNMIL/NCDDRR. While according to the programme SF, the JIU was supposed to be the overall responsible for the DDRP under the NCDDRR, in practice some of the components, such as DD, were run directly from UNMIL without the necessary degree of close collaboration that was requested in the framework. On the other hand, JIU/UNDP was tasked with M&E and rehabilitation and reintegration, while JIU/OCHA was to be in charge of information and sensitisation. Two issues arise from the JIU set up: 1) that JIU was an integrated unit in name only, partly given the weakness of the transitional government and therefore of the NCDDRR, and operational responsibilities for DD solely allocated to UNMIL DDR (see JOP) and not under JIU responsibility, with an information unit working closely with the NCDDRR and the reintegration component essentially under UNDP supervision and responsibility.
  39. In theory the JIU was a positive and consultative structure allowing buy-in from all stakeholders. However in practice it was essentially (and contrary to the SF scheme) placed under UNMIL DDR in the DD phase, and considered as a UNDP responsibility in the reintegration phase, with a late set-up of field offices and unclear divisions of responsibilities between UNMIL RRR, NCDDRR and JIU/UNDP field offices.
  40. The evaluation recommends an immediate review of the collaborative arrangements between NCDDRR/UNMIL/JIU/UNDP/UNICEF in order to ensure that the best use of available resources is being made to facilitate proper programme corrections and completion within the anticipated time-frame for implementation.

## II. EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY

The purpose of the evaluation is, according to the enclosed TOR, is to:

- Review overall lessons learned, challenges and best practices from the disarmament, demobilization and early reintegration phase of the DDRP programme. In particular special attention will be paid to:
  - i) The treatment of male, female and child ex-combatants;
  - ii) The application and enforcement of eligibility criteria;
  - iii) The applications of the Cape Town Principles and associated conventions on the rights of women and children in combat;
  - iv) The national ownership, capacity and leadership in the execution of the programme;
  - v) Modes of decision making on key policy and technical issues.
- Review co-operation arrangements between UN agencies and other national and international stakeholders, with a view to gathering lessons learned and best practices to be used in the new UN integrated approach to DDR;
- Review the contribution made by the DDRP to conflict mitigation and sustainable peace in Liberia; and
- Provide practical recommendations on how the reintegration programme can be phased into longer term community based recovery programming.

The evaluation team leader arrived on 15 June 2006 in Monrovia. On 17 June 2006 a meeting was requested by the DSRSG to explain the context in which the evaluation was being undertaken and request the evaluation to place some focus on the forward looking dimension of the remaining DDRP. On 21 June a meeting was called with all the PAC members at the request of the team leader. A copy of the evaluation methodology and notes of the meeting on the 17<sup>th</sup> June 2006 were given out (see annex 5). At stakeholders' request, a second meeting to discuss the evaluation framework was held on 26 June 2006 and handouts of the power point presentation were given to all participants. This clearly sets out the scope and approach used by the evaluation, which given time constraints was based on a specific hypothesis and assumptions (see details in annex 6). During two weeks, the team leader carried out an extensive documentary review and went to collect information and statistics as the information made available was insufficient to provide a comprehensive understanding of the programme (see list of available documents in TOR annex D). Throughout the evaluation additional information was being obtained, some of which became available only at the end of the mission. The total final bibliography which has been read in full by the team leader is mentioned as annex 4.

The evaluation team composition kept shifting during the first two weeks of the evaluation. The team leader, who had not been in Liberia at any time before the assignment, could not count on a fixed resource person or evaluation team member until the Gender consultant, Cerue Garlo, was officially appointed as evaluation mission member. Field work started with a two-person team in Tubmanburg on 28 June 2006. The team eventually was completed on 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2006 as the UNDP BCPR team member, the UNMIL ESCU team member, the UNICEF team member all arrived and met with the rest of the team to obtain the ten page update as requested by the TOR (annex 8) and plan the rest of the evaluation mission and the field work to be completed. Additionally the P&P advisor brought into the team a resource person from

NCDDRR, Isaac Roland. At the request of the team leader the EC kindly appointed a resource person, Mr. Alessandro de Blasio, M&E TANAQ, who participated and supported the work of the evaluation team.

By the 3<sup>rd</sup> of July a number of individual meetings in Monrovia had already taken place as well as some field work in Tubmanburg, Buchanan, and Gbarnga.

The evaluation methodology was therefore based on three methods :

- 1) A thorough documentary review of existing reports and information (annex 4)
- 2) Individual interviews and/or group interviews with key informants and stakeholders both in Monrovia and in different counties at field level;
- 3) Observational evidence from the different places visited by evaluation team members

In addition triangulation (confirmation from three different sources) was applied to validate the key findings of the evaluation and contribute to the credibility of the evaluation report wherever possible.

The evaluation has applied the UN common standards and norms for evaluation published on 29 April 2005 by UNEG, fully compatible with the UNDP handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for results.

#### Bias and constraints:

The evaluation suffered from a high number of constraints, chief of which :

1. Fielding the evaluation during the rainy season has limited the outreach capacity of the evaluation team;
2. Difficulty in recruiting some of the team members. Both the UNMIL ESCU consultant and the Gender and Human Rights consultant experienced administrative problems for their contractual arrangements which negatively affected their participation in the evaluation. In particular the UNMIL ESCU consultant was unable to participate in the original design of the evaluation. In addition the initial NCDDRR resource person, the former executive director, dropped out after having indicated his availability to backstop the mission.
3. The TOR did plan to have a representative from UNDP-BCPR HQ, UNICEF HQ and DPKO HQ as team members. The only agency which made good on its promise was UNDP BCPR. DPKO finally delegated responsibility to the UNMIL, and the DSRSG appointed Erin McCandless as head of the M&E unit as team member. However as she was on leave throughout most of the evaluation period an international consultant, Sam Doe, was appointed as team member. Likewise UNICEF finally appointed an international consultant, Hirut Tefferi, as evaluation team member.
4. All team members except for the team leader and the Gender and Human Rights consultant had been involved at one point or another previously with the DRRP.
5. The original time-frame for the two phased evaluation according to the TOR was not followed as no response to the team leader's requested time-frame for the evaluation was ever received.
6. The TOR did not identify any evaluation management committee or evaluation manager. As a result the evaluation appeared to be working in a vacuum without a clear ownership strategy for the use and application of the evaluation results. Furthermore the TOR did not specify the dissemination strategy of the evaluation report, and only on the last day of the evaluation did the UNDP Country Director specify he would be the focal point for the evaluation report.

7. Given the complexities and agendas of the different stakeholders, and the absence of an evaluation management committee, the TOR were not revised despite being in a draft format.

### **Evaluation theory, scope and questions**

Considering the difficult environment for the evaluation, the team leader requested a meeting with the evaluation stakeholders to present the methodology for the evaluation as well as its scope and approach. Please refer to annexes 5 and 6 for details.

The evaluation scope is two-fold : backward looking to identify good practices and lessons learned, and forward looking to provide recommendations for the continuation of the DDRRP during its on-going reintegration phase until the end of 2007, and identify lessons and good practices.

Evaluation theory : Review the decision making structures and process which ultimately determined DDRR operations

Hypothesis : DDRRP was not run like an integrated programme, but as two separate programmes : a DD operation managed by UNMIL, with an RR operation left to the JIU.

This approach was endorsed by stakeholders at the presentation on 26 June 2006 contents of which are found in annex 6.

The hypothesis was tweaked when tested during the evaluation and re-phrased as : The whole DDR process was not run like an integrated programme, but as a piecemeal approach when Camp Schieffelin incidents challenged the operating procedures, set a precedent and invalidated the planned implementation through a compressed time-frame and a focus on quick and visible results.


Two of the questions that the evaluation had to address were therefore:

1. What is the DDRRP trying to achieve : reinsertion or reintegration?
2. Is the DDRRP trying to achieve the immediate objective “consolidate national security” or the overarching objective “consolidate national peace” during its life cycle?

### III. MAIN FINDINGS

#### a) Programme design

A schematic representation from the SF of the DDRP is provided hereunder.



The structure outlined above can be summarised in the tables below:

#### *Disarmament and demobilisation process*

Assistance component	Disarmament assistance	Demobilization and discharge assistance
<b>Objective</b>	Disarmament of Groups to consolidate and enhance security situation in the country	Recognition and legal classification of disarmed combatants as <u>individual</u> civilians, renunciation of allegiance to the command structure of any group and provision of initial services to individuals to facilitate return to civilian
<b>Type</b>	Opportunity (adult & children)	Benefit (adult & children)
<b>Nature</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pre-disarmament sensitisation</li> <li>• Operational meetings with commanders and UNMIL Security</li> <li>• Transportation of ex-combatant and families to demobilization centre</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Issuance of beneficiary items.</li> <li>• Medical screening.</li> <li>• Pre-discharge orientation</li> <li>• Reintegration interviews</li> <li>• Photo ID</li> <li>• Transport allowance and discharge</li> </ul>
<b>Timing</b>	1 day	Maximum 30 days
<b>Location</b>	Cantonments	Cantonments
<b>Implementation</b>	UNMIL with NCDDRR policies, technical and operational Guidelines	NCDDRR establishment and management.

The design of the strategic framework which was used as the basis for the DDRRP showed a number of strengths :

- It is comprehensive in scope, covering all areas;
- It defines and attributes clear roles and responsibilities;
- It has a specific strategy for each of the target groups (women, children, disabled, etc.)
- The process of developing the framework had wide stakeholder participation and support, leading to the formulation of the framework as the outcome
- It is the first UN integrated DDR framework produced aiming at developing a common approach to the UN response.

As such with these strengths the SF had the potential for facilitating a smooth DDR process in Liberia.

However it also contained some weaknesses :

- It lacks a definition of the terms used for the programme objectives such as “national security” and “peace”
- It did not establish any benchmarks or indicators to measure success
- It did not foresee any mechanism for tracking assumptions
- Parallel programme partners (e.g. funded by USAID and the EC, such as DAI, LOIC, CESD) and IPs were not part of the TCC. Therefore a forum gathering all actors in DDR was missing as the TCC was not an inclusive membership.


The DDRRP programme was initially foreseen as an integrated programme pulling from resources and experience of the different UN bodies and the Government into a single approach and a unified framework. However the incidents which marked the initial disarmament and demobilisation phase in Camp Schieffelin on 7 December 2003 created a different dynamic and a process which differed from the original strategic framework of 31 October 2003 as is mentioned hereunder. Furthermore, two of the seven initial assumptions (i and v) of the SF (point 2.7) did not materialise and therefore invalidated a part of the initial planning and undermined the efforts of the DDRRP.

The SF was implemented through Joint Operation Plan (JOP). Two such plans were prepared, detailing the procedures to be followed. The first JOP was established in February 2004. The second was prepared on 16 April 2004. In the first JOP prepared for UNMIL DSRSG by JIU P&P Advisor, minimum pre-conditions and operating pre-requisites included : “Provision of nominal list of fighters from the various factions including location and types of weapons, etc.. Demonstrated political commitment of the parties through formal NCDDRR meeting on the need to provide an accurate number of combatants”. Failure to meet these requirements have led to an explosion of the caseload, from an initial estimate of 38,000 to a revised estimate of 53,000 – whereas the actual number of screened participants ultimately topped 103,000 people.

The evaluation has not been able to ascertain clearly the reason for the explosion of the caseload beyond the original planning figures. It is equally unclear why the UN did not update and reformulate documents (SF and JOP) when assumptions did not materialise on the SF (points i) a post conflict rehabilitation and reintegration framework, v) the comprehensive national recovery programme) or the minimum pre-conditions were not met in the JOP (Provision of nominal list of fighters). This either means that : assumptions and pre-conditions for planning were unnecessary, and were used as a pretext to lend credibility to a political process, or that there was no capacity

within the UN to reformulate programming decisions according to changing assumptions and conditions. In any case, the consequences were that the original provisions for DDRP implementation were no longer valid and that the DDRP adjusted with its own flexibility but without a clear plan to the changing conditions, particularly a bloated caseload.


The late recruitment of a head of DD operations in UNMIL proved to cause further problems as personalities issues and rivalries regarding competencies undermined a smooth coordination of the process, despite the SF that foresaw DD as one of the four pillars of the DDRP under overall JIU oversight. Hereunder the original institutional arrangements as foreseen in the SF:




The following comment was made by JIU : "To the extent one can agree with the contention of the evaluation as to the apparent disconnect between DD and R, it is important to examine not only programmatic issues (was the collaborative planning effort at both the TCC and the consultative forum sufficient? etc) but also what might be termed decisional, placement of responsibility for the DDR under the DSRSG/ROL/O as opposed to the DSRSG/RC/HC. The later brings in responsibility for humanitarian coordination as well as outreach to UN Specialized Agencies. To a large extent, this lesson has already been learned in the context of integrated mission programmes and planning."

**b) Disarmament**

According to the SF the Outline of procedures for disarmament and demobilisation was as follows (p. 44) :



The specific procedures for disarmament were :



The initial disarmament exercise at Camp Schieffelin on 7 December 2003 resulted in a commanders apparently did not keep their word as to the number of combatants they should have been bringing, and the camp capacity was overwhelmed. UNMIL pushed ahead for disarmament to begin on 7 December 2003 with clear documented opposition from technical agencies, NCDDRR and partners claiming that the facilities were not yet ready. Some internal opposition was reported, from the Force Commander to DPKO HQ as the necessary requirements to proceed with the disarmament were not met. In a written interview by Frontline World with former SRSG Klein of May 2005 available on the internet, it appears clearly that the SRSG dismissed the potential opposition as irrelevant in view of the high weapon take: ". Some people were more cautionary voices. That's immaterial. The fact is, in December when that [the riots] happened, we disarmed how many in 10 days? Thirteen thousand. We took in more than 8,700 weapons and 2 million rounds of ammo .... New York said, "We want the disarmament process to start now."

UNMIL agrees that "certainly there were discussions between DPKO Headquarters and the Mission on the time-line for the process as well as possible differences of opinions".

The evaluation further explored the assumption that the disarmament was rushed given the existence of security threats if the process was delayed. However there was no matching evidence found amongst any of the key informants interviewed or in the documentation reviewed that suggested there could be a security risk if the disarmament was delayed for a month to ensure proper capacity and facilities at Camp Schieffelin. There is nonetheless documented evidence that some visible result of the DDR process had to be obtained in view of the December 2003 donors' meeting. While DDR has always been a political and a technical process, the two should not necessarily be antagonistic and decision making should be reflected in adequate technical support.

To some extent heed was given to the difficult start of the disarmament exercise and some more caution was placed in the resumption of the disarmament and demobilisation.

Disarmament was carried out in separate phases :

#### Phase I

7 December 2003 – 09 January 2004 : Camp Schieffelin

#### Phase II

15 April 2004 – 26 July 2004 : Gbarnga

20 April 2004 – 5 July 2004 : Buchanan

25 April 2004 – 14 September 2004 : Tubmanburg

30 May 2004 – 8 September 2004 : VOA

#### Phase III

7 July – 31 October 2004 : Zwedru

17 August – 31 October 2004 : Ganta

8 September – 31 October 2004 : Voinjama

29 September – 31 October 2004 : Harper

Residual caseloads and "mop-up" operations were conducted where formal disarmament could not be undertaken, as per details hereunder :

23-26 October 2004 : Barclayville

24 October 2004 : Greenville

4 November 2004 : Fassama  
 29 Oct. –23 Nov. 2004: Foya-Kolahun-Vahun  
 4-5 November 2004 : Generals  
 4-5 November 2004 : Special Operations Division

Weapons, SAA and UXO statistics from the DD phase<sup>7</sup> :

Weapons collected during DD	28,314
SAA collected and destroyed (includes rounds of ammunition, plus 10,996 hand grenades and rockets)	6,486,136
UXO (unexploded Ordinance)	33,604

Number of disarmed ex-combatants from 7 December 2003 until 22 November 2004 according to NCDDRR : 103,019  
 Weapon to person ratio : 0.275

The JMAC 20 November 2005 report indicates that “being optimistic Liberia is disarmed in a 94% but we must have in mind that the estimation is not complete”.

After the end of the official DD phase, additional weapons, ammunition and UXO have been collected<sup>8</sup> :

Weapons (29.06.05 to 25.02.06)	481
SAA	60,059
UXO	772
Miscellaneous (empty ammo cases)	11,461

In comparison with other DDR exercises, the weapon to person ratio of 0.28 is amongst the lowest in DDR history. In Sierra Leone, the ratio was 0.58, while in Angola it was 0.38 and in Congo 0.43<sup>9</sup>. The overall average for DDR is 0.5<sup>10</sup>.

However this figure needs to be taken with a certain amount of caution. During the Camp Schieffelin the weapons to person ratio was much higher, with 10,312 weapons for 12,770 persons disarmed (ratio of 0.81)<sup>11</sup>. Comparatively the remaining number of disarmed persons outside Schieffelin amounting to 90,249 only provided 18,002 weapons, with a ratio of 0.20 weapon per person. It is not an outstanding result given that the UNMIL force of 15,000 was one of the highest peacekeeper to person ratio in DDR history. One reason for this is that at Camp Schieffelin the participants had the understanding that the eligibility criteria were based on “one person, one gun”. Looking at the statistical report from NCDDRR/JIU<sup>12</sup> during the first phase only 424 women disarmed and 1,404 children as compared to 11,296 adult men. Percentage wise women represented only 3% of 13,125 people disarmed, and children 11%. In phase II with a total of 51,469 disarmed, the percentage of women rose to 21% (with 5,310 children still representing around 10%), and in phase III of a total of 38,425 women represented 29% of the total number of people disarmed. From virtual exclusion in the

<sup>7</sup> source : UNMIL JMAC inter-office memorandum, 20 November 2005

<sup>8</sup> Source : UNMIL JMAC inter-Office Memorandum, 26 April 2006

<sup>9</sup> Source : ECP, Barcelona, op cit, p. 22

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 4

<sup>11</sup> Source : NCDDRR First quarterly report, annex 2, based on JIU validated figures

<sup>12</sup> NCDDRR/JIU DDRR Consolidated Report phase 1,2&3 (status as at 1/16/2005)

first phase the number of women exploded to 29% in the final phase, showing the difficulties of the screening process and the understanding of the eligibility criteria. This table is reproduced hereunder.

The breakdown of disarmed programme participants by phase shows the increase:

JIU Statistics		Phase I	percent.	Phase II	percent.	Phase III	percent.	total	percent.
adult	male	11297	86,1%	35306	68,6%	22678	59,0%	69281	67,3%
	<b>female</b>	<b>424</b>	<b>3,2%</b>	<b>10853</b>	<b>21,1%</b>	<b>11179</b>	<b>29,1%</b>	<b>22456</b>	<b>21,8%</b>
child	male	1253	9,5%	4089	7,9%	3429	8,9%	8771	8,5%
	female	151	1,2%	1221	2,4%	1139	3,0%	2511	2,4%
sub-total		13125	100,0%	51469	100,0%	38425	100,0%	103019	100,0%

The disarmament process was the most inclusive to date. This allowed the non-fighting groups that accompany combatants to also be eligible for disarmament, thus obtaining the same DDR benefits as the combatants. The two traditionally excluded groups in disarmament tend to be women and children. The form used for disarmament “Ex-Combatant Disarmament Form” actually gave three options (despite the “and” at the end of the first condition) to be eligible for the DDRP :

- Having demonstrated to the observer’s satisfaction that he/she has participated as an active combatant of the above fighting forces in Liberia at the time of the signing of the Accra Peace Agreement of 18 August 2003; and...
- Having delivered at least a personal weapon or belonging to a group of at most five combatants delivering at least one group weapon; or...
- Being an underage combatant, accompanying minor, unaccompanied minor, or any other participant under the age of 18 or female, presenting with any of the fighting forces

In theory this should have allowed for comprehensive disarmament while taking into account the Cape Town principles. However the different interviews held by the evaluation team showed that in many cases abuses from all target groups (adults as well as children) were committed to be eligible for DDRP benefits. This resulted from inadequate training of those in charge of screening and registration, insufficient information on eligibility criteria among participants (and therefore unrealistic expectations), and communication and understanding problems between the peacekeepers and the population given language difficulties.

Example of a generous disarmament process in Tubmanburg

“Generous” is a 20 year old youth born in 1986 in Bomi county. He often went to the front line with his AK47 during the war. Because he was under 18, he went to a World Vision camp for 2 months after he was disarmed. He is proud to show two additional DDRR cards : one from his younger sister and one from his grand-mother. Asked on how they were able to be eligible for DDRP, he proudly answers : “I gave them ammo (150 rounds each), and a result they both got US\$ 300 in two payments”.

A faction commander in the same town also acknowledged having given ammo to two family members to obtain DDRR cards and benefits.

This is by no means the only example the evaluation met where the openness of eligibility criteria was utilised to maximise the benefits to the combatant or his/her family by distributing weapons and/or ammunition to family members. Other cases in other parts of the country included selling additional weapons for as little as US\$ 15 each (AK), and the practice was emulated by some of the faction commanders as well. While the number of interviews cannot be considered statistically representative, it is clear that a portion of the overall caseload did not meet the eligibility criteria. However it is impossible to make even a guess as to how widespread the practice was. It appears to have been more common in some areas with a specific faction than in others.

At the other end of the spectrum faction commanders interviewed claimed that there has been a degree of exclusion, for two motives:

- in some areas disarmament was done too quickly: because of the rainy season and given communication difficulties, some combatants were not able to arrive at the disarmament camps on time (South-East);
- claims that some legitimate combatants did not obtain DDRP benefits because they could not answer some of the questions from the peace keepers such as “how long does the bullet take to reach the enemy?”

The evaluation team was unable to triangulate any of these allegations, because of the high turnover of UNMIL staff and the rotation of the peace keeping forces. The training for screening provided for in the SF to the Peace Keepers did not appear to have been conducted with much success. One issue was the language barrier, as often the international PK forces used an English with a heavy and different accent to that of Liberian English, which made communication between nationals and PK forces difficult, and sometimes even impossible. Another issue is that commanders were not brought into the screening process, something already identified by the Review Team on the DDRP in January 2004.

In addition two other claims were made by faction commanders interviewed (which should be validated):


- claims that the former NCDDRR director, Dr. Moses Jarbo, had signed a letter with a group of 525 combatants to provide them DDRR cards. The leader of the group who has the signed list is known as “Sumo Denis” and is actually at the Guthrie plantation. This is documented in the first NCDDRR quarterly report;
- claims that in Fassama disarmament was much too short, especially given the distances to the collection point and the terrain. It appears that 23 weapons and 15 RPG remain in that location. UNMIL Pakbat were allegedly informed of this some three months ago, but no action seems to have been taken yet.

The evaluation recommends following-up on both of the above mentioned issues as they are potential causes of discontent and could lead to larger problems if not addressed properly.

### **c) Demobilisation**

The original SF also contained the following chart regarding the demobilisation process:

Demobilisation chart:



### Length of stay at cantonment sites

Demobilisation and cantonment of disarmed participants was undertaken in various locations throughout the country. Originally the stay in cantonment sites (so called D2 sites, as opposed to D1 sites which were only for disarmament and where people did not stay for more than hours) was planned for a period of thirty days, but it was later revised to three weeks. In the end, it was actually much shortened during the actual implementation phase to a stay of five days per person. While the length of the cantonment can be argued as being too short, it proved in this case to be a sound decision given that it contributed to minimise idleness and provided a rapid but useful transition to ex-combatants. All programme participants interviewed confirmed the usefulness of the various activities at the cantonment sites, particularly the psycho-social counselling received, and the overall good treatment they had received while on site. The enormous caseload of 103,019 registered programme participants did not allow the keep to the original design which planned for thirty days on site. With hindsight this has been a sound decision, as a longer stay might have led to higher incidents and fomented additional requests for assistance from programme participants. It should be mentioned that all interviewees confirmed having received the full range of services as foreseen in the SF during their stay at the cantonment sites.

At the other end of the spectrum, and in the words of one of the faction commanders “it is impossible to demobilise in five days someone who has fought for fourteen years”. And this has had consequences on the capacity of participants to adapt to their new environment during reintegration, pointing out to the necessity to provide gap-filling measures when adults are discharged and go back to their communities. The shortness of the stay meant that an important part of the psycho-social counselling was not done in an integrated manner. As a consequence community and religious leaders have played a key role in assuming this responsibility without any support from the DDRP.

### Relevance of Cantonment sites

The evaluation also found that in the case of Liberia the relevance and usefulness of setting up cantonment sites, even for a limited duration, proved to be a correct decision.

### Caseload size

The number of people who were accepted into the programme has been a cause of concern for all actors involved. There is in fact no clear evidence indicating who, in the end, accepted the increase in the caseload from the initial planning figure of 38,000, which was revised to 53,000, only to end with a caseload 2.7 times greater than the initial planning figure. UNMIL did continue with DD until the caseload was over 100,000 persons. This had obvious implications beyond the time of stay in the cantonment sites and particularly in the resources needed to implement the reintegration component of the programme.

Regarding the size of the caseload, two of the three warring factions had provided a detailed list<sup>13</sup> with the number of combatants, which numbered 23,000 for both factions<sup>14</sup>. Considering a similar number of combatants for the third faction, the overall

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<sup>13</sup> JIU comment: Although two of the warring factions provided a detailed list with numbers of fighters, the information came too late and after series of efforts which, tested the patience of the leadership of the Mission, yielded futile results

<sup>14</sup> See the lists in the NCDDRR second quarterly report

figure would have been well within the initial planning figure of 38,000, with some 34,000 combatants for the three factions, without counting supporting children and women. As the caseload showed that children under the age of 18 constituted 11% of the caseload (both combatants and non-combatants), it could be argued that the original planning figure would have been nearly correct to include both combatants and non-combatant children, both male and female, had there been the required agreement on the name lists. A realistic caseload might have been as follows:

hypothesis	Lists given	Children 11%	women 22%	maximum caseload
GOL	12749	CAFF & WAFF both armed and unarmed		
MODEL	11075			
LURD**	10000			
<b>sub-total</b>	<b>33824</b>	<b>3721</b>	<b>7441</b>	<b>44986</b>
**LURD did not submit any list, its force was estimated at 10,000				

Based on actual overall percentage of WAFF (22%) and CAFF (11%), equivalent to one third of the overall caseload, a projection of the anticipated caseload would have yielded a maximum of 45,000 participants, well under the 103,019 actually disarmed.

However demobilisation did not play its original screening role, as the screening was actually done at D1 (disarmament sites) with some degree of inconsistency across the country despite a theoretically clear procedure for screening. MILOBS (Military Observers) responsible for receiving the weapons at D1, de facto, became gatekeepers to the programme. Measures and resources to effectively and efficiently monitor access to the programme at D2 based on the criteria established in the SF, as planned, were not provided. Commanders were not used to screen eligible programme participants. As a result, and to the mission's best knowledge, no participant that went through D1 was turned down at D2. The discrepancies in the screening process between what was described in the SF and the actual implementation resulted in a very diffused, hence inefficient, screening process facilitating its abuse.<sup>15</sup> In any case, it is clear that screening practices varied from location to location and resulted into widely different caseloads as is shown in the statistical information (annex 9) covering the different phases (and locations).

### Information

The UNMIL radio has been reported by program participants as an important source of information that explained the process of demobilization and the return of the country to peace.

The source of information to the participants was not only limited to UNMIL Radio, but also through comprehensive information and sensitization measures jointly implemented by the ISU in the JIU and UNMIL-PIS. Their activities included:

- i) *Focus group discussions*
- ii) *Community outreach programs*
- iii) *Dramatization, and*
- iv) *Public Skits*

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<sup>15</sup> Comment from UNICEF: Contrary to what the evaluation is saying about screening in the D2 sites, Child Protection Agencies worked with Military Observers to screen children at the D1 sites. At times the CPA staff were threatened by community members who perceived them as preventing them from benefiting from the DDRR Programme. The screening continued to the D2 sites and children who did not meet the criteria were sent out from D2 sites – in fact the number of children turned out in certain D2 sites runs into hundreds.

All these activities were carried out as an integral and major pre-conditions for the implementation of the programme.

#### d) Reintegration

The scheme according to the SF was :

Assistance	Reintegration Assistance	
	Reinsertion benefit	Reintegration programme
Objective	To assist the ex-combatants resettlement and meet some basic Household needs during critical period of post discharge	To provide the ex-combatant opportunity to acquire basic skills (for employment or self-employment) to support themselves and to participate in the community reconstruction process. And, to provide of referral and counselling services to facilitate their social reintegration
Type	Benefit (adult)	Opportunity (adult)
Nature	<u>Adult:</u> • two payments	Programme opportunities <u>including assistance package for each of the following programmes:</u> • Formal education • Vocational training • Public works • Agriculture/livestock/fishing
Timing	Sufficient for an initial period of 3	Programme is on the average 6 to 12 months depending on type of opportunity selected. Ex-combatants are expected to select one programme.
Location	In area of return and through DDRR Field office	In area of return and through DDRR Field office
Implementation	NCDDRR	NCDDRR: • Contracts with NGOs • Co-financing with NGOs based on MoUs • Parallel placement

Originally according to the programme SF there were two forms of reintegration : economic and social. However only the economic aspect of reintegration was pursued in detriment of the social reintegration aspect. This means that a key issue of social reintegration, reconciliation, was not recognised as a priority issue for reintegration. Public works was dropped from the list of programmes and the reintegration package as indicated in the above scheme was limited to vocational skills training, formal education, and agriculture.

JIU statistics indicate that 95% of reintegration participants have opted for formal education or vocational training, 4% for agriculture, with a further 1% opting for employment<sup>16</sup>.

The are two major features of the reintegration process:

1) The speed with which actual reintegration projects started to be implemented, as early as June 2004, whereas the DD phase continued until November 2004. This

<sup>16</sup> Source : DDRR consolidated report phase 1,2 & 3 of 1/16/2005 – annex 9b

means that reintegration projects were launched five months before the DD phase was completed, something rather exceptional.

2) The very high number of people, including adults, wanting to return into the formal education sector (over 38,000 people, representing 38% of the overall reintegration caseload). This is likely the single largest formal education component of any DDR programmes and challenges the common practice that formal education is only for children and that adults prefer vocational training.

Formal education has shown numerous advantages over the vocational training schemes :

- It is economically cheaper than vocational skills training.
- Schools are found in most communities, and therefore it is grounded in community structures and has better outreach capacity than vocational training that are usually concentrated in urban areas.
- Because there is no toolkit given at the end of formal education (valued between US\$ 150 to a maximum of US\$ 200 depending on the training), the support can be given for a longer time-period. In Liberia, three years of free education (including paying the examination fee) is provided, and decreasing stipends over the three school years (30 US\$ month for the first year, 15 US\$ month for the second year, no stipend for the third year), along with the provision of school uniforms and shoes.
- DDRRP participants are back together with civilians in a structured and disciplined environment and are not being differentiated from the other students : the same level of academic achievement is required from all students.
- The diplomas obtained are recognised by government and are valid country-wide. A person graduating anywhere in Liberia will be authorised to pursue his or her studies at university level regardless of where the high school diploma was obtained.

There are equally some negative points to the otherwise seemingly successful school reintegration assistance projects:

- The choice of the JIU was to focus on grades 7 to 12 (equivalent to junior and senior high). According to the memorandum of understanding between UNDP/JIU and UNICEF, grades 1 to 6 (elementary school) were to be covered by UNICEF CEIP (Community Education Investment Programme)<sup>17</sup>. While the JIU DDRRP targets the individual participant, UNICEF CEIP targets the school as a whole and gives no individual benefit. However this division of labour shows some inconsistency as the grade level does not necessarily match the age of the student. Two examples of youth who were interviewed showed such inconsistency. One student currently 20 and one currently 21, both underage at the time of the DD and both having underage children DDRR cards, but one going to grade 4 and the other being in grade 7. The student in 7<sup>th</sup> grade is receiving all the DDRRP benefits, while the one in fourth grade receives nothing. In fact they were both in the same group, have both gone back to school and they cannot understand why one of them is excluded from the benefits of the DDRRP.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> The design of the CEIP is based on increasing demobilized children's access to primary education while avoiding stigmatization through non-targeting of individual children, hence promoting social reintegration. CEIP works on the premise that the support goes to the school in order to get schools to accept the demobilized children as well as spread the DDRR benefit to other community children as well as teachers.

<sup>18</sup> Comment from JIU: "The Program did strive to achieve consistency to the extent possible – eg uniform costing and packages for the different areas of assistance. However, differentiation will always exist, regardless of efforts at standardization, and therefore should not be construed

- While DDRP is certainly not a socially equitable programme as regards to the general population, it must nonetheless be consistent within its target groups. The grade level division<sup>19</sup> is creating inequities amongst students, and will place a lot of pressure on teachers both to approve those enrolled in 6<sup>th</sup> grade (to obtain the individual benefits of JIU programming in 7<sup>th</sup> grade) and runs the risk of fomenting enrolment only in the higher grades. An alternative would have been to use age as a cut-off point for benefiting from specific projects, rather than grade level, although it could also be argued that the age approach would have caused problems in the Liberian situation where birth registration was not functional.
- The CEIP is a school based support and consists of training teachers on how to provide school based psychosocial support to children who have had difficult experiences, educational materials such as dictionaries, maps, English readers with life skill messages and play and recreational materials such as drums, balls and checkers. The CEIP supplies kit is provided to schools in accordance with the number of CAFF in the school and the student enrolment and augments the larger UNICEF education programme where items like copy books, school renovation and furniture are provided to schools. Only about 5% of children enrolled in the CEIP drop out from the programme due to various reasons. Monitoring visits to schools that are implementing CEIP have also consistently shown high levels of acceptability of ex-CAFF in the schools and that they do not stand out as a special group<sup>20</sup>.

There may be some issues for future investigation as to the effectiveness of different project approaches used in the reintegration program such as the CEIP versus the individualised payment of stipend to students.

The UNICEF supported CEIP program is not based on modalities for adult reintegration programmes but is designed to promote greater objective for the overall reintegration of children as per the Cape Town Principles<sup>21</sup>.

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as program inconsistency. Age and grade were both used as cut-off points in the CEIP and the Formal Education; however, the assumption that the average age for Grade 7 is 12 years and for Grade 6, 11 years could not hold against the background of a target population that have missed opportunities for education for a period of almost ten years. It is an understandable failure of the assumption of the programme that responsible and respective educational authorities in Liberia would enforce minimum age criteria applicable to each grader level. Recognizing the differentiation, the Program has been flexible in admitting students supported under CEIP into formal education upon completion of Grade 6. Having a 21 year old in grade 6 as opposed to 11 year old in the CEIP, when the legal age of maturity in the country is 18 years and cut off age for the program with regard to the definition of a child is below 18 years is unacceptable.”

<sup>19</sup> In the Policy Notes on Formal Education dated January 10, 2005 a decision was taken to focus on grades and not age, while recognizing the ‘challenges associated with the categorical delineation of the groups by age and grade’.

<sup>20</sup> The same programme was undertaken in Sierra Leone where it had a similar pattern of acceptance by the children and low drop out rate and helped both CAFF and non CAFF and contributed to the overall development in the locality. In post-conflict situations education is very highly valued and programmes that support the re-development of educational facilities is greatly appreciated by the communities.

<sup>21</sup> Cape Town Principles and Best Practices on the Prevention of Recruitment of Children into the Armed Forces and Groups and Release and Reintegration of Children Involved in Armed Conflict, 30 April 1997.

UNICEF has provided the following additional comment:"

"The evaluation remains critical of the grade versus age policy that was used in the support of demobilized children who opted for formal education. UNICEF will once again assert that this policy was adopted after very careful considerations by UNDP, JIU and NCDDRR. Considerations focused on practicalities in the implementation of the formal education for children as detailed in the Community Education Investment Programme, expectations of the affected children, population of children affected and related consequences. It should also be remembered that children who opted for formal education in the elementary schools had their school fees waived by the school authorities. Nonetheless the clear answer to these questions will be made from an evaluation of the degree to which the CEIP enabled the reintegration. The evaluation can be undertaken in Sierra Leone and Liberia where CEIP was implemented in the same manner."

- The NCDDRR, which has undertaken its own internal review and will shortly be subject to a comprehensive audit. At the evaluation's presentation of the preliminary findings in Monrovia, NCDDRR staff questioned the actual attendance of students in classes. This is directly related to the monitoring capacity of the programme structure, and applies not only to schools but also to vocational training. In all reintegration projects the attendance was 75% in order to be eligible for the monthly stipends. Those not having a valid reason (medical certificate for illness, or other) were no longer entitled to the stipends. How much monitoring of attendance was realised both by IPs and by the M&E officers of the JIU is questionable. In the JIU the human resources and means but also the geographical coverage, with a late opening of field offices, were lacking to ensure adequate supervision of all projects.
- A third issue has to be raised regarding teacher's salaries. These are actually lower than the monthly stipend of US\$ 30 that each student in grade 7 and above receives on his or her first year. Two questions then arise: Is there a potential threat of paying for obtaining passing marks by students, and is the motivation and quality of teachers up to the task. These questions fall outside the scope of the evaluation but should be given some consideration. The evaluation team recognises that the low government salaries are an endemic problem in Liberia which will have to be addressed by government and the donor community at some stage if an effective and efficient administration is to be created.

Vocational training has covered a wide range of skills and there has been no standard curriculum for vocational skills. Therefore each implementing partner has had the chance to develop its own training system but without any direct guidance and oversight from the programme as regards to the quality and contents of the training. Vocational skills training have met with the following difficulties :

- Emerging from 14 years of war, the network of institutions delivering vocational skills was depleted and disorganised. Especially outside the capital and Montserrado county, it was very challenging for the DDRP to identify and partner with credible training organisations.
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- lack of accreditation country-wide. What is the use and recognition of the skills training received, and how does this facilitate access to employment opportunities? The Ministry of Labour should analyse the feasibility of giving accreditation to those organisations meeting a set standard, in terms of length of training, methodology, and training quality.
- There has been no standard package regarding skills training. The positive side is that there has been no imposition regarding how training must be performed giving IPs the possibility to customize their packages to the need and local conditions. The negative side is that as no standard has been set, there are wide variations between IPs for the same type of training.
- Attendance has been a difficulty for all IPs. The SF foresaw that in order to receive the monthly stipend, attendance was to be at least 75%. However there has been a lot of pressure on IPs (and sometimes threats) not to report those under the 75% mark and there has been no capacity nor expressed concern by the JIU M&E unit to systematically monitor attendance. While this was initially done on random spot checks in the first reintegration projects implemented it was not continued<sup>22</sup>.

Table of attendance versus validated number of participants :

IP name	type of training	attendance/validated
ADA	agriculture (partial)	80/272 (63 relocations)
UMCOR	skills training	931/1166
YMCA	skills training	982/1000
BWI	skills training	777/800
MVTC	skills training	466/500
GOVTC	skills training	493/500
SDP	skills training (phase 1)	733/771
CEP	skills training	146/200
UN-HABITAT	skills training	502/640
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>ratio 87.3%</b>	<b>5110/5849</b>

- Toolkits constituted another difficulty. Given the wide number of partners and in order to ensure timely delivery, economies of scale and consistency in the toolkit package given at the end of the training, it was decided that the DEX would be responsible for the purchase of the toolkits. However there have been long delays in procuring the materials and some of the participants interviewed who graduated two months ago from training are still expecting their toolkits. While in some cases IPs are also to blame for such a situation (e.g. a poultry training course decided to sacrifice the hens given the avian bird flu risk, and finally gave pigs to the graduates...), there is one thing that needs to be remembered for ex-combatants : never make promises that are not kept on timely basis.
- Some of the problems encountered during reintegration (riots or lock-ins not allowing JIU/UNDP staff or IPs to leave a site given lack of timely payment of stipend, or absence of toolkits) can be easily avoided provided that promises made are kept on timely basis. Posting at the training sites and schools when events will take place (payment of stipends, graduation, giving toolkits, etc.) would take

<sup>22</sup> Source : JIU, M&E, Summary of Evaluation Reports, First Generation Reintegration Projects, June 2005

pressure off IPs and JIU/UNDP/NCDDRR staff. Failure to keep a timely execution is a security risk and should not be underestimated.

Another point which needs to be mentioned is that NCDDRR is the main focal point for DDRRP participants. The role of moderator/advisor/intermediary of the NCDDRR has been key in many moments of tension and incidents faced during the process. NCDDRR is the first place participants go to when disgruntled or dissatisfied with their plight. Most of such pressure and damage control was actually addressed by the NCDDRR, despite lack of manpower and other resources and less than optimal coordination between the UNMIL/RRR, the JIU/UNDP and the NCDDRR given the lack of a clear division of labour amongst the various actors.

### **Counselling and reconciliation**

There have been different procedures for adults and CAFF (adults were referred from D1 to D2 sites, while children were sent to Interim Care Centres –ICC- for a period of time varying from 3 days to 12 weeks depending on the case and on the length of family reunification). Adults were provided psycho-social support during the 5 days they spent in cantonment. Interviewees indicated that such a counselling was good and useful. However upon discharge the responsibility for counselling and reconciliation was *de facto* transferred over to the community and religious leaders, without any gap-filling measure or transitional procedure to ensure continued specialised counselling to the DDRR participant. Community and religious leaders therefore played an important role in social reintegration, using different local traditional mechanisms, but the programme did not provide them with any support. Noteworthy the perception of a DDRR participant varied from one area and one culture to the next in Liberia.

Contrary to the approach implemented with adults, the UNICEF Child Welfare Committee (CWC) proved to be an effective community-based counselling system and conducted follow up of reunited CAFF. It should have been emulated for adults as the need for reconciliation and continued counselling pervaded after discharge. A targeted study to analyse CWC's effectiveness and draw good practices for adults should be undertaken.

Yet there appears to be a wide window of opportunity around post conflict reconciliation. In some specific areas, programme participants were not seen as a threat at all, although this was in a minority of cases. In regards to CAFF, one community member described the potential tolerance that creates space for social reintegration in this manner :”there is no bad bush where one would get rid of a bad child”.

### **Where are the reintegration programme participants?**

As regards to the overall reintegration caseload, according to JIU statistics there remains 19,240 participants in the JIU programme plus an additional 22,511 in parallel programmes, which should be covered by June 2007 (for the JIU caseload), before the DDRRP ends in December 2007. However considering the current difficulties and capacities, it appears unlikely that the remaining caseload will be absorbed in the allocated programme time-frame. Implementation procedures and requirements for projects should be given more flexibility, particularly for those partners who have performed well earlier in the programme, so that projects can be kick-started as soon as possible.

Based on the data provided by the JIU Reintegration Coordinator, the first 20 projects for the first phase totalled 18,675 targeted participants. The total number of participants enrolled was 13,505, or 72% of the original target<sup>23</sup>. There are several reasons which contribute to this low figure :

- Lack of the programme's outreach capacity. Most vocational skills training projects were in or near urban or peri-urban centres, and could not be deployed closer to where potential participants are residing;
- Lack of geographical coverage and presence of IPs. In some areas reintegration projects have not yet started (e.g. Harper) and should start urgently (a planned 800 participants in Maryland should be able to benefit);
- Very low number of professional national and international IPs available outside of the capital to implement projects. This has been a challenge for the DDRRP as the demand for IP largely exceeded the offer, slowing down the process and increasing the risks of mismanagement and decrease in the quality of the delivery. The programme did not foresee bringing in specific experienced IPs (contracting specialised IPs) from out of the country to service its needs in the countryside given cost considerations.
- There is an unknown number of participants who may have chosen alternative assistance scenarios, such as going to refugee camps outside Liberia to obtain free education, food and medical assistance (e.g. Zwedru), or who have already reintegrated by themselves. Considering that two years have nearly passed since the end of disarmament and demobilisation, the planning figure of 2% of spontaneous reintegration may in fact be lower than actual spontaneous reintegration capacity;
- The monthly stipend of US\$ 30 is certainly an incentive for attendance, but is not sufficient for a person to move to a training centre from a different community given the costs of food, transport, housing and maintenance;
- In the areas where UNMIL has a strong presence, there is a direct impact on local economies (Monrovia, Zwedru, etc.). Local business is developing again partly thanks to the cash injection of the UN projects and cash benefits given out (some ex combatants have used the TSA to start their own business in Tubmanburg, Zwedru). Also a fraction of the UN staff salaries is disbursed locally into the local economy. But some of the counties have developed very differently and unattended needs still exist. For example Harper in Maryland county is an example of a very low level of entrepreneurship and the town does not show the same level of dynamism in economic activities as other places visited.

Given the level of under subscription, there could be a possibility to include some of the community members in the provision of training for the remainder of the programme activities. This is further explored in the recommendations section.

### **Links to community-based reintegration schemes**

At field level an example of successful transition from individual assistance to community assistance was found in Tchien district, Grand Gedeh, through the implementation of UNDP's CBR programme, which had supported 13 individual

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<sup>23</sup> There are three different types of figures in all projects : a) the initial estimated target figure, which is used for the project proposal and budget; b) the validated number of participants, once the lists have been sent to the JIU M&E unit to cross-check on eligibility of the participants and avoid double-counting with other projects; c) the actual enrolment rate, or people who have attended the entire duration of the school or training. Sometimes there have been large differences between original target figures and validated figures, in particular for non-JIU parallel programmes where adequate information has not been provided.

recovery projects to date, and which included the labour force of those DDRRP participants who had acquired the corresponding skills during reintegration training. Unfortunately both the geographical extension of the CBR and its budget does not allow its presence in all counties and all districts. However it could be one model for government to consider for community development as the IPRSP and other long-term development plans are being developed for Liberia. Such a programme provides the necessary connection between some of the vulnerable caseload who have received individualised assistance (IDPs, returnees, DDRRP participants, etc.) and the community-based approach which is a preferred option and contributes to reconciliation and the end of differentiation of the community members (labelled on the basis of their perceived categorisation as ex-combatants, refugees, IDPs, etc.).

### **Reinsertion or reintegration?**

One of the primary evaluation questions was to determine whether the DDRRP was aiming at achieving reinsertion or reintegration, according to the definitions provided at the beginning of the report. The SF did differentiate between reinsertion (point 4.4), social reintegration (point 4.5) and economic reintegration (point 4.6). But this did not become criteria for project selection.

It appears that DDRRP was not able to aim at sustainable reintegration, given a mix of factors:

- factionalised transitional government when the process started leading to some marginalisation of the NTGL and the NCDDRR in the DDR process;
- no overall national recovery and development plan which is necessary to facilitate the programme's exit strategy;
- social and economic conditions were weak and unemployment widespread in Liberia;
- absence of a functioning administration when the process started (particularly some parts of the country controlled by factions)
- no parallel complementary programmes designed to operate at community level, with the exception of UNDP's CBR, but which was not linked to the DDRRP and had a limited geographical coverage (5 of 15 counties).

A challenge for the evaluation of the programme is that contradictory information existed regarding the reintegration process. Two factors contributed to this situation : 1) the lack of definition and separation between social and economic reintegration, and 2) the absence of clear success indicators for each category (social and economic reintegration). Some public statements by NCDDRR seemed to indicate that sustainable reintegration and employment would be the final benefits, and some of the leaflets produced by the JIU contained different information on different dates, as to how far the DDRRP was able to support the reintegration process. At the time of the evaluation and after discussions with the DDRRP P&P advisor, it was made clear that the programme was essentially targeting an immediate quick-start economic reintegration process, rather than a long-term reintegration which requires complementary programmes. The underlying assumption was that economic reintegration fosters social reintegration. However this does not consider the essential dynamics of reconciliation, which are necessary for social reintegration and have not been given proper support in the programme.

The original SF did provide for a differentiation between social and economic reintegration, but the social dimension was largely lost during the execution of the reintegration component.

At the same time, the DDRRP went somewhat beyond the definition of short-term reinsertion, as it was able to provide support in the formal education for three years,

something beyond the definition of short-term reinsertion assistance. Although this will pose some monitoring challenges as the programme will come to an end before the end of the three years cycle of support to formal education programmes, it is a significant accomplishment which contributes to social reintegration. Despite its inclusion in the SF, reinsertion is a word that has been essentially dropped from the DDRRP terminology currently in use.

For those participants who are trained, there remains a strong need for referral and counselling services over and beyond the skills acquired. This should be undertaken by the NCDDRR as part of its regular responsibilities in the DDR process. This is further developed under the recommendations section.

### **e) Overall findings**

The DDRRP did not follow the original SF given that political decision making has challenged the technical planning and implementation process. From a purely technical perspective a number of things could be improved and are mentioned under lessons learned.

Considering the context at the time the DDRRP was designed and implemented, and the following constraints:

- Political decision-making not informed by programming preparedness;
- Pressured time-frame;
- Absence of overall recovery framework;
- No direct ownership of the process from NCDDRR
- A transitional government factionalised;
- A difficult security situation in some part of the country;
- The initial trickling of donor contributions to the DDR process, rather than being able to count initially on a substantial funding base readily available;
- The inflation of the caseload to 2.7 the initial planning estimate;
- The current social and economic state of the country following 14 years of war,

The evaluation mission considers that the DDRRP has performed to satisfactory levels of implementation towards the achievement of its immediate objective. However this is essentially a short-term objective and further concern regarding the longer-term security issues need to be addressed by the government, the UNMIL and the international community.

As regards to the economic aspect of reintegration, it is too soon to say whether the programme will achieve its objective. Doubtless the injection of US\$ 30 million of cash into the local economy (US\$ 300 TSA in two instalments to over 100,000 participants) has had some positive impact on local economies. However this is demonstratively stronger in the areas where UNMIL bases and strong UNMIL presence exists. Furthermore, the challenge of economically reintegrating 100,000 participants in an economy that strives to recover from 14 years of war, sanctions on diamond and timber, with an unemployment rate of 85%<sup>24</sup> is simply enormous. Success of socio-economic reintegration needs to be measured against the macro economic reality of Liberia which is yet to be conducive to the economic reintegration of participants.

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<sup>24</sup> Security Council Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia, 13 June 2005, para 23 based on UNDP figures

## Security

The immediate objective of the DDRRP is to “consolidate national security”. Therefore the evaluation has attempted to gain an understanding of the security situation in Liberia from two perspectives : the human perspective and the state perspective (from LNP and authorities). Different sources were consulted and quantitative as well as qualitative information was collected.

In addition to the original JMAC weapons statistics under section b) disarmament, two sources of statistical information seem to confirm that security has been improving. This was confirmed by qualitative information from different key informants, including county police superintendents and UNMIL Senior Officers.

Statistics from the JFK Hospital, trauma cases 2002 to 2005 :


Treated combatants for the year 2002 to 2005						
<b>Note: Trauma Center was operated by ICRC</b>						
No	Cases	2002	2003	2004	2005	Total
	Gun shot wound	2.104	1.056	398	59	
	Bomb blast	945	431	213	24	
	Knife wound	54	39	49	39	
	Motor accident	899	493	583	435	
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4.002</b>	<b>2.019</b>	<b>1243</b>	<b>557</b>	<b>7.821</b>

By & Signed:

David N. Boley

Sr. Statistic Clerk ( LJFMH)

Cel. Num. : 06 541 522




Here the sharp drop in gunshot and bomb injuries from 2002 to 2005 is particularly telling.

Regarding the crime rates, the UNMIL Crime Analysis Unit, based at LNP HQ, has facilitated the evaluation mission with the available statistics from 2004 to date. These are the actual figures of crimes committed and do not include the attempts.

The actual figures for 2006 cover the period from January until May 2006. Therefore an annual estimate based on the figures for the first five months has been made.

It needs to be noted that the figures are mainly from Greater Monrovia, as there is of yet no functioning information system providing feedback from the different counties.



Based on three types of crimes, namely : aggravated assaults, rapes, and murder/homicide cases, a downward trend appears for murder/homicide over the last three years, while the aggravated assaults and rapes have increased from 2004 to 2005 and appear to diminish in 2006.

On a more qualitative note, the following additional security elements need to be noted:

- The deployment of UNMIL and the LNP presence, coupled with the deployment of a civilian administration country-wide, ensures a degree of social order which contributes to security. Therefore there is relative peace. However the withdrawal of UNMIL troops at present would yield catastrophic consequences as efforts to deploy law enforcement and public administration are only incipient. The police force and its means remain insufficient.
- DDRRP participants interviewed wanted to go back to civilian life. There was a general feeling of being tired of the war and a predisposition to go back to civilian life.
- There remains inadequate coordination and response to address DDRRP participants' grievances in the counties. This security threat should not be underestimated.

- Command structures still exist in the majority of cases. Sometimes commanders also enrol in reintegration programmes together with some of their ex-combatants which tends to enhance their roles as spokespersons for the programme participants.
- The community and religious leaders have played a distinctive role in achieving social order (religious leaders, chiefs, etc.) without any support from the international community in this essential function.
- Special attention has not been paid to foreign CAFF in Liberia. In some instances foreign CAFF were identified as potential security risks as they are not affiliated to families or communities who could have exercised a level of social control over them.
- Delays in payment of stipends, as well as untimely supply of toolkits, are creating security threats as DDRP participants riot easily if promises are not delivered on a timely basis. In the words of a religious leader: “Ex-combatants are not troublesome but they are not far away from trouble”. Special efforts to ensure timeliness of payment and toolkit delivery must be made by JIU/UNDP and IPs.

## **Reintegration**

The high interest in formal education is considered to be very positive by the evaluation team for two reasons : 1) it allows for participants to return to a disciplined and structured civilian environment, which is part of the community; 2) it allows the participants to be mixed in classes with students from different backgrounds, and therefore serves to a certain extent as a social reintegration factor. The percentage of participants going back to school as a reintegration project under a DDR process is possibly the highest in terms of caseload percentage (38%).

There has also been a positive change of behaviour among programme participants as a result of the DDRP. The psycho-social counselling in cantonment sites played an important role as communities could see a changed and more positive attitude from some of the programme participants. But there should be further psycho-social support at community level as once the participants were discharged they no longer had any opportunity to obtain psycho-social counselling.

The approach to reintegration was difficult given the changing scenario and the expanding caseload under which the DDRP was being implemented. One of the primary problems has been the ambiguous position of the DDRP regarding how far reintegration efforts should go, and how much of these efforts were to be borne by each the JIU/UNDP, the RRR, the NCDDRR and the IPs themselves. It would have been necessary to establish a revised reintegration framework to provide clear and unambiguous guidance and a consistent message to programme participants and different stakeholders.

There does not seem to be a significant level of resentment against programme participants caused as a result of the handing out of cash and other reintegration benefits. In the words of one woman ex-commander: “A person’s behaviour and the manner of conducting oneself determines how she/he is received in the community, not whether they have received benefits or not”.

The DDRP has not developed an exit strategy. Neither the SF nor JOP nor any other document have prepared the programme’s exit. The lack of an exit strategy has been compounded by the absence of a national recovery framework, which is one of the assumptions of the SF which did not materialise.

## Conflict sensitive programming

A DDR programme is essentially driven by security concerns to “consolidate national security”. Although it is not equitable with the wider population, it must be equitable across projects formulated under a DDR framework.

One difficulty in the approach to reintegration is the fact that different implementing partners have different understanding of the objectives to be achieved under the DRRP, and there is not necessarily a common vision. . For example the UNICEF approach is to use the strategies indicated in the Cape Town Principles and its mandate for child protection as the overarching objective<sup>25</sup>.

By not defining its key programmatic terms and objectives, the DRRP has left the door open for each actor to interpret what was meant by and how far the efforts for “reintegration” and “consolidate national security” should go. This has led to inconsistency of projects (individually targeted JIU students versus small support to the school in the CEIP) and is not an example of conflict sensitive programming.

From a limited sample of projects it appears that the individual reintegration projects which have been approved by JIU/NCDDRR/UNDP and the PAC do not define “reintegration” (neither in the actual contract nor on the project document itself), further allowing for different interpretations of what the projects’ final objectives are supposed to be<sup>26</sup> and placing more efforts into the actual activities (outputs) than the result of these activities (outcome). In some cases rehabilitation appears as one of the anticipated results, although the DRRP has never actually focused its attention on “rehabilitation”, another term which remained undefined and for which no specific component was developed.

At the field level there has been resentment among some of the communities. The benefits given the programme participants, even the US\$ 30 monthly stipend, are much more than the school teacher monthly salary (around US\$ 20) and still much less than the value of monthly food needs for a family. Therefore perceived inequity at community level is not being addressed through comprehensive sensitisation programmes and needs to be addressed to contribute to the objective of reconciliation and consolidation of national security.

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<sup>25</sup> According to the Cape Town principles "all services to assist the transition of children to civilian life shall be carried out within a broad child protection framework which takes into account the needs of all children affected by conflict. This will ensure that support is provided based on need and promote reconciliation by minimizing the stigma and reducing the resentment against children associated with armed forces and groups."

<sup>26</sup> ADA project signed 29 August 2005 and MVTC project signed 27 August 2005.

## IV. EVALUATION CRITERIA

### Relevance

The Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of August 2003 called for a DDR programme, sending a clear signal of political support to the process.

All programme participants interviewed by the evaluation were longing and willing to return to civilian life. Therefore enabling conditions for a DDR process existed as well as willingness amongst combatants to disarm and reintegrate into civilian life.

However there was no initial needs assessment before the start of the DDRRP. As a consequence no initial baseline to determine the caseload and to feed into programme design was available.

Parallel programmes were funded by donors (EC and USAID) but there was no overall coordination of DDR programmes nor a centralised overall monitoring of DDR projects.

### Efficiency

Efficiency within the DDRRP has been divided into different sections according to the following additional sub-criteria : timeliness, resource management, operational efficiency

#### 1. Timeliness

The DDRRP was too rushed for the DD phase, and this was the cause of a disconnection between the political agenda and the operational readiness to undertake DD, highlighted by the Camp Schieffelin incidents and the temporary suspension of DD. It was also conditioned by the capacity of UNMIL to deploy and secure certain zones of the country to make them conducive to the undertaking of a DDR programme.

On the other hand, reintegration projects started to be implemented in June 2004, only two months after DD was started throughout the country (phase II in April 2004) and five months ahead of the end of the DD phase. But it has not been able to keep the reintegration on the fast track and, two years after cantonment, 41,920 participants (of which 19,409 under UNDP TF) are still awaiting their reintegration package.

#### 2. Resource management

In terms of cost per head of the DDR process, Liberia appears to be within an acceptable ratio. It has been more expensive than the Sierra Leone operation, but much less than the planned figures for the eventual DDR programme in Côte d'Ivoire. According to the study from the Barcelona School of Peace, the average cost for 20 DDR operations in 2005 was US\$ 1,686 for an average length of 3.5 years<sup>27</sup>. However it needs to be kept in mind that the UNMIL peacekeeping force is three times that of the Sierra Leone operation and the highest in terms of peacekeeper to population ratio, with 15,000 troops for an estimated 3 million population (0,5%).

The details regarding costs and ratios are mentioned hereunder. The second table also uses updated population figures from the CIA World Factbook.

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<sup>27</sup> ECP, Caramés et al., Analysis of DDR programmes existing in the world during 2005, Barcelona, February 2006

Comparison of costs between different DDR operations					
Country	per capita income \$	per capita DDR cost	number of participants	total \$ costs	DDR/PCI
Angola	975	1799	137999	248	1,8
Burundi	83	1000	85000	84,4	12,0
Congo	949	1060	30000	31,8	1,1
DRC	104	1228	150000	200	11,8
Sierra Leone	150	623	72500	45,2	4,2
Liberia	130	1550	107000	160	11,9
20 ops avg+tot	361	1686	1129000	1900,4	4,7

In Liberia the cost of DDR (including PK costs) is 12 times the per capita income, as compared with an average of 4.7 for 20 DDR operations. It has also the single highest troops presence of all DDR operations, with a ratio of 0,5% as compared to an average of 0,04%, as per details hereunder :

Comparison between DDR operations			(US\$ mio) budget	(US\$ mio) GDP	% budget to GDP	pop. Figures from CIA factbook	
country	Name	troops				population	troop/population
Burundi	ONUB	5650	307	600	51,2%	8090000	0,07%
Côte d'Ivoire	UNOCI	7558	386	13700	2,8%	17654000	0,04%
Eritrea	UNMEE	3622	186	800	23,3%	4787000	0,08%
Liberia	UNMIL	16000	846	448	188,8%	3042000	0,53%
DR Congo	MONUC	16200	403	5700	7,1%	62660000	0,03%
Sierra Leone	UNASMIL	1711	373	800	46,6%	6005000	0,03%
Sudan	UNMIS	6385	969	19500	5,0%	41236000	0,02%
<i>total and averages</i>		57126	3470	41548	8,4%	143474000	0,04%

In terms of resource management there are two additional points which need to be mentioned :

- Continued commitment from UNDP to keep the JIU P&P advisor to ensure continuation and coherence throughout the process, when most other actors have left or changed (e.g. UNMIL, NCDDRR);
- DEX proved to be very useful and efficient in the DD phase, particularly in support of some of the constraints and limitations encountered by the UNMIL DD. However in the reintegration phase it is obtaining mixed results, as there are some issues (timely and regular payment of stipends, timely and regular supply of toolkits) which are negatively impacting on the DDRP and constitute unnecessary security risks. As mentioned before some of the delays are also due to IPs not respecting the UNDP regulations, so that timeliness for delivery of payment or toolkits is a mixed responsibility.

### 3. Operational efficiency

#### Programme design

As regards to the DDRP, the first "R" standing for Rehabilitation was not programmed as a component of the overall process, except for CAFF, although some partners did include "rehabilitation" components in their project proposals. Rehabilitation, along with other key terms, was not defined by the programme.

### Information

Information regarding the reintegration programmes beyond the DD phase was not widely disseminated. Therefore some groups, such as women, had limited access to reintegration programme information.

### Programme structure

The opening of the five field offices as foreseen in the SF came much later than anticipated and negatively affected the programme's capacity to track participants and monitor results.

The programme structure, with a sharing of responsibilities between JIU for programming and policy and the UNDP DEX service centre for procurement, finance and administration, obtained mixed results

### M&E

Closer monitoring of implementing partners is necessary to ensure delivery of benefits in a timely manner. Monitoring started late and insufficient resources were placed and available to ensure close monitoring of reintegration projects. The evaluation received claims (from NCDDRR) that attendance criteria were not being implemented strictly. The MIS put in place in the M&E unit to track programme participants is very efficient, but it needs to be replicated at field level with a decentralised, albeit limited, database information to be used as a tool for the different field offices. In the absence of cost information the evaluation cannot judge whether the MIS is cost efficient or not.

### Overall

From a planning perspective, the uncontrolled increase in the caseload from the initial 38,000 to over 100,000 does not appear as an example of efficiency.

From a positive perspective, however, the programme has shown its ability to adapt and respond flexibly to changing requirements and conditions as a result of the political decision making, amongst which the unexplained increase in the caseload.

### **Effectiveness**

The original programme framework was as follows :

<i>Intervention Logic</i>	<i>Indicators</i>
<b>Overall Objectives</b> <i>To contribute to the consolidation of peace, national security, reconciliation and development through the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society.</i>	<i>Three years after demobilisation, 35, 000 Ex-combatants settle in their communities and the majority participate in civil society and engage in economic activities along with other groups and do not pose threat to national security</i>
<b>Project Goals</b> <i>To facilitate an environment where ex-combatants are able to be disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated into communities of choice and have access to social and economic reintegration opportunities.</i>	<i>Three years after demobilisation sufficient numbers of ex-combatants are economically active or are engaged in subsistence activities and the majority have settled in their communities of choice</i>

<i>Intervention Logic</i>	<i>Indicative activities</i>	<i>Indicators</i>
<b>Result One</b> <i>Combatants are disarmed and weapons are disposed of</i>	<i>Carry out a national information and campaign</i>	<i>Ex-combatants and the population at large are aware of the DDRR processes</i>
	<i>Combatants hand their weapons in at cantonments for storage and subsequent</i>	<i>The disarmament of combatants contributes effectively to an improvement</i>
	<i>Collect, disable, store and destroy all weapons and munitions handed in</i>	
	<i>Register, verify and report on the equipment disposal process</i>	
<b>Result Two</b> <i>Combatants are registered and verified for participation in DDRR</i>	<i>Register and certify the eligibility of participants for the programme</i>	<i>Ex-combatants use their personal identity card to access reintegration services provided by NCDRR and their progress is able to be tracked</i>
	<i>Issue eligible participants with personal identification card</i>	<i>Socio-economic data collected is used to design effective reintegration interventions</i>
	<i>Collect socio-economic data as part of the registration process</i>	
	<i>Carry out medical checks</i>	<i>Ex-combatants are aware of their health profile</i>
<b>Result Three</b> <i>Ex-combatants return to their areas of choice and are provided with a means for immediate subsistence</i>	<i>food and medical services</i>	<i>preference</i>
	<i>Provide ex-combatants with pre-discharge orientation services</i>	<i>Ex-combatants are aware of the reintegration opportunities available to them and have reasonable expectations for the immediate</i>
	<i>Provide ex-combatants with part of reinsertion safety net allowance</i>	<i>Ex-combatants are able to subsist in the immediate future</i>
	<i>Provide ex-combatant with transportation support to their destinations of choice</i>	<i>Ex-combatants arrive in their areas of choice</i>
<b>Result Four</b> <i>Ex-combatants are received into and contribute to the development of their communities</i>	<i>Initiate measures of reconciliation with the participation of ex-combatants and community members.</i>	<i>Ex-combatants are socially reintegrated and participate in community social and traditional events</i>
	<i>Promote ceremonial and traditional rites activities in support of reconciliation and</i>	<i>Ex-combatants are accepted as active members of their communities</i>
	<i>Promote measures at the communities with a mix of ex-combatants and community members</i>	<i>Ex-combatants extend their social network beyond their ex-military circle and improve their perception of personal security</i>
	<i>Promote civic education with the participation of the ex-combatants and community members</i>	<i>Rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants / contributes to national reconciliation and conflict prevention</i>
<b>Result Five</b> <i>Ex-combatants are able to engage in economic activities</i>	<i>Promote traditional mechanisms for dispute resolution</i>	<i>Social tension and conflict between ex-combatants and their communities</i>
	<i>Ex-combatants are provided with opportunities to access market related basic skills training</i>	<i>The majority of ex-combatants are economically reintegrated</i> <i>Ex-combatants access opportunities generated</i>
	<i>Ex-combatants are provided with opportunities to access apprenticeship schemes</i>	
	<i>Ex-combatants are provided with opportunities to access further education</i>	
	<i>Ex-combatants are provided with opportunities to access credit/grants and skills for micro-business</i>	
	<i>Ex-combatants are provided with opportunities to access opportunities in public and community based development projects</i>	
<i>Vulnerable groupings are provided with opportunities to access tailored programmes for economic participation</i>		

The programme went through a series of difficulties and tense situations. Riots and/or lock-ins of UN or IP staff by programme participants had occurred in most of the places visited by the evaluation team, as a manner to present claims to UN or IPs for services and goods not delivered on timely basis. Even in Monrovia one riot took place at an IP site (ADA) during the evaluation.

The most difficult situation was the Camp Schieffelin riots on 8-9 December 2003 which marked the start of the DDR and left nine people dead.

As such there are a number of events which militate against a good level of effectiveness. The difficult relationship between the different programme members (NCDDRR, UNMIL, UNDP/JI) given personalities, styles and conflicting agendas did not contribute to good coordination, which would have enhanced effectiveness in programme implementation.

Form the initial programme framework, results one to three were largely met with various degrees of effectiveness. Result four was essentially lost in the process and was not achieved. Result five was largely achieved, except for the vulnerable group component (women, disabled, elderly) for which no specific component was implemented.

Nonetheless, from a general perspective, and considering :

- political decision making not supported by programming;
- pressured time-frame;
- absence of an overall framework for recovery;
- no direct ownership from NCDDRR;
- a factional transitional government;
- difficult security situation in some parts of the country;
- initial trickling of donor contributions to the DDR process;
- inflation of the caseload almost three-fold
- current social and economic conditions in the country after 14 years of war and sanctions,

the evaluation mission considers that the DRRP has performed to satisfactory levels of implementation towards its immediate objective, which is to contribute to the consolidation of national security, notwithstanding a number of weaknesses and shortfalls.

## **Impact**

The DRRP has already created a number of impacts, which can be divided into two categories : positive and negative.

### *Positive impacts*

There is a diminishing level of violence involving firearms as supported by the trauma statistics.

The DRRP has provided participants with some degree of reintegration opportunities. Most reintegration projects (vocational skills training and agricultural projects) have been designed to provide economic reintegration of participants, while formal education projects allow for some degree of social reintegration of programme participants. Nonetheless neither of the two components can provide by itself sustainable reintegration over the long-term, as linkages need to be made with a national recovery framework into which DRRP should exit.

The DDRP has contributed to community returns, and especially for CAFF, through family reunification, and has further contributed to social reintegration of DDRP participants.

The monetary input from the DDRP has generated a positive impact on local economies, and some of the participants have used the TSA payment to set up their own business (Tubmanburg, Zwedru). But the mission could not quantify this and is therefore mentioning it as anecdotal evidence.

#### *Negative impacts*

The DDRP was perceived as a weapons buy-back programme, especially after Camp Schieffelin. Some of the material produced as part of the dissemination and information campaign (T-shirt with a gun and money) contributed to reinforcing that perception.

The communities were not included in the process and felt marginalised, especially as they bear the weight of the reconciliation and reintegration of DDRP participants. The evaluation team received claims that communities are also somewhat resentful that the DDRP “rewards killers” in the word of one community member. However given time and resources the evaluation team was unable to substantiate this perception over a large number.

The DDRP had insufficient geographical presence to ensure an entirely comprehensive coverage. Coupled with a DD phase during the rainy season, which limited mobility and the limited length of the DD phase in some parts of the country, there is a risk that in some of the remote areas there may have been a degree of exclusion from the programme.

### **Gender**

Gender was an issue which was not adequately covered and women were marginalised in the process. While CAFF were protected and looked after by UNICEF and its partners, women, according to the SF, were supposed to have a comprehensive programme answering their specific needs. However no agency took up this challenge. As a result women were largely treated as adult men during the process, with two exceptions : separate quarters were prepared at cantonment sites, together with CAFF, and some specific gender projects were undertaken (e.g. UNFPA). But women (especially non-fighting) had more difficulties being screened and admitted into the programme, and there was no network of partners working around the women’s issue or their social reintegration in civil society as for children. As a result, adult women have been largely overlooked as a group needing specialised attention and appears as one of the major programme’s weaknesses.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Comment from UNICEF: “Contrary to what the report says about catering for the needs of women associated with fighting forces during the DD process, UNFPA (who even brought in a specialist from Burundi) was assisted by IRC, UNICEF and UNMIL Gender Section to advocate and to lobby for special attention to women during the disarmament and demobilization process. These agencies actively participated in the Technical Coordination Committee meetings and articulated the needs and rights of women during the DD phase. What is true is that there was not the same proactive network of partners working for the women during the reintegration phase.”

## **Sustainability**

DDR programmes are not meant to be sustainable, and are necessarily time-bound. It is the process of reintegration (social and economic) that must be sustainable. Most IPs developed a project in response to the DDRRP, and therefore without considering the longer-term implications of sustainable reintegration. Sustainable reintegration requires an overall national recovery/development framework to guide its exit strategy and affirm government ownership, something which had been lacking during the whole DDR process given the interim nature of the transitional government and the fact that the democratically elected government has just recently taken charge of the country<sup>29</sup>. This framework is necessary so that both the DDRRP and IPs projects are able to merge into this framework.

The DDRRP is lacking an exit strategy that must be developed immediately taking into consideration the change process within NCDDRR and UNMIL RRR. Capacity transfer from JIU to NCDDRR should start immediately and a transition plan should be jointly prepared, shared and approved by stakeholders.

## **V. LESSONS LEARNED**

DDRRP are political in nature. But it is important to be informed by technical preparedness in order to minimise the security risks linked to the process and the setbacks that they can create. Therefore the political decision making process, based on competing political agendas, should strive to be supported by technical preparedness. Camp Schieffelin could potentially have derailed the DDR process, and all actors undertook great efforts to ensure that this would not happen.

It is always difficult to work with an interim government, but it is better to have an inclusive and collaborative approach, rather than to leave the transitional government on the side-line, even if said government does have leadership and credibility problems. Greater involvement of the NCDDRR in the DDRRP would have been possible and could have contributed to a smoother DD phase, particularly for keeping the caseload within a reasonable figure and screening of legitimate participants with the support of the different commanders.

A clear and unambiguous sensitisation campaign on the programme including eligibility criteria and programme benefits has to reach all participants before the programme is launched.

Commanders should be given a specific attention in a DDR process, through an inclusive strategy that allows to use their knowledge and skills for screening and bringing all participants into the programme, and giving commanders some incentive for cooperation within the process. At the same time and in order to break the chain of command, separate reintegration schemes can be devised for commanders (such as in Sierra Leone were some commanders were given scholarships or placed in jobs away from areas where they had influence).

Engagement of programme participants in reintegration activities appears to be a strong factor in limiting the continued contacts with their ex-commanders. On the other hand, confusions and dissatisfactions with reintegration programs tend to provide an opportunity for commanders to take the role of mediators between program participants and reintegration service providers.

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<sup>29</sup> Under the SF point 2.7 assumptions point v such a framework was announced to be in the making, although the evaluation team was not able to find any copy of such document.

Programme fragmentation is not conducive to an integrated approach and a holistic response. Even within the reintegration component, fragmentation induced by different partners under different standards and requirements (EC and USAID) has had negative impact on the programme.<sup>30</sup> JIU, as a Joint Implementation Unit, was supposed to reflect synergies between the three constituents (NCDDRR, UNMIL and UNDP). However in practice, actual decision making between the three constituencies and the JIU proved to be less than optimal, as the JIU was tasked with responsibilities for which it was not designed, such as the coordination of parallel programmes. It is unfair to expect the JIU with its resources to address the lack of a national recovery framework, especially given that such a framework was a pre-condition for the DDRRP.

The National Commission (NCDDRR) must be mandated for the overall coordination, monitoring and evaluation of all DDRRP projects. The absence of an overall M&E mechanism has led to inefficient monitoring of the projects and a lack of coordination and synergies between the different actors (UNDP TF, EC, USAID).

In regards to the DDRRP SF, three lessons must be extracted:

- 1) if the assumptions are not correct, pre-conditions are not met, and the situation changes, a revised framework must be developed to incorporate changes and plan under the different conditions (something the DDRRP did not do);
- 2) A clear definition of all key terms, particularly programme objectives, must be provided and agreed upon by all actors, to avoid individual interpretations and sometimes conflicting agendas as well as facilitate monitoring and evaluation of the programme;
- 3) M&E must be a management function, streamlined into RBM practices. As such the SF must determine clear benchmarks and indicators for success. An external evaluation is not merely a compliance exercise, it must bring added value to the programme and major stakeholders and as such must be carefully planned for in the SF.

## **VI. CONCLUSION**

The evaluation hypothesis of a fractioned DDR rather than an integrated and streamlined process proved to be correct. The integration and coordination mechanisms did not provide the necessary coherence for an integrated process. Fragmentation was damaging both between the DD and RR phases of the programme, and in the reintegration component by having different programmes (UNDP TF and parallel programmes financed by the EC and USAID) fund specific projects under different standards and requirements.

The political requirements drove the DDR process against the technical and operational realities leading to the Camp Scheffelin incident and challenging the technical work that had been prepared.

However, despite the lack of an integrated approach, the programme proved to have performed satisfactorily in regards to its immediate objective of consolidating national security.

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<sup>30</sup> Comment from JIU: "Program fragmentation became inevitable in the absence of a strong national institution to coordinate the implementation of the program in demonstration of national ownership. The absence of such institution during the transition period made the coordination of parallel programs difficult."

The DDR process was the most inclusive to date, allowing non-fighting groups to register, and applying the Cape Town Principles as eligibility criteria for screening. However its openness was widely abused, leading to a substantial increase in the caseload.

Regarding the weapons collection, despite and beyond the low figures, the disarmament process visibly contributed to peace consolidation and security. Demobilisation, however, did not play its original role of screening potential participant to the programme.

Reintegration has both a social and economic dimension. In the absence of a national recovery framework, the DDRP contributed partially to reintegration but it is too early to appraise sustainability of economic reintegration.

Community reintegration and reconciliation mechanisms have played an important role although they were not directly supported by programme activities.

Recent changes within the NCDDRR leadership resulting from the democratically elected government should lead to a necessary hand-over of part of the programme to enhance and affirm government ownership and leadership.

## **VII. RECOMMENDATIONS**

At the policy level :

1. There is an urgent need to define the areas of competence of NCDDRR, JIU/UNDP DDRR, UNMIL RRR. The internal review of NCDDRR together with the external mid-term evaluation of the DDRP should be urgently completed with a review of each stakeholder's area of responsibility, and particularly that of UNMIL RRR in relation to the changes in NCDDRR and JIU/UNDP. A specific mission from Senior Management of UNMIL, NCDDRR, UNDP and UNICEF should be fielded to identify the possible exit strategy of the DDRP into the wider recovery framework (which is still not fully developed), address the issue of the DDRP's continuation and re-focusing of the implementation mode (and consider including a participation from communities instead of only targeting programme participants, as suggested under point 2. of operational level recommendations).
2. The transfer of responsibilities to NCDDRR from the JIU must be reflected in policy decisions and a transition plan must be prepared and validated by the stakeholders.
3. The ownership and the future of the database needs to be determined, as this raises of number of issues regarding confidentiality and protection of participants.

At the operational level

1. Division of labour between NCDDRR, JIU/UNDP DDRR, UNMIL RRR at field level must be clarified and the work of field offices streamlined. Efficient coordination mechanisms must be set up at local level to assure better cooperation and synergies between the different actors. A critical review of the number and size of field offices must be undertaken, considering the outstanding needs;
2. The remaining reintegration programme should study a possible broadening of its participants category, considering the current programme's under subscription, to include a percentage of community members. These should be identified by the communities themselves through traditional community mechanisms and a list of eligible participants should be posted publicly, with special attention to other war affected groups within the community. In addition,

- programs for persons with disabilities must also be designed to cater for their reintegration needs.
3. The skills training component in Maryland (and possibly other parts of the south) has not yet started, and should do so immediately, as there have been reports of disgruntled participants and a plea from local authorities to ensure that the programme will soon start, providing a necessary security buffer to the county.
  4. It is necessary to increase outreach programmes based on the capacity of the field offices and identify partners that can reach participants in remote areas.
  5. A limited database should urgently be developed for field offices, with the necessary internet connection and facilities, to ensure efficient monitoring and supervision of the programme.
  6. All monitoring and evaluation responsibility should be transferred to NCDDRR, including DDRRP, parallel programmes and UNICEF projects, to ensure that there is one overall coordinator for all DDR programmes.
  7. NCDDRR should further be able to provide referral and counselling services to DDRRP participants, and their field offices capacity should also reflect this need.
  8. There is an urgent need to strengthen and develop business skills as a transversal issue in all skills training to improve sustainability of the skills acquired by participants.
  9. There is also a need to support necessary conflict transformation outreach programmes at community level as a transversal issue, in conjunction with other programmes where possible.
  10. This should be coupled with a redefinition of the sensitisation campaign at community level, and particularly tackle the issue of perceived inequity by the programme.
  11. Some mechanisms should be installed in order to ensure local and decentralised ownership of the programme.
  12. District Development Committees (DDC) appear to be a good structure for absorbing participants after training. A clear inter-phase of CBR with the DDRRP should be ensured wherever possible;
  13. Special attention to the time payment of stipends and provision of toolkits must be ensured to avoid security problems.

At the overall strategic level, NCDDRR has a difficult role to play, as its new leadership must simultaneously address very different issues :

- Role of the NCDDRR in the remaining life cycle of the DDRRP;
- Role of the NCDDRR in relation to the other parallel programmes;
- Role of the NCDDRR in relation to the UNICEF child projects;
- Role of the NCDDRR after the completion of the DDRRP and other projects.

It is recommended that after 2007 the NCDDRR change its name and structure. In line with the President's position, the evaluation believes that the best possible result of NCDDRR's work is that ex-combatants cease to be an issue, and become a part of the community life through community-based initiatives. Therefore the programmatic focus should in 2007 shift to the communities rather continuing targeted individual support. However this requires a national recovery framework that will certainly exist soon as it is currently being developed.

- To ensure this multiple transition NCDDRR should also plan its exit strategy beyond 2007, along with the corresponding exit strategy of UNMIL's RRR.

In order to follow up on recommendations and suggested improvements contained in this report, the evaluation team recommends the creation of a task force from senior managers of the primary stakeholders (NCDDRR, UNMIL, UNDP, UNICEF and possibly donors) to oversee the change and improvement process of the DDRRP, as a sort of “evaluation management committee”, something that did not exist in the evaluation design and TOR.