

Report of the Evaluation of DDR and CIP in AFGHANISTAN

*Qatra Qatra darya meshad –
One drop at a time makes a river -
Collecting one gun
at a time makes peace -*

EXTRACT *nine pages from the Report*



KABUL, 6th September 2007

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Report of the Evaluation of DDR and CIP in AFGHANISTAN

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THE FULL REPORT CONSISTS OF FIVE PARTS:

PART 1: Summary Report

PART 2: Lessons and Recommendations

PART 3: Commander Incentives Programme

PART 4: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

PART 5: Annexes

Abstract

Between 2003 and 2006 the UNDP and UNAMA assisted the Government of Afghanistan to organise the down-sizing and disarmament of Afghan Military Forces. Generous support from a number of donors, led by Japan, funded the Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) created for this purpose, leading to more than 63,000 ex-combatants being disarmed and demobilized and more than 106,000 weapons collected by 30 August 2007. An external evaluation of the DDR and CIP components of ANBP was desired by all stakeholders, to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the DDR, to identify its impacts, and to draw lessons from the Afghan experience that can be useful to other disarmament programmes. This is the evaluation report prepared by a team of four independent specialists.

This document is only a short EXTRACT of the full evaluation report that is available from UNDP Kabul

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Evaluation Team was requested to evaluate the DDR and CIP components of the Afghan New Beginnings Project, to analyze the direct and indirect impacts of the programme, and draw Lessons Learned, and to make recommendations to the Government of Afghanistan, UNDP and the donor working group concerning future policies and strategies in support of ANBP's objectives.

We identify eight different components inside the ANBP. The 'Ammo Project' and 'DIAG' were accorded separate project status, but they could have been integral parts of a six-year DDR programme. Likewise the Heavy Weapons Cantonment could have been a separate project, but wasn't. Reintegration is so complex that could have been broken down functionally into a number of different units. This raises structural DDR management issues we address in the Lessons Learned.

We find that the Disarmament & Reintegration Commission Chaired by Vice-President Khalili (with Minister Stanekzai as Vice-Chairman) is the appropriate high-level mechanism for coordinating inter-ministerial actions and the Afghan government's partnership with UNAMA and UNDP in the delicate security sector. We recommend that the mandate of the D&R Commission should be extended to cover destruction of surplus weapons and ammunitions and explosives, and that this activity should receive continued UNAMA and UNDP support for three more years.

We find that the original three-year mandate of ANBP was too short, and its work is incomplete due to this programme design error. Donors were generous and far-sighted in their support of ANBP: funding was adequate and flexible, and funds arrived early enough for project activities to work smoothly. Yet all donors recognize that the work is not complete. We recommend that the Ammo and DIAG projects should not be handed over to the GoA in 2008. On the contrary, **we recommend that UNAMA and UNDP should continue to support the government in managing these projects, assuring international standards and recognition for a further three years.**

We recognize the extreme sensitivity of weapon policy and weapon ownership issues in Afghanistan. Afghans have an historical relationship with firearms that borders on the romantic, and Afghans are sensitive to the fact that the millions of small arms and munitions in the country have cost it dear in money and in blood. Nevertheless some dramatic symbol is needed from the nation's political leaders, to show Afghans and the world that the legacy of war is broken and the flow of weapons must be stopped.

We recommend that the emotional dependency of the Afghan nation on firearms should be challenged in a dramatic way with a major, public and symbolic destruction of soviet era surplus weapons that tells Afghans, 'We must put the rule of firearms behind us.' This weapon destruction ceremony should take place on 9th July 2008 (UN International Weapon Destruction Day). A documentary film should be made of the ceremony and widely broadcast. President Karzai should describe and

highlight this dramatic event – and Afghanistan’s destruction of its mine stockpiles - in a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2008. We believe this will radically change international and domestic perceptions of Afghanistan’s progress towards peace.

Disarmament is first and foremost a political activity, and its success should be judged by political factors. We find that the ANBP disarmament project – and specifically through its DDR and CIP components – has made a significant contribution towards promoting peace and bringing stability in Afghanistan.

Overall we are very favourably impressed with the management, results and impacts of ANBP. The collection of light and heavy weapons changed the level and nature of potential violence in Afghanistan and brought commanders into the political and electoral processes. Downsizing the armed forces, and the defence budget, paved the way for creating a new national army. DDR has been the most successful aspect of Afghanistan’s security sector reform. The CIP created significant peace building and reconciliation initiatives, while helping to buy time for a democratic political process to develop. The destruction of weapons, ammunition and stockpiles of anti-personnel landmines has brought very significant benefits to Afghanistan, although these achievements are not sufficiently recognized at home or overseas. We recommend that the Government of Afghanistan should make more noise about these achievements.

ANBP created an excellent, committed Afghan staff whose competence is a national asset. ANBP missed opportunities with demobilization and reintegration, and we recommend that UNDP should pursue post-integration activities for three more years through the NSP, the RSPE, and the NABDP. We recommend that eight ANBP regional offices should be maintained to support the ongoing Ammo, DIAG and post-reintegration projects, and that other UN projects should use these offices for greater decentralization, for national capacity building, and to obtain development impact in the provinces.

The table below indicates the number of XCs put through various processes and the number of weapons collected by DDR and DIAG at end August 2007:

Disarmament	Demobilization	Reintegration
63,380	62,376	53,145
Light Weapons handed to MoD	Heavy Weapons collected for MoD	
38,099	12,248	
Total weapons destroyed	Total weapons collected	
56,163	106,510	
Total Ammunition destroyed	Total anti-personnel and landmines destroyed	
15,833 tons	512,845 pieces	

The disarmament and demobilization phases came to an end in November 2005, with the last AMF members officially handing their weapons over to President Karzai in a ceremony held in Kabul. The reintegration phase of DDR officially ended on 30th June 2006, when the DDR mandate came to an end. The DIAG and Ammo projects continue.



Strategic Lessons Learned

1. *The UNAMA-UNDP partnership worked very well*

ANBP benefited from a well-coordinated partnership between the development and peacekeeping departments of the UN. UNAMA provided political guidance at critical junctures (such as heavy weapons cantonment) and UNDP provided efficient field support for implementation. This combination between UNDPKO and UNDP has worked before; it worked well in Afghanistan and DDR was a political success.

2. *The D&R Commission Chaired by Vice-Pres Khalili, is an appropriate GoA high-level mechanism for coordinating DDR.*

The D&R Commission was well-composed and well-coordinated. It provides a coherent mechanism for the Afghan government partnership with UNAMA and UNDP in this delicate sector. Such a commission, seated above any individual ministry, has the necessary influence to bring ministries together and to ensure that decisions are implemented. The commission has an important role in bringing the MoD and MoI and

other government entities to devise and coordinate government policies on weapons, ammunition and other security issues.

If the Commission has not always worked as comprehensively as everyone hoped, this is because many of the member ministries are overwhelmed by the multitude of tasks thrown upon them. Partly this is due to the capacity limitations of individual ministries, but also to the fact that multiple donors are thrusting too many tasks at ministers. More decentralization to the provinces by donors, and by the functional ministries themselves, would improve central coordination of policy initiatives including the D&R Commission.

3. Continued support to D&R Commission

As the DDR process was winding down, the BCPR mission recommended in 2006 that UNDP should “engage with the GoA in order to revisit the ToRs of the Commission. The ToRs should include new responsibilities in line with its role in implementation and policy making on the DIAG project. Its membership should also be reviewed to reflect this new role.”

The evaluators find that the D&R Commission will need – and should receive - continued support from the GoA and the UN for its supervision of the DIAG and other security issues. The UN should continue to ensure international standards and recognition, and to support consolidation of the disarmament and reintegration process over at least the next three years. We find that pulling out UN support too early carries the risk of losing the positive results and diminishing the positive impacts already achieved.

Recommendation to GoA

The evaluators recommend that the role of the D&R Commission should be strengthened and its mandate extended to provide technical and political supervision of the Ammo Project and Mine destruction in the MoD in addition to the DIAG project. We further recommend that the D&R Commission should receive a mandate from the President to ensure that all surplus weapons, ammunition and explosives will be destroyed as they become surplus to need.

Recommendation to UNAMA and UNDP

The evaluators recommend that the DIAG and Ammo projects should not be handed over to GoA at present and that further, appropriate support should be extended to the D&R Commission to supervise these projects for at least three years.

4. Threat of exports of arms and ammunition from Afghanistan

Experience in countries across the world shows that surplus stocks in official military or police armouries that are not destroyed, inevitably leak into the criminal market or are sold - legally or illegally – on the world market. Afghanistan has become the region’s

largest reservoir of small arms and ammunition. The numbers of weapons and munitions surplus-to-usage will increase significantly, as the ANA and ANP receive NATO standard weapons and equipment beginning in 2007. The Deputy Minister of Defence has stated to the evaluators that he wishes all surplus arms and ammunition to be destroyed.

Recommendation to GoA

The evaluators recommend that a major destruction ceremony of soviet era surplus weapons should be organized on 9th July 2008 (UN International Weapon Destruction Day) – in view of impending change over of ANA and ANP to NATO standard weapons. We recognize that destroying weapons is a sensitive – even emotional – issue in Afghanistan, but the political value of such a ceremony far outweighs the monetary value of ageing surplus weapons.¹

A documentary film should be made of the event for television broadcasting worldwide. President Karzai should present the world-premiere of the film and announce the destruction during a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2008.

Recommendation to NATO and the international community

The evaluators recommend to NATO and to donors that they should continue to support large-scale destruction of weapons and explosives by GoA. Unless the international community engages with the GoA on this issue, and implements a complete inventory and destruction programme, Afghan SALW and explosive stocks will remain a source of regional instability for years to come.

5. Donors established a partnership for success with GoA

The financial commitment of GoA and donors was largely responsible for this disarmament success. As BCPR noted, “Unlike other DDR programmes that have suffered because of partial funding for different components of the process, the upfront dedication of donors allowed the GoA and its partners to plan and implement from the outset a coherent and comprehensive DDR programme. The success of DDR programmes is often dependent on this critical element. In Afghanistan, thanks to the commitment of the stakeholders, and principally of the donors, this shortfall was avoided.”

¹ “A recent poll carried out by the Afghan Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium reveals that two-thirds of Afghans think that disarmament is the single most important path to security. In fact, Afghanistan's famous gun culture is motivated as much by fear as by cultural norms. From Kabul to Kandahar, people are not willing to surrender their weapons if they feel vulnerable to criminals, warlords, or Taliban insurgents.” Quoted from the article “**Afghan 'gun culture' is fuelled by fear**” by Mark Sedra and Robert Muggah, *Ottawa Citizen*, Thursday, 6 September 2007

6. *Disarmament was innovative, efficient and successful*

ANBP excelled at implementation, under UNAMA political guidance and UNDP management. Micro-disarmament arrangements benefited from military planning and precision that were generally admired. Organizing Mobile Disarmament Units supported by a national computer system carried into the middle of the Hindu Kush mountains on the backs of trucks - producing an apparently accurate database covering more than 63,000 XCs checked in detail by Regional Verification Committees – and bringing back safely 94,262 SALW was a triumph of ingenuity and implementation.

Cantonment of 12,248 heavy weapons took place between January 2004 and October 2005, and was officially completed February 2006. Observers agree that the HWC changed the balance and level of potential violence in Afghanistan and created the conditions for political dialogue. This was a remarkable triumph for UNAMA and ANBP, for the GoA and for international cooperation which – for once – was quick, focused and effective.

7. *Demobilization was very efficient, not quite so effective*

Demobilization very efficiently entered 62,376 XCs into a national database, provided them with instant photo IDs and passed them through to the reintegration training stage. Normally demobilization leads into reinsertion activities that include health checks and treatments (which ANBP neglected), training in civic education and human rights, literacy and numeracy. Participative teaching methodologies encourage returning fighters to respect the village hierarchy, eschew domestic violence, protect women and children, understand the rule of law. These are important parts of the interface between military and civilian life, between demobilization and reintegration. They were missing from the ANBP strategy, and that is a pity. We recommend that these aspects should be an important part of each and any future DDR programme.

Recommendation to UN

Demobilization and reinsertion activities – including health, literacy and human rights training - should always be carried out, before the reintegration phase is introduced.

8. *Reintegration needs more time to get sustainable livelihoods*

We find that three years is not long enough. Although the vocational training delivery exercise was efficient and most XCs liked their training, it is not clear how many XCs have been able to establish themselves with ‘sustainable livelihoods’. It is too early to evaluate this. Most XCs and commanders believe they were promised jobs by the government. Some government ministries have been unhelpful giving employment to XCs, despite the best efforts of the ANBP and the D&R Commission.

The reintegration mandate for ANBP was mainly limited to providing training, and this was done (even if some training subjects were questionable and the duration not always adequate). To provide training to 55,000 people and 335 commanders in 18 months

provides further proof of ANBP's excellence in implementation. The mistake lies in designing a DDR project for only three years.

Recommendation to donors and to UNDP and UNDPKO

A DDR programme should never be designed for only three years. If the DD take a year or two, the RRRR will last at least a further four years: making a minimum of six years. Donors must be persuaded to commit to investing in the full peace process, or they may provoke further conflict. Disarmament without successful reintegration and reconciliation does not bring peace.

9. Government cooperation with ANBP

The BCPR mission of 2006 heard complaints from officials that they were 'not engaged in the process from the outset, in terms of consultation in programme design and were subsequently 'out of the loop' during the implementation. While information flows are often complicated to manage, the evaluation team finds that the D&R Commission provided an adequate and effective government coordination mechanism at the formal level. If government officials wanted information, it was there and available and DDR processes were transparent.

We find that the reintegration design process was insufficiently participative, but in general we cannot fault the ANBP staff for forging ahead and getting the programme done - with or without ministry participation. In 2003 most ministries were new and weak, and even today they are overloaded. The fact that Afghanistan had a successful DDR programme was thanks to the fact that the D&R Commission, UNAMA and UNDP pushed ahead to implement the President's policies in the most expeditious manner possible, and using a decentralized implementation strategy.

Recommendation to donors and UN agencies

More decentralized planning and project implementation at the provincial level would reduce the overload on central government ministries, giving them the chance to be more efficient and to focus on national planning, while improving project implementation and developing national capacity in the regions.

10. Who should design a DDR programme and how?

We find that a major weakness of ANBP lies in the original conception, which was carried out by a handful of people (initially just three men) rather than a structured group of experts bringing different skills and experiences to share at the table. Specialized UN agencies, DDR analysts and experienced international NGOs² were not involved, so the

² No DDR programme should be designed without including technical experts from relevant ministries, UNICEF, UNOPS, WHO, WFP, FAO, ILO, IOM and NGOs working in the field. A disarmament researcher from UNIDIR or another security research group should be included, to ensure that lessons are drawn from the analysis of other programmes.

Lessons Learned from other DDR programmes were lost. This, we believe, explains the failure of demobilization to go beyond the purely administrative, the absence of reinsertion activities, the delays in reintegration planning, the failure to create an M&E system, the lack gender awareness in DDR, the forgetting of ammunition, the lack of market surveys for the vocational training programmes, and the three-year design.

Recommendation to donors and to UNDP

Future DDR programmes should begin with inter-agency collaboration, and a group of men and women with multiple skills and experiences. At the same time, strong and dynamic leadership is essential, and DDR leaders should not hesitate to tread on a few toes in order to get disarmament and demobilization done in a timely manner.