

## **Final report**

# **Evaluation of the “Youth at risk project” and some security related components**

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## Executive summary

“Youth for change” is a pilot project implemented in Somalia jointly by UNDP, ILO and UNICEF, in partnership with a large number of local NGOs operating in four complex regions of Somalia. The project has provided specific support to young Somali’s with the aim to decrease insecurity in the targeted regions.

The context of intervention is characterized by differences between targeted regions and the high level of complexity and fluidity in the dynamics of each different regional conflicts. The number of locations targeted has proportionally increased the challenge of implementation.

This project has been designed as a community based approach, developing community inclusiveness and recognizing the specificity of the Somali context and its various layers of conflict.

The evaluation has focused on the “Youth for Change” project but has also reviewed other key interventions and stakeholders linked to this project such as the observatory for crime and victimization prevention (OCVP), the women civilian protection unit (WCPU), and the district peace committee (DPC).

The interpretation of the project has oscillated between reduction of criminality within the community and a disarmament orientated project.

In dealing with a concept close to DRRR, the project should consider that while the recent evolution of the conflict has provided advantages to some belligerents, all layers of the conflict are still active and targeting youth from specific armed groups could be perceived as taking a partial and active role in the conflict. Therefore, the senior management should define specific limits on the project, notably the profile of the youth targeted, and the collaboration with specific entities.

Within a context offering limited opportunities for the youth to access education, employment and income generation, this type of project is perceived as a positive opportunity for youth; and therefore the risks of bias during the selection of the youth should not be underestimated. Pre-selection of the youth should be duly justified against specific indicators and should be subject to validation from Nairobi level.

### Key findings and recommendations

- **The design of the project is coherent with the needs and opportunities in Somalia.** Youth and communities in Somalia are interested in a project supporting young people with basic education, social integration, and income generation capacity. A contributing factor to this is some layers of the conflict are generating youth defectors, and so interventions seeking to provide solutions for young people previously engaged with armed groups are needed.

The design of the project along with interventions such as the District Peace committees (DPC), the Women Civilian Protection Unit (WCPU) and the Observatory of Conflict and Crime Prevention of (OCVP) has begun to contribute to the integration of minorities or marginalized groups, and to a better understanding of the security context.

- **Challenges in project management and coordination have been the main concern reported by all actors of the project.** The management of the project faces numerous challenges such as the high number of actors involved on the project, the challenges of distance management, the sensitivity of the subject addressed, and the complex and specific environment of each of the four locations targeted by the project.
- **The system for data collection the project is properly structured but is not in used.** While the monitoring system is properly designed, most of the key data is not entered and therefore the management of the project has been not implemented with timely access to monitoring information. For example, while the OCVP has produced detailed and valuable crime and victimization surveys (CVS) for each of the four locations targeted by the project, these surveys have not been used as baselines to measure specific impact of the Y4C project for each of the region targeted. The DREAM software database registering young people is set up, but more information should be added to the system. The data collected on the project at RPC, WCPU, and the district peace committees is not sufficient to be used to measure any impact of the project at youth or contextual level.
- **The monitoring structure of the project does not include clear indicators. This has impacted not only on the ability to monitor the project,** but has also contributed challenges in the management and coordination of the project. The project should use very specific objectives and indicators per region and

the profile of the youth accessing the RPC should be linked to these objectives. A validation process of the selection of the youth should be set up through the monitoring system to ensure that the risk of bias in the selection process is appropriately mitigated and with Nairobi management involved in the validation process.

- The District Peace Committees are in place and meet regularly and the composition of the DPC is inclusive of different layers of the community including women, youth and minority groups. However, the level of influence of these minorities in the decision making of the DPCs is not known but is not foreseen to be very high. **It is recommended to use a local partner with strong capacity to influence and challenge, when needed, the local authority participating in the DPC.** This partner could also report accurately how minorities actually contribute to the DPC decision making and which issues are not being addressed. **District safety plans should be set up and preconditions to allocating the funds to implement such plans should be controlled by the Nairobi team to increase influence and control of the DPC action plan.** This could also be used to increase integration of the youth involved in the RPC in community work proposed in the DSP.
- **Reintegration of the youth within the community** should be realized by supporting young people, but also by encouraging and strengthening community members capacity and willingness to reintegrate these young people. Reintegration of young people should focus as much on the wider community as specifically on the youth.
- **More profiling data of the youth is needed to better inform, justify, and monitor the decisions made and the impacts of the project on specific groups of youth targeted.** The criteria and justification for the selection of the youth for inclusion in the project has lacked clarity and the level of “at risk” for the youth selected is considered differently between regions but does not follow specific rationale.
- **The impact of the curriculum designed for training of young people is not perceived to be high** as there are major differences in the youth profile and capacity in the project and therefore a standard curriculum has not been suitable for all. The means and equipment deployed at training center have often been minimal and the overall duration of the training such as literacy, numeracy and vocational training has remained relatively short. Given the relatively low learning capacity of these young people targeted by the project, the achievement of the technical training as currently configured may remain modest and is not foreseen to have a significant impact in an environment where the employment market has limited opportunities.
- **The reintegration efforts of the project could be separated** to differentiate between social reintegration and economic reintegration as the incomes generation capacity should not be the sole factor of reintegration within the community.

The rehabilitation and technical training elements of the project were implemented by the project in parallel, increasing the coordination challenges and decreasing the opportunities for the youth most at risk to pass the restrictive selection process of the technical training. This has undermined the ability of the most difficult cases or “at risk” youths to access these trainings and the related exit package. **Separation of the rehabilitation phase from training phase** would decrease the coordination pressure and would increase the efficiency of each phase.

- The impact of the **WCPU is mainly an information system** where specific women’s groups report security issues to the police station within their district. The approach of this specific unit has not been clearly defined and confusion was expressed on the role and the approach to the WCPU. Data has not been recorded accurately enough to estimate impacts of this unit at police intervention level or to help inform a view of the security issues.
- **While the data management of the security report needs to be further developed, the follow up action of the police should also be accurately measured.** It is also recommended to consider moving toward a more comprehensive “neighborhood watch” approach, involving the community as a whole in this process, and for example, to increase the capacity of the community to report information (phone number, SMS etc) to the police. Support to women’s group (SWDC) initially involved on this aspect should be maintained due to the potential and actual impact on women’s empowerment, but the support to SWDCs could be more focused on sexual and gender-based violence.

- **Communication about the project to stakeholders in Somalia** has not been strong or clear enough, resulting in the space for local rumors that contributed to security incidents arising from misperceptions about the project. Given the sensitivity of the subject of the project, the community ownership of the project should be emphasized notably through extensive communication toward the community on the project objective. A feedback loop mechanism could also be set up to increase reassurance and quality of field reports and to provide various channels for the communities (as a whole including beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) to communicate directly with the senior management.

### **Main conclusion**

The project is coherent with the needs and opportunity in Somalia and there is a critical need to propose new opportunities for youth in Somalia especially at a time when the number of youth defectors from armed groups is increasing.

However, the implementation strategy could be defined with more clarity; monitoring and control mechanisms should be strengthened to address the key challenges of implementation; and looking at the problems and solutions through the lens of the wider community and not just the youth at risk may also increase accountability, impact and sustainability. Further measures should also be taken to define the specific objectives of the project in each region.

## Acronyms

AMISOM	African Union Mission In Somalia
BRA	Banadir Regional Administration
CDRD	Community Driven & Recovery Development
CPD	Center for Peace and Democracy
CVS	Crime and victimization survey
DC	District Commissioner
DDG	Danish Demining Group
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DSC	District Safety Committee
DSP	District Safety Plan
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GBV	Gender Based Violence
ICPC	International Center for Prevention of Crime
IDP	Internal Displaced Person
ILO	International Labour Organization
INGO	International Non Governmental Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JCCP	Japan Center for the Crime Prevention
JPLG	UN Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery
KII	Key informant interview
KMC	Kow Foundation Peace
LNGO	Local Non Governmental Organization
MSSP	Mogadishu Security and Stabilization Plan
RPC	Resource Peace Center
RCIED	Remote Controlled Improvised Explosive Device
SEED	Sustainable Employment and Economic Development
SGBV	Sexual Gender Based Violence
SHARDO	Shabelle Relief and Development Organization
SMS	Short message service
SOCDA	Somali Organizations for Community Development Activities
SORSO	Somali Relief Society
SOYDEN	Somali Youth Development Network
SWDC	Somali Women Development Center
TFG	Transitional federal government
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
USAID	US Agency for International Development - USAID
UN	United Nations
WCPU	Women civilian protection unit


## Objectives of the project

The project was designed as a pilot phase to address insecurity in Somalia, linking numerous actors together at the community and aid organizations' level. The project brings together UNDP, ILO, UNICEF, a large number of local NGOs, the local authorities and various key stakeholders of the community. The wide inclusion aspect was a target of the project to provide long term stabilization effect through a community based project.

One of the key objectives of the project was to reach youth 'at risk' of violence at community level. The project also referred to a DDDR concept where armed actors could be demilitarized. The specific indicator the project is "to contain and prevent violent conflict by engaging youth at risk through the creation of employment and livelihood opportunities at the district level" and should be measured, as stated in the project document through three indicators.

### Key partners of the project

UNDP  
UNICEF  
ILO  
OCVP  
HAVOYOACO  
SOYDAVO  
Burao Youth center  
SYS  
SOYO  
KMC  
Bill brooking  
SORSO  
PAS  
DIAL  
SOCDA  
SOYDEN  
CPD  
SWDC  
SHARDO



**1. Number of youth targeted which are not repeated offenders. 2. Security perceptions of the community. 3. Level of violence in targeted district.** Youth and women have been the main target of the project as gun holders, actors of instability or excluded minorities.

The project was designed by UNDP as an alternative to a formal DDDR project which was perceived not to be working in Puntland and Somaliland; and represents a major change in the approach to security management in Somalia. The number of actors, involved in the overall process is remarkable and creates a long chain of command and reporting. The project was implemented in Mogadishu, Galkayo, Bossasso, and Burao.

## Contexts of intervention

### MOGADISHU

Mogadishu is the capital city of Somalia, and there is a perception that whoever controls Mogadishu, controls Somalia. Since the fall of Siad Barre in 1991, Mogadishu has been the epicenter of conflict. Warlordism emerged and has continued to exist in Mogadishu due to this long period of statelessness, and is based on the vibrant economic activities and the high level of insecurity in the capital. Mogadishu is also the location where AMISOM is largely active, and where the successive transitional authorities supported by the international community have attempted to emerge as a national authority.

While the city is an epicenter of conflict where the vast majority of parties at war in Somalia are active, it is also a hub for internally displaced persons (IDPs) as access to relief support is higher therein. There is population movement within the city, towards or from the outskirts of the city, and notably towards the Afgoye corridor. IDPs do not benefit from strong clan protection mechanisms and are therefore understood to



be more vulnerable. More recently, the dynamics of the conflict in Mogadishu have evolved with the removal of the front line opposing Al Shabaab to AMISOM /TFG in August 2011, and in 2012 a push from AMISOM/TFG towards Afgoye and Lower Shabelle region. While Al Shabaab is still present in the city, their operational and financial capacities are believed to have decreased, and their mode of operation has also evolved towards destabilization rather than control. Their progressive loss of ground has also contributed to an increase in the number of Al Shabaab defections within the community with the potential of reintegration.

The main security incidents reported in Mogadishu are related to terror actions targeting TFG and AMISOM forces through hand grenades, RCIED<sup>1</sup>, suicide bombings...

The prevalence of rape is reported to be very high<sup>2</sup> even if formal figures do not exist, and rape is reported to target displaced persons and residents in an almost equal manner<sup>3</sup>. Possibilities of adaptation of IDPs to the urban settings of Mogadishu is a real challenge, as the level of education of the rural youth, the ability to access employment or undertake small scale businesses, while not being part of the local community is significantly limited. Many youth IDPs or youth excluded from the authority in charge are reported to set up free-lance militias in areas they could control, which increases overall insecurity, and further fragmentation of areas of control from local authorities. The main security incidents reported in Mogadishu are related to assault at home or in the streets<sup>4</sup>, land disputes related to the return process in the city, and high frequency of terrorist style attacks in the city.

## GALKAYO

Mudug Region and Galkayo District in particular have long been considered a hotspot for violent conflict. Dating back to the Italian occupation of the region, clan and resource-based conflicts have routinely occurred in this area due to its diverse clan composition, and strategic importance along key trading routes. Galkayo is a city dividing two regions, two clans, along a line between North and South, referred to as the “green line”. The city is affected by clan tension opposing *Darod–Majerteen* to *Hawye-HaberGedir*. The southern part of the city falls under Galmudug regional administration, while the northern part of the city falls under Puntland authority.

Galkayo is also a hub for IDPs originally from South Central regions. While IDPs have been a vulnerable entity within the context of Galkayo, they are now reported to organize themselves to insure their own protection. The dynamism between the residents and the IDPs is part of a complex relationship, where IDPs would not benefit from local protection, but are employed by the residents and get assistance in case of emergencies. Violence against women is highlighted in the CVS through the reported rates of assault, homicide, sexual violence and kidnapping, though the reporting rates to the police are low.

Property crimes are also prevalent in this region under two forms; house burglaries and street theft, and are linked to organized criminal groups<sup>5</sup>. Galkayo is very close to the piracy areas of Hobyo, and the presence and influence of piracy groups is seen to be high, notably due to the pirates’ financial leverage. The presence and influence of Al Shabaab in these areas is not clear, but rumours suggest that they are close to some piracy groups.

## BOSSASSO

Bossasso District is located to the north of Puntland State of Somalia, and lies within the administrative region of Bari within Puntland region. Puntland is mostly composed of semi-arid land supporting nomadic pastoralists who raise goats, camels and sheep.

According to the CVS, property crime is of concern, with burglaries and theft (36% respectively of property crime) with a tendency to target poorly protected internally displaced person (IDP) shelters, as well as homes deserted during the hot summer months when residents move to cooler areas. In addition, street theft, is perceived as opportunistic, not highly organized and often not associated to specific groups.

People smuggling is a significant issue in Bossasso principally due to the port, as it is the principal jump-off point for aspiring emigrants.

<sup>1</sup> Remote controlled improved explosive device

<sup>2</sup> Interview with SWDC organization in Mogadishu.

<sup>3</sup> Violence in the lives of girls and women in the Somali Republic. UNDP, UNPOS, UN Women. 2012.

<sup>4</sup> Crime and victimization survey

<sup>5</sup> CVS Galkayo

The key security dynamics within the community reported in Bossasso were mainly based on assault faced by women especially within the IDPs settlements, and some form of abuse including assault, sexual violence, domestic abuse, and forced marriage. Remarkably, when clan conflicts occur, they are largely concerned with issues of land and water. There are also a number of unknown killings, reported to be conducted by southerners hiding within the IDPs camps.

## **BURAO**

Burao is Somaliland's second largest city and capital of Togdheer region. In the last decade, the area has experienced rapid rural urban migration as recurrent drought has forced pastoralists to abandon livestock rearing. Population estimates for the district vary widely, but it could hold up to 400,000 people.<sup>10</sup>

Compared to other regions, Burao does not face the same scale of insecurity like Mogadishu, Galkayo or Bossasso. The central location of Burao, between Hargeisa, Berbera, Las Anod, Ethiopia, makes it a commercial crossroads. All clans have links through Burao for trade. Livelihood based on livestock management is prevalent and the increasing impact of drought has accelerated urbanization of the population, thus generating some challenges in terms of adaptation from rural to urban settings.

The key dynamics reported in Burao leading to insecurity are mainly based on unemployment and poverty which challenge the youth's ability to constitute dowry in order to get married, and therefore rape is reported as a coping mechanism to enforce marriage. Migration from rural pastoralism to urban livelihoods has increased pressure on unemployment leading to poverty and potential violence as a means of survival. Khat consumption is high in the Somaliland context and is very often associated with decision making amongst men of status. The cost of khat consumption has been reported by the Burao CVS as a factor of conflict at household level.

## Methodology

The evaluation was undertaken through a desk review, a set of key informant interviews (KIIs) at Nairobi level and in Somalia, some focus group discussions (FGDs) and numerous interviews with youth beneficiaries of the project, and some youth not part of the project. The evaluation was undertaken in four regions targeted by the project. This methodology was designed to support the verification of key findings in the analysis and to better understand the specific impact of the project per region. A team of Somali consultants were deployed in Mogadishu, Galkayo, Bossaso and Burao to conduct the field data collection. Additionally, a team of enumerators were recruited and trained in each location on the templates to be used for the interviews with the youth. 358 interviews were conducted with youth beneficiaries of the project. 150 youth considered 'at risk' but not involved on the project were also interviewed using a different questionnaire to better appreciate the specific impact of the project on the youth. The youth interviewed who were not involved on the project were identified by the youth beneficiaries of the project who were requested to come along with a friend, meeting some criteria of being "at risk".

The evaluation was designed as a review following a pilot phase, in order to integrate some lessons learnt in the succeeding phases. It is not an impact evaluation but one aimed at consolidating the remarks and recommendations from various stakeholders of the project and from the field observations.

Numerous KIIs were conducted at field level with key stakeholders of the project, some key stakeholders part of the community and not involved in the project, and few KIIs were conducted with some actors of violence. The profile of the persons in the KIIs interviewed were defined in advance, but were adjusted based on the availability of the targeted respondents, and the specific locations accessed by the field consultants who were able to secure and conduct specific interviews. Some focus group discussions were also conducted with some specific groups targeted by the project using the same templates of the KIIs to assess the trend of opinion of the group. These FGDs were not intended to focus on counting the number of respondents providing specific answers. The consideration was to follow the perception of the decision making of the group rather than the sum and discrepancy of opinions.

The evaluation focused significantly on the desk review and various KIIs at Nairobi level to understand how the decision making, management, coordination, monitoring and reporting of the project was structured. Given the large number of actors involved on this project, the coordination and the perception on the objective of the project was understood as key aspects to consider during the evaluation of the project. The desk review was mainly based on the documents provided by DFID, UNDP, ILO and UNICEF.

The comparison of findings between regions was not emphasized during the evaluation as each context has its own dynamics, specific impact, context evolution, and specific profile of youth targeted and a specific level of performance reached. A random approach to the selection of the sample group was used in Mogadishu, from the list of beneficiaries. However, the lack of lists of beneficiaries made available to the evaluation team in the three other regions challenged the random selection of beneficiaries decreasing the accuracy of the findings of the evaluation in these regions. In the three regions where lists of beneficiaries were not provided, the evaluators simply requested the ex-staff involved on the project to identify some beneficiaries for the interview. The closure of the centers in three of the four regions, few months before the evaluation presented a constraint in the field data collection in relation to finding people and understanding how the centers were working.

The main focus of the project was on the youth center in Mogadishu but components related to the WCPU and the DPC were also included to provide a better understanding of the overall picture of the project.

## Specificities of the Somali context

The specificity of the Somali context is key in the understanding of how a community based project can operate within this environment, and what leverage and constraints would present opportunities or limits in project implementation.

### Influence of the clan

The importance of the **clan status**, the clan based exclusion factors within the community, the collective clan responsibility, and the high level of influence of clan elders within the Somali society are critical elements to appreciate in project implementation as clan dynamics is a key driver of conflict dynamism in Somalia and Somaliland and does influence the project implementation and targeting.

The level of influence of various clan elders in the strategic decision making process is also determined by the strength of the specific clan, making minority clans much less influential. This is critical at the DPC level where the community is represented in an inclusive manner while members of the DPC represent different strengths and influence capacity.

The status of women and youth within a clan authority dominated by male elders faced key challenges for activities geared towards defending the rights of women such as the WCPU or addressing SGBV.

The Somali society is articulated around strong social links based on Islam and clan division governed by the *Xheer*. Islamic reference is always denoted to as a respected moral code in any Islamic country. Religious leaders are influential and respected people within the Somali society. A Somali interpretation of Sharia law is applied in Somalia and is also linked to the traditional customary law the *Xheer*. The appreciation of the rule governing the clan is therefore essential in the understanding of how the DPC generates is ruled and managed.

**Collective responsibility:** The Somali society is all about clans. Clans are not ethnic groups, but rather understood as extended families with common descendants. Four major clans are found in Somalia. These clans are sub divided into factions (Laf), clans (Jilib or Gembe), lineage (Reer) and families (Qoys). Blood compensation (Diya) is paid at Reer level. In Somalia, the link of each individual to his clan is strong and allegiance to clan is from birth and is indefectible. This point is particularly important as youth getting out of the elder's authority, still engage a sense of common responsibility that elders are accountable for. **A youth killing a prominent elder from another clan, exposes the elders from his own clan to revenge killing or to major diya<sup>6</sup> paying compensation.** Technically, all members of diya paying group have financial interest in controlling all members of their clan, including the youth. The collective responsibility encourages the fact that individuals are not directly accountable for their actions thus increasing a sense of impunity.

Conflicts between clans are managed by clan elders, and are coded as the *Xheer* which is led by jurisprudence principles and is based on the oral memory of all cases opposing each clan of sub/sub clans. As key actors of the conflict, clan elders are able to mobilize clan militias and to fuel the conflict to defend their interests; but are also key in conflict mediation, and clan based traditional law is the basis for negotiated settlements. Any security strategy at community level would therefore include the clan dynamism.

The collective responsibility induces that some families would ask the police to place the youth in jail to neutralize his behavior before his action is engaged on as the family or the clan responsibility. It is interesting to note that the police accept such requests but the detention of minor criminals is critical as they are further excluded from the community and are in close contact with criminality. The role of prison in the Somali judiciary system is challenged by the *Xheer* where the better off families can simply pay compensation on behalf of the perpetrator.

**Exclusion factor:** Leadership of the clan is held exclusively by elderly<sup>7</sup> men. There is no space for women or youth within this form of local authorities. Both youth and women play only an influential role. This situation

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<sup>6</sup>Although Somalis are organised in lineage groups that follow clan and sub clans, the main lineage group for day to day interaction is diya paying group. This is usually a group consisting of approximately 100 men (and their families) that will come together and share out compensation expenses when one of their clan members has committed a crime or has been involved in a dispute. The groups are lead by a group of elders that act as the external link to other diya paying groups when mediation and negotiations take place (Lewis, 1961;2008). *Source: IDLO. Evaluating the effectiveness of the legal empowerment approaches to customary law reform in Somaliland and Puntland. Maria Vargas Simojoki.*

<sup>7</sup> Elders can be remarkably young but are then often supported by wider counsel.

creates a lower status for **women** or **youth** which then implies that issues affecting women and youth have lower importance than issues directly affecting the elderly men or more specifically, the diya paying group. More over, the clan representation at elders' level provides space only for powerful clans and excludes the **minorities**. The DPC is seen to include the whole community, and notably youth, women and minorities but their ability to orientate the decision making process or their ability to engage elders and police officer in addressing SGBV or others minorities specific issues do face challenges related to their status.

- Women as a vulnerable and unprotected victim. Women are regular victims of rape and violence in the Somali context. SWDC NGO in Mogadishu reports an average of 20 cases of raped victims coming to their center each month.

The status of women in the Somali society is perceived to be lower compared to men. Elders are represented by men, women are perceived to be less obedient to clan system as they are mixed between their clan of birth and the clan of their husband.

- Youth exclusion as a new layer of the conflict dynamism. The exclusion of youth<sup>8</sup> from the management of the clan is interesting in light of the conflict opposing clan elders to Al Shabaab. Al Shabaab means "the youth" and is mainly composed of young members. Before the emergence of Al Shabaab, there were no youth as leaders of any faction of armed groups. In fact, this situation is remarkable and the conflict opposing clan elders to Al Shabaab can also be understood as a conflict of generations. By extension, the elders should be understood as the main authority in place amongst the TFG as the rule of 4,5 rules is applied, and refer to clan balance amongst clan representatives which by definition are clan elders. The competition for power between clan elders and Al Shabaab is significant in the rural areas controlled by Al Shabaab as there is a complex competition for power and some sort of support from specific clans. Quite often Al Shabaab representatives in specific locations are chosen from minority clans, (who will not be easily caught in some clan alliance) to challenge the clan system. Marriage by Al Shabaab members originally from minority clans to women from better off clans has also contributed to create some confusion between clan alliance and balance.

This aspect is understood to be essential as the low level of youth implication in politics and decision making in the Somali structure has encouraged the "de socialization" of the youth and therefore contributes to lead youth towards violence.

- Armed Youth representing local authority: Youth have always been part of the conflict in Somalia as the "armed hand" of the elders' groups, militia or warlords. "Clan militias" are composed of youth reporting to elders, and based on the understanding of how elders influence local authorities. These armed youth are therefore indirectly part of the local authorities. Elders have some lists of youth they can mobilize at short notice to defend the interest of the clan. Being on these lists, the youth can be mobilized.
- Minorities are not represented at elders' management level as the clan representation is defined based on the clan power. This is not related to clan consideration as such, but rather as how specific groups can play a significant part of the conflict dynamism. Bantus, which is out of the Somali clanic system, have their place in Hiraan region at the level of negotiations between clans as they are armed. The wealth of each clan or group defines its capacity to get guns and to influence the conflict. Therefore, minorities should be mainly considered as entities not rich enough or powerful enough to play a political role. More over, the principle of reciprocity implies and therefore the poorest clan will not request too high compensation as they would need to be able to pay the same amount, should the position of victim – perpetrator be reversed.

## Minorities

The concept of minorities in a situation where the state is not providing protection to all and where various actors can have their own armed protection mechanisms increases the level of vulnerability of minorities who are targeted as beneficiaries of the project. IDPs are usually poor and from clans not considered powerful and therefore remain a very vulnerable group.

**IDPs** are particularly a vulnerable group within a context of self-protection based on clan mechanism. Mogadishu, Galkayo and Bossasso are hubs for IDPs where the project has been implemented. Within the specific status of IDPs, there are specific constraints and vulnerability levels that are important to appreciate in these contexts.

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<sup>8</sup>"Youth" in Somalia is understood to be up to 35 years old.

### **Population displacement and IDP status**

IDPs are traditionally categorized as people having lower clan protection as they are not in their area of control, are poor and are very often rural populations not adapted to the urban settings where they are seeking protection. To some extent, IDPs remain marginalized and within the violent context are easy targets with limited retaliation and deterrence capacity.

Access to employment is very much related to trust and networks which is supported by the close clan affiliation. Access to employment or integrating some small business is not related to merit, but to connections where IDPs are excluded. IDPs youth do therefore face higher challenges of social and economic integration. The integration or reintegration opportunities and challenges will really depend on each region targeted by the project and the specific profile of each youth.

### **Prevalence of rape and level of impunity**

Women victims of rape do not have many options to report their cases to attain justice. The Xheer mechanism is organized by representation from dominant clans, and therefore there is not much hope for victims from minority clans to expect real justice, yet there is also a high risk of retaliation. In many cases, the coping mechanism used by the survivor is "silence". The subject is also taboo as it could generate social exclusion for the victims. So, the Somali social structure induces high level of impunity about cases of rape.

When cases of rape are addressed by the clan elders, there is a compensation which could be paid by the perpetrators clan to the victim's clan. But there is also a risk for the victims to get married to the perpetrator as part of the clan conflict mediation or social coping mechanism to adapt to the taboo status of survivor. More over youth have also been active in "gang rape" with perpetrators from different clans increasing the complexity for the application of the Xheer and diluting further their individual responsibility.

Police is also strongly influenced by the clan, all over Somalia and Somaliland. However, the police expect elders to handle rape issues, while the clan expects it to be handled by the police. The elders are usually more involved in conflict mediation when there is a case of death. As long as no death has occurred, elders are less engaged.

So, the SGBV is not sufficiently addressed in Somalia and women remain without protection from the local justice mechanisms. The need to address women protection, SGBV prevention and to decrease impunity on perpetrator of SGBV is critical and the project aims at addressing these issues.

### **Role of women in the conflict dynamism**

Women are engaged in conflict at a lower level than men but do represent an important layer of the conflict dynamism. They provide logistical support for the militias (washing clothes, cooking, ...) and have now appeared as Al Shabaab suicide bombers. However, it is not known whether they play a role in Al Shabaab intelligence and information role. Women have also been active in supporting men in responding to conflict. While women are actively involved in the WCPU of the project, they are not represented at the RPC which targets exclusively young male. Integration of women to the RPC could be considered to allow them also access the benefit of the project training and exit packages in order to increase the women's empowerment.

## **Different types of armed groups challenging the concept of central authority**

A monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force (sometimes referred to as the state's monopoly on violence) is the conception of the state expounded by Max Weber in Politics as a vocation. According to Weber, the state is that entity which "*upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.*" In Somalia, there is no monopoly of the legitimate use of force, and the number of armed actors within the community defending their specific interest contributes to challenging the concept of a central authority and therefore introduces the concept of armed communities able to use force and to apply justice as an independent entity for its own interest. This concept is critical in understanding how to engage with which armed group as the conflict dynamism is fragmented in many sub conflicts which are all active and challenges further the traditional approach to DDRR.

As the project had a tendency to incline towards the concept of a DDRR project, the Somali specificity should be appreciated. **Armed groups in Somalia** are not part of formal armed groups as it would be understood in other contexts and the high level of weapons available within the community structure and the various layers

of conflicts within the Somali context induce some key limits in traditional or formal approach to disarmament in Somalia.

This section has been developed as the youth represent a significant proportion of gun holders in various armed groups. The multiple categories of armed groups operating in Somalia reflect various layers of the Somali conflicts and the way each armed group is linked to the community should be a key determinant in defining how targeting specific group would impact on security.

### **Militias**

Militias in Somalia are very active and represent the ability of the civil society to arm itself to defend or protect its own interests. The division of the Somali society, the high level of weapons available, the low level of positive opportunities for youth to get employment, and the weakness of a central authority in South Somalia since 1991, all create conditions favorable to the development of armed militias.

- **Free lance militias**

The free lance militias are understood as small militias, operating out of the major chains of command, and are more the micro militias willing to make money based on their ability to control a territory or a check point. The freelance militias are groups able to develop sufficient control in a very specific area, not challenging enough a larger authority. Not reporting directly to a larger authority, the free lance militias in Mogadishu should be the main target of a "youth at risk" project as the youth engaged in these activities are looking to get some incomes and do represent a challenge, even minor, to the central authority. It is therefore in the interest of the district commissioner to remove the free lance militias to increase its own control over the district.

- **Business militia**

Business militias do represent the protection of a business interest. Historically businessmen were defined a strategy to support specific warlords to defend their interests, but the approach was not conclusive, leading to the set up of independent business militia. *See section on private business for more details.*

- **Clan militia**

Clan militias are youth who have an agreement with elders to be mobilized upon the request of elders to defend the interest of the clan. Given the level of influence of the clan across the Somali society, the clan militias should be understood as part of the local authority even if they represent members of civil society, and are armed to defend interest of very specific groups.

- **TFG militia**

TFG militia are understood to be the militia supporting the TFG and close to the clan of the senior TFG leaders. This type of militias is understood to be, even unofficially, part of the local authority.

During the evaluation with the youth, they mainly refer to these groups of the militias.

## **TERROR GROUPS**

- **AlShabaab**

Al Shabaab ("The youths") was the armed wing of the ICU and was led by Adan Ayrow (HabarGidirAyr). During a conference held in Las Anod in 2003, on the demilitarization of the Salafi movement in Somalia, chaired by Sheikh DahirAweys, a small group of young afghan trained men rejected the proposition made by the salafist elders and subsequently created the Al Shabaab. The leaders were Godane, Ayrow, Robow, AlAfgani<sup>9</sup>. This point is important in the understanding of not only the confrontation and competition between elders and Al Shabaab, but also the relationship with the clan system is articulated on understanding of how Al Shabaab uses the clan system and works against it.

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<sup>9</sup>Source: The Anatomy of Al Shabaab. Abdirahaim "Aynte" Ali.

Al Shabaab also uses women as fighters for suicide bombing purpose, kills Muslims (kaffirs consideration) which further challenges the Somali approach to conflict.

The inclusion or not of ex Al Shabaab members on this project is key as strategically one of the main conflicts in Somalia is opposing TFG/AMISOM to Al Shabaab and some visible gains done by TFG/AMISOM is expected to be consolidated by bringing some stability and by addressing, notably the status of ex Al Shabaab members. However, the Al Shabaab being a terror group, can deploy intense destabilization effects with very limited means and therefore might remain a significant factor of destabilization. Such terror actions have been observed at high scale in Mogadishu with recurrent actions related to assassination (TFG, journalist, ...), RCIED, suicide bombing. Therefore, as the conflict is still on-going between Al Shabaab and the TFG/AMISOM, integrating ex Al Shabaab members in the process would induce some major security implications which should be carefully considered as it would become a key strategic determinant of the overall project

Al Shabaab strategy to attract youth is based on income (approximately 200 USD per month) and phone credit (approximately 100 USD per month).<sup>10</sup> Some intense training and sensitization on radicalization occurs and the phone credit is expected to be used to influence other youth within their community to join Al Shabaab.

The DDDR would be further challenged by the fact that Al Shabaab could be considered as a network and that formal chain of command is not strict. Lots of intelligence work is conducted by Al Shaabab and many youth were actually involved in intelligence work for "Amniyaat" who conducts execution or other armed actions. This brigade is highly feared as they report directly to the top Al Shabaab management and operates out of the control of local influence and local knowledge. They have been also used in killing elders with masked gun men to impact on clan authority and to annihilate clan retaliation process.

Youth known to have been involved with Al Shabaab do face the challenge of integration in the community as in some cases they are still perceived as dangerous by the community, and it does make sense to integrate such profile in some DDDR process but the level of risk would also be significant.

Defectors are targeted by Al Shabaab with execution and threat letters left in their family homes. This threat on defectors is further increased by the intelligence use of defectors by the TFG and would be further increased should the project be led and/or perceived to be led by entities recognized to be at war (AMISOM/TFG) or politically engaged (UNDP/UNPOS). The lack of cease fire status and the active conflict status would lead to specific risks from armed organizations if youth originally from these organizations are selected by the project.

➤ **Hizbul Islam**

There is no much information currently available on Hizbul Islam but they initially merged with Al Shabaab and the decrease in the level of influence of Al Shabaab might lead to the separation from Huzbul Islam. The mode of operation and involvement of youth is not known but Hizbul have become a less influential actor in the Somali conflict.

## CRIMINAL GROUPS

➤ **Gangs**

Gangs are small criminals generating income out of petty crime. They represent a risk for the community as they are out of control and target the community members.

➤ **Pirates**

Piracy is an organized criminal group focusing on hijacking ships and negotiating ransoms. The pirates activities on the land can evolve towards kidnapping of expatriates. It is a business fairly close to warlordism where the level of money generated enables to buy protection and to secure safe community heaven. The connection between the piracy groups and the community has to be strong as the protection within the community is needed.

When a ship is hijacked everyone calls for support from his clansmen to provide security for the ship and to get a share of this business. The relationship with piracy groups was reported to be an one off where the group dissolve after the reception of the ransom. The integration of these youth within a Somali project aiming at

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<sup>10</sup>Source: interview with Somali who previously conducted specific interviews with Al Shabaab defectors



increasing security within the Somali community could be discussed as the youth's involvement in piracy does not seem to "hurt" the Somalia community as it is not targeting the community. However, the group as a whole, generates sufficient financial leverage with the ability to challenge the local authority.

*Remark:* Initially pirates were seen to be mainly based in central region. However, it has been explained that when ICU took over Mogadishu against the warlords in 2006, the Haber Gedir militias went back to central region and were involved in piracy activities. More over, the connection between Mogadishu and piracy are still significant strong and business investment from pirates is occurring in Mogadishu.

## **Context affected by weak central authority**

The **private sector** and the long term stateless situation in Mogadishu are key elements to consider how business community can play a key role on the project at reintegration level and how youth can access employment in a context where the trust from the community is essential.

### **Role of private sector in the conflict dynamism**

Somali businesses have played varying roles in Somalia's conflict, with both positive impact on post conflict reconciliation and negative impact that has contributed to an escalation in violence. The business sector in Somali society is particularly active with remarkable results on the cash transfer system (Hawala) and telecommunication.

The stateless situation in South Somalia has created a vacuum of legitimate power, in the provision of protection and essential services to the population. Essential services are de facto a good business as it is composed of vital items or services to sell. The private sector in Mogadishu is providing water, electricity, and health services.

The link between business and conflict is strong as businessmen protect their interest (assets protection, extension of markets control) either through armed militia, or support to peace and reconciliation, or through working across the various borders of the protagonists to get the best possible access.

**Warlordism.** Warlords emerged in Somalia with the fall of Siad Barre in the 1990s and took control over specific areas of Mogadishu establishing territorial control and taxation. Warlords are understood as being accountable to nobody but do still keep a close relationship with their clans in a manner that the relationship "warlord – clan" benefits both. Numerous warlords are still in Mogadishu and exercise control over specific territories. A warlord is an individual, usually supported by his clan and generates income on the basis of his military capacity.

**Business militia.** A businessman will set up his security capacity for the purpose of protecting the interest of his business. The difference could become blur in the midst of the conflict between warlord and a business militia but businessmen will mainly be identified by their entrepreneurial capacity to undertake venture in other clan's network domain, and hiring staff from other clans to secure access to new territories. A warlord also needs to maintain insecurity to keep his business running which is not the case for a businessman.

### **Influence on the clan system**

Businessmen, as any Somali, are members of their respective clan. However, the financial capacity of the businessmen makes them major contributors of the diya paying group and therefore increases their influential leverage within the clan. Clans rely on powerful businessmen, and businessmen rely on the clan to mobilize militias when needed. The combined interests of the clan and interest of the businessmen creates a very close alliance.

### **Trust element**

Without an overarching authority, or without an overarching fair authority, there is no formal rule or procedure to follow in undertaking business in Somalia. More over, Somali being an oral society, the "word given" is a signed contract. This lack of formal procedures and systems creates a situation where the trust element between individuals is key. Traders willing to sell their items will supply resellers and will get their money later on, upon items sold, without any contract or warranty. The trust element, especially at a minor level is provided through the clan or recommendations system. This point will be developed during this evaluation as youth rehabilitated during the project will face major challenges to integrate in the local economy (getting job, doing business) if they have not been able to recover some trust from the community and therefore the high visibility of the project (intensive labor) and extensive communication on the project

are key in rebuilding the trust from the community. However, it was explained to the evaluation team that this could not be done because it is not known how the communities will respond to the project and the security of the beneficiaries and staff was crucial.

## Key components targeted by the evaluation

### The district peace committee

**District Peace Committees:** (DPCs) have been established in each district targeted by the project. In Mogadishu, DPCs have been established in eight districts under the legal framework provided by the National Somali Stabilisation Plan (NSSP) and are fully operational in Wadajir, Hodan, Dharkenley, Waberi, HamarJajab, Shangani, Shibis and Hamarweyne districts. These committees have been provided with basic induction, conflict resolution, mediation and analysis trainings by the Somali Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention.

Each DPC comprises of 12 to 15 members and has representation of the various segments of society (i.e. local authorities, police, elders, religious leaders, women, youth).

The committees played a crucial role in identifying beneficiaries for Phase I of the Youth for Change programme and do provide some supervision at the Youth center level.

The DPCs define the main security issues at the district level, enforces discussions about these problems, and are supposed to define a **district safety plan** (DSP). The design and composition of the DPC is critical, but is not more important than its management and the real level of authority or influence of each of its members. The role of each member within the committee is critical as the community can meet and discuss, but the level of influence and the importance given to each member, even from the less influential groups within the community, should be properly followed to appreciate the level of inclusiveness of the process. The leadership and monitoring of the DPCs should be closely controlled to ensure an understanding of whether the decision process is inclusive or whether the authority remains in the hands of the District Commissioner.

The DPC is a relevant approach and has been implemented by other actors in the Somali context. The DPC is inclusive enough to generate the pre-conditions for various elements of the stakeholders at war in Somalia. Its management remains the most important element of success.

#### 1. Composition and activities of the DPC

The composition of the DPC is understood to have a critical role in the project as it is overarching on other key components of the project. The composition of the DPC represents the community as a whole and should be inclusive enough to provide space for the less considered, or more vulnerable of the community such as minority clans, women, and youth. The concept of the DPC is to provide a complementary platform for the formal authority and to represent the voice of the community as a whole. The current composition of the DPC is reported to have the District Commissioner, elders, police, and court representatives which represent strong elements of the community. The specific level of participation of all members of the DPC and the ability for the minorities to influence the decision making is the key aspect to be considered in the DPC's ability to be inclusive and to go beyond the local authority status of the DC.

The activities of the DPC include overall supervision of the youth center and the WCPU<sup>11</sup> to link it with the global community strategy at district level. The performance of the DPC is relative to each district targeted which has its own conflicts dynamisms and its specific set of personalities composing this committee. Ability for all key members of the committee to come together and to define a common strategy serving the interest of wall varies between districts.

#### 2. Selection of the youth participating in the RPC.

The DPC is involved in the selection of the youth participating in the RPC<sup>12</sup>. This aspect is critical as it is strategic in addressing specific security issues at the district level. More over, the district commissioner who is chairing the DPC signs a contract with the youth joining the project to ensure full commitment from the youth and to provide some warranty about youth participation up to the end of the process.

#### 3. Type of conflict the DPC is involved on.

The role of the DPC is seen to address the security of the community as a whole. In fact, it is noticeable that some security issues cannot be addressed by the formal authority as some matters cannot be prioritized because the local authority may be overstretched. This means that some issues can be considered less

<sup>11</sup>Women civilian protection unit.

<sup>12</sup>Resource Peace center.

important or less strategic, thus could be neglected. The DC, the elders have their own mechanisms of conflict prevention and conflict resolution, protection enforcement and therefore there is an opportunity to address neglected issues such as GBV, minor to medium offenses and to develop a global **district security plan** addressing the long term security issues.

#### 4. Achievement of the implementation plan of the DSP

In Mogadishu, no DSP<sup>13</sup> has been developed. The role of the DC on the youth center is important as some “strong and feared” authorities must be established in the center to impose rules when needed on youth potentially undisciplined and violent.

## 2

### The youth center providing a solution for youth as vectors of insecurity in the community

The objective was to prevent crime and violence by engaging youth at risk, and those associated with armed groups in a project providing them with socio-economic skills and livelihood opportunities. Youth who are selected for the programme are either **at-risk** or are already **affiliated with criminal activities** or **armed groups**. The brand of the project evolved from “Youth at risk” to “Youth for change”.

Implementation began in phases starting in Burao (August 2011), Bossasso (September 2011), Mogadishu (November 2011), and Galkayo (October 2011). The first activities focused on training the partners and local authorities, then implementation through a phased approach as follows: (1) sensitization, outreach and identification of the caseload, (2) case management including profiling and registration of the caseload, (3) rehabilitation which includes classes and community services (6 months), (4) reintegration.

The programme provided the youth with social and legal skills in the framework of social rehabilitation. It also provided 120 of them with specific vocational skills, and 130 received start-up capital for micro enterprise establishment.

The youth centers are also called the “*Resources Centers for Peace*” (RCP) and are dedicated to host a caseload of preselected youth to receive some basic training, to socially rehabilitate them and to prepare them to increase their skills for income generation purpose. The RCP are dedicated to host around 250 youth considered as vectors of insecurity within the community. During the period of the training at the center, the youth are alternatively engaged in basic training, intensive labor in the city, skills training and business training for some of them.

In the RCP youth are organized per sub group managed by instructors and facilitators. The mentors are part of the case management system and work as guiders of the youth but not per se employed by the RCP. Mentors are mainly concerned with providing guidance and follow up for the individual.

#### *Selection Criteria:*

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
The selection of the youth is central to the project as it defines which specific security aspects would be addressed. The District Peace Committee representing various layers of the community is responsible to select the youth participating in the project.

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<sup>13</sup> District safety plan

Selection criteria <sup>14</sup> : <i>Example of Mogadishu</i>	Caseload					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Youths of 18years to 35years old</li> <li>✓ Freelance Militias</li> <li>✓ Madani militia</li> <li>✓ Militia dependents</li> <li>✓ Likely to be militia</li> <li>✓ Not to be a government soldier</li> <li>✓ Willingness to change in behavior</li> <li>✓ To be selected and identified by the district Peace committees.</li> </ul>	Region	District Name	Youth center	# of youths planned to be registered	# youth graduated	
	<b>BANADIR</b>	HamarWeyn	<b>RAAGEUGAAS CPD</b>	Above 18 years old	62	189
		Shangani			64	
		Shibis			62	
		HamarJajab			62	
		Waberi	<b>SOYDEN</b>		62	179
		Hodan			62	
		Wadajir			64	
		Dharkinley		62		
	<b>GALKAYO</b>	--	<b>DIAL</b>		225 <sup>15</sup>	111
<b>BURAO</b>	--	<b>SYS</b>		250 (above 18 years old) 350 (below 18 years old)	230 350	
		<b>Soydavo</b>				
		<b>Sonyo Burao youth center</b>				
<b>BOSSASSO</b>	--	<b>SORSO</b>		250 (above 18 years old) 350 (below 18 years old)	260 350	

**Focus on Mogadishu: Location of the center and catchment area**



**Registration, profiling and follow up of each youth**


In Mogadishu, SOCDA registered the youth and entered their profiles into the DREAM database software and biometric data was taken through Iris scan. Key information collected during registration such as age, clan, reasons for joining the project, photo etc were all entered into the DREAM database software also named Youth Support Management System. However, for the under eighteen case load managed by UNICEF, it was reported that the data was entered under the “interagency child protection database” for youth under 18 profiles.

<sup>14</sup> SOCDA, monthly report, June 2012.

<sup>15</sup> DIAL Galkayo north youth at risk project. Situation report. February 2012.

The DREAM database was designed to co-host all follow up information for each youth of the project and to increase access to data and monitoring capacity over the project. Based on information provided by SOEDA on the profile of the youth still part of the project at the time of the evaluation, the evaluation team defined a random sample of the youth to be interviewed in Mogadishu but could not apply the same methodology in others regions as no list of youth was made available.

**Organization of the center. Example of Mogadishu** The RCPs are organized around three main activities prepared for the youth and part of the whole curriculum for follow up. The youth benefitted from Social and Peace transformation that consists of (1) Social skills (2) Peace-building (3) Rule of Law (4) Governance and (1) Sports for Peace (2) Art and drama (3) Religious education (4) Community Volunteer activity – all participants have benefitted from these classes. These have been complemented with literacy and numeracy - only fully literate did not benefit from it.



**Additional courses:** (1) HIV/AIDS for all in Burao, Bosasso (2) Media Training in Burao (3) Child rights training in Burao. (1) Business management skills (2) Entrepreneurship training (3) vocational skills training (4) On-the-job training (5) business grants – not all participants qualified for all the 4 activities. Community Service (labour intensive) – all benefitted from it.

Given that the level of school drop out was reported to be high amongst the caseload, the proportion of youth perceived not to be able to read and write was equally high. The ability to sit in class, to interact with others, and to learn new things was part of the rehabilitation process. Other activities were integrated in the planning of the youth per half day intervals. **Vocational training** (ICT, plumbing, carpentry, auto mechanic, mobile phone repair) **or business training**(how to start and run a business) were provided for some of the youth – through a selection process, providing this opportunity only for the youth getting the best scores during tests. These specific trainings were organized by ILO and its partners, and not only enabled the provision of some skills training and, **job placement** for the selected youth for vocational training (carpentry, mobile phone repair, electrician, ...) but also provided some business skills development for youth organized, or being assisted in organizing, in **cooperatives/production associations and receiving some business start up grants.**

### Security management

Security management is important for this type of project as the project can be perceived to support specific entities at war and could be targeted. The profile of the youth targeted induces security measures.

- Approach to security for such a sensitive project is related to the profile of the youth selected and the ability for implementing partners to manage the youth and to impose some authority. The link of the youth center with the district commissioner is therefore essential in imposing a respected authority.
- The profile of the youth defines whether they are defectors or not, and whether they could be targeted by some armed groups. Understanding in details the respective profile of the selected youth and the comparison with the selection criteria used is critical in taking appropriate security measures and providing a curriculum fitting the needs and capacity of the different categories of youth.
- Communication over the project and the purpose of the center is critical. Being a community owned project, the community as a whole should be aware of the project and should provide some protection for it. And this has been proved through the DSC management of the project in Burao. If the project is not locally accepted by the community, then some security risks remain.
- Dissatisfied youth should be carefully controlled and managed as they could represent risk over project staff and assets. Transparency over the process of payment, the time of payment, amount agreed on, are critical issues which could lead to security incidents in the RPC of the project.

## **Key security incidents at center level**<sup>16</sup>

**Galkayo** has been the center most exposed to security incidents and was finally closed in March 2012 but reopened in July 2012.

- <sup>17</sup>Killing of Key Project youth mentor
- Warning letter from the youth.
- Bomb threat. November 26<sup>th</sup> 2011<sup>18</sup>.
- Disappearance of two facilitators<sup>19</sup> in December 2011
- Hand grenade thrown in the compound<sup>20</sup>.
- Threatening leaflets distributed in town targeting implementing partners and facilitators<sup>21</sup>.
- Intimidation messages from the youth received by the RCP project manager
- Closure of the center since December 9<sup>th</sup> 2011.
- Perception over the project. There was rumor that the project was part of activities related to "black water" security company and therefore become a target<sup>22</sup>.

## **The key elements of success of the Youth center is based on three steps.**

### **1. Selection of the youth. Who is being selected ?**

The selection of the youth is critical for the following reasons; the benefit from the project such as training, daily wage, technical training and business grants attracts lots of interest from many youth who might not be at a high level of risk, and does generate a risk of bias during the selection of the youth. The profile of the youth selected directly impacts on the local perception of neutrality of the project and therefore the perception from active armed groups. **The profile of the youth selected and their specific security background defines the specific objective of the project in addressing security issues at the district level.** Targeting youth from specific armed groups, or youth involved in specific criminal activities induces some impact on and from these specific armed organizations.

The mix of the profiles of the youth is not only a critical element in controlling the level of challenges that could be met during the project implementation but has also reinforces some elements of reintegration by mixing easier and harder cases, by mixing clans, origins of the youth, education levels, etc.

### **2. Curriculum: Is it appropriate ?**

By better understanding the profile of the youth, the project can better comprehend their specific needs, the duration of the foreseen rehabilitation phase, and the level of risk taken. Youth on drugs, and youth ex Al Shabaab would require clear different curriculum. Illiterate youth would need more training on literacy and numeracy.... The detailed database on the profile of the youth when joining the project and their performance while at the center should have provided key information in understanding the quality of the training provided, the management of the center, the detailed curriculum (too ambitious, too easy ?) and relevant information on the caseload targeted. It should have answered questions such as: How many youth have not been totally rehabilitated, (the project should have some), how does the project measure this rehabilitation performance at youth level (mind set assessment, results at literacy and numeracy tests, behavior performance, ...)

Some key aspects of the curriculum should challenge the drugs habit, should generate "controlled" conflict management within the center on discussion over sensitive issues. Religious leaders have been reported to play a key role in the center by providing some lessons and this point is important as the most respected social entities in Somalia are Islam and clans.

<sup>16</sup>OCVP/Dial/&Galkayo.RPC Trainers Joint Meeting Minutes. January 2012.

<sup>17</sup> DIAL Galkayo north youth at risk project. Situation report. February 2012.

<sup>18</sup> DIAL Galkayo. Report December 2011.

<sup>19</sup>DIAL Galkayo. Report December 2011.

<sup>20</sup> DIAL Galkayo. Report December 2011.

<sup>21</sup> DIAL Galkayo. Report December 2011.

<sup>22</sup>OCVP, Dial, Galkayo RPC Trainers Joint Meeting Minutes. January 2012. "They ended up their comments by proposing that if the centre remains to close and completely halt the centres daily activities it means that we accepted the proposal of the terror groups claiming the centre operates under Black Water ideologies". This point is as it demonstrated that local perception on the project was based on wrong rumors.

### 3. Reintegration: Which youth can be reintegrated into the community ?

The issue of reintegration of youth at community level is a critical point of the project as it remains the final objective. Under the current approach, the reintegration is understood as the **social reintegration** and the **economic reintegration**. Both levels will be linked and the social reintegration will remain the basis to allow the youth to evolve toward economic integration or reintegration. The economic reintegration focuses on the capacity for youth to generate income in a peaceful manner which is a fair point as financial reasons have been regularly mentioned by youth as a justification for their participation in armed and criminal activities. In many cases, the financial reasons have been reported to be associated with drugs consumption<sup>23</sup>.

However, the duration of the vocational or entrepreneurship training determines the skills level reached and thus the competitiveness of the youth on the employment market. There is no way that a youth would become a good carpenter or mechanic in just a few months as the level of training remains basic, the learning capacity of the youth is not seen to be the best, their behavior and approach to learning process remains key challenges in reaching a sufficient level of competency and credibility in the professional sectors targeted. More over, the most difficult youth at risk may not be able to access such training as their literacy, numeracy and the global behavior is foreseen to be lower than other youth and the competitive process used in the project to access technical trainings will exclude access to skills and business training for the most difficult cases. The level of reintegration depends on the profile of the youth, the context of reintegration (from a conflict economic and social points of view) but also on the level of qualification reached by the youth to find sustainable incomes generation as a way to find his place within the society.

DDG mentioned that their approach to community reintegration is not developed at youth level but rather at community level. This approach makes sense as youth at risk are affected by a lack of trust within their community and their capacity to work and to perform is perceived to be lower than average. So, integrating these youth into employment will remain a risk, a burden and a challenge for the community members offering these opportunities. This is particularly true in the Somali context where the trust factor, notably on key elements of clan ownership is determinant. Providing benefits to the community who take the risk to reintegrate these youth could be considered. Half of the salary paid by the organization, some work funded at community level if x% of youth at risks participates in the work....

## 3

### The women civilian protection unit

In 2011, the Ministry of Interior requested support for a women's protection initiative in Mogadishu. The goal was to organise women as a **voice for change in the community**. The Women's Civilian Protection Unit (WCPU) was launched in December 2011 by the mayor of Mogadishu. A total of 500 women were mobilised from 5 districts. The women applied to the programme on a voluntary basis, and were vetted by the District Peace Committees to help support community security.

Through discussion and training on the positive role women play in Somali society, women were empowered and trained to provide a range of referral services to survivors of violent crime, and help ensure the safety of their communities. Recent security gains have supported the expansion of this initiative. Thus far, participants of this component have been provided with basic induction, conflict analysis, resolution, and mediation trainings as well as reporting and SMS technology. So far, the WCPU has been able to:


- *Assist the identification and mobilisation of young men to participate in the programme;*
- *Support victims of violence by providing direct assistance (orientation, accompaniment to legal clinic, health centre, etc.);*
- *Integrating the police into the DPCs;*
- *Provide reinforcement for monitoring and oversight of the beneficiaries registered as part of the Youth for Change programme;*
- *Support the resolution of small scale disputes on the neighborhood level through mediation; and*
- *Support crime prevention through reporting suspicious activities through a sophisticated SMS system to the police.*

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<sup>23</sup> Most of KIIs



## PILOT DISTRICTS



## SELECTION PROCESS

### Selection Criteria<sup>24</sup>:

*For proper beneficiary selection the implementing organizations – SOCD and SWDC agreed to select and register women based on the following selection criteria considering what the district members could suggest and select at district level. Below are the agreed selection criteria:*

- ✓ *She should be a female or women*
- ✓ *35years old and above*
- ✓ *Self working mother( tea, khat, fruit, maize, cloth, milk , shop etc. sellers)*
- ✓ *Experienced in peace aspects at community level*
- ✓ *Residing the same district of selection*
- ✓ *Better communal relationships*
- ✓ *More involved in community activity.*

District	Total women to be registered	Registered Civil women	Registered police women	Total women registered for each district
HAMARWEYNE	<b>120 (100 civil &amp; 20 police)</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>102</b>
WABERI	<b>120</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>96</b>
WADAJIR	<b>120</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>115</b>
WARDHIGLEY	<b>120</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>99</b>
HAMARJAJAB	<b>120</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>96</b>

<sup>24</sup>Source: SOCD, Monthly Report, January, 2012

## COMMUNITY SECURITY REPORTING



Basic induction training. Waberi. 25th -27th January 2012.  
Source: SWDC report



Some WCPU members doing patrolling near Wadajir district.  
Source: SWDC weekly report. 04/07/2012.

The women were reported to do some patrolling, on a low profile manner and usually at night time paralleled with the district police up to 09.00 pm. Then, the police would continue without the women<sup>25</sup>.


The concept of patrolling alongside the police district and the use of “uniforms” identifying the role of these women challenges the “**neighborhood watch**” concept and implies security risks for these women when reporting security incidents. Warnings and threat calls from the terrorist group were reported in SWDC report.

WCPU members also attended the tradition women meetings called “Abaayabaay” for information sharing.

## COMMUNITY SERVICE PROGRAM

Women engaged in the WCPU were also involved in community service activities in close collaboration of the BRA<sup>26</sup>. The evaluation did not assess where and how much garbage had been removed. The link to garbage collection is an important aspect of this component as it represents not only a source of income for the women group involved in the WCPU but also represents a stronger link with the local authority managing the youth for change program.

## NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH



<sup>25</sup>Source: SWDC, weekly report. May 30th 2012.

<sup>26</sup>Banadir regional Administration.

The key concept about the neighborhood watch is to have eyes and ears within the community, in order to increase crime prevention and police efficiency. The role of women was reported to be critical in this aspect as women are more connected and more present within the community especially if they stay at, or around, their home. The women’s involvement on security issues is important as it contributes to empower them within the community and to place women’s security concerns closer to the center of decision making.

Women were organized in groups of 25 per sub district at neighbor level where everybody is known within this perimeter. In a context of risk of terror attack, the engagement of the community in the intelligence work is critical. Women from the WCPU are also accompanied by police women.

SWDC LNGO is implementing the WCPU component of the project. Other than this project, SWDC is also involved in gender based violence and refers cases of rape to medical and legal services. SWDC’s involvement on the WCPU is therefore also an opportunity to place the violence of women at the center of community security.

### CAPACITY BUILDING FOR WOMEN

CERTIFICATES	TRAININGS
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Basic induction training</li> <li>2. Advanced rule of law</li> <li>3. Conflict mediation</li> <li>4. Victim assistance</li> <li>5. Crime prevention advisor</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Literacy and Numeracy training.</li> <li>2. Somali language.</li> <li>3. Conflict resolution, Mediation, and Negotiation Human Rights.</li> <li>4. Revenue Collection Mechanisms.</li> <li>5. Good governance, Democracy, Leadership, and Communication.</li> </ol>

Some specific trainings were organized on how to send SMS and how to communicate on security incident. However, during literacy test it appeared that 54%<sup>27</sup> of women members of the WCPU are not literate which reinforces the relevance of the literacy and numeracy training but challenges the concept of reporting security incident through SMS. However, it was explained to the evaluation team that the SMS was a discrete way of reporting sensitive issue with lower exposure than a loud phone call.

### DATA MANAGEMENT

The data management of the SMS incidents was seen to contribute to the understanding of the evolution and the profile of security incidents per district. This was also seen to be linked to the Observatory and to be consolidated amongst other security information.

This WCPU has been implemented in Mogadishu only. Technically, the WCPU is formalizing an information feedback mechanism from the community to the police in order to increase the “intelligence” capacity of the local authority. However, it remains only an information management system and how the information is transformed into action remains a key point to assess and to consider but no information was available to assess this aspect.

The women’s role on this aspect is critical as there is a real need to address the women’s vulnerability in the context of crime as victims of rape and household violence. Prevalence of rape is high in Mogadishu and the WCPU was designed notably to address this issue.

**Remarks:** The WCPU was reported to be involved on the selection of the youth and monitoring of the youth at community level. As the selection of the youth is handled by the DPC, the women’s influence is seen to have occurred at the DPC level only. The monitoring of youth engaged in the RPC at community level has not been much reported on. Technically, no information on this aspect has been identified in the documents provided to the evaluation team. At the same time this aspect is seen to be already included in the neighbourhood watch.

<sup>27</sup> Training Report for WCPU members on “Basic induction training”. From 21st – 31st January, 2011

## KEY STEPS OF THE WCPU

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### 1. Level and category of reporting through the neighborhood watch

No report is available on the exact type of incidents reported by the WCPU. This information should have been critical in the understanding of how effective the reporting mechanism is, which types of incidents are reported, and how these reports lead to action from the police. This would have enabled the evaluation team to highlight the relevance and efficiency of the WCPU in reporting and in understanding which incidents lead to specific actions from the police and which incidents reported were not addressed by the police.

### 2. Type of conflict resolution of small scale disputes engaged on

WCPU was initially foreseen to conduct specific conflict resolutions but this has not been reported extensively. The type of conflict the WCPU can be involved in, is very important as the notion of conflict negotiation is also directly related on the profile and the strength of negotiators. This strength defines the credibility and legitimacy to conduct conflict resolution and WCPU does not appear to be strong enough to conduct such exercise.

### 3. How and how much gender based violence has been addressed

Data on gender based violence and on the number of incidents women have been involved on is critical in the understanding of how the project has been able to address this issue, which is understood as an important focus on the WCPU. The limit on prevention the SGBV is important as the information sharing is not based on awareness but rather on reporting of the incidents after it has happened (*"The ability [from WCPU] to prevent gender based violence is limited since it happens in families and they don't know till it has happened"*<sup>28</sup>) and is directly link to the level of police intervention and the application of justice perpetrators. *"The justice system to reduce sexual violence is still not in place"*.<sup>29</sup>

The prevention of SBGV needs better consideration on women status within the Somali society; *"WCPU don't have ability to prevent sexual assault because they are only women"*<sup>30</sup> and needs a strong mechanism to enforce justice with strength and power. *"Women cannot prevent sexual violence because they are so weak"*.<sup>31</sup> In fact, the justice and the ability to represent a respected entity is defined by the deterrence status. Without sufficient leverage to represent a deterrence strategy then the principle of justice, protection or prevention remains obsolete.

### 4. How the WCPU is linked to the police

The objective to empower women in active security roles within the community is critical as women rape is regularly reported. Preventing these actions through increasing pressure on actors of gender based violence will not be implemented by the WCPU and will depend on the police capacity and prioritization of actions related to SGBV. The follow up of the case reported by the WCPU is therefore critical to better understand how the report leads to action.

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<sup>28</sup> Mogadishu, Darkenley district, KII with stakeholder of the project.

<sup>29</sup> Mogadishu, Darkenley district, KII with stakeholder of the project.

<sup>30</sup> Mogadishu, Shibis district, SOFDA.

<sup>31</sup> Mogadishu, Wadajir district, District Commissioner.

## 5

### Observatory

The board of the Observatory is instituted and consists of DDG, Saferworld SOCCA, ICPC, JCCP, UNDP Somalia, University of Hargeisa representatives.

	- Danish Demining Group (DDG) and Saferworld	<i>Supports its research and analytical capacities.</i>
	- Saferworld	<i>Contributes to the development of the first training manual on Peace education.</i>
	- the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC)	<i>Contributes to its structural and operational set up.</i>
	- Japan Centre for Conflict Prevention (JCCP)	<i>Responsible for the establishment of a data management system.</i>
xxx	- SOCCA	<i>Gathers data for the Crime and Victimization survey in Mogadishu.</i>
	- United Nations Development Programme Somalia	<i>Overall facilitates and overviews all the activities.</i>
	- University of Hargeisa	<i>Currently houses the Observatory.</i>

The overall goal of the Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention in Somalia is to improve the effectiveness of community safety interventions by advancing learning and evidence-based programming. The mechanisms of the Observatory consist of four major components: **Training and Peace Education, Research and analysis, Knowledge management, Institution building**.

Crime and victimization surveys have been developed by the observatory and implemented with the support of SOCCA, the Danish Demining Group and Saferworld. This **Victimization Survey** was done in the eight TFG controlled districts in Mogadishu, Galkayo, Burao, Bossasso and Las Anod.

The overall concept of the observatory is to be a bank of security related information in Somalia in order to develop knowledge management, lessons learned, and to become the point of reference for comparison of security situations. The link of the observatory to all components of the project is therefore critical and extremely strategic to lead the data management and its analysis. The observatory should have linked the profile of the youth, the SMS reported by the WCPU, the security data from the police station, the type of conflict prevention of resolution the DPC and the WCPU have been involved on, to measure the project and the impact of the project, quantity and justified all data used in the reporting of the project.

In theory the observatory should be the back bone of the monitoring strategy of such a project and its analysis over specific indicators should compose the means of verification.

## 4

### Dan Guud


Transition Federal Government (TFG) officials from the national, regional, and district authorities have been working with peace committees from each of the 16 Districts of Mogadishu to design in-kind community projects. Supported by USAID and DFID and called by Somalis "Dan Guud" (*"In the public interest"*), the projects is designed to **promote stabilization and reconciliation, and to promote district level consensus building through the development of district-level, quick-impact projects**. Activities are chosen by **District Peace Committees and community members through consensus**, and may include road clearance, street lighting, building rehabilitation, or community events. The youth for change project is partially integrated within Dan Guud organization.

**District Community Centres Rehabilitation** in Mogadishu, in particular the supervision of the consulting engineers employed by IOM and ensuring effective management of contractors.

The Dan Guud has been very involved in the project implementation of the Youth for change project by supervising and leading the intensive labor conducted respectively by the youth (bush clearing) and by the women of the WCPU (garbage collection) in Mogadishu. Dan Guud is paying youth and women for this work and also for the days of training for the Youth. Additionally, Dan Guud involvement at District peace committee level has created a significant space for Dan Guud to operate as a key actor of the youth for change project.

In Mogadishu, Dan Guud has various set of projects. In Mogadishu, Dan Guud approach is part of the Banadir administration and interacts with the district commissioners who themselves chair the DPC which is the overarching of the project. The interaction with Dan Guud is therefore important and strategic for the youth for change project.

# FOCUS ON MOGADISHU





## **Process: How effectively has the Y@R programme been planned, managed and implemented?**

### **Programme design**

1. Why was this project developed? Is it tackling the right issues for this context?
2. To what extent is it informed by beneficiaries and Somali stakeholders?
3. How sound is the evidence basis for the programme?
4. How well does it complement other UN projects and those of the wider international community?
5. How logical and coherent is the programme's design?

### **Why was this project developed? Is it tackling the right issues for this context? How sound is the evidence basis for the programme?**

### **Justification for a new approach to security**

#### **Ending the DDR as it was not reaching expected results**

UNDP was officially involved in formal DDR process in Puntland and Somaliland. **A review of this process, highlighted that the process of DDR in Puntland and Somaliland was not downsizing the security forces but was rather providing a benefit package for old or disabled fighters while vacancies created were filled by able bodied.** So, the approach to formal DDR was challenged by the active status of some conflicts and the fragmentation of the armed organizations within the civil society rather than depending on formal armed organizations with strong and single chain of command. In Somalia, the dynamism of conflict is wide spread all over the community and is reinforced by the large number of weapons available in the Somali community, increasing the concept that conflict management is not in the sole hands of the formal authorities and the community, at large, has a key determinant role in conflict management.

The recommendations of the previous evaluation<sup>32</sup> was to focus more on a DDR preparedness, conflict management/transformation measures at community level, support to reintegration to the victims of armed violence (youth, women,...).

*“The Concept of Community Security which facilitates the empowerment of existing community based traditional structures to address security needs and creates sustainability in conflict management and transformation while complementing and reinforcing top-down interventions. It is fully compliant with the rational and framework for International Community intervention in the context of Security Sector Reform, Rule of Law and Early Recovery.”<sup>33</sup>*

The precaution of stability and the overall structure of the conflict deeply rooted at community level discredited an approach based exclusively at the level of national or regional bodies.

#### **Loss of credibility through classic approach to security**

**Local perception of UNDP conducting DDR activities at level of national security forces** notably through the training of police forces has been affected by misbehavior of these forces and therefore decreased the relevance and the credibility to continue this type of support.

*“Several sources have advised that a general perception in South Central Somalia that UNDP is closely aligned with the TFG and therefore US and Ethiopian interests. This would militate against the wisdom of UNDP visibility in South Central Somalia in the short-term. However, with an improvement in the security environment, with a reduction in threat to local implementers, community based programs might be implemented based on UN funding from Somalia Office HQ and UNDP invisibility on the ground. While the M&E implications for such operations are clearly not favorable, foundations for an empowering environment can be established working through effective IPs and limited impact delivered”.<sup>34</sup>*

So, there was a critical need to change the approach to security management in Somalia. A basic review of conflicts dynamism highlighted the importance and the efficiency of local actors, far from the classic approach

<sup>32</sup>Evaluation Report. UNDP, ROLS – DDR/SAC Program, Somalia, Aug/Sept 2008. Desmond Molloy, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.

<sup>33</sup>Evaluation Report. UNDP, ROLS – DDR/SAC Program, Somalia, Aug/Sept 2008. Desmond Molloy, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.

<sup>34</sup>Evaluation Report. UNDP, ROLS – DDR/SAC Program, Somalia, Aug/Sept 2008. Desmond Molloy, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.



preferred by the international community, to address conflict prevention and conflict resolution, the clan based Xheer is one of them, and the influence and role of business community is also part of it. Numerous initiatives were organized in Somalia to engage the key stakeholders of the community such as the Mogadishu Security and Stabilization Plan (MSSP) in 2005 with the financial support of the business community enabling to dismantle the road blocks in the capital<sup>35</sup>.

In South Somalia, the TFG, TNP have always been affected by lack of credibility and legitimacy at community level, as they are perceived to be imposed by the international community rather than reflecting the needs and opportunities at field level to work on security. This de facto contributes to reduce the government ability to impose security over communities equally armed and used to a stateless situation.

## **A community based project**

### **Appreciating the root causes of the Somali conflict dynamism**

A concept addressing security through the community is coherent and was a new approach for UNDP Somalia. The advantage of a community based approach was to understand the dynamics of the Somali conflict and Somali violence not through the official structure but through the Somali conflict dynamics specificities such as the clan, the patriarchal status, the conflict for natural resources, the armed status of communities, the stateless situation in South Somalia, and the national, regional or independent movements. All the dynamics of the Somali conflict can be interpreted totally differently if the point of understanding is taken at community level. The clan for example influences the whole structure of the Somali government through the 4.5 rule. However, they do also influence the control of police, army and do serve by priority the interest of their clan. The dynamic at sub clan level are even more important to consider in understanding who decides and who influences. The structure of the current government does not represent the whole Somali society and therefore there is always a risk of having specific groups within the Somalia society being less protected and more victimized. More over, the largest the exclusion group is, the more unstable the conflict dynamism will remain. The “under the scene” leverage to influence and to some extent control the representatives of the Somali society is important.

### **Not a new approach in Somalia**

Developing a community based approach through-out the reading of the Somali dynamics at community level and from within the Somali society was a good initiative. Various INGOs were already engaged in *neighborhood watch schemes* led by women; *demilitarization of the Bakara market* in Mogadishu, the Mogadishu Security and Stabilization Plan (MSSP) in 2005, the *National Declaration of traditional leaders*<sup>36</sup> supporting the revision of the customary law, providing better protection for vulnerable groups such as women and minorities. DRC-DDG were also engaged in a large scale project using in rural areas the *District peace committees* linked to the *Community-Driven Recovery and Development (CDRD)* empowering the community to define and implement an action plan reflecting their needs and priorities.

Maintaining this level of reading of the conflict dynamism in Somalia at community level, avoid the easier level of reading used by external actors through government and organization structure. In Somalia, the dynamics could be simplified to “*it is all about clan and all about business*” but the reading of the conflict dynamism at this level is complicated. For example the DCs do not report directly or strictly to the governor but are rather very much influenced by their clan elders.

To some extent a community based approach is in competition with the official authorities, and therefore while coordination is necessary, the influence on the project by the government should be carefully controlled as the whole concept of community based should not be overwhelmed by the Government authorities. The community based approach cannot evolve positively without formal local governmental authorities which should be consolidated by the community based approach. The principle of working together is key as the objective of the community based project is to reach all, across the traditional borders (clans, gender, wealth, ...) and to be as inclusive as possible. The whole concept of community based approach is to engage local stakeholders more globally for longer term solutions.

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<sup>35</sup> Accord project on Somali peace processes. Connecting Somali and international peace-making strategies. Workshop report, Nairobi, July 2009. Conciliation Resources.

<sup>36</sup> DRC supported initiative in Puntland and Somaliland. 2003-2004.

## Key components of the project

### ➤ WOMEN CIVILIAN PROTECTION UNIT

**Engaging women in security prevention through a “neighborhood watch”.** While formal figures are not available, various discussions with Somali actors indicated that the prevalence of rape is very high and not well addressed. Many women are vulnerable due to the lack of protection (minorities clan, displaced status, women headed households, gender considerations, ...). During the peak of the famine and the subsequent influx of IDPs within Mogadishu, the prevalence of rape was reported to be particularly high. The profile of perpetrators and the profile of victims were based on a division of clan strength and men from powerful clans are in position to conduct such crimes on women from minority clans.


### ➤ YOUTH CENTER

The major displacement occurring in Somalia in the past year due to the famine, led to a major increase in the presence of youth out of control in Mogadishu, unable to adapt positively to the urban context as their profile (different clans, more rural orientated, ...) did not allow them to find positive income generation opportunities in Mogadishu.


The overall average age of the youth assessed during the evaluation is 19.2 years and the average age they had when they left school was reported to 11.2 years meaning that the level of education and their learning capacity is expected to be low. Amongst the youth who joined armed groups, the main reason was for financial, protection or respect within the community reasons. Within this target group, the ideological reason was almost not existing.

#### Youth reason for joining specific armed groups

*One youth could provide more than one answer and the same youth can have been with different armed group at different time.*



**Proportion of reasons expressed by youth to join specific armed groups**  
*More than one answer could be selected for each group*



**Decrease efficiency of some armed group as an opportunity to engage with defectors**

Pirates’ decreased influence and Al Shabaab’s progressive loss of financial support and territorial control, face an increased defection and youth leaving these groups need to be reintegrated within the community. From a gender point of view, young men are the victims of the cycle of violence as they are much more enrolled in the armed violence. Many youth are part of the groups of perpetrators either through a socially integrated way such as the clan militia, TFG Militia, or through a dissocialized way such as the freelance militias or the Al Shabaab.

Initially, the project was understood to mainly target the youth at risk rather than the youth perpetrators of violence, however, both cases have been reported to be selected at youth center level.

➤ **DISTRICT PEACE COMMITTEE**

**Create or reinforce inclusive platform of discussion over community security.**

The engagement of women and youth in a platform of decision making and involvement on approach to security is good as it develops a **more inclusive approach** and addresses the specific issues related to women and youth. The overall project engaged various stakeholders at different levels from formal local authority to community levels which provide a forum to address any issues or concerns in a more inclusive manner, and can create some bridges between some actors. Enforcing more discussions with the district commissioner is good as it creates the capacity to address issues in a comprehensive manner rather than being too localized and disconnected from the global pictures. It is understood that approach to long term security needs to be as inclusive and comprehensive as possible.

➤ **OBSERVATORY**

**Aim at providing overall information on security in Somalia.**

What is the real security situation in various regions of Somalia or Somaliland? What is the evolution of crime? Answers to these questions are not well known and security information is not properly documented to enable strong security analysis. While police stations do record the security related incidents, this information is not consolidated, so the security elements is more of a local perception rather than a formal data management system and analysis. This undermines the appreciation over security, and decreases the capacity to monitor the evolution and causality of insecurity. Setting-up a formal data management system as a platform for all actors was a good and much needed initiative.

**To what extent is it informed by beneficiaries and Somali stakeholders?**

The structure of the project design has the advantage of bringing many local stakeholders together and is therefore reaching the community from different angles, thus increasing its connection within the community. However, within the stakeholders of the project, the flow of information is unstructured and not sufficient across the different components of the project to develop a sense of common objective and understanding. So, the beneficiaries and Somali stakeholders involved in, or close to the project, are informed about the global activities but not on the detailed outputs of the project in terms of achievements or failures. Additionally, the large number of actors involved on the project increases the challenges in developing project leadership.

Within the extended community there is quite a low level of information on the project. Engaging all layers of the community, and informing the whole community about the project would as a first step increase the pressure on the project but also enforces transparency, accountability, and increases implications from the community on the project. Keeping the project –under reported - for security reasons induces that some key aspects may not be addressed, the limits of the project is not known and the project is at risk of being a concept not adapted to the specific context of each region. If the whole community is not informed about the project, then there is a risk of not generating enough community ownership and community responsibility which should be the essence of the project.

For the selection of the beneficiaries, communicating extensively about the selection criteria would not only clearly raise the issue of integrating or not ex Al Shabaab, but also increase the pressure on youth selection which should generate enough dynamics and problems at community level to really develop a strategy benefiting all in an appropriate manner. Communication of the project would generate some issues, discussions, and difficulties, but the essence of the community based approach is to generate these difficulties and to address them at an early stage on the development of difficulties.

**Communication over the project** should be extensive and there should be more forums to present the project. This aspect is really important as the youth go back to the community after the end of the project. How the community integrates them, how the community perceives them, how the youth would be at risk to be re engaged in crime and armed violence, what is the level of trust the youth are benefiting of, are currently questions not addressed.

It was reported at DPC level in Mogadishu that a strength of the project has been for DPC to be a forum where specific issues are regularly discussed and some initiatives were taken. However, the DPC activity is under reported which undermines the ability to identify their impact.

The KMC peace caravan operating in Somaliland and Puntland have been key elements of awareness, pre-registration, community sensitization categories of the youth that were needed to participate in this project and play a major role in the communication over the project as the caravan is a very visible approach.

The example of the failure of the center in Galkayo was notable, but not only related to a lack of efficient communication on the project to reach various local stakeholders. Not occupying all the space for such sensitive and community owned project has left rumors that provide a wrong local perception which has led to major security incidents at RCP level in Galkayo.

### **How well does it complement other UN projects and those of the wider international community?**

Any project aiming at providing some stability in Somalia is coherent with the wider international community strategy. The engagement of various UN agencies such as UNDP, ILO and UNICEF is remarkable and there is a skills complementary effect. However, the link with other INGOs working on peace building, or having strength and experience in community driven project and community development is strong enough. In fact, it is remarkable that DDG-DRC who has extensive deployment of DPC activities linked with a CDRD initiative, more in rural areas, is fairly disconnected from this project.

The international community is not credited by a high level of trust within the Somali community level and the support to the transitional national entity which, in all cases, has not performed as expected, has also always been limited to a low level of credibility at community level. Therefore, this community based project enables to create more local connections than a top down approach.

Creating more bridges and forums where the community, as a whole, and the local authorities meet and discuss key issues contributes not only to increased legitimacy and credibility of the local authority but also enables to complement the overall strategy of the international community by a deeper or rooted understanding of the Somali dynamics.

The international community military approach to address piracy and terror group's activities in Somalia needs to provide a solution for youth defecting from these armed groups and this project can provide a complementary solution to armed action as part of stabilization strategy. With more ambitious scaling of the project, some solutions in addressing the roots causes leading the youth to join these armed groups (before they join) could be linked to such a project which was initially designed to target the youth at risk (pre perpetrator).

Following the gained field of the TFG/AMISOM and the decreasing influence<sup>37</sup> of Al Shabaab, there is a need to reengage positively with the youth and to propose some alternative options to them which could lead to anticipate an increased space for youth in the political spheres.

The involvement of the DPCs which are platforms used by many others actors in Somalia reinforce the legitimacy of these entities and do increase the inclusiveness aspect of the project. The WCPU empowering women and aiming at addressing the root causes of women vulnerability and protection issues in the Somali context also complement other projects working on gender aspects and/ or on protection issues.

### **How logical and coherent is the programmes design?**

The program design, at macro level, is coherent in terms of needs and global structure. The design of the project addresses the real needs at local level and proposes an approach relevant to the Somalia context. It is relevant to acknowledge the difference of approaches between regions and the specific constraints and opportunities of the environment of implementation.

#### **Policy versus field implementation**

The weakness of the design of the project comes in the details, and notably, on the how the coordination, management, reporting and data management are structured and implemented. How the recruitment of the youth is organized ? Which profiles are targeted ? Which profiles are excluded ? What is the bias level in the selection of youth and women to participate in the project ? All these questions are key in understanding the outputs of the project.

UNDP as a direct supervisory agency on the local partners is not the most qualified agency to conduct daily management as regular field presence with sufficient flexibility to visit centers, to set up system and to organize ad hoc specific visits is needed. The security and access constraints do limit the UNDP supervision capacity. INGOs or strong LNGOs is the missing link in the organization structure as the gap between the LNGO capacity and the UN complex system is significant. There is a sense of lack of coordination between local actors and a global lack of control and supervision of the project implementation. The policy developed by UNDP is coherent but cannot be directly passed to LNGOs which are left without sufficient information and control mechanisms.

#### **Efficient coordination and key role of implementing partners**

Each organization works with the youth in an alternative manner rather than as consecutive steps. While youth are engaged in the rehabilitation process which notably includes some basic literacy and numeracy training, art and fun, intensive labor; some of them do also receive every second day some skills or business trainings. The effort of coordination is therefore higher than a concept based on a consecutive process with youth first rehabilitated and then, for some of them, trained based and their learning capacity and field of interest.

#### **District peace committees**

The program design for the DPC is coherent but has not provided the project with outputs such as District Safety Plan. Without implementation budget specifically allocated, the District Safety Plan becomes obsolete.

The control mechanism in understanding how minorities or youth, or women interact at DPC level is not known, yet the overall concept of the community based approach is to challenge the local authority by enforcing increasing space and influence for minorities in the decision process. There is no evidence that such an aspect has been sufficiently addressed. How the District Commissioners as strong authorities can be challenged should be analyzed to better understand the limitation and the efficiency of the concept of the DPS. The risk of the community based approach is to be overwhelmed by the local authorities.

#### **Complex coordination with local authorities**

The link with Dan Guud is positive as the Dan Guud is already involving a large number of actors and therefore increases the inclusiveness of the community based project. The involvement of many local authorities from

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<sup>37</sup> Decreasing influence is understood as loss of territory control, decreased local support, and decreased financial capacity. The decrease Al Shabbab influence in Mogadishu for example means that initially Al Shabaab operated as a visible, formal local authority while they now operate only as invisible elements and exclusively as a force of destabilization on the TFG/AMISOM forces. Their political ambition and capacity is therefore currently lower than one year ago.

DC, to governor to ministry, is good but the increase in the number of actors increases the coordination and leadership challenges.

### **Legitimacy of local partners**

The authority within the youth center is critical as it should not be weak to be able to manage such caseload, especially considering the violent youth. The strength of the implementing NGOs, the profile of the staff involved in dealing with the youth, should be able to enforce a strong and respected authority.

Local implementing partners must have the legitimacy at the local level in order not only to be recognized and respected at clan level, but also to be able to influence clan elders to take action.

The technical credibility of the implementing partner is also critical in order to operate as an efficient mentor and performing teacher. The program design does not link the curriculum taught to the specific profile of the youth.

## **Implementation**

6. *How well has the design been translated into reality on the ground? What is working and what is not?*
7. *What major issues have arisen and how well have they been addressed?*
8. *How effective are the processes of identifying issues and problems and resolving them?*
9. *How effective is the role of the implementing partners? Is the programme and beneficiaries effectively served by these organisations?*
10. *What are the major risks going forward? Are these sufficiently mitigated?*

### **How well has the design been translated into reality on the ground? What is working and what is not?**


#### **WHAT IS WORKING**

##### **Community based approach**

The major success of the project is to have initiated dialogue and alternative approaches with many actors, in different regions lead by different contextual challenges, from the members of the community to the senior levels of the local authority. The inclusive aspect of the community based approach has therefore been initiated. Meetings between actors, initiating relationships and discussion about specific approaches to security is a success as a first step even if consolidation of outputs should be done and better measured. Addressing insecurity at the community level as a key issue is also a success as it changes the whole dynamics and approach to project implementation.

## Mindset assessment


The evaluation team has used the structure of the UNDP mind-set assessment to estimate the mind set up of the youth who participated in the project. The graph below indicates the mind setting of the whole group of the sample group



### Key aspects of the mind set assessment:

- The mind set assessment of the youth targeted by the project shows that the concept of a functional state protecting all is clearly appreciated and expected from the youth as 81% of the youth respondents “strongly agree” to the statement “*functioning state will provide basic social services to every member of the community*”.
- The level of radicalization of the youth respondents is fairly low.
- The holding of firearms at community level is still very strong in the mind of the youth as around 25% of the youth respondents agree with the statement “*a man who has no gun is not a man enough*”.
- The consideration over the status of women within the youth respondents shows some significant low consideration on women status which is not positive but what not foreseen to be easy changed.

**Breakdown of responses from the youth on his plan for the future**



Setting up of a business is by far the highest level of response from the youth respondents on their plan for the future which is a positive set of mind. It was interesting to note that youth trained on vocational training were also focusing on developing their own business rather than looking for employment within existing company.

### The intensive labour

The intensive labor activities managed by the youth had the double advantage of serving the interest of the community and providing some visibility for the youth working positively for the interest of the community. This aspect was very important as it contributes to rebuilding the lost trust by the community on these specific youth and prepares them for the reintegration phase. The intensive labor also injects some cash at community level which has some indirect positive effects within the community.

The intensive labor was not the most preferred activities implemented by the youth and in some cases they were not willing and /or not able to implement some of the work. However, the intensive labor is understood to be part of the rehabilitation process for the youth and is expected to challenge them in physical and psychological aspects.

In Mogadishu, the youth were mainly engaged on **bush clearing** under BRA and IOM management.



**In Bossasso**, through UNDP (PREP) and the Bossasso municipality, youth have been engaged in the following activities<sup>38</sup>: Repair and maintenance of the cracks and worn out points in and along the sides of the Bossasso tarmac road, collection of garbage and construction of garbage collection pits, improvement of some feeder road, rehabilitation and improvement of Bossasso main football Stadium, tree planting, Construction of surrounding cement block walls parking court yard



North view after the intervention with flow on the stream.  
 Source; ILO AVR Project In Burao District. Construction of erosion protection structures.

**In Buroa**, through coordination of ILO, JPLG and SEED, the youth have been engaged on the rehabilitation of two (2) irrigation canals in Beer village (Janaale and Maahato), rehabilitation and construction of tarmac road section to livestock market, rehabilitation and construction of tarmac road sections through Indho-deero bridge, construction of erosion protection gabion walls (photo on the right side)

### **Skills and business training**

The business training and vocational skills training followed by job placements are both strong and interesting aspects to develop as they were mentioned regularly in the KIIs and the hope for the future by the youth.

### **WHAT IS NOT WORKING**

#### **Global**

- The efficiency of the **coordination**, the management and the decision making, and the flow of information are questionable. There is no consolidation and analysis of the data collected which should inform the overall management of the project. No database was made available during the evaluation and if the monitoring information is not available at Nairobi level, then there is some level of decision making and coordination which occurred without sufficient field information. The information sharing between the actors at field is not perceived to be very strong neither, especially in Mogadishu. Most of respondents of the KII reported that they faced challenges with coordination and in some cases they mentioned they were not sure about what they were supposed to do.
- There is some **retention of information**. Contracts with partners have not been provided, lists of youth have been provided only for Mogadishu. This aspect generated many challenges during the field evaluation and contributes to decreasing the level of transparency over the project.
- The **observatory role to consolidate all information on the project and to conduct regular contextual surveys on the evolution of crime and victimization is a good idea, but is not implemented**. Data is scattered between partners, for many reasons, confidentiality being one, and security of information being another one. However, there is still a critical need to better manage the data of the project in order to improve implementation and reporting. Without timely and detailed access to project information, the appreciation of

<sup>38</sup>UNDP.Final progress report of Bossasso Municipality for infrastructure rehabilitation of Youth at risk activities.

its impact will be limited and there would no coordination. Additionally, while the Crime and Victimization surveys are very interesting and have detailed documentation, they are not used as baselines information, and have not been used to define specific indicators to measure the impact of the project on a regular basis. Actually, the CVS are disconnected from a monitoring strategy.

### Youth center

- The **selection process of the youth** is not clear, yet the curriculum at center level and the security management of the center must be designed based on the capacity, the constraints, and the opportunities of the profile of the youth selected. The profile of the youth targeted defines also the specific objective the project. Why these youth are considered at risk? What are the strict selection criteria? What are the limits of the project in working with specific profile? What is a measurable definition of “at risk”? The lack of detailed report of the profile of the youth challenges the overall targeting of the youth as the relevance of the curriculum cannot be confirmed, and it is unclear what the project is specifically expected to achieve (decrease prevalence of specific crime? decrease conflicts or tension between clans? decrease recruitment efficiency of specific armed groups or organized crime?)
- An estimated 30% of youth selected in Mogadishu centers was reported by SOCDIA to drop **out of the project**. There is no follow up or information available on the profile of the youth who dropped out (no name, no reason, no date, etc). SOCDIA reported that the youth dropping out were simply deleted from the database which generates an accountability issue.  
The high level of drop out highlights the **failure of the social contracts** signed between the youth and the District Commissioners. It was reported that from SAACID NGO experience, the social contract should involve many people (parents, elders) close to the youth to warranty their engagement on the project. A drop out is a failure and is clearly not cost effective. However, the profile of the youth is foreseen to remain difficult cases and not all the youth will necessary be ready to be “rehabilitated”. This aspect is important as at some point it should not be the choice of the youth to complete the project or not. Proper rehabilitation of these youth would ensure they are challenged and passed through some difficult steps.
- It is not clear what the youth become after the project as there is no follow up. This point is understood in Mogadishu as the project has just been completed but not in Burao, Bossasso, Galkayo, where the project was completed a few months before the evaluation, yet it was very difficult to identify the youth. When the project closed, the youth went back to their areas, and some of the partners’ staff were employed by other organizations. A **tracer survey**, would structure the Youth follow up and would enable a better understanding of the long term impact of the project. The tracey survey could also be linked to a longer strategy to address youth issues and could be also contextualized with employment and enterprises surveys but also employability and integration survey of the youth in their community. Such tracer survey could then focus on wider understanding of the social and economic reintegration of the youth. The future of the youth is unclear as their capacity to get a successful income generating strategy due to contextual elements such as the **high level of unemployment will remain a major challenge**. Some of the key aspects to consider are that there is very little chance that such short term projects will be able to train youth to a level of competitive employability for competency reasons, and for **reasons of trust** within their community. The reintegration phase of the **project does not engage enough the community as a whole in reintegrating the Youth**. The best reintegration might actually be the Youth benefiting from some job placement as they are now positively engaged with the community. Therefore, the ambition and the approach of the project could evolve towards a situation where the community is more engaged in integrating and following these youth after the project.
- **Information management and exchange**. Accessing the information on the project has been a real constraint, yet it should have been a priority in the pilot phase. Additionally, it should have been a key management and learning element of the project. It is not clear, how many youth have been fully rehabilitated; and how many have not been sufficiently rehabilitated and do remain at risk. This would be necessary in the understanding and appreciation of what is working, and up to which limit and what is not working on this component of the project.
- **The level of report of the WCPU** was not made available but was not seen to be very significant. With no information available, the evaluation team does not know what the WCPU did report on, how much of the patrolling is occurring, how many of the WCPU reports have generated police action, and which one did not lead to any intervention from the police... this information would have been very important to enable a better understanding of the project impact, and to identify what is working and what is not working.

It was planned that all this information would be linked to the observatory database but was not made available to the evaluation team from the observatory level. **The District Peace Committees (DPCs)** have not produced a District Safety Plan (DPS) and there is no budget for such with an exception of Burao where DDG provided support on the DSP. So far, the DPC has been used, in Mogadishu as a platform to select the youth and to discuss some security issues only. It is a clear positive start but the DPC should evolve towards a more operational status to increase its role in the reintegration of the youth into the community and to increase the voice of the community as a whole in preventing specific aspects of insecurity. It is not clear how much the minorities have been able to influence the decision making within the DPC.

## What major issues have arisen and how well have they been addressed?

### How effective are the processes of identifying issues and problems and resolving them?

#### **Coordination**

Coordination is by far the most recurrent issue mentioned by all actors of the project. There is a sense of disconnect within different sections of UNDP, between UN agencies, and between local partners on the field. While the steps to bring all these actors together is a success, the way of working, the inevitable perception of competition and contradiction of mandate should be addressed in a realistic manner. Coordination between UN agencies but also between NGOs has always been a major challenge as there is no natural overall leadership from one organization to the other.

#### **Lack of clear objectives**

The project is unclear on its objective, and the results framework is not articulated as a logical framework with clear indicators and means for verification. This formulation not only challenges the reporting, the management, and the analysis of monitoring data, but also creates the space for confusion over strategic and sensitive aspects of the project. Clearer indicators and means of verification would increase the accountability and responsibility at agency level and would therefore contribute to simplify the coordination and reporting from partners.

The project refers to many concepts which are in contradiction, such as demilitarization versus crime prevention, youth at risk versus perpetrators, Ex Al Shabaab members versus no ex Al Shabaab members, community based project versus potential overwhelming of local authority on the project, WCPU patrolling in the street with uniform versus neighborhood watch, low profile of the project versus the concept of a community own project.

Some decisions over the project implementation should have been clarified, and the UNDP senior management should have defined clear limits and detailed control mechanisms. Keeping the situation blur has created a situation where the project objective could be interpreted differently. As there is no sufficient control mechanism to verify what is really happening on the ground, the organizations in Nairobi are carried away by the field project implementation and have faced a progressive loss control over implementation. This point has been reinforced by the limited access to the field and the distant management situation.

#### **Delay of payment of the youth**

It is quite a strange approach but all payments to the youth for their intensive labor and for their time participating in classroom is paid by Dan Guud or UNDP, or ILO rather than by the NGO operating at youth center level and significant delay in payment occurred. The difference of systems and the different requirements for such payment should have been clarified during coordination through specific and common support document to initiate payment. In some cases (Galkayo, Bossasso) this delay lead to major security incidents. As the financial aspect has been reported to be a key point of interest of the youth, there is a sense that the local partners should be themselves responsible to this sensitive financial disbursement issue.

Key incidents of youth coming to the center with weapons and kidnapping NGO staff to claim their money was reported in Bossasso highlighting the sensitivity of the timely payment of fees. The key aspect to consider is that what has been promised to the youth must be honored in a timely and accurate manner else there are security issues to consider and there is a risk of loss of trust and confidence in the project.

### **How to engage with local authority ?**

The concept of a community based project is to extensively include the community which required in Somalia as formal local authorities are facing limitations in credibility and popularity, and are also perceived not to serve all community members in an equal manner (clanism, gender consideration, individuals interest, pressure from the international community). To some extent a community based project challenges the local authorities legitimacy while at the same time aims at reinforcing the long term capacity of the local authorities. So, while the local authorities, official or not, are parts of the community based approach, there is a subtle management of the platforms where members from the minority groups and members from the local authorities needs to define the community based approach. If the minorities are not supported enough within these platforms and if the game of influence is not active enough, there is a risk of having the local authority domineering over the project and therefore the concept of inclusion of the minorities and their concern would be at risk of not being adequately considered.

Dealing with Dan Guud was a good aspect of the project as Dan Guud represents a community based approach but remain under the government TIS management which aims at increasing the visibility of, and confidence in, government and therefore the inclusion of the community based approach needs to be backed up with an influential partner..

### **Monitoring the project**

The monitoring of the pilot process was affected by lack of monitoring information at management level which should have generated major push on the partners involved in the monitoring of the project. The distance management of the project has contributed to major limitation in taking advantage of this learning phase. The architecture of the monitoring system is in place but not in use.

Some strategic information is filtered at data entry level leading to loss of strategic information in implementing the project appropriately and appreciating better the risks and results. This aspect is critical during a pilot phase where the project needs to be adjusted and where the specificity of each context and each youth or youth category should be appreciated. The final end of the data entry seems to be within SOCDA NGO as there is no detailed data analysis in any of the reports from the partners. The report focuses on activities such as training, workshop, and mobilization but has very few quantitative inputs or overall analysis of the caseload and their performance in test, participation in business or vocational training. The lack of access of the data and analysis by the management of the project keeps the organizations in a blind management approach and does not allow the report to be supported with performance information and means of verification. More over, the purpose of any monitoring system is to enable the management team to drive the project with timely information. This did not happen. So , there is a lot of contradicting information over the perception of the profile of the caseload at youth centers, some youth are reported to be in the centers because they drop out schools but their average age in 22 years old in Mogadishu.... So, the profiling of the youth, even if some information should remain confidential such as name, photo, ... should be used by the management team to better understand the type of youth (is it more for minor criminal, is it an alternative to jail, is it for ex fighters, for ex members of terrorist organization ...)

### **Location of the observatory**

The observatory is based in Hargeisa and is linked to the Somaliland Ministry of Interior inducing some sensitivity to host, consolidate and analysis on security from South central, Puntland and Somaliland. While most of data is not effectively centralized at the observatory level, not much has been done to link the data from youth center, from the WCPU SMS unit, from the police stations, ... However, it has been explained to the evaluation team that in the future phase of the project some branches of the observatory will be decentralized which should be able to address this specific limitation on data consolidation.

### **How effective is the role of the implementing partners? Is the programme and beneficiaries effectively served by these organizations?**

The capacity of each organization to serve the beneficiaries has to be understood as the technical capacity, the strength to deal with youth at risk, the ability to reduce the risk of wrong selection of beneficiaries, and the ability to increase influence of minorities in decision making.

The performance of the partners to serve beneficiaries of the project is difficult to define in detail as each partner has its own challenges and its specific technical performance capacity. However, the level of credibility of these partners within their community would define their ability to develop the community based approach

on all sensitive aspects such as the selection of the beneficiaries of the project, raising the voice of the minorities at the risk of challenging the bias of key local stakeholders in power. Much confrontation and more time allocated to negotiation of key aspects such as selection of the youth, women, definition of the DSP should have arisen to better serve the interest of the project. In general, the capacity of the implementing partners to serve the beneficiaries could be more effective but has also been undermined by coordination challenges. To increase effectiveness of implementing partners, the quality of services provided (means deployed at youth center for learning purpose -books, equipment for demonstration of skills training, etc are limited) and detailed reporting is needed to understand the current effectiveness of the partner for specific youth caseload.

The quality of training can be discussed mainly as the education level, and learning capacity of the youth should be factored in to avoid mixing the need of rehabilitation and needs of basic literacy and numeracy training.

### **What are the major risks going forward? Are these sufficiently mitigated?**

The major risks of going forward would be:

#### **Response not strong enough**

If the project is not efficient enough to rehabilitate the youth, to protect women through the WCPU, and to include the minorities in the decision making, then the project will remain superficial and will lose credibility and support from the community. Being a good concept is not good enough and there is a need to make and demonstrate a visible and significant impact. This would occur only if influential negotiation capacity is deployed through "strong" local partners and implementation brought at a higher level.

#### **Inappropriate method of selection of the youth or women**

The selection of the youth and women to participate in the project is the key issue about the project, and attracting of the real target of youth and women means that the compensation or indirect financial inputs should occur. By doing so, there is a risk of increasing the bias over the selection of the youth and women. This situation is common in any project implemented in Somalia and there is a constant competition for resources and selection of staff, contract, and beneficiaries for any organization operating in Somalia which should be carefully controlled, monitored and negotiated. This has not been perceived to be sufficiently controlled and mitigated on this project especially in Mogadishu and Burao where the profile of the youth is not perceived to be so much at risk.

#### **Not engaging and challenging enough the community**

The community approach is needed in the Somali context as the governmental authority is not applied all over the country and because the community plays a key role in influencing the various local authorities. Continuing the project by providing a response without real engagement with the community will give a perception that this method has been tested while it might have been pushed far or strong enough to demonstrate its advantages. Working with the local authorities on a community based project is a subtle concept as the local authority could feel challenged in its authority. This aspect remains particularly sensitive and the implementing partner leverage capacity to deployment a clear influential role is critical and will define the credibility of such actors.

#### **Loosing control on the project**

Without increased control mechanism and management capacity from Nairobi level, the project is at risk of scaling up without sufficient direction and limits. Control mechanisms should also be set up in terms of communication over the project to reduce the risk of misinterpretation on the specific objectives of the project.

#### **Tendency to go toward a large scale DDR**

The DDR might become very popular in Somalia while the gain in terms of peace on the ground is still limited. The belligerents in conflict in Somalia are still very much active. Scaling up and communicating over the project should be done very carefully as the DDR will be understood as undermining the interest of some armed groups. More over, the potential high level of funding allocated to large scale DDR would increase the coordination challenges and would increase the local pressure on the selection of the youth to be integrated into the process. Going further these risks should be mitigated through strict monitoring and supervision of the project but also with clear limits set up on the project objectives.

## Management, monitoring and coordination


11. Is the management team, structure and resources in place sufficient to effectively deliver the programme?
12. Are the processes and mechanisms currently in place (such as workplans, budgets etc) sufficient for the programme?
13. How effectively is the programme coordinated across UN agencies? Across implementing agencies? Across government stakeholders?
14. Are monitoring mechanisms sufficient?

### Is the management team, structure and resources in place sufficient to effectively deliver the programme?

#### MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE / DISTANT MANAGEMENT / PARTNERSHIP

The management team is separated as different layers and blocks with coordination aspects rather than overall management decisions and considerations. Information management is a key element of the management structure and without proper flow of information it is difficult to manage the overall project across all partners.

The lack of follow up on daily management activities gives space for difference in approach to drive the project



↔ **Coordination** is an exchange of information, and a potential adjustment of approach and activities in a horizontal structure with no leadership and authority. No actor is able to impose its approach on others. So, the coordination is characterized by the lack of leadership or authority and a break in the chain of command. Coordinating UNDP, ILO and UNICEF is not seen to be an easy task as the relationship is very much horizontal and lack legitimacy of any organization to lead the others.

The project was reported to be a success as it engaged UNDP, UNICEF and ILO on a common framework. However, how this engagement has been translated to benefits on the ground is not directly visible. The project is not perceived to be better managed out of this structure, or cheaper, or more efficient in terms of administrative processes.

↑ **The management** between organizations in the project refers to contractual relationship between UN agencies and LNGOs. The distant management aspect is critical to consider here as it requires very structured flow of information and detailed implementation processes. Limitation of field access requires more means of verification, more control mechanisms and timely access to information to maintain a management role at Nairobi level.

Numerous respondents of KII at the field level complained about the lack of community feedback mechanism which should be set up not only to increase control mechanisms but also to measure the local perception at community level through this feedback mechanism. Without systems adapted to distant management, and notably control mechanism able to challenge field reports, decisions are made on the field and the overall



coordination from Nairobi level is excluded. The profile of the youth selected, the low level of exchange of information between partners, the low level of means of verification made available enforce the idea that the management of the project has neither been adapted to the context of distant management nor to work with so many partners.

The management within the organization has been challenged within the different departments of UNDP for few reasons. The level of information produced by the project remains low and therefore there is a lack of clarity of what is happening on the ground.

#### **Sensitive project requires strong management decision**

Not enough clarity in the specific limits of the project from the top management of the project: The high level of sensitivity of the project has not been addressed by taking strong position or decision but has rather been implemented through a low profile approach to reduce risks related to project implementation. However, how strategic decisions on the project (are we including ex Al Shabaab or not, does this project aim to be a community based project exclusively or does it intend to be or become a DDDR project with significant involvement of local authority and military actors, can we call it a neighborhood watch ...) have been made is not clear. All key decisions not taken at senior management level have created space for confusion about the project as different entities within the same organization have different understanding of the scope of the project, thus created sufficient space for decisions to be taken at field level rather than at senior management level. This point is particularly important as the management has been criticized all along the evaluation that it was not clear what the project was supposed (results framework is activities based) to achieve and what were the limits (caseload profile).

Unclear project documents and result framework: While the project intended to work on “youth at risk” (pre perpetrator), it slipped, even at proposal level on “demilitarization” which induces different profiles of youth and generates different levels of risks, and requires different curriculum.

Senior manager to engage with local authorities: The management of the project is also critical to challenge the current authority to increase the space of the community based project and the senior staff in project management has more legitimacy to engage with local authorities on this aspect.

Low profile: The low profile aspect went along a shy management of the project at organization level, and did not occupy enough the communication space over the project which is perceived as a mistake as the project is aimed to be community owned and therefore needs to be very transparent and inclusive. As a result, in Galkayo, the center was perceived to be guided to benefit some foreign parties at war in Somalia which contributed to causing lethal security incidents leading to the closure of the center.

#### **MONITORING AND DATA MANAGEMENT**

The monitoring and data management is far below the expectations as some key questions about the project remained unanswered.

**The monitoring system is in place but not in use.** The monitoring of the project does not provide a proper follow up of activities. While a little data is entered into a database, the filtered data on the profile of youth done by SOCDCA creates a lot of limitation on understanding who is who, and whether the rehabilitation center provides the best answer to each profile.

While the CVS in Mogadishu, Galkayo, Las Anod, Bossasso and Burao are very detailed surveys, providing some clear contextual elements of crime and violence, these surveys have not been designed to be integrated in a monitoring strategy and to be used as baselines.

#### **- What is the profile of the youth targeted**

What is the bias level in the selection process? This is inherent to the Somali context and many youth, even if not at high level of risk would be interested to benefit from training and income generating opportunities.

- How the youth perform during the project (exams, behavior changes, mind set, ...)  
What is the percentage of failure? Which profile needs different support,.... Understanding this aspect would have been critical during a pilot phase in order to develop sufficient lessons learnt on what is working and what is not working.
  
- What is the output of the DPC?  
What are the issues the DPC is involved in? What are the issues ignored by the DPC. What are the security concerns of the minorities? Are the minorities able to make their voices heard, are the minorities able to participate in the decision making of the DPC? And if yes, on which subjects?
  
- The WPCU and the observatory represent two major components of the project and are exclusively based on information management and therefore monitoring of the situation. If the information is not reported, recorded, organized and then analyzed, the specific outputs would not have value. This point is particularly important as the WPCU has deployed and trained 500 women for this task in Mogadishu which is already a very positive performance. The Observatory is understood to have strong capacity in terms of equipment and quality of staff deployed to undertake the activities in order to achieve its objectives, but remains not fed enough with the field information from different partners.
  
- What is the profile of security incidents reported by the WPCU.  
Type of security incidents reported, evolution of these incidents over a period of time. Questions raised include, how police reacts to categories of incidents reported, what should be the influence of senior management of the project to increase police capacity and/or action to address potential low level of responses on specific security incidents, should be questions based on the outputs of the monitoring process.
  
- What is the overall observatory output.  
The key aspect of monitoring is to get timely information and analysis of the situation to appropriately manage the project, particularly during a pilot and learning phase. The key aspect to consider here is whether information of the project has enabled the management team to understand the project impacts, challenges and opportunities and to take appropriate management decisions in a timely manner.

While the architecture of the monitoring process is very good and enables deployment of strong capacity on the ground, most of the data is not centralized and therefore there is no possibility to handle appropriately the data analysis over the project and its analysis. *Who are the youth* has for example being a recurrent question asked by the evaluation team as the profile of the youth determine the relevance of the project and the relevance of the curriculum provided. What types of SMS reports have been provided or added into the database system. It is remarkable to notice that the observatory does not have much data from the project and is not used as a central platform to collect data on crime, victimization or situation of the youth project. This seems to be a missed opportunity and should be adjusted.



## RESOURCES

Resources allocated to the project are in terms of staff perceived to be sufficient, except for the daily management and coordination of all components at field level. Some field overall coordination, providing supervision on the daily management activities is missing and this missing element affects the link between the field and Nairobi office.

The youth center should be better equipped in terms of furniture, books, documentation on employment, and practical equipment for skills training. Plastic tables and plastic chairs as the sole furniture of a classroom and are not enough to create the best conditions for learning or behavior changes.



Soyden Youth center. Wadajir. Mogadishu.

## Are the processes and mechanisms currently in place (such as workplans, budgets etc) sufficient for the programme?

Budgets and workplans are in place. A detailed partners budget follow up is available on the question related to the question “How satisfactory are the processes for managing finances and handling contracts?” the evaluation did not focus in details on the financial documentation but the key contractual documents are in place at the level of UN agency and their partners.

## Results: What results has the programme achieved to date, and is likely to achieve in future?

### Outputs

1. *What progress has been achieved by the programme thus far in delivering the activities and outputs?*
2. *How have these been perceived by stakeholders?*
3. *What have been the most significant achievements to date and why?*

### What progress has been achieved by the programme thus far in delivering the activities and outputs?

The measurement of the outputs of the project is particularly challenging as the outputs are not backed up by structured indicators related to specific means of verification. Basic structural approach to a logical framework is not applied in this programmatic framework. Ideally, each indicator should be set up as SMART<sup>39</sup> with reference to specific means of verification organized and availed for monitoring, reporting and evaluation purpose, as part of an accountability and transparency strategy.

As indicators are not specific and not properly articulated, there is a lot of room for interpretation of what should be done on the ground, who is the target group, what should be the indicator to measure the impact of the project etc.

#### Indicators:

The three first indicators mentioned in the result framework are actually not indicating the level of achievement reached on the **Intended Outcome**: *“To contain and prevent violent conflict by engaging youth at risk through the creation of employment and livelihood opportunities at the district level”*.

<b>Number of youth targeted which are not repeated offenders.</b>	A significant proportion of the youth targeted are in fact not offenders. The notion of repeated offenders is not measured in the monitoring process and does not have timeframe for this measurement ( <i>within xx months after the end of the project</i> ).	No means of verification are associated to these indicators so indicators.
<b>Security perceptions of the community.</b>	Not specific enough to be measurable.	
<b>Level of violence in targeted district.</b>		

Capacity for peace and human security established in target districts under recognized legal and institutional frameworks in support to the selection and demilitarisation process of 2,000 youth and adolescent – **Lead agency: UNDP**

- 1.1. *The Peace Building infrastructure is capable of supporting initiative in peace-building and violence prevention.*
- 1.2. *2,000 beneficiaries are selected, registered, profiled.*
- 1.3. *Demilitarisation process implemented for 2000 beneficiaries.*

**1.1 The peace building infrastructure is capable of supporting initiative in peace-building and violence prevention.** This “secondary outputs’ as stated in the results framework of the proposal is understood to refer the Resource of Peace Centers and the District Peace Committees which were reported to be capable of supporting such initiative even if some improvement is required.

**1.2 2,000 beneficiaries are selected, registered, profiles.** 1,889 youth and adolescents have been selected and registered—(based on UNDP final report). 500 women in Mogadishu have also been selected and registered. However, the profiling, which in such project is critical, has not been done in a manner accurate enough to define detailed profile of the target group. Name, photos, age, district currently lived

<sup>39</sup>Specific Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time based.

in, and reasons for selection on this project have been added in Mogadishu only. However, information such as clan, sub clan, type of armed groups involved in, type of crime involved in, level of literacy and numeracy, were not added into the profiling database.

	Mogadishu	Galkayo	Burao	Bossasso
<b>Youth above 18</b>	<b>500</b>	<b>225</b>	<b>230</b>	<b>234</b>
<b>Youth below 18</b>	--	--	<b>350</b>	<b>350</b>
<b>Women</b>	<b>500</b>	--	--	--

### 1.3 Demilitarisation process implemented for 2,000 beneficiaries.

The secondary outputs of demilitarization process of 2,000 beneficiaries is confusing as the community based project does not aim at targeting formal soldiers engaged in formal armed groups. The reference to the D of a “DDR” process generate lots of confusion here as a demilitarization process would induces that some groups have formally been engaged in cease of hostilities, which is not the case in Somalia. The piracy groups, the Al Shabaab, the militias are not concerned about any cease fire. All other armed groups can be associated to formal local authorities (clan militias, TFG militias).

The youth targeted by the projects were initially understood to be more related to petty crime or youth considered at risk of going into violence. The project was foreseen to target the small actors of violence disconnected from the major actors and are therefore understood to be at risk of becoming perpetrators of violence rather than current perpetrator of violence.

However, even if not clearly reported in any documentation of the project, some youth are reported to be from Al Shabaab, TFG, and clan militias which are all actors of the conflict in Somalia. However, their level of engagement, and in what activities is not clear.

While youth involved in freelance militias or piracy are engaged in criminal activities and cannot be considered as part of a demilitarization process.

An estimated 700 adolescents, from within the profiled 2000 youth, demobilized and reintegrated at community level. **Lead agency: UNICEF**

#### 2.1. At least 700 selected underage beneficiaries have access to structured educational and life skills learning opportunities

700 youth under 18 years old were reported to be enrolled in UNICEF center but no mean of verification were made available to the evaluation team. However, 118 youth under 18 years and beneficiaries of the project have been interviewed by the evaluation team. Kindly note that list of beneficiaries have not been provided which presented a challenge during the evaluation and a failure to provide some key means of verification.

#### 2.2. Selected beneficiaries have access to protection services (case management - psychosocial, legal, medical services) in target districts

This information was not specifically captured by the field evaluation but it was reported that in Burao, 40 youth under 18 years were counseled and reunited with their families. In Bossasso, 350 had regular access to psychological support through trained counselors and mentorship program. 50 children who were separated from their families were reunified and supported with services like psychological support and medical support as needed.

#### 2.3. An enabling protective environment for youth is fostered in target districts through community mobilization activities

The concept of a protective environment for youth was explained to the evaluation team as the WCPU in Mogadishu where women could monitor the situation of the youth reintegrated. This concept was

initially for the purpose the WCPU evolved during the course of the project as a group of women engaged with Dan Guud in garbage collection activities and in neighboring watch. The monitoring of the youth engaged with the youth center within the community has not been documented in the reports provided to the evaluation team.

Implementation of activities in at least four DSC creating at least 1,300 short-term job opportunities for youth to contribute to violence reduction activities, community development and public works projects for initial employment and reintegration community – **Lead agency: ILO supported by UNDP**

### 3.1 1,300 short terms jobs opportunities created for youth, also addressing drivers of conflicts and violence.

The short term job opportunities refer to labour intensive employment and all youth (1,189) engaged in this short term employment.

### 3.2 105,000 workers days created

	MOGADISHU	GALKAYO	BURAO	BOSSASSO
ILO	--	15,304	12,367	--
UNDP PREP	--	--	--	34,156
Dan Guud - IOM	? Garbage collection with the WCPU	--	--	--

Figures mentioned above are extracted from respective reports. Difference of interpretation of calculation of this indicator, on what is a day of work, should learning day should be paid or not as incentive learning, could occur between agencies.

### 3.3 US\$420,000 injected into the local economy through wages

	MOGADISHU	GALKAYO	BURAO	BOSSASSO
ILO	--	141,500	163,689	--
UNDP PREP	--	--	--	108,402
Dan Guud - IOM	?	--	--	--

Women, youth and marginalized groups are empowered to contribute meaningfully to safety and security decision-making – **Lead agency: UNDP**

### 3.4 Youth, women & male powerbrokers on respective roles and responsibilities with respect to violence prevention.

This aspect has been initiated through the setting up of the DSP and the WCPU. The DSP and its community role should be complementary to the formal local authority and in essence provide a platform where more entities can be consulted and be part of the decision making. The set-up of the WCPU has not only been the opportunity to empower women and to develop their capacity through various basic training, but also to access some income. However, the key changes in the role of Women, youth and marginalized groups in security decision making cannot really be measured as no data is available and no indicator has been set up to this extend.

While lots of efforts have been invested into women empowerment in security decision making, their real level of influence on the decision making remains unmeasured. Being part of the committee members is not enough to influence the decision but is a first positive step.

Avenues created for longer term job creation/enterprise development through vocational training (based on labour and enterprise surveys) youth entrepreneurship training and related business skills development. 100 new businesses started. – **Lead agency: ILO**

### 5.2 Youth enterprises established

In Mogadishu, 100 youth trained on business have been organized in 25 cooperatives and have received a grant of 2,000 USD to start a business. At the time of the evaluation, it was too early to measure the impact and the longevity of this intervention but it would be interesting to maintain the link with these youth to better understand how their business evolve and how they manage to remain out of the cycle of violence.

### How have these been perceived by stakeholders?

The perception of the local stakeholders on the level of visibility of the project depends on the region assessed. In Burao it was reported that the project should have *“less publicity and should be kept secret”*<sup>40</sup> while in Galkayo the *“lack of awareness campaign”*<sup>41</sup> was reported and has been confirmed by the level of threat and rumors circulating on the project.

#### ➤ **WCPU**

The WCPU was reported, in many cases as the group of women, in charge of garbage collection in Mogadishu and doing the neighborhood watch. In general the WCPU was perceived as *“too weak”* to prevent SGBV as (referring to the lack of deterrence capacity) and would always be informed about a case of SGBV after its occurrence, limiting the impact of the prevention aspect. The key aspect to consider is more about justice and condemnation of perpetrators which would increase the deterrence aspect especially if information is properly reported. The neighborhood watch was also reported to be a collective responsibility *“I and every community member can realize the efficiency of the WCPU”*<sup>42</sup> which could an important point to consider in the potential evolution of this component of the project.

With a high level of impunity, the SGBV cannot be really addressed; *“harsh sentences for rapist and violence against women”*<sup>43</sup> should be set up.

#### ➤ **DPC**

*There was no ability to report any complaint because there was no good and truthful response from DPC/ ...”*<sup>44</sup> Some aspects of conflict dynamics in Mogadishu are seen to be related to the level of stability reached and the foreseen return process and the confrontation between the different perceptions of ownership related to the wave of expulsion initiated in the 1990s. *“People have been on other people lands for 20 years and now they are coming back”*<sup>45</sup> The DPC should be prepared to handle such issues especially as the clan aspect would be important to consider in dealing with such issues.

#### ➤ **YOUTH CENTER**

The perception over the relevance of the youth targeted has been a mixed opinion ie *“Young people who were leaving in bad behaviour are being rehabilitated in the centre”*<sup>46</sup> in Burao while in Mogadishu *“poor relevance of the selection of the youth”*<sup>47</sup> was stated while both profiles of youth in Burao and Mogadishu were perceived to be “easy” cases, while the caseload in Galkayo and Bossasso were perceived to be much more at risk. In Galkayo, the level of tension was high, and profiles of the youth selected were more involved in armed groups, but the selection was also perceived to be affected by *“lack of transparency and fairness in the selection process of the beneficiaries”*<sup>48</sup>.

<sup>40</sup> Burao. KKI with NON stakeholders of the project

<sup>41</sup> Galkayo. KKI with NON stakeholders of the project

<sup>42</sup> Mogadishu, HamarJajab district. District Commissioner.

<sup>43</sup> Burao. Training center manager. OCVF.

<sup>44</sup> Galkayo. Teacher at the center.

<sup>45</sup> Mogadishu, Shibis district, DPC.

<sup>46</sup> Burao, FGD, District Peace Committee.

<sup>47</sup> Mogadishu, KKI with NON stakeholders of the project

<sup>48</sup> Galkayo. KKI with NON stakeholders of the project

The employment and income generation is a central consideration in the project, as youth are reported to be joining armed groups, very often for financial purpose. And is perceived to be a key determinant in the stability for the youth rehabilitated *“the ability of the youth to live peacefully will depend on the given jobs and education”*<sup>49</sup>.

Ability for the youth to join and remain in the project will depend on the level of income they would generate from it. *“They [youth] believe that there is no money in the project. Some of the youth are seeking daily life costs so they don't have chance to join the project”*.<sup>50</sup>

While in many cases the respondents indicated that they could consider employing these youth, a police officer in Mogadishu mentioned that he *“would not trust not them yet”*<sup>51</sup>. The level of influence within the community to encourage some youth to go back to armed violence is still present and *“the ability of the youth to remain out of the cycle of the crime and violence is average because there are still more of their friends and families outside who are in the action and will be encouraging”*.<sup>52</sup>

The impact of the youth center and the intensive labour reached the overall community and the community nearby the center; *“the shops near the centre have good business the roads are now good and the gully has been fixed”*.<sup>53</sup>

## What have been the most significant achievements to date and why?

### Impact

4. *Is there a sound results framework in place to determine the impact the programme is having on the key issues?*
5. *What initial impact is the programme having on the ground on the key issues of community security, youth and women's engagement? What are the perceptions of stakeholders?*
6. *What are the early signs of impact on local populations - Youth, women, officials, police, business and others?*
7. *What is the likely future impact of the programme? What are the main determinants of this impact?*
8. *Have there been any unintended impacts?*

The result framework might be the weakest point of the project as it does not define clearly what the objectives of the project are, and how specific results would be measured. The results framework is more focused on activities than on the objective which leaves lots of room for confusion, and has most probably contributed to challenge the coordination of the project. A clearly measurable specific objective would have eased the coordination and distribution of responsibilities between partners.

## Is there a sound results framework in place to determine the impact the programme is having on the key issues?

The results framework is based on activities only and indicators are not related to impact and not supported by means of verification. The results framework is therefore weak in its design to measure the project performance. More over the flow of information is not efficient enough to measure these impacts. The role of the observatory is based on a relevant concept but the information enabling to measure the impact of the project is not reported to the observatory.

The Crime and Victimization surveys in Mogadishu, Galkayo, Bossasso, Buroa and Las Anod provide a detailed analysis of the key dynamics of the conflicts for each region, and as such is a very good performance, but have not been connected to further monitoring plan or used to measure or define specific indicators to assess the

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<sup>49</sup> Mogadishu, Wadajir, KII with DC

<sup>50</sup> Mogadishu, HamarWeyne.FGD.

<sup>51</sup> Mogadishu, police station.

<sup>52</sup> Galkayo, District Commissioner.

<sup>53</sup> Buroa, religious leader.

progressive impact of the project. These surveys are more of a context analysis, very good ones, than baseline surveys connected to the project implementation and project monitoring.

Example of impact indicators which could be used in such project.

EXAMPLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION
<b>SELECTION</b>	
➤ <b>Percentage of youth selected in the project part of x or x armed groups. Target: 75%. Remark: (specific armed groups should be targeted).</b>	Analysis of the database on the profile of youth selected. <i>Remarks: some analysis per armed group, level of offense, per profile would determine the profile of the youth selected and their status of "at risk".</i>
<b>REHABILITATION</b>	
➤ <b>Percentage of youth scoring less than xx in the mind set mind assessment when joining the project have improved their score by more than 25% at the end of the rehabilitation phase. Target is 75%. Remark: Responses of the mind set assessment could be weighted to provide an overall score.</b>	- Youth score on mind set assessment when joining the project. recorded in dream database - Youth score on mind set at the end of the rehabilitation phase
➤ <b>Percentage of youth improving their score on literacy test by more than 25% between the beginning and the end of the rehabilitation phase. Target 50%.</b>	- Youth literacy test when joining the project. recorded in dream database - Youth literacy test at the end of the rehabilitation phase. recorded in dream database
<b>REINTEGRATION</b>	
➤ <b>Percentage of youth involved in more than x offenses within (x) months after the end of the project. Target: less than 10%. (Definition of specific offense has to be done and example of the offenses used in the evaluation could be considered.</b>	- Tracer survey.
➤ <b>Percentage of youth reintegrated generating at least x USD per month more than 6 months after the beginning of the reintegration phase. Target: 25%</b>	- Police report.
<b>EVOLUTION OF CRIMINALITY</b>	
➤ <b>Percentage of SGBV cases reported to SWDC (for example) led to legal or police intervention. Target 50%.</b>	- Police monthly report - SWDC monthly report.
➤ <b>Evolution of the quarterly prevalence of rape in the district as a percentage comparing situation the year before the implementation of the project to the situation at the end of the project. Target: Decrease of at least 25%. Remark: this type of indicators could be repeated for each segment of insecurity targeted.</b>	- Police report. - Observatory quarterly report.

**What initial impact is the programme having on the ground on the key issues of community security, youth and women’s engagement? What are the perceptions of stakeholders?**

The security situation has been reported to evolve in each area of intervention of the project but was not necessarily related to the effect of the project. The security at community level in most of responses from KII was reported to have positively evolved for contextual reasons or increased capacity of the police.

The local perception is globally positive in terms of what the project has achieved with the youth. “Ability for the youth to live peacefully in the community has increased”<sup>54</sup> but the local perception are very subjective and no solid data could be collected to back up local perception.

The key aspect mentioned regularly during the KII was the positive aspect of the training provided to the youth. SAACID NGO who ran similar projects previously mentioned that youth preferred training compared to grants as the training could not be taken from them. More over, education is valued by the youth especially as the average age of leaving school for the overall caseload of youth is 11.2 years old. This training aspect is perceived to be important for youth reintegration process and the community security.

<sup>54</sup> KII, Mogadishu, businessman.



The level of youth and women engagement in the decision making has been reported to have significantly increased. Women ability to address SGBV cases was not perceived to be very high notably due to the lack of credibility to impose protection which emphasized the lack of efficient to influence the local decision maker to back up the women concern.

**What are the early signs of impact on local populations - Youth, women, officials, police, business and others?**


This question is also difficult to answer as the KII and the FGD will only provide perceptions and not any significant indication on impact. The youth for change is appreciated as it proposed a positive solution for the youth excluded from the community. However, the impact mentioned would be very subjective and limited. They were mainly referring to the police deployment (Mogadishu) but also the arrest of some perpetrators. However, the project is understood to focus on long terms issues rather than sort term ones and therefore the early sign of impact are difficult to measure and therefore subjective.

The status of women has not been reported to have significantly changed and remain at the same high level of risks of being risk of SGBV.




KIIs and FGDs were asked about their perception on the evolution of the security situation in their respective district. While responses cannot be totally genuine and do not represent a strict evolution of the situation but rather a trend on the perception of insecurity and the perceived reasons for these evolutions. Evolution of the security situation cannot all be imputed to the project.

**Mogadishu - evolution of security trend since the beginning of the project**




The reasons mentioned during KIIs and FGDs on the evolution of security incidents in **Mogadishu** were mainly related to deployment of police patrol, increased government presence, police patrol at night, removal of check points in the city.

**Galkayo - evolution of security trend since the beginning of the project**




The reasons mentioned during KIIs and FGDs on the evolution of security incidents in **Galkayo** were mainly related to arrest of perpetrators, poor economy and poor livelihood, decline of piracy activities at sea (leading to inland kidnapping), increased prices of land related to increased investment from piracy activities, improved access to water due aid organizations interventions, weak legal system (revenge), religious and political unrest (assassination), political instability in Galmudug (Political related security issues)

**Burao - evolution of security trend since the beginning of the project**



The reasons mentioned during KIIs and FGDs on the evolution of security incidents in **Burao** were mainly related to high proportion of perpetrators being selected in the youth for change centers, the awareness conducted by various local stakeholders, and strong government intervention.

**Bossasso - evolution of security trend since the beginning of the project**



The reasons mentioned during KIIs and FGDs on the evolution of security incidents in **Bossasso** were mainly related to the high proportion of gang perpetrators being selected in the youth for change centers, increased value of land due to piracy reinvestment, political unrest (assassination).

The KII and FGD, mainly reported impact of the project on security situation in Burao and Bossasso as the youth involved in the project were the ones generating insecurity within the community which highlights a perceived positive targeting of the youth in these two locations.

## What is the likely future impact of the programme? What are the main determinants of this impact?

The outputs of the project will quickly decrease with time if the outputs achieved in terms in rehabilitation, training and reintegration phases are not strong enough. The factors turning youth towards crime and violence are still valid and other youth involved in armed groups would play a negative influencing role on the beneficiaries of the project.

The key determinant for the youth to remain out of crime and violence will be their capacity to generate income and to be positively reintegrated within the community. Many youth indicated that they were scared about the risks related to involvement with armed groups and might have less attraction for these activities.

If the level of trust is not re established with the community, then the access to employment opportunities will proportionally decrease. A key determinant for the impact of the youth component would be the level of the community engagement and the community will to reintegrate these youth.

## Have there been any unintended impacts?

Thanks to the income received while in the center, some youth were able to get married which is a positive step and increases social linkage within the community.

The labor intensive provides some social, sanitary, economic and livelihood impact at community level which could be measured notably in the value for money aspect.

## **Value for money**

9. *Do the results thus far justify the costs?*
10. *Could the same results have been achieved with less resources?*
11. *How satisfactory are the processes for managing finances and handling contracts?*

## Do the results thus far justify the costs?

### **Ambitious pilot phase**

So far, the project is perceived to be geographically too wide spread, and the means deployed at field level are not perceived to represent very high cost.

A pilot phase would have been easier to manage on a smaller geographical coverage. This phase was understood to be a pilot project but the learning process of the pilot status has not been maximized as monitoring and coordination have not reached sufficient levels to measure, in a timely manner, what was working and what was not working.

The centers are operational with very minimal means and equipment such as chairs and tables, and no book or demonstration equipment for the skills training were displayed. If the same budget would have been focused on smaller areas, the means per center or per youth would have been higher and the means deployed to increase impact would have been stronger.

### **Controlling the beneficiaries payment aspect**

The payment for the youth is perceived to be minimal but still attract lots of interest. Increasing the amount paid to youth would not only increase the interest from all youth to join the project but would also increase the complexity and the sensitivity of the selection process. However, if the project evolves toward a process encouraging demobilization the financial should be competitive enough with what youth are currently getting while operating with armed group.

### **Exit package**

The proportion of youth receiving a package at the end of the skills or business training is limited which has financial implication, and challenges the sustainability of the youth rehabilitated if they remain unable to generate sufficient income for their living. The reintegration capacity reached at the end of the process is not the same for all. This point is important as the most difficult case as the most at risk and the less performing in the learning process would be the ones getting the less out of the completion process to get training and exit



amendments with partners are based on a “no cost extension” principle. The contracts with partners are also linked to a report to the UN risk management unit insuring that information about partners is verified and recorded.

The financial aspect from a cash flow perspective is allocated to partners through tranches based on specific level of achievement reached which is good.

## **Recommendations: How can the programme be improved?**

1. *What are the primary recommendations for guiding future programming and policies?*
2. *What evaluation methodologies should be used for future evaluations of impact and outcome?*

### **What are the primary recommendations for guiding future programming and policies?**

#### **OVERALL CONSIDERATIONS**

##### ➤ **Clarify the specific objective of the project and formulate a detailed logical framework**

The specific objective and the monitoring of the project should be clarified, or else the project can evolve towards any direction which challenges coordination and management across all actors, who may interpret the concepts of the project differently.

*Caseload targeted:* The objective of the project should be specific and should clarify which youth caseload is targeted. For example if the target is the ‘Youth at risk’ (before becoming a perpetrator of violence) then the notion of ‘at risk’ should be clearly defined through a set of measurable selection criteria. Additionally, if the project aims at targeting perpetrators of violence it should be clear which profile (which groups, which levels within the group, which type of crimes) should be integrated in the project, and security measures should be taken to identify the profile of the youth integrated, and to adapt to the related security implications. A specific understanding of the caseload profile should then enable the definition of the most appropriate curriculum.

Understanding the profile of the youth is essential as it determines what the youth centers are: Is it a place where youth can get an alternative sentencing, is it a center where youth are taken when they are ‘at risk’ of turning violent, is it a demobilization center? At Nairobi level, there are different perceptions over what this project is or what it should be. Should the DRR become more popular, it would be essential to define clear limits in the youth for change project.

*Justified selection of the youth group:* The criteria of the youth groups targeted should be very selective and justified against selection indicators, with no room for discretion. Whoever is in charge of the selection of the youth should be closely monitored and a detailed profile of the youth should be made available to the management of the project in a timely manner and for validation purpose. A second committee for validation of the caseload could be set up to increase transparency and verification.

*Specificities of each region should be acknowledged in the results framework.* The project expected achievements per region (or per neighborhoods in Mogadishu) and this should be specified in the project document. Each targeted region has different constraints and opportunities to address security at community level. Emphasis on who the target group is per region, and what the baseline is in terms of security, what and how security information is to be exchanged would clarify the objective and performance plan of the project at regional level. This would also narrow down the selection criteria of the youth targeted by the project to a regional level, contributing to decrease the bias of selecting wrong beneficiaries. In other words, the concept of the project, which is very coherent with the context, has to be narrowed down to detailed and specific regional implementation plans.

##### ➤ **Redefining the coordination aspect between the local authorities and the community based project approach**

The coordination of the community based project with the local authorities should be reinforced taking into consideration the need to challenge the local authority to increase the inclusive concept of the community based project. Creating platforms with all actors sitting around the table is not enough, and some monitoring of the influence of minorities in the decision making should be considered to really measure how this project enforces some changes on consideration of minorities (youth, women, clan minorities). Key reporting and

strategic qualitative monitoring should be set up. The district peace committee is the platform to link the local authorities to the whole of the community, and should offer the opportunity to also challenge the local authority. The DPC could be understood as a set of personalities where the inclusive process will work or not, based on how each personality and his/her profile is able to influence the decision making process of the DPC. The performance of each DPC depends on the local dynamics, the profiles of personalities, and how local partners are able influence the DPC to increase inclusiveness approach for minorities. This aspect reinforces the importance to have strong and well-connected partners able to challenge the local authority.

A strict action plan validated by a coordination board (led by UNDP) and a budget released by the same coordination board would contribute to maintain some influence capacity over the DPC. Some preconditions for the release of the funds could be related to specific reporting from various members, (to check whether minorities have enough voice within the committee, and to ensure that specific issues are addressed by the DPC, etc).

➤ **Set up a community feedback loop mechanism enabling a better appreciation of the project deviance and local perception**

Community feedback loop should be set up to collect, in a timely manner, all issues related to the local perception of the project implementation. Under the current status there is a risk of depending too much on implementing partners' reports and not to adequately include communities in the reporting process. This Community feedback loop would enable a better measurement and appreciation of the community perception over the project and to set up some points of comparisons with the information on the field reports.

➤ **Control the communication of the project**

The project being community based, the low profile aspect should not prevail and the sensitivity of the subject to address insecurity and to work with 'youth at risk' necessitates that the project should have a very clear communication strategy, and occupy the communication space to decrease opportunities for rumors developing as experienced in Galkayo. The perception of the project is critical and depends not only on the profile of the youth targeted by the project, but also on the profile of all stakeholders involved on the project.

The visibility of UNDP might be a point to consider as UNDP is perceived to be politically aligned and mainly dealing with governmental entities rather than operational at community level. As it was explained to the evaluation team, a following phase could involve UNPOS, AMISOM in some formal of a demilitarization process, with detention camps, which would increase the complexity of the project and its political dimension. Strict control over the communication would be required as UNPOS and AMISOM's engagement in the conflict could affect the overall perception and objectives of the project. The risk could be important for the implementing partners, the youth centers and for the women neighborhood watch to be perceived as part of a formal process run by actors at war.

➤ **Review of the monitoring plan of the project and the related indicators and means of verification**

A monitoring plan should be defined and implemented as the variety of actors, the sensitivity and the complexity of the project necessitates that implementation and close control over such project is critical. While most of the architecture of data collection and data analysis have already been designed, entering all monitoring data must be done. In fact, without detailed monitoring analysis available, in a timely manner at Nairobi level, no rational management of the project would be possible. A tight monitoring system is needed to identify on time what is working and what should be adjusted.

The security information from the neighborhood watch and the data from the police stations should be reported to the observatory as initially planned to provide a better global understanding of the security situation and its evolution.

The monitoring plan should also be based on measuring the indicators of the project and a proper logical framework is required with SMART indicators, and appropriate means of verification for transparency and accountability purposes in reporting. Without these, the project could evolve in any direction which could increase the complexity of project management and reporting.

➤ **Overall monitoring with timely access to information.**

There is need to re-engage with external actors of the project to feed the observatory with key data on security per region. There is also need to redefine the structure of reporting of each partner of the youth for change project to provide a space for data consolidation at observatory level.

## YOUTH CENTER MANAGEMENT

### ➤ **Creating a center where women could join**

Integrating youth female in the centers would contribute to empower women which would increase their status and their voice within the community. Women are increasingly involved in the conflict and are part of the fighters, even in a limited proportion, with Al Shabaab. ILO is already working on Women empowerment through enterprise and this aspect could be further linked to this project.

### ➤ **Create follow up mechanism for the youth who have passed through the project**

The monitoring system should enable sufficient profiling information about each youth trained at the center to get regular feedback on their evolution. This could be part of a tracer survey strategy to measure the evolution of the youth situation after the end of the project.

### ➤ **Getting credible actors on board to do the daily management of the center.**

While the project is coherent with the needs and opportunities at field level, the main weakness is in its daily management. UN agencies outsourcing services to LNGO are at risk of facing a large gap in daily supervision and reporting ability. Some entities, qualified for supervision of daily management, able to link partners and benefiting from sufficient local support within the community should be engaged to increase the daily follow up of the project and the coordination of the daily activities.

### ➤ **Payment should be done by each agency to decrease risks related to delay of payment.**


The financial income in the project is a key and sensitive issue. Without financial compensation, youth would not be interested in joining the project as they and/or their families face some financial constraints. On the other hand, the higher the package for youth would be (training, grant, monthly payment), the higher the tension would be over the selection of the youth as beneficiaries of the project.

The delay in payment of the youth has been a critical source of insecurity during the implementation of the project and was notably related, to the fact that the paying organizations were not the ones managing the center. This increased the need for the coordination process and disempowered the managing organization in dealing with the youth to address the delays. It would therefore be wiser to have implementing agencies at youth center level directly responsible for conducting payment for the youth.

### ➤ **Rehabilitation and only then training for the youth able to receive the training**

The youth most at risk are seen to spend more time in the rehabilitation phase prior to being able to join the learning process. The set-up of consecutive and conditional rehabilitation, training and then reintegration phases would increase the provision of tailored support per category of youth, and would provide training only when youth would be ready. This approach would increase the agencies' responsibility per phase and would decrease coordination pressure. However, a delay in one phase would impact on other phases. The curriculum should be very specific to provide different support for different needs and different capacities.

Youth failing some tests should be provided with more than one chance to pass these exams, and should have alternative options such as increased duration of curriculum. Some components should be prepared for the youth who failed all tests. The skills or business training should be part of the rehabilitation process and should be results oriented meaning that youth not rehabilitated should not take the place of other youth, but specific solutions – may be, based on very basic training - should be proposed to them.



## REINTEGRATION PHASE

- **Reintegration of the youth within the community should be encouraged by providing incentive and motivation and support to the community to facilitate this reintegration**

The reintegration process is first understood as an access to sustainable income generation capacity for the youth. However, the employment market and the business opportunities do remain very limited in Somalia. While no labor survey was made available during the course of the project, such surveys could determine the best sector to target to increase income generation capacity for the youth. However, there is a high probability that a significant proportion of the youth will remain with very limited income generation capacity after the end of the project, not only because of the lack of opportunity in their environment, but also because of the low level of technical expertise reached by the youth trained. A real technical assessment of the youth skills at the end of the training should be conducted to better understand the capacity built from these trainings.

Given, the high proportion of small businesses in Somalia, the set-up of youth cooperatives supported by significant cash grants remains an interesting approach but it is too early to measure its impact and to understand how the cash has been used by the youth.

The social rehabilitation is an important aspect to consider as the youth contributing the most to insecurity at the district might have, in most of the cases, lost the trust from the community and will therefore remain socially marginalized. Intensive labor which serve the community and show the youth to the community on activities serving the community do contribute to rehabilitation and therefore should be maintained. This aspect is critical in understanding how the most difficult cases will be able to access technical training and what would be their learning capacity.

The reintegration could be emphasized through support of the district safety committees where the district safety plans should integrate some components for the reintegration. Rehabilitation of specific infrastructures could employ a minimum of youth from the project, some companies employing youth from the project could



be supported either with equipment, materials or a percentage of the youth salary. The presence of businessmen in the DPC could support the concept of business opportunities for the youth. Budget allocation of the DSP could integrate some budget lines dedicated to youth reintegrating the community in order to encourage the community to develop specific approaches for such reintegration, based on the opportunities within their district and on the profile of the youth targeted within their district.

#### WCPU

##### ➤ **Change the concept of the WCPU**

The concept WPCU should be clarified. A neighborhood watch should be moved to a community sensitization on information reporting based on community awareness about a report system based on crowd sourcing concept.

The SWDC should be reinforced and refocused on the management of SGBV violence as referral, reporting and advocacy basis. This information reported by SWDC should be linked to the observatory for knowledge management purpose.

#### **What evaluation methodologies should be used for future evaluations of impact and outcome?**

Any evaluation should be based on a strong monitoring system and mechanisms of reporting and availability of means of verification. The profile of the youth and their performance at different stages of the process should be accurately measured and recorded to develop a detailed understanding of what is working and what is not, and should define also the limits of the process as some youth might be too far to be reintegrated back into their community.

The evaluation methodology would ideally come few months after the end of the project to conduct a **tracer survey** in order to better measure the real situation of the youth after the end of the project. This would allow the project to continue to connect with these youth.

### **WIDER OPPORTUNITIES: What wider opportunities exist to tackle these issues?**

3. *What other programmes, initiatives, partners, organisations, linkages should be invested in to widen the opportunities for and increase impact on tackling the key issues of community security, youth and women's engagement in South-Central?*

#### **What other programmes, initiatives, partners, organisations, linkages should be invested in to widen the opportunities for and increase impact on tackling the key issues of community security, youth and women's engagement in South-Central?**

- Low level of employment is a reality and more should be done on providing opportunities and/ or skills for youth even if they are not yet at risk. This should refer to a global employment strategy in Somalia and Somaliland implemented by various actors. Supporting existing vocational schools, business incubators ... by increasing their capacity, outside of the framework of the project of youth at risk would increase the integration element of the project and would further address the root causes of the problem as most of youth joining the armed groups or criminal activities have financial motivation.
- Advocating for Youth and Women engagement in the decision making or influence of the decision making should be supported by regular advocacy from senior staff at local authorities' level. Currently, the division of responsibilities within the local authorities is done as per the clan division but does not increase youth and women status. Should elections be held in south central, there would

be no youth representative and the youth would not be able to recognize themselves as potential candidates.

- Rape is a reality in the Somali context and more emphasis should be given to this aspect, in terms of prevention, reporting, health access, database of cases, and impunity status. With better data it should become an advocacy at clan elders' level, especially to protect women from the minority groups, and to enable the international community to act on this issue with proper data management.