



**Evaluation and Feasibility
Assessment of Demobilization
and Reintegration Pilot Project**

For

UNDP, Somalia



DRAFT REPORT

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration (DDR) is one of the most urgent obstacle and challenge to peace-building in Somalia. The issue of DDR is also of a major concern to the international and regional community in different levels. Abundance of weapons in the hands of the youth, who grew-up in a culture of violence, escalates violence in Somalia. The armed youth play an instrumental role inter-clan skirmishes that develop, some times, into wider inter-clan conflicts. The absence of rule of law and order in Somalia and the presence of heavily armed interest groups ranging from political factions, business groups, freelance militias and the Islamic Shari'a courts all make the situation in Somalia unstable. Complex clan loyalties between Somalis and the scarcity of resources have further aggravated an already volatile security situation in the country, particularly Mogadishu.

Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, is the epicentre of the Somali conflict, and has the largest concentration of armed groups in comparison to many other regions in Somalia. The city is known to have been the most violent and politically unstable city in the country in which more than approximately 20,000 armed militia groups are currently involved in the conflict.

In response to the need for a comprehensive DDR in Somalia, particularly in the city of Mogadishu, the UNDP/Somalia Programme has commissioned a community based DDR Pilot Project intended to provide training for 300 militia groups and remove light weapons, used by these militias, from the streets of the city of Mogadishu. The pilot project was implemented in northern Mogadishu by

SAACID, a local NGO, based in Mogadishu.

An evaluation conducted by the Center for Research & Dialogue (CRD), an affiliate of WSP International, reveals that the project has overall achieved its intended objectives. 300 armed militiamen and women have directly benefited from the training, 300 usable guns were collected during the implementation period of the project. The removal of these guns has positively contributed to the local security of the selected district areas from which the armed militia groups were recruited from. About 29% of the graduates in the program have obtained an immediate employment opportunity after the completion of the project.

The availability of a number of host trainers across the target areas has facilitated in the creation of a short and long-term employment opportunities for the armed youth. The project has also impacted economically in the provision of limited incentives to host trainers which allowed them to expand their services operations. Due to the widespread unemployment rate and the limited capacities of the host-trainers to hire graduates, as permanent employees, has reduced the level of employment for the graduates. Thus over 50% of the graduates remain unemployed. Based on evaluation findings, there is potential that the unemployed number of graduates may return to their old profession of carrying weapons for any interest group that may need their services. However, if the economic outlook of Somalia changes and the new TFG establishes itself inside Somalia the skills of these graduates could be utilized by the government or the new business ventures.

The attitude of those unemployed graduates may also change and adapt to

the new environment. Majority of participants interviewed trainees indicated that they have not participated in any form of formal education before the training. The time frame accorded for the trainees, to acquire basic skills, was not adequate. In order for this project to have a lasting impact in the local communities, the training period need to be extended and the number of trainees increased.

The armed militia groups have noticeable anti-social behaviour, violent and destructive manners that are not socially acceptable within communities. They routinely practice some of the most violent and socially harmful acts such as looting, rape, killing, burglary and the use of drugs. Focus group discussions conducted have revealed that a majority of the participants have indeed made some remarkable change towards violence. Families of the program participants have reported that there is less incidents of violence generated by the graduates, only 13% of the graduates have actually returned to their militia posts right after the completion of the program.

Throughout the implementation period, the project has faced number of obstacles including security treat, logistic problems. The lack of properly thought planning and inadequate time frame created a situation where many armed militia groups were unable to get the basic necessary skills or social support network to get employed. The process was further complicated by security threats in a number of areas where inter-clan conflict was dormant and periodic armed clashes have occurred before. At times, some of the trainees were tempted to re-join their militia groups.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

In 1991, Somalia descended into a full-fledged inter-clan civil war that led to the eventual collapse of all the national state institutions. The country has remained without an effective central government for over 14 years. Various heavily armed warlords, embedded in the capital city of Mogadishu, fought over the control of key resources, port-towns and the fertile lands between the Juba and Shabelle rivers. A short-lived US-led military peacekeeping operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) ended in a fiasco. Serious misjudgement and lack of coordination between the multi-national intervening forces in 1993 embroiled the UN in an un-necessary war with one of the major factions in Mogadishu which culminated in the killing of hundreds of Somali civilians and tens of foreign peacekeepers in Mogadishu. As a result, the UN led multi-national peace-keeping forces had to eventually pull-out from Mogadishu on March 1995. The hasted departure of the multi-national peace-keepers from Mogadishu, Somalia has created the increase of the proliferation of weapons into the country and the creation of new armed faction leaders.

In 2000, a Transitional National Government (TNG) was established following the outcome of a five months old peace talks held in the Djibouti town of Arta. The then new TNG, with limited recognition from many countries, was faced with fierce armed opposition from within the armed faction leaders in Mogadishu. The TNG was unable to assert control over the city of Mogadishu, and attempts to impose its authority outside the capital, has been aggressively frustrated by the armed warlords and a number of other factors. For over three years, clans and factions grouped under the umbrella of

the Somalia Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) and Mogadishu based warlords have fought the TNG, resulting in a heightened armed conflict in the southern and central regions of Somalia with still the weapons proliferation levels not withstanding.

After more than a dozen failed peace processes, a National Reconciliation Conference was launched on Oct. 15, 2002 sponsored by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). After two years of a labyrinthine negotiations in Mbagathi, Kenya, the NRC ended in the formation of a new parliament and its speaker, Mr. Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, followed by the election of Mr. Abdullahi Yussuf Ahmed, the former leader of the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland, as the new president of the Federal Republic of Somalia on October 10, 2004 to lead the transitional authority for a period of five years. The president, Mr. Ahmed, appointed a prime minister – who will form the cabinet ministers of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia.

During the interim period, following the past experience of the TNG established in 'Arta' Djibouti, the new TFG, led by Mr. Abdullahi Yussuf Ahmed, is widely believed to facing an enormous task ahead of it. Apparently, with Somalia a failed state, following its collapse in 1991, the TFG will have to laboriously get engaged itself in a sustained reconciliation and reconstruction effort throughout the country, consolidate an effective cease-fire between the armed factions now members in the TFG, demobilise, disarm and reintegrate thousands of armed militiamen, re-build an effective and functioning judicial system, control the proliferation of weapons into the porous border of Somalia, form a police and military force and establish mechanisms of sharing

internal revenues, among many other things. The new TFG is required to prove to the Somali population that a revived state is not just an instrument of predatory accumulation, repression, expropriation and clan hegemony but more of what needs to avoid all these negative perceptions.¹ One of the most important tasks awaiting the new TFG is disarming thousands of armed militia throughout the country particularly Mogadishu, the seat of the government.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration are arguably the most complex issues to be faced by the new TFG of Somalia. The three issues DDR, frequently categorized under the single umbrella, encompass the immediate term (demobilization) through the long term (reintegration). After nearly fifteen years of lawlessness, a whole generation of Somali youth knows nothing but warfare. Not all young men can be integrated into emergent security forces and many post-conflict countries have struggled in peace time to assimilate disaffected former fighters. The process is costly and in Somalia there is acute shortage of skilled personnel to oversee implementation: cash compensation, training schemes and other solutions require sustainable funding and there is little scope for the provision of counselling to tackle the effects of trauma and other mental health fallout from sustained conflict.² To succeed in the implementation of the DDR, the new TFG needs the support of the international donor agencies in

¹ Menkhaus, K., Political and Security Assessment of Southern Somalia: Implications for Emergency Response, Report to the UN Development Office for Somalia, Nairobi, December 1998.

² Dialogue for Peace, a Working Paper presented to National Project Group Meeting held in Nairobi, Kenya on Dec. 2004 by WSP International and its affiliates in Somalia.

partnership with the local support of the Somali people and institutions. Projects such as the UNDP funded community based DDR initiatives seem to reflect the need for a comprehensive DDR programs throughout Somalia particularly the heavily populated cities like Mogadishu.

1.2 DDR in the Context of Somali Culture

The form and extent of disarmament depends on the norms of the society under consideration rather than imposing a “standard model” tested on other societies. What is applicable to the current situation in Somalia may not be applicable to other societies in conflict elsewhere. There are post conflict societies where guns play major roles and therefore complete disarmament modality may seem unfeasible and possibly undesirable. Nevertheless, certain types of weapons, with no adequate socio-cultural justification to keep them, must be removed from the hands of active or former combatants.³

The spread of modern weapons (pistols and small guns and automatic weapons) became available in most of the markets throughout Somalia. These modern weapons, compounded with additional weapons, which are proliferated into Somalia, had ignited widespread violence and killings in many parts of the country.⁴

³ Ending civil wars, Pg 141

⁴ The collapse of the strong Somali Army, and its numerous abandoned arms depot created a huge supply of weapons that the decade long civil war could not exhaust. This enormous supply of weapons went into the hands of masses creating a militarized society. Weapons markets flourished in Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia. The neighbouring countries also provided their share of supply.

The collapse of the state, obliteration of the Somali national army and the subsequent inter-clan warfare between 1991 and 1992 has created a situation where many civilian populations became militarized. All forms of military arsenal were looted by both the civilian population and the armed factions then fighting for the overthrow of the military regime. Young men of the ages 13 and above were recruited as militias by the armed factions while many others, because of the widespread unemployment, took their guns for a living. Many armed militia, ownership of guns became a means for livelihood following extreme unemployment rates and lack of access to education in Mogadishu and the perception created by widespread availability of guns has contributed to the untenable insecurity situation in Mogadishu.

1.3 Project Evaluation

Based on the understanding between CRD (Center for Research & Dialogue) and UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), CRD undertook a substantive and independent evaluation for the Pilot Project “*Demobilization & Reintegration*” by Local NGO SAACID. This project was aimed to demobilize militia with meaningful alternatives in the form of skills training that will enable them to help sustain themselves productively in their respective communities.

The overall objective of this evaluation is to focus on the objectives and results achieved in the field during the implementation of the Project and purposed a set of recommendation for future replication of the project in other parts of Somalia. CRD research team made an attempt to aggressively pursue an in-depth analysis of the performance and impact of the project and the beneficiaries it addressed.

1.4 The Pilot Project

Demobilization and Disarmament requires a certain degree of momentum to be successful. This project, initiated by UNDP/Somalia, was introduced to six districts in Mogadishu at a time when the Somali Peace Process was in its final phase and was expected to produce a Somali government that leads the country towards peace and reconciliation. The general populous in the target areas have also demonstrated a level of readiness and willing to take part in the implementation of a DDR project of this nature.

For the purpose of implementing such pilot project, UNDP/Somalia has contracted SAACID, a local non-governmental organization based in north Mogadishu, to implement the Demobilization, Disarmament and Re-integration programme.⁵ The project commenced on August 2003 and ended on July 2004, a time line of 12 months, involving 300 armed militia groups selected from 6 districts inside Mogadishu. The objective of the project included the training of 300 armed militia groups with the provision of job placement as a part of providing vocational skills. SAACID was also expected to destroy 300 fully functioning weapons collected from the trainees.

2. EVALUATION FRAME WORK

2.1 Methodology

As a part of the evaluation framework, an initial consultative meeting was arranged between SAACID, the project

implementing agency, and CRD, the project evaluating organization on November 25, 2004 in Mogadishu. Out of the consultative meeting, a decision was taken on establishing structures and framework for the evaluation process. Four enumerators were hired whose duty was to gather data and conduct interviews with the participants of the project. Also two consultants were hired to synthesize the data and produce a report based on the outcome of the evaluation.

The team was given an extensive briefing about the pilot project, its background and objectives. The enumerators were given a short training on data collection and overall evaluation process and have commenced their work of interviewing and gathering data on November 28, 2005. The response from the team was positive and interactive. To enhance the capacity of the team and ensure their understanding about the objectives of the pilot project, a one day field-test was carried-out with selected districts and individuals in the target areas. The overall questionnaire testing was positive, and their feedback was incorporated into the design and techniques of the final draft questionnaires.

The questionnaires used were designed in a way which makes it easier for the participants (militia) to understand and to give the evaluating team the necessary information. The questionnaires consisted of set open-ended and close ended questions. The interviews were taken during the day between 8 AM and 3 PM. The trainees (militia) were interviewed in different locations such as SAACID centre, selected check points in the target areas, at the host trainers. Also team conducted an interview with the host trainers at their localities, district authorities and community leaders at their district centers.

⁵ SAACID is one of the oldest NGO in South-Central Somalia. SAACID has previously entered into agreements and implemented projects with number of International and local NGO

2.2 One-on-One Interview

To gain maximum information possible, specialized one-on-one interviews, with members of the participants in the training, were used in order to generate profound and reliable data. Enumerators spent a great deal of time to build a good rapport with the militia. In many aspects, one-on-one interview were used to entice detailed information from the militia known not to volunteering information easily. To encourage interviewees to feel confident and free to speak about their thoughts, they were give free space and time to express their views about the focus issues. At times, militias have demanded monetary incentives to exchange information. Every possible persuasive method was employed to avoid the demand and, at the same time, extract as much information as possible with success. One-on-one interview was also utilized for the district authorities, teachers and community leaders.

2.3 Focus Group Discussions:

To validate data collected, and gain an in-depth understanding of the overall impact of the project, a focus group discussion was used. Three FGDs meetings were held: one for the district authorities, one for the traditional and religious leaders and one for the militia groups at three distinctive places. Experienced researchers facilitated the FGDs successfully.

2.4 Profile of the Selected Districts for the project

CRD selected specific areas of the target districts during the evaluation process.

District of Kaaraan: Karaan is one of the largest districts and home of many faction leaders with substantial numbers of militia groups. In the

district, there are major business centers that employ hundreds of armed militia such as 'El-maan' Natural Seaport.

Hamar Weyne and Shangani: This is the former down town districts of Mogadishu city. In the height of the inter-clan fighting of 1992/93, these two districts were severely hit by the fighting. Many armed militiamen are occupying different sectors of the districts particularly major landmarks contested by a number of armed political factions.

Huriwaa - (also known as Heli-waa): This is a small portion of the district of Kaaraan situated in the north-eastern portion of the city of Mogadishu. It was named as a district, and made as a base, by one of the warring faction leaders of 1991/1992. There are many check-points in the area as it links Mogadishu with the district of Bal'ad, Middle Shabelle region. Many armed militiamen, from different clan constituencies, have basis set up in it.

Dharkenley: This is the single largest district in the city of Mogadishu where one of the fiercest fighting took place in 1996. Since then, the districts are contested by 5 armed factions until today. There are check-points in many different places within the two districts and due to that public and goods movement into and from the two districts is very limited.

Shibis: This district is situated at the heart of the city of Mogadishu. It was inhabited by many Somali clans and particularly people of Arab decent. Most of the minorities have left the district and their houses and business centers are now occupied by armed clans.

Bermuda: This is an area rather than a district. It is 4 portions of four bordering districts in the city of Mogadishu. Bermuda is an area at the center of Hodan, Hawl Wadaag, Waaberi and Hamar Jab-jab districts. It is a strategic area that controls the pathways to Mogadishu's main airport, seaport and roads that link the area with the center of the city. It is cut-off from most districts of Mogadishu and still remains a contested by armed factions with frequent armed conflicts to date.

Table 1 Militia and focus groups

Target Areas	Militia Interviewed	F G Part.
Kaaraan	19	15
Xamarweyne	16	9
Shangaani	10	4
Huriwaa	16	11
Dharkenlay	12	6
Shibis	10	6
Bemuda	8	9
Total	91	60

2.5 Constraints

In the process of interviews and focus group discussions, the enumerators encountered a number of constraints. These include:

Insecurity: Given the enormity of the insecurity prevailing in Mogadishu, accessibility to various locations poses serious challenges. There are a number of roadblocks, with armed militia, in control. Negotiations with multiple stakeholders in the target areas created an atmosphere of fear and confusion. At times, interviewees were forced to hire armed groups for protection.

Tracing of Project Participants: Another problem confronted with the enumerators was the tracking down of the former graduates of the pilot project as the trainees were moving from one place to another. Sometimes, if an appointment was arranged, some of the

trainees may not turn up. With the end of the project implementation 5 months prior to the commencing of the evaluation, SAACID was unable to assist in the process of tracking trainees.

Un-necessary Expectation: By conducting an interview with the district authorities and traditional elders have created an atmosphere of an unnecessary expectation such as renewal of the project and possible monetary gain from the evaluation exercise etc.

2.6 Project Design

The project proposal submitted by SAACID to UNDP clearly explains the project objectives and the complex issues of insecurity the project intends to address. It also proposes the implementation strategy based on the guidelines provided by UNDP/Somalia. Indicatively, it specifies the expected impacts, objectives and outputs of the implementation of the DDR in the selected districts in north Mogadishu. What is also observable from the project design is that SAACID was fully and well aware of what the implementing agency is expected to perform and the potential constraints that could be faced during the implementation phases.

Given the existing dynamics of various political patch-works in different parts of the selected districts throughout Mogadishu, UNDP/Somalia gave SAACID enough flexibility to adjust to the ever changing realities in the target areas to ensure the successful implementation of the project.

The overall objective of the project was to provide training and job placement to 300 militia groups from selected districts of Mogadishu. The project was also intended to entice the attending militia groups in the training to exchange their guns with skills based training which leads to an alternative mode of life for

the trainees. The training was also envisaged to help alleviate the levels of insecurity in the target areas of the project implementation. The critical long-term objective of the project was to serve as a practical experience about its applicability in other areas of the country, particularly in the major cities through-out south-central Somalia.

To ensure the successful implementation of the project in the target areas, and that a maximum impact is achieved from within the communities the project addresses, SAACID divided the implementation into 3 main phases.

➤ Phase I (Preparatory Phase): This phase involves community consultation, public mobilization, selection of the militia and collection of weapons;

➤ Phase II (Literacy & Civic Education): This phase involves the provision of health, civic and literacy education to the militia;

➤ Phase III (Vocational Skills): This phase participants were offered practical hands-on vocational training by selected host-training sites throughout Mogadishu.

3. PROJECT ACTIVITIES

3.1 Selection Process

One of the most daunting tasks in implementation of such DDR project is the selection process of the participants in the training, given the complexity of the existing local dynamics (periodical inter-clan clashes), the community diversity, different competing interests

of the stakeholders in the region which all could complicate the selection of the militia groups.

300 armed militiamen and women from 6 districts and the Bermuda enclave within the city of Mogadishu were selected. Of these selected groups, 150 were active militia, 75 women and 75 men whereas the other 150 were non-active militia. The latter, although also armed, were not taking part in an active conflict. Given the larger concentration of armed militia inside Mogadishu, it would have been more efficient that all the 300 militia groups were recruited from the active combatants.⁶

Due to the lack of a proper and clear mechanism that verifies the selection process (selected militia Vs unemployed youth) it is quite difficult to verify whether the selected militia groups are really militia. This is particularly problematic when an enumeration is paid to participants as money changes hands. Although SAACID and some of the community leaders have formed a selection committee for the participants, there is still no adequate verification mechanism that could identify the selection of the militia.⁷

⁶ The age of the selected participants in the training was between 18-30 years and their educational level was very low. Very few of them had in fact formal education, while some had limited basic literacy skills.

⁷ In Mogadishu, there is large pool of non-active but armed militia who are periodically employed by some of the businessmen, international NGOs or other sources. Although they do not receive regular payments, they are better off compared to those in active conflicts. In the case of SAACID's DDR training, it is not clear whether the non-active combatants had employment opportunity or not prior to the training.

3.2 Community Mobilization

The success of militia reintegration into civilian life largely depends on the support they receive from their families and communities. Demobilization itself is a community affairs and SAACID, as a part of their implementation strategy, has organized a community workshops in its compounds in Mogadishu. The objective of the workshop was to explain to the community the objective of the project and its intended goals. The workshop was attended by members of the community leaders, district authorities, religious leaders, elders and women groups. Participants in the workshop were also educated on the issue related to disarmament policy and the principles of demobilization and re-integration process.⁸

“Every gunman has a family and therefore it is imperative that his/her family play an important role in the re-integration of the gunman into the community”

A Community Elder

Participants interviewed by CRD indicate that SAACID had, during the workshop, consulted with the community leaders on the process of the selection of the militia groups. During the workshop, a committee for the selection of the trainees was appointed. Community leaders have initially agreed to monitor and voluntarily contribute to the supervision of the behaviour of the trainees. However, according to elders

⁸ The problem of power sharing which has been a major obstacle to the peace building in Somalia at the national level is also affecting the local level of power sharing. There is a power struggle within districts, at times there are three different authorities in one districts, each claiming to be the legitimate district authority.

interviewed, some of the community leaders declined to conduct the supervision citing lack of incentives and clear instruction from SAACID as to what they were expected of. Nevertheless, the overall support of the communities to the project was substantive and remained high throughout the project.

3.3 Collection of Weapons

As part of the admission criteria to the DDR training, participants were required to surrender a weapon in exchange for the training. During the evaluation process, CRD identified 300 stored guns reportedly collected from the militia groups before the training commenced. According to an interview conducted by CRD, it was informed that the guns in store were actually collected from the militia that attended the training. Pictures made during the training verifies that the collection of weapons have indeed taken place. Subsequent interviews with the community leaders and the district authorities authenticate the collection of the guns.

The fact that 300 guns were actually removed from circulating into the target areas is a major step ahead towards creating a secure environment. However, the method itself raises some serious questions. The armed militia, that hands-over a gun, may not mean that he/she is the real owner of the ‘gun’. Given the cost of an assault rifle, for instance an M 16, which is around US Dollars 90/-, a militiaman or woman may borrow a gun from someone else (a possessor) just to attend a training and obtain an incentive that could cover the entire cost of the M16 within a short period of time. This could mean that the actual trainee may not be necessarily a militiaman or woman. According to participants interviewed, most of the weapons handed over by the women

participants were either purchased or borrowed from some one else relatives. Thus, the concept of exchange of training with weapons may not necessarily lead to long term disarmament of an armed militia.

The site visit conducted by the enumerators at the weapons depot reveals that the types of weapons (guns) that were collected consisted of weapons made by Russia, Korea, U.S. and China. The types of weapons collected include: Stirling Assault Rifles, M 16s and few additional RPD types. The value of these collected assault weapons is comparatively very cheap to an AK 47 assault rifle sold in Mogadishu markets. Some of these weapons are not widely used in combat during conflict or even at check points in part because its ammo is relatively very expensive. However, this innovative process of weapons collection contributes to an initial disarmament process countrywide. If the process of exchanging 'training' for 'weapons' is well toned to the local dynamics and the collection process includes lethal weapons such as AK 47, it will certainly have far greater impact on local security and an over successful community-based DDR.

The scheme of 'training' in exchange for 'weapon' may, at times, prevent a lethal freelance militia, who may not permanently own a gun, to attend the training. Over the last 14 years, the most violent and brutal militia groups known as '**Sa'abbooley** (bare-handed)' were part of the fighting machine in a conflict. They often pair with an armed militiaman and in the event of death of the armed militia, the accompanying pair '**Sa'abbooley**' would takeover the weapon. The intention behind the '**Sa'abbooley**', pairing with an armed militia, is to get a weapon from the dead of the opposing militia or get one in the event of a death of his pair. If the admission, therefore, to the training is

based on the possession of a weapon by a militia, the '**Sa'abbooley**' group may not be qualified to the DDR but they could still pose threat upon acquisition of a gun.

3.4 Training

Re-integration of militia into civilian lives requires skills training for ex-combatants. Training provided to ex-combatants should have direct links to the local employment needs. Training of armed militia for direct employment, if it must succeed, has to be based on labour market assessment and should be strictly driven by demand.

Some of the challenges confronting many militia groups in Mogadishu is the acute shortage of marketable skills to support sustainable livelihoods. Many armed militia groups have very limited educational background, and in consequence to that, their amalgamation into civilian life is difficult. To implement a successful re-integration process, skills development should first be a priority for the implementing agency.⁹

"I have observed considerable change in the behaviour of the trainees since the beginning of the training."

Literacy Teacher

SAACID have not conducted adequate survey of the labour market needs in Mogadishu. It rather selected 12 vocational skills host training

⁹ Children who have no adequate access to the basic social services may end up having no employment opportunity which may, in this case, lead them to join armed militia. The lack of a central authority adds fuel to the already precarious situation, thus the intensity of insecurity many parts of Somalia.

workshops, some of whose skills could not perhaps provide employment opportunities to the militia graduates. As part of the skills training, SAACID had selected 31 host-trainers in Mogadishu offering different types of skills. These skills include: Auto-mechanic, Auto-electric, Auto-body shop (panel beater), Auto-painting, Auxiliary nurse, Tailoring, Carpentering, Welding, Electrician, Fishery, Motor winding and Administration. The participants were given 3 hours per week training for a period of 4 months. 150 trainees have successfully completed the skills training above mentioned where 35% of them were women. The attendance of the trainees during the course of the training was 80% according to an interview with the managers of the host trainers.¹⁰

Although, some of the skills training fail to provide permanent employment opportunities for the participants, the training itself will enable the armed militia groups to temporarily enter into and participate in the formal or informal job markets.¹¹ Training can also serve as a vehicle for the social reintegration of the trained armed militia groups in Mogadishu by giving them vocational skills which are considered valuable to the community as a whole.¹²

¹⁰ Some of the businesses centers approached to train the participants have declined to take part in the programme due to limited time allocated for the training. They have stated that they could only train militia groups if the time-frame of the programme is a year or more. Similar concerns were expressed by both Madina and Keysaney hospitals. Both hospitals agreed to offer training for few militia groups. Their concern was not only that the training period was too short, to prepare the trainees for the necessary skills, to gain an employment - but that time was not enough to change the attitudes and mentality of the ex-militias to fully adopt to working life.

¹¹ Although some of the graduates from the DDR program may not get an immediate job placement, the skills they have gained could be utilised once the stability returns to the city.

Based on the focus group discussion groups, the most popular choice of skills, after graduation, is tailoring. Trainers claim that 'tailoring skills' is easy to learn within a short period of time and there is a great need for it in the market place. Such 'training skills' is more convenient as it does not require a lot of money to invest. This is simple, cheap and profitable business for the graduates and there is a demand for more tailors. Women graduates, in particular, have expressed a preference for tailoring skills over other business skills because of the small investment it requires.

4.1 IMPACT ASSESSMENT

4.1 Impact Assessment

A DDR Pilot Project, whose scale is limited in terms of the training attendants and of its time-frame, may not have a feasible major impact on a city of nearly 1.5 million inhabitants with many armed militia groups circulating. Nevertheless, the challenges that confronted the evaluators is to distinguish between the direct impact of the actual project on local communities and the momentum created by the project indirectly by contributing to the existing community based peace-building efforts. The project impact assessment is divided into 3 areas:

- Employment Opportunities
- Behavioural Changes and
- Contribution to Security in the Target Areas

4.2. Employment

The challenges in Mogadishu are that there is widespread unemployment, particularly among youth. There are limited employment opportunities even for those trained armed militia groups. Since there are limited employment

opportunities for trainees, the implementing agency needs to put emphasis on the skills-training based on the assessment of the current economic conditions in order to make sure that trainees find employment based on the skills they have acquired during the training. The selected 31 host-trainers by SAACID offer some specific skills to trainees that may not offer employment opportunities. For example, training of armed militia on issues like administration, auxiliary nurse and auto-painting may not provide an immediate employment opportunity. In fact, the brief and limited skills-training for the armed militia and their low-skills levels may not help the current economic climate in Mogadishu.¹³

29% of the over-all program participants interviewed are either hired by their host trainers or are self-employed, while 71% are unemployed. 13% out of the 71% have returned to their former militia groups and the remaining 58% are unemployed and prone to return to their militia life style. Even though the rate of employment among the program participants is relatively low, yet compared to the unemployment rate in Mogadishu, in general – this rate seems significantly an improvement.

“I thought that by taking part in a skills training I would get an employment opportunity. Unfortunately, now that I have skills but no job, I am afraid I have to go back to checkpoint for living”.

A trained Militia

¹³ It is important to take into consideration that many armed militia groups, without marketable skills, will have little prospect of securing permanent employment in this kind of a situation.

One of the overlooked areas is the income generating scheme, where graduates can establish small business enterprises. The promotion of income-generating activities could have complimented the skills already acquired by the armed militia groups. This could include the provision of tools kits for use during the period the trainees are self-employed. Tools kit is meant to help the armed militia to begin an independent life. Tools kit could also assist in the event of loss of employment opportunity to try to compensate for the trainees’ temporary disappointment until possibly such time when they secure another employment.

If this type of a program is intended to be replicated in other parts of Somalia, it is important to consider that income generating schemes be considered as well as comprehensive labour-market assessment as a fundamental component. Most of the regions in Somalia, unlike Mogadishu, have no adequate host-trainers with training equipment. This is particularly the case in Baidoa and Jowhar where local host-trainers have poor equipment and limited capacity.

Table 2 Status of Militia Interviewed

Status of Graduates	Number of Graduates
Employed or Self employed	29
Unemployed	58
Militia returned to Militia life	13
Total	91

4.3 Behavioural Change

While the ultimate objective of employment is to enable armed militia groups to successfully enter into civilian life, together employment and training can serve as a vehicle towards social and behavioural changes of the militia. It is equally important that training should

emphasize skills that assist militia to successfully socialise with the communities.

After years of civil unrest, it is difficult that armed militia groups, involved in fighting, to instantly change their attitude and behaviour psychologically. Because of the trauma that combatants have inherited from active armed conflicts, it is not easy that they (armed militia groups) adjust to the maximum required attitudes and expectations. The armed militia groups have noticeable anti-social behaviour, violent and destructive manners that are not socially acceptable within communities. They routinely practice some of the most violent and socially harmful acts such as looting, rape, killing, burglary and the use of drugs. However, focus group discussions revealed that majority of the participants have indeed made some remarkable change towards violence. Families of the program participants have reported that there is less incidents of violence generated by the graduates. Only 13% of the graduates have actually returned to their militia posts right after the completion of the program.¹⁴

4.4 Contribution to Security in the Target Areas

The removal of 300 weapons from the streets of Mogadishu had certainly contributed to the long-term security of the city. The militia groups that possessed the weapons that were handed over, and the training they have attended, had enhanced the security situation in the target areas. Community elders and traditional leaders interviewed have indicated that the security of the districts, particularly the check-points in

the target areas, has relatively become less violent. However, they could not ascertain whether this relative improvement of security is directly related to the training offered or other variables.

“I suggest that instead of recruiting new militias for the next training, the graduates of the old training should be given another chance to properly complete their training”

*Dr Sheikhdoon Salaad, Director
for Medina Hospital*

5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Recommendations

Based on interviews conducted during the evaluation process and subsequent impacts assessment made, it is widely agreed that the project has achieved considerable success in the community. We recommend that the project should be expanded and its timeline extended, particularly in other 6 remaining districts of Mogadishu. The level of success achieved can be replicated in other districts of Somalia like Baidoa and Jowhar where there is large concentration of armed militia groups. Following are the set of recommendations based on the interviews, visits, community consultations and observation made by researcher team:

A) Extension of Training Period

Majority of participants interviewed trainees indicated that they have not participated in any form of formal education before the training. The time frame accorded for the trainees, to acquire basic skills, was not adequate.

¹⁴ If employment or other incentives are not forth coming, the remaining militia groups may return to their old form of lives as a matter of necessity. Elders interviewed confirm that militia groups will eventually return to militia lives unless employment opportunities are provided.

For instance, a trainee with no formal education back-ground cannot learn administration skills within 4 months period of time. Likewise, skills training on auto-mechanic need a period of more than 4 months.

B) Comprehensive Labour-market Assessment

Some of the challenges that have confronted the graduates have been the acute shortage of relevant skills to support a sustainable livelihood. There is a need of a more comprehensive analysis of labor-market assessment that should be strictly demand-driven. This type of Pilot Project will only be beneficial if supported by adequate assessment of the existing skills in the target areas and the host trainers. This assessment will also have to identify other practical skills such as attitude, norms and abilities of the militia.

C) Enhanced Verification Mechanism

The weapons collected so far through exchanging 'Training' for 'Weapon' was remarkably effective. What is required though for future implementation of such project is to establish a verification mechanism that identify the type of weapons to be collected, militia groups that possess these weapons and the location of the armed groups. The intention of this is to verify that the weapons to be collected are the lethal ones and the militia groups are the rightful owners of these weapons. What is equally important is to train the DDR implementing agency on weapons disposal and collection process.

D) Sustained Community engagement

Implementation process of DDR should not only be limited to one agency. In

fact, it imperative that the community and civil society members be included. The process should be a community-own and driven. Future projects need to accommodate all stakeholders involved in a conflict and the civilian population through the local news outlets.

E) Conflict Resolution Training

Part of the training, on top of skills training with vocational skills, participants should also be introduced with lessons on conflict resolution methods. Armed militia groups have no skills to resolve their conflicts through peaceful means. The capacity of the militia to resolve daily conflicts and manage their relationships will determine the successful re-integration into the society.

F) Securing support from Political Authorities

When the pilot project was undertaken, most of the prominent political faction leaders were outside Somalia attending the Somali peace and reconciliation conference in Nairobi, Kenya. These faction leaders were busy securing their political ambitions. Their absence has facilitated the smooth implementation of the DDR Pilot Project. In the future, if similar projects will be implemented, it is necessary that the faction leaders are consulted and requested to participate in the process.

G) Partnership with Business Groups

To ensure community participation and ownership, the funding agency needs to form partnership with business groups, not only for moral support, but also financial contribution. For example, establishing an income generating scheme, business groups such as telecommunication and remittances

companies may provide an investment and/or contribution to such schemes. Particularly this is the case where local companies are assuming corporate responsibilities.¹⁵

The business community must be fully engaged in any future demobilization initiatives as the private sector is the single biggest employer of armed militia. The Somali business community members are heavily armed and they can either derail the demobilization process or support.

H) Limitation of Female Participants in the DDR

There are no known active Somali women combatants in an armed conflict in Mogadishu. They may have only been assisting the armed militia groups as logisticians by providing fuel, ammunition or cooking food for the militia groups. However, in the event women groups are included, program designers must ensure that physical and medical needs for women are adequately addressed as well as other social needs such as child-care etc.

I) Active Involvement of Funding Agencies

Funding agencies must take part in all the implementation stages or phases of the project. This is particularly important where local organization's capacities are limited and governing institutions are absent.

J) Long-term Commitment of Implementing and Funding Agency

Re-integration has a long-term focus of assisting the armed militia groups in the difficult transition into civilian life. There is need to encourage graduates not to return back to their militia life-style. This must not necessarily be fund driven but rather community based. For instance, some of the business groups or the governing institutions, where available, could provide long-term opportunities to militia groups after graduation.

5.2 Conclusion

Reintegration is both an economic and social process, and is likely to be on the medium to long term agenda and not an immediate concern. To guard against ostracism of ex-combatants, reintegration of militias could be placed within the context of general reintegration efforts, which will be aimed at the internally displaced and refugees also. If demobilisation and re-integration are intended to play a role, it is necessary that it addresses a broader process of national reconciliation. There is also need that it must be built in such a way that it brings together all the groups and individuals in the conflicting sides. DDR has proved to be complex, time-consuming and expensive, but essential to sustaining lasting peace in post-conflict areas. It is therefore important that the DDR efforts are coordinated and well funded to be sustainable.

After 14 years of anarchy, Somali youth knows only warfare. Not all young men can be demobilized and integrated into emergent security forces or any other civilian life. The process of DDR is very costly and in many parts of Somalia there is acute shortage of skilled personnel to oversee implementation of such

¹⁵ Nation-Link Telecommunication Co., one of the largest telecommunication companies in Mogadishu, have once entered partnership with a local NGO, Elman, in a project funded by UNICEF Canada on the rehabilitation of child soldiers.

initiative. UNDP initiative of DDR came at a time when the national reconciliation process was in its final phase and expected to produce a government that brings peace and stability in Somalia. The initiative has created expectation among the people in Mogadishu. This bold initiative has already generated a spin-off in other socio-economic sectors i.e. the economy, security, public mobilization etc. in spite of short falls as indicated in the proceeding chapters. It has achieved a relative success in the target areas.

If the recommendations made in this report are considered, the designing and planning of future DDR in other major cities throughout Somalia will be successful and contribute to a lasting peace in Somalia.

PART II

Organizational Capacity Assessment of Selected Organizations & District Jowhar

6. ORGANIZATIONAL ASSESSMENT

6.1 Overview

To expand this pilot project into the other 6 remaining districts of Mogadishu, it is necessary to identify a local partner that can deliver short and long term implementation of the DDR. This is particularly the case in Mogadishu where there are a number of competing clan based institutions, with limited capacity, in under-taking DDR pilot projects. CRD conducted an organizational assessment as to which, among many, can deliver the services of DDR.

There are numerous active local organizations in Mogadishu which have sprang out of the collapse of the Somali state. Many of these organizations exclusively depend on donations given by aid agencies. Nevertheless, there are few, among many organizations, which have the capacity and experience on issues related to DDR of militia, particularly in their areas of operations, which have acquired a certain level of expertise and specialization for which they are reputed.

Demobilization and reintegration of militias is an area that only a limited number of organizations have managed to get involved because of the potential risks associated with working with militias. There are three local organizations that are selected for their capacities in implementing demobilization programs in south Mogadishu. These are Elman Peace Center, Somali Peace Line and HINNA (Somali Women's Peace Vanguard).

Following is the profile of each of the three organizations including weaknesses and strengths as well as the peer review by external and local actors

7. ELMAN PEACE CENTRE

7.1 Background

Elman Peace Center (formerly known as OTTI) was established as a non-profit organization in Mogadishu in September 1991, by a group of Somali intellectuals led by the late peace activist, Mr. Elman Ali Ahmed, following the overthrow of the Somali Government and the collapse of the state institutions.

Elman was founded on the principle that the only way to make lasting changes to the situation in Somalia was to break the cycle of violence through education & the creation of opportunities for the young generation. The centre started its activities with rehabilitating child-soldiers by creating income generating opportunities.

The organisation has worked on activities related to the demobilisation and reintegration of armed youth. The centre implemented DR projects in the past with International Organisations such as the UNICEF, UNESCO and is currently in the closing phase of program on the rehabilitation and reintegration of child soldiers in Mogadishu, Marka and Kismayo. This current active program is funded by Canadian Government

As part of its work with marginalised children, over 1500 children and youth have successfully completed various vocational and literacy training at the centre. Many of the former students presently have well-established business that sustain their families and productively contribute to the community. Many of the former students currently act as trainers at the centre and are the best role models for other youth in search of a better alternative for themselves and their

families.

7.2 Organizational Objectives

The Vision of Elman Peace Centre is to assist in the establishment of a stable Somalia with a better future for its children and disadvantaged youth, where the rights of all Somalis are equally respected. Also Elman Peace Centre intends to dissuade youth and children in Somalia from joining armed conflict in their communities by facilitating meaningful alternatives through vocational, technical and trade skills trainings. Over the years EPC has implemented a number of DDR projects funded by various international NGOs including UNESCO and CARE. The specific organizational objectives of EPC are:

- To assist youth in high risk and vulnerable groups from disadvantages families by providing them with practical skills to earn a living as an alternative to the war machine;
- To strengthen the capacity of local communities to enable them meet and sustain their development needs;
- To promote peace and human rights throughout Somalia;

7.3 Management Structure

The centre has board of directors consisting of 9 members with the responsibility to oversee the operational and program management of the

organization. EPC currently employs 20 staff members with different responsibilities. These include:

- Community outreach officers
- Conflict resolution practitioners
- Counsellors
- Literature and numeracy trainers
- Recourse centre manager
- Security staff
- Cleaner

7.4 Strength

EPC has a proven track record in program development and delivery of a community based activities. The organisation enjoys tremendous support from the community and has strong ties with the civil society organizations and local authorities. The center has demonstrated a capacity to undertake large projects with remarkable success. Partnership organizations, who have in the past entered an agreement with EPC, acknowledged its capacity. Particularly partners have emphasized the strong board of directors who have demonstrated capacity to monitor and evaluate its activities..

7.5 Weakness

Like many other institutions in Somalia, EPC suffers from lack of core funding. This has created as a consequence that good employees leave upon completion of project. As a pit-fall, EPC has to recruit new employees. Currently, EPC has employed 20 staff members.

Table.3 Summary of the projects implemented, dates and donors funded:

Date Implemented	Duration	Project name	Sector	Funder	Status
1993	8 months	Put the gun, Take the pen	Rehabilitation	UNOSOM	Completed
1993	4 months	Fuel Distribution	Electricity	CWS	Completed
1994	8 months	Handcraft Education	Carpentry and Masonry	OXFAM UK	Completed
1994	3 months	Orphanage	Rehabilitation	CWS	Completed
1994-95	2 years	Food for Work	Sanitation	WFP	Completed
1995	4 months	Street Children	Rehabilitation	CARITAS	Completed
1996-98	3 years	Light for Peace	Electricity	DBG	Completed
1997-98	2 years	Capacity Building	Elman Centre	EU	Completed
1998	8 months	Feeding 100 Children	Relief	WFP	Completed
1999	1 month	Food and tents	Relief	WFP	Completed
2001	3 weeks	Workshop and Research	Demobilisation	UNDP through SCPO	Completed
2001	6 months	Gunmen	Rehabilitation	Italian Gvmt through UNESCO	Completed
2001-2002	18 months	Child Soldiers	Rehabilitation	UNICEF	Ongoing

7.6 Assessment

EPC is well positioned to undertake DDR projects given its long history of dealing with DDR projects previously. It has also been active in bringing together professionals in support of creative initiatives for underprivileged and marginalised youth. EPC has strong credibility in the community and can perform professionally on issues related to DDR because of the equipment they have, venues and adequate human resources it possesses.

Organizational Contacts

Email: elmanpeace-hrc@hotmail.com
elmanpeacehrc@yahoo.com

8. SOMALI PEACE LINE

8.1 Background

Somali Peace Line (SPL) was founded in October 1995. It is a non-profit organization based in Mogadishu, Somalia. The SPL is known to adopting in the unwavering neutrality in all its activities on peace building related issues in Somalia.

With the support from the Somali Diaspora, it has participated in many reconciliation efforts and peace-building matters. During late 1990s, SPL has indirectly participated in a number of initiatives related to DDR activities.

8.2 Organizational Objectives

The Mission of SPL is to build a sustainable peace for Somalis through community based peace building approach. SPL has facilitated in the promotion of knowledge and skills to many Somalis in order to be able to resolve conflicts. Organizational

objectives include training and mobilization of civil society organizations.

SPL is managed by a governing body consisting of 9 executive elected at an annual General Meeting. Management team comprises of a deputy chairman, program officer, training and reconciliation officer, gender and minority rights officer and other support staff.

8.3 Main Activities

SPL is actively engaged in the demobilization of both youth and adults as a way of improving the security situation of the city and in particular to manage specific crisis affecting certain communities in the city. SPL's firm believe is to work along the lines of Community-based approach. Activities of SPL include:

- Survey of militia concentration in Mogadishu;
- Assessment possible disarmament in Mogadishu;
- Coordinated Peace Journey throughout Somalia;
- Facilitated resolution over crisis in the animal market of Mogadishu;

8.4 Training Workshops

From 1997 to date, SPL has implemented 23 major training workshops on Conflict Resolution, Peace Consolidations, Capacity Building, Human Rights campaign, 73 Peace Advocacies and Capacity Building inside and outside Somalia. The efforts of SPL have contributed to the dismantling of former green-line that separated Mogadishu. The SPL workshops were attended by 674 social leading groups including: 200 teachers, women groups, intellectuals, youths, elders, traditional

leaders, religious groups, politicians, regional and district officers, police officers, ex-combatants, business communities, artists and other peace activities.

8.5 Mediations

Somali Peace Line had on a number of occasions mediated successfully conflict between armed communities and humanitarian aid agencies working in Somalia. It also facilitated in the inter-clan conflicts such as the conflicts in Galgudud, Afmadow district, gedo region and Bay & Bakool regions.

8.6 Human Rights

In addition to its activities in peace, SPL has also campaigns for the rights of the vulnerable and marginalized groups in Somalia, with particular references to women and minority group rights.

8.7 Strength

SPL has demonstrated capacity to design and implement training workshops; has successfully mediated conflicts between militia groups and their top leaders.

8.8 Weakness

SPL have not effectively conducted a DDR project. SPL also have no experienced skilled DDR trainers. However, SPL can form partnership with the other identified experienced organizations to design a training workshop for a DDR.

8.9 Assessment

SPL is a local organization that has strong credibility in the Somali community both in Mogadishu and elsewhere. Its strength lies in the facilitation, training and targeted mediation efforts. They are also good in

community mobilization activities. They have limited capability in DDR related issues because of its lack of adequate human resources and training equipment particularly vocational training skills. However, they could assist in the implementation of the pilot project through training and facilitating community engagement in the program.

Contacts

Eden Residence, Km5
Mogadishu, Somalia
E-mail: peaceline@globalsom.com

9. SOMALI WOMEN'S VANGUARD FOR PEACE (HINNA)

9.1 Background

Hinna is a not-for-profit community based organisation based in Mogadishu, Somalia. It was established on 28th April, 2003 by a group of prominent Somali women. Its main objectives are to work directly with the communities in Mogadishu on the improvement of peace and security in the city. In its short history, they have successfully campaigned for peace and security in Mogadishu with a remarkable success in its efforts. They have successfully reopened social services facilities that were closed since 1991. These include hospitals, roads, schools, etc. They have also conducted a short-term mobilization initiative in Mogadishu including the facilitation of trainings for the Neighbourhood Watch where many armed militia groups, who initially were the perpetrators of unrest, later became neighbourhood guards.

Hinna is a relatively new organisation and its formal organisational structure is much weaker compared to the previous two organisations. There is no governing board to oversee the activities of the organization.

9.2 Organization Objectives

HINNA's vision is to building lasting peace and respect for the human rights. The organization believes in the development of peace culture within the framework of enhanced traditional participatory in conflict transformation and peace building process. Organizational objectives include:

- To support community based development program, linking peace with development, and promoting a culture of peace, democratic values, and good governance.
- Demobilize armed militias through the intervention of skills training and literacy campaign.
- Empowering women through awareness raising in education and advocacy.

Activities from April 2003 – October 2004

- Helped release 7 kidnapped civilians in Mogadishu.
- Persuaded militias to disband 14 checkpoints held by the armed militia groups.
- Successfully reopened 5 main roads in Mogadishu that were closed for 13 years.
- Distributed food for patients in Martini hospital in Mogadishu
- Opened 10 schools for a campaign against illiteracy targeting armed militias in Mogadishu.
- Invited and brought together more than 1000 personalities including: political factions, members of the Transitional National Government, women, youth, and traditional leaders for the establishment of an administration in Mogadishu.

- Contributed to the foundation of the civil defence groups.
- Succeeded to reopen the Maternity and Children's Banadir hospital in Mogadishu closed since 1991.

9.3 Strength

The key strength of HINNA is Community mobilization and public advocacy.

9.4 Weakness

HINNA has no adequate skilled human resources. It also has no capacity to engage in DDR.

9.5 Assessment

HINNA is relatively a new organization. It has no adequate capacity and human resources to implement a pilot project like DDR. Their weakness lies in the program development and shortage of human resources.

10. RECOMMENDATION

After having conducted a comprehensive organizational assessment against the objective of a DDR pilot project, we recommend that Elman Peace Center be selected to implement the extension and expansion of the DDR pilot project in south Mogadishu.

11. JOWHAR FIELD ASSESSMENT

11.1 Brief Background

CRD conducted a brief field assessment in Jowhar to examine a possible implementation of a DDR pilot project. The assessment was focused on the existing armed militia groups, their affiliation to the authorities and clan constituencies in the region as well as the existing infrastructure such as host trainers and the available vocational skills. Throughout the field assessment, CRD has met with members of the local authorities, traditional elders, militia commanders and their groups as well as the business groups.

11.2 District Profile

The district of Jowhar is the capital of Middle Shabelle region. It is situated in the north-eastern part of Mogadishu. Its distance from the capital, Mogadishu, is 120 KMs. The district is agriculturally rich and it hosted the major development projects of the previous Somali governments. The inhabitants in the area are of multi-clan structure. Because of its richness in agriculture and clan diversity, the district is prone to conflict over resources rather than occupation, as is the case in Lower Shabelle.

Since the collapse of the Somali state, there was dispute over the issues of governance in the region where the heavily armed indigenous groups have dominated power over the indigenous unarmed minorities. This has since then precipitated armed inter-clan conflicts and, in consequence, led to creation of substantial number of armed militia vying for power and resources. In 2001, Mohamed Dheere, an armed faction leader from the heavily armed indigenous groups, has captured the city

establishing a local administration without proper consultation with the inhabitants of the region. His administration brought relative stability in the district of Jowhar. Unlike many regions in south-central Somalia, the Middle Shabelle administration has set up a functioning and effective local administration.

11.3 Militia Groups

The guess estimation of the concentration of the militia groups, whether under the authority of the regional administration or, independently, the clan constituencies in the region, is about 700 – 1,500.¹⁶ Most of these armed militia groups have no skills and they constantly perpetuate violence in the area. A focus group discussion conducted by CRD in Jowhar indicates that the number of armed militia groups have been on the rise and in parallel to that created higher levels of instability in the area. It is a priority both for the regional administration and the different clan constituencies in the area to have a DDR program implemented. A pilot program of a DDR would help alleviate the constantly growing insecurity problems in the region.

11.4 Local Capacities

The local capacities in the region are acutely short in terms of vocational skills. The district has 16 host trainers with the capacity to provide skills based training ranging from Auto-Mechanic, limited Carpentry to Welding with a capacity to handle 72 students all together. If the SAACID model of DDR is to be implemented in Jowhar, Middle Shabelle region there is need to raise the capacity of the local host trainers.

¹⁶ This estimation is based on interviews with militia groups, business groups interviewed during the field assessment conducted by the researchers.

Table.4 Available Host-Trainers in Jowhar

Type of host trainers	Number of Business	Potential trainees to be trained
Auto mechanics	2	11
Auto-electric	2	5
Auto body build	1	2
Welding	2	4
Carpenter	1	3
Electrician	1	5
Tailoring	6	24
Computer Training	1	20
Total	16	74

in the region: Adale, Warsheekh and Aden-yabaal.

One advantage the district of Jowhar has is the potentiality of agriculture as a skills training program which can, in many ways, be re-invented as an income generating project. This includes substance agriculture kit, small animal husbandry project, food processing, poultry farming. The project could also be directed as a credit-scheme program.

Unlike the situation in Mogadishu, following the SAACID pilot project, Jowhar district can create an employment opportunity to many armed militia groups with vast incentives available if properly invested. Many armed militia groups can have employment opportunities if the agricultural sector is adequately invested. This kind of agriculture based model is applicable in most of the agriculturally fertile areas of Somalia.

Given the political dynamics on the ground, and the enormity of the armed militia in the area, CRD recommends that UNDP extends DDR Pilot project to Middle Shabelle region particularly in the district of Jowhar. The local administration is also requesting the extension of a DDR project not only in Jowhar district but other major districts

ANNEX 1

Tracer Study Participants

District Authorities

Abdullahi Ibrahim Sahal – District
Chairman, Hamarweyne
Abdisalaad Abdullahi Kuulow – Deputy
Chairman of Hodan District (Bermuda)
Abdi Ahmed Barrow (Food Adde) –
District Chairman, Heliwaa
Mahad Ahmed Daahir, Acting Chair of
Shangani district, and deputy chair

Enterprises/Host trainers

Abdirahman Abukar Sh. Ahmed
KESCO Electricity
Kaaraan/Beexaani

Barre Ali Alasow
Hosada Ifka – Tailoring and Electricity
Sii-Sii?

Mukhtar Yusuf Haji Osman
Almukhtar Tailor
Boondheere

Eng. Muse Mohamed Sheikh
Somali Seaman Union
Liido

Ali Muhudiin Ismaan
Hosada Malabow Auto mechanic
San'a

Abdullahi Hussein Mohamed
Hosada Banadir 1 – Auto mechanic and
Auto electricity
San'a

Mohamuud Sebriye Nur
Suuq Ba'aad training school – Tailoring
Suuq ba'aad

Ali Yusuf Mohamuud (Ali Bille)
Keysaney Hospital
Kaaraan

Asha Ahmed Ali
Tailoring Trainer – employed by
SAACID
Abdiaziz

Sh. Omar Mohamuud Iyow
Alla-Aamin Tailoring training school
Kaaso Bobalaare

Shiikhdoon Salaad Ilmi
Madina Hospital
Madina

Hassan Daahir Dir'a
Hosada Dir'a – Auto mechanic
Taleeh

Abdulkadir Ali Duqow
Adala (welding)
Afarta Jirdiino (the four gardens)

Fishing

Mustaf Abukar Ma'ow – Kaaraan

Auto-Mechanic

Ibrahim Mohamuud Nur – Heliwaa
Mohamed Abdulle Hussein – Heliwaa
Abdi Muhiyadiin Ahmed – **San'a ?**
Bashir Ibrahim Sheikh – Bermuda
Haashi Hussein Moalim – Yaaqshiid
Abdi Mohamed Nur – Yaaqshiid
Faisal Ali Mohamuud – Yaaqshiid
Omar Mohamuud Sheikh – Shangani
Salaad Mohamed Odowaa – Dharkenley
Mahdi Abdullahi Hassan – Heliwaa
Awil Ahmed Ali – Hamarweyne
Sulebaan Hassan Abdi – Hamarweyne
Hassan Mohamed Sudi – Hamarweyne
Abdirashid Hareed Adan – Hamarweyne
Ahmed Farah Surian – Hamarweyne

First Aid

Fatima Mohamuud Mohamed –
Yaaqshiid
Ali Mohamed Hassan – Dharkenley
Nasleeh Hussein Ahmed – Shibis

Ikhro Geedi Madahey (F)? – Kaaraan
 Faarah Mohamed Arale – Abdiaziz
 Daahir Qasim Moalim – Kaaraan
 Ali Omar Mohamuud – Dharkenley
 Abdullahi Mohamuud Ali – Shibis
 Ugaaso Mohamuud Jim'aale (F) –
 Heliwaa
 Hamdi Diiriye Awaale (F) – Dharkenley
 Yonis Ali Qaboobe – Bermuda

Electricity

Abdulkadir Mahamed Ali – Kaaraan
 Abdullahi Ahmed Joodah – Heliwaa
 Hassan Sabriye Ga'al – Dharkenley
 Abdi Ali Gurey – Heliwaa
 Muqtaar Foolyare Barrow – Bermuda
 Barre Mohamed Afrah – Dharkenley
 Abdirisq Sheikh Mohamed Addow –
 Dharkenley
 Daahir Mahamuud Yare – Heliwaa
 Abshir Hassan Mohamed - ?
 Mohamed Yusuf Ali – Shangani
 Ismael Mohamed Hassan – Kaaraan
 Salaad Yusuf Hussein – Hamarweyne
 Abdi Abdullahi Aadan – Hamarweyne
 Ali Omar Mohamuud – Hamarweyne
 Dahir Mohamed Guuleed - Wardhiigley

Tailoring

Mowliid Mohamed Jeylaani – Shibis
 Ahmed Mohamud Alasow – Kaaraan
 Aasiya Sheikh Ibrahim (F) – Yaaqshiid
 Shamsa Mohamed Ahmed (F) –

Huriwaa

Khadijo Mohamed Aroole (F) –
 Abdiaziz
 Nuur Barri Ali – Shibis
 Badro Mohamed Nuur (F) – Kaaraan
 Amina Moalim Hassan (F) – Kaaraan
 Maryam Mohamud Araale (F) – Kaaraan
 Sahro Mohamed Xaaji (F) – Bermuda
 Khadija Omar Ali – Dharkenley
 Amina Bedel Hassan – Shangani
 Mohamed Ahmed Badal (M) – Shangani
 Adar Aadan Hassan – Shangaani
 Mohamed Abdi Sheikh (M) –
 Hamarweyne

Hassan Dhoore Jim'aale (M) –
 Hamarweyne
 Sahro Ahmed Addow – Yaaqshiid
 Amina Alasow Gaabow – Kaaraan
 Mohamud Mohamed Farah (M) –
 Hamarweyne
 Shamsa Ibrahim Sheikh – Heliwaa
 Shire Mohamud Awil – Dharkenley
 Halimo Abdullahi Mohamed – Shibis
 Abdullahi Yusuf Mohamed (M) –
 Kaaraan
 Maryam Mohamud Alasow – Kaaraan
 Hindia Husein Yalahow – Yaaqshiid
 Leila Hassan Muhumud – Kaaraan
 Abdinasir Mohamed Ali (M) –
 Hamarweyne
 Amina Yusuf Ali – Hamarweyne
 Fatima Ali Hassan – Shibis
 Ubah Barre Hassan – Hamarweyne
 Abyan Yusuf Geele – Hamarweyne
 Kowsar Farah Warsame – Dharkenley

Secretarial

Muse Kasim Moalim –
 Shibis/Bermuda??
 Fatima Mohamed Hassan (F) – Kaaraan
 Ahmed Moalim Ali – Shibis
 Abdullahi Moalim Isse – Heliwaa
 Muhuyadiin Abdi Adolow – Shangani
 Deeqa Ahmed Hassan (F) – Shangani
 Said Haaruun Mohamed – Shangani
 Mohamed Abdulahi Hundubey –
 Shangani
 Anfac Omar Ahmed (F) - Shangani

Welding

Ahmed Jiinow Hassan – Heliwaa
 Hassan Abdi Mohamed – Yaaqshiid
 Ahmed Abdulkadir Sheikh – Shibis
 Yoonis Abdulahi Sheikh – Shibis
 Abdullahi Omar Adde – Shibis
 Mohamed Ga'al Omar - Dharkenley

Carpentry

Abdi Sheikh Mohamed – Karaan
 Abdi Ahmed Mohamed – Shibis

ANNEX 2

Questionnaire for District Authorities

1. Name (Magac): _____
2. Age (Da'da): _____ Sex: _____
3. Place of Birth (Goobta dhalashada):-- _____
4. The name of this district/area (Magaca degmadan/goobtan): _____
5. The title of the interviewer (tiitalaha/magaca wareystaha): _____

6. Can you tell us estimated population number of your district/area? (Ma noo sheegi kartaa qiyaasta tirada dadka degmadan/goobtan ku nool)
7. About how many households are permanently residing? (Waa imisa qoysaska sida joogtada ah u degan)
8. About how many households are temporarily residing? (Waa imisa qoysaska sida ku meelgaarka ah u degan)
9. The most important reasons that these households moved into this area are: (sababaha ugu muhiimsan ee qoysaskan ugu soo guureen halkaan waxay tahay)
 - a) Displaced by warfare or expected warfare elsewhere (waxay ka soo barakaceen dagaalo ama kuwa la filayo inay dhacaan)
 - b) Came for work (shaqo ayay soo raadiyeen)
 - c) Came to receive food aid (waxay u yimaadeen inay helaan mucaawino cuno ah)
 - d) Have come to find health care (waxay u yimaadeen inay helaan daryeel caafimaad)
 - e) They escaped from political persecution (waxay ka soo carareen cadaadis siyaasadeed)
 - f) They belong to the strongest clan in this area (waxay ka soo jeedaan qabiilka ugu xooga badan ee goobtaan)
 - g) Others, Please specify (kuwa kale, fadlan cadee)
10. Where did most of these temporary households come from? (halkee ka yimaadeen qoysaska aan inta badan joogtada aheyn)
11. How many permanent households are evacuated from your district/area? (Meeqo qoys oo joogta ah ayaa laga barakiciyay degmadaada)
12. The most important reasons they left are: (sababaha ugu muhiimsan oo ay u tageen waxay tahay)

- a) To escape the warfare or expected warfare (inay ka fakadaan dagaal ama mid la filayo inuu dhaco)
 - b) To escape forced recruitment into militia (inay ka fakadaan in si xoog ah loogu daro maleeshiyada)
 - c) To escape political persecutions (in ay ka baxsadaan cadaadis siyaasadeed)
 - d) They left for work (shaqo ayay raadsadeen)
 - e) To receive food aid (inay helaan cuno mucaawino ah)
 - f) To get health care (inay helaan daryeel caafimaad)
 - g) Others, please specify (kuwa kale, fadlan cadee)
13. What was your role of the training programme?(maxuu yahay doorkaaga ku aadan barnaamijka tababarka ah)
14. How did you select the participants? (sidee u dooratay ka qeybgalayaasha)
15. What criteria did you use for their selection? (waa maxay sharuudaha aad ku xulatay)
16. What did they use to do for the district authority/community? (maxay u qaban jireen maamulka iyo bulshada degmada)
17. Do you believe that the training programme has changed the behaviors of the participants? (ma filaysaa in barnaamijka tababarka wax ka badalay hab dhaqanka ka soo qeybgalayaasha)
18. Are these schools in the district? (iskuuladan ma waxay ku yaalaan degmadan)
- a) Yes (haa)
 - b) No (mayaa)
 - c) I don't know (ma garanayo)
19. Up to what level do they go: (ilaa heerkee ayay yihiin iskuulada)
- a) School I
 - i. Through Primary Education (Dugsi hoose)
 - ii. Through secondary school (dugsi sare)
 - iii. Others, please specify (kuwa kale, fadlan cadee)
- *** Use the codes of School I for the answers of other schools (u isticmaal iskuulada kale qaabka jawaabaha Iskuulka I)
- b) School II
 - c) School III
20. About how many students currently go to these schools? (meeqa arday ayaa hadda iskuulka tagta)
21. If there is no school at all, how far is the nearest school? (hadii uusan iskuul jirinba, intee ayuu idiin jiraa iskuulka idinkugu dhow)

22. Are there health facilities in the district? (goobo caafimaad ma jiraan degmadaan)
- a) Yes (haa) b. No (maya)
23. If yes, what kind of health care facility is there? (haday haa tahay, daryeel caafimaad nooc ee ah ayaa jira)
- a) An outpatient dispensary (OPD) (Bukaan socod eegto)
 b) Health post – HP (Rug caafimaad)
 c) Clinic or Hospital (isbitaalo ama kiliiniko)
 d) Others, Please specify (kuwo kale, fadlan cadee)
24. Who operates it/them? (yaa ka hawlgala)
25. Is there any international NGO permanently operating in this district (ma jiraan NGO-yo caalami ah oo ka hawlgala degmadan)
26. Is there any local NGO permanently operating in this district? (ma jiraan wax NGO wadani ah oo ka hawlgala degmadan)
27. What are their principal activities? (waa maxay waxqabadkooda ugu muhiimsan)
28. Is one of Mogadishu faction leaders controlling your district or part of it? (mid ka mid ah hogaamiye kooxeedyada muqdisho miyaa xukumo degmadaada ama qeyb ka mid ah)
- a) Yes (haa) b) No (maya)
29. If yes, who is/they? (haday tahay haa, waa kuma isaga/ayaga)
30. Do you work under his control? (maka hoos shaqeysa adiga)
- a) Yes (haa) b) No (maya)
31. Do you have any collaboration with him? (waxa wada shaqeyn ah ma idinka dhaxeeyaan)
- a) Yes (haa) b) No (maya)
32. Did you share with him the selection of the participants? (ma isla sameyseen xullida ka qeybgalayaasha)
- a) Yes (haa) b) No (maya)
33. Were some of the participants members of his militia? (qaar ka mid ah ka qeybgalayaasha, ma waxay ahaayeen maleeshiyadiisa)
- a) Yes (haa) b) No (maya)

34. Did you agree with the inclusion of women into the training programme? (ma aqbashay in haweenka lagu daro barnaamijka tababarka)
 a) Yes (haa) b) No (maya)
35. Were they militia women or assisting them in their activities? (ma waxay ahaayeen maleeshiyo ama way caawin jireen)
 a) Yes (haa) b) No (maya)
36. What activities were they doing for the militia? (maxaa hawl caawin ah ayay u qaban jireen maleeshiyada)
37. Were some of them working for the faction leaders? (qaarkood ma waxay u shaqeynayeen hogaamiye kooxeedyada)
 a) Yes (haa) b) No (maya)
38. If yes, what were they doing for them? (haday haa tahay, maxay u qaban jireen)
39. Were you been committed to discipline the participants who make any mistakes? (ma waxaad ku qasbaneyd inaad caananato ka qeybgalihii qalad sameeya)
 a) Yes (haa) b) No (maya)
40. What kind of discipline did you exercise? (canaan noocce ah ayaad isticmaali jirtay)
41. Did one of the participants you have chosen conduct or assist in the following: (ka qeybgalayaasha aad dooratay ma sameeyaan ama waxa maka caawiyaan falalka soo socda)
- a) Before the Training
- i. Killing (dilka)
 - ii. Raping (kufsiga)
 - iii. Looting (bililiqo)
 - iv. Injuring (dhaawaca)
 - v. Road Blockage (jid gooyo)
 - vi. Kidnapping (afduubka)
- b) After the Training
- i. Killing (dilka)
 - ii. Raping (kufsiga)
 - iii. Looting (bililiqo)
 - iv. Injuring (dhaawaca)
 - v. Road Blockage (jid gooyo)
 - vi. Kidnapping (afduubka)
42. After the end of the training we found: (dhamaadka tababarka ka dib, waxaan helnay)

- a) Increased security and stability (nabadgelyada iyo deganaanshaha oo kordhay)
- b) Increased socioeconomic (dhaqaalaha bulshada oo kordhay)
- c) Returned law and order (sharciga iyo nidaamka oo soo laabtay)
- d) Decreased crimes and disorder (waxaa yaraada dambiyada iyo qaskii)
- e) None (waxba)
- f) Others, Please specify (waxyaabo kale, fadlan cadee)

43. Recommendations

44. Remarks

Questionnaire for Trainees

1. Name (Magac)
2. Full Address (Cinwaan):
Tel:
3. ID Card No:
4. Sex (Lab/dhedig):
5. Marital Status (Xaas Ahaan)
 - a) Single (Doob)
 - b) Married (Guursadey/tey)
 - c) Divorced (Furay/la furay)
 - d) Widow/er (laga dhintay)
 - e) Abandoned (laga haajirey)
6. If Married, When? (hadii aad tahay xaasle, goormaad aroostay)
 - a) Before training (tababarka kahor)
 - b) After training (tababarka ka dib)
7. Where you reside? (Xagee degantahay)
8. Education – before the training programme (heerka tacliinta tababarka ka hor)

9. Previous workshop trained at (Aqoon is-weydaarsiyo hore aad ka qeybgashay)

10. Location of the workshop (meesha aqoon is-weydaarsiga lagu qabtay)

11. Type of trade trained on (nooca ganacsiga/xirfada lagu tababaray)

12. Do you work with the trade/skill that you were trained on? (maku shaqeysaa waxa lagu tababaray)
- a) Yes (haa) b) No (maya)
13. If yes, (hadii ay tahay Haa)
- a) Employed by host trainer (ku shaqaaleeyay tababarahaagii)
- i. Permanent (si joogto ah) ii. Casual (si aan joogto aheyn)
- Salary (mushaarka)_____S.Shs Wages
 (mushaar)_____S.Shs
- b) Self Employed (isa shaqaaleeyay)
- c) Who assisted you in setting up your business? (yaa kaa caawiyay dhisida ganacsigaaga)
- i. Parents (waalidka) ii. Relative (qaraabo) iii. Others(kuwa kale)
- d) Employed in another enterprise?: (shirkad kalaad shaqeysaa?)
- i. Permanent ii. Casual
- Salary _____S.Shs Wages _____
 S.Shs
- e) Engaged in other activities - not related to the training received (ma waxaad heysaa shaqooyin kale, aan la xiriirin wax lagu tababaray)
- i. Permanent (joogto) - Salary (mushaar rasmi ah) _____S.Shs
- ii. Casual (aan joogto aheyn) - Wages (mushaar aan rasmi aheyn)_____ S.Shs
- f) Are you satisfied with your job? (ma ku qanacsantahay shaqadaada)
- i. Yes (haa) ii. No (maya)
- g) How long have you been working since you finished the training?
(muddo intee le'eg ayaad shaqeyneysay tababarka ka dib)
- i. _____ months (bilood)
- ii. _____ weeks (asbuucod)
- iii. _____ days (maalmood)
14. If no, why? (not employed) (hadii aadan shaqeyn, maxay tahay sababtu)
- a) Lack of job opportunity (fursad shaqo la'aan)
- b) Income from employment is very little (lacagta shaqada oo aad u yar)
- c) Prefer studying to increased knowledge (waxaan doorbiday waxbarasho)
- d) Unwilling to work (ma rabo inaan shaqeeyo)

- b) No (maya)
25. Who informed you about the training (yaa ku ogeysiyyey tababarka)
- a) District authority (maamulka degmada)
 - b) Elders/religious men (odoyaasha dhaqanka/culumada)
 - c) Neighbors (deriska)
 - d) Saacid NGO (NGOga saacid)
 - e) Saacid staff member (xubin ka mid ah shaqaalaha Saacid)
 - f) A friend (saaxiib)
 - g) Others (kuwa kale)
26. What kind of gun you surrendered (Qoray nooc ee ah ayaad dhiibtay)
- a) AK 47 mm (Aake)
 - b) G3 (Faal)
 - c) RPD (RPD amd Aake silisle)
 - d) PKM(daba miishaar)
 - e) SAR 80 (Saar 80)
 - f) SAR 80 (Saar 80)
 - g) M-16 (M 16)
 - h) SKS (kaarabiin)
 - i) Xakiin (Xakiim masri)
 - j) (Lixle dhere)
 - k) (Shanle)
 - l) Basuke 7
 - m) Basuke 2
 - n) Law 85
 - o) Milan
 - p) Smal gun (bistoole)
 - q) Hand bumb (bamboo gacmeed)
 - r) Mines (miino)
 - s) Others, please specify (fadlan cadee)
27. What has convinced you to give up your gun? (maxaa kugu qanciyeey inaad dhiibto qoraygaaga)
28. How do you evaluate the LNT training programme (sidee ahaa tababarka LNT)
- a) Excellent (wax u dhigma ma jirin)
 - b) Very good (aad ayuu u fiicnaa)
 - c) Good (waa fiicnaa)
 - d) No bad (ma xumeyn)
 - e) Bad (waa xumaa)
 - f) Very bad (aad ayuu u xumaa)
29. How much they paid you (meeqa ayey ku siiyeen)
-
-

30. What is the overall impact of the project in the community? (waa maxay saameynta guud uu barnaamijka tababarka ku leeyahay bulshada)
31. Constraints (caqabadaha)
32. Remarks/Observations By Enumerator (Aragtidaada)

ANNEX 3

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