

# INDEX

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| <b>1. INTRODUCTION</b>   | <b>4</b>  |
| <b>2. DEFINITIONS</b>  | <b>4</b>  |
| <b>3. METHOD</b>   | <b>5</b>  |
| <b>4. IP SELECTION.</b>  | <b>6</b>  |
| <b>5. REINTEGRATION OPTIONS</b>  | <b>7</b>  |
| <b>6. EVALUATION</b>   | <b>8</b>  |
| 6.1 Roles and responsibilities of IPs.   | 8         |
| 6.2 Quality and relevance of the reintegration options                               | 9         |
| 6.3 Operational costs and costs which directly benefit the ex-combatant              | 10        |
| 6.4 Assessment of customer satisfaction with the training offered                    | 11        |
| 6.5 Criteria for assessing reintegration   | 13        |
| 6.6 Has the reintegration training helped acquire a sustainable civilian livelihood? | 14        |
| 6.7 Opportunities and Threats  | 15        |
| <b>7. RECOMMENDATIONS</b>  | <b>17</b> |
| 7.1 The design and implementation of the reintegration component                     | 17        |
| 7.2 Framework for monitoring and evaluation of reintegration                         | 17        |
| 7.3 Targets and indicators   | 17        |
| 7.4 Institutional aspects of reintegration   | 18        |
| <b>ANNEXES</b>   | <b>19</b> |
| Annex I Field Visit observations   | 20        |
| Annex II A selection of Ex-combatant interviews                                      | 34        |
| Annex III An illustrative analysis of the Reintegration Survey                       | 45        |
| Annex IV A selection of monitoring reports   | 70        |

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| <b>Annex V Cost-distribution of reintegration training</b>             | <b>72</b> |
| <b>Annex VI issues in Reintegration: RPO workshop output</b>           | <b>79</b> |
| <b>Annex VII Suggestions for longer term Monitoring and Evaluation</b> | <b>89</b> |
| <b>Annex VIII Evaluation workplan</b>                                  | <b>92</b> |
| <b>Annex IX Terms of Reference</b>                                     | <b>97</b> |

## Abbreviations

|       |   |
|-------|---|
| AMF   | Afghan Military Forces                        |
| ANA   | Afghan National Army                          |
| ANBP  | Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme        |
| BEST  | Basic Education and Employable Skill Training |
| DDR   | Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration |
| D&D   | Disarmament and Demobilisation                |
| FAO   | Food and Agriculture Organisation             |
| GAA   | German Agro-Action                            |
| HQ    | Headquarters                                  |
| ICT   | Information and Communication technology      |
| IOM   | International Organisation for Migration      |
| IP    | Implementing Partner                          |
| INGO  | International Non-Governmental Organisation   |
| LNGO  | Local Non-Governmental Organisation           |
| M&E   | Monitoring and Evaluation                     |
| NGO   | Non-Governmental Organisation                 |
| RDB   | Relational Data Base                          |
| RFP   | Request for Proposal                          |
| RO    | Regional Office                               |
| RPO   | Regional Programme Officers                   |
| UNDP  | United Nations Development Programme          |
| UNOPS | United Nations Office for Project Services    |
| XC    | Ex Combatant                                  |
| ZOPP  | Object Oriented Planning Procedure (German)   |

## 1. Introduction

In including the R of reintegration in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme, ANBP has taken responsibility to ensure a sustainable livelihood and reintegration into civilian society for 50,000 ex-combatants after their disarmament and demobilization, or at least show the way towards achieving this goal. What is understood under a 'sustainable livelihood' however and what does 'reintegration' mean? This will receive attention in an introductory paragraph on definitions.

Thereafter the antecedents of IP selection and the reintegration options they offer will be summarized. The evaluation which ensues looks back over the previous year and places the final project year of ANBP/DDR within the broader context of national development issues and a wider timeframe. The recommendations which follow are however limited to the current mandate of ANBP/DDR and the period of June 2005-2006. The annex provides some elaboration of longer term options in reintegration policy as well as impact evaluation.

The choice of regions to visit was made in close co-operation with UNDP/ANBP staff in Kabul. Due to time constraints and security issues, Kandahar and Gardez regions were not included in field visits. As these regions are still suffering from considerable unrest, the impact of the reintegration component may be significantly less positive there, than in most of the other regions visited. This factor should be taken into account when considering the conclusions of the team. The current report limits itself to the reintegration trajectories under agriculture, vocational training and small business, together covering over 90 percent of the beneficiaries.

The positive co-operation with ANBP staff at Headquarters and Regional Offices must be mentioned. The overall impression which remains of the organisation is one of dedication and commitment in a healthy atmosphere of solidarity and team spirit.

## 2. Definitions

The Terms of Reference under the Requests For Proposals (RFPs) state that 'the principal objective of ANBP's reintegration effort will be to *assist former combatants to return to civilian life; to assist communities to increase their employment and economic absorption capacity; and to provide former combatants with sustainable and appropriate means of making a living*. In short ANBP intends to develop a comprehensive and targeted reintegration programme that will offer each former combatant an opportunity to secure an economically sound and *sustainable career or job opportunity that equates with his standing and capabilities and that will provide for the needs of his family*.'

The household survival strategy of most respondents is an extended family affair, not one in which the graduate is the sole breadwinner in a nuclear family. Two or three brothers tend to share a household with their surviving parents, contributing in their own way to its sustainability. The household is a production as well as a consumption unit. Some subsistence farming and small scale market production is usually combined with income generation through manual labour or commercial activities. The risks of failure are spread and options to shift labour input to the more rewarding activities help to optimize utility. In this light one might say that household coping

strategies are by necessity sustainable; one way or another the extended household survives. If not, it disintegrates and new households are formed. A *narrow* definition of **sustainable livelihood would be given as continuity of the unit per se, survival.**

If more than bare and precarious survival is to be understood under a *sustainable livelihood*, how would we define it? In first instance, sustainability is then conceptualized in terms of *occupational stability and household structure, leading to food and income security*. The more reshuffling of financial and human resources is required -redefining tasks and contributions- and the less long term investments in time and money are made, the less sustainable the livelihood. A household which is in a continuous state of re-adaptation and reorganization, incapable of reaping the benefits of sustained effort is not considered 'sustainable' in this definition.

A second dimension of sustainability would be the level at which the household succeeds in satisfying its basic needs. In this sense, sustainability implies that there should at all times be a safety margin keeping it *above minimum subsistence levels*.

A *broader* definition would be: "**A sustainable livelihood** is a household survival strategy which has occupational stability, and structure (a clear definition of household roles), therewith achieving durable levels of income and food security to satisfy the basic needs of its members at levels above minimum subsistence."

**Integration** can be described as *the process by which individuals and groups participate in their society, with equitable access to income and employment, social benefits and services, and to various aspects of cultural and community life*. It includes ethnic and cultural diversity from a viewpoint of social justice and equity but also from a concern that socially excluded population might pose a threat to the well-being of society due to their limited stake in the existing order.

But what is realistic and desirable for the short term as far as reintegration of ex-combatants is concerned? ***That they leave their military allegiance behind and look forward to a civilian life of gainful employment in community solidarity.*** This we will call the narrower definition of reintegration.

The *broader* definitions of 'sustainable livelihoods' and 'integration' is what we would wish to achieve in the foreseeable future for ex-combatants and other citizens of Afghanistan. These definitions refer to desired impacts of the intervention. The *narrower* definitions are what we realistically strive to achieve over the last year of the ANBP/DDR project for ex-combatants and stakeholders. These definitions of *sustainable livelihoods* and *reintegration* refer to outcomes of the intervention.

### **3. Method**

The current evaluation has used two methods of research, participatory observation and qualitative interviews. The first approach entailed working side-by-side with staff in the M&E and Programmes Departments of ANBPat regional offices and Kabul headquarters in order to understand the functioning and working culture within the operation which is directing the reintegration intervention and to make optimal use of information within the system. The second approach is directed towards the beneficiaries to obtain an impression -as independent as

possible- of the perception of the beneficiaries. The workplan and time schedule are contained in the annex and speak for themselves.

## **4. IP selection.**

The Implementing Partner (IP) selection process followed standard bidding procedures within the United Nations, publishing a Request for Proposal (RFP) and selecting the most economical eligible bid. The procedure followed is that of pre-financing by the contractor, with reimbursement upon satisfactory fulfilment of contractual obligations. A bank guarantee for the entire sum of the contract is required. These are difficult conditions to meet for the few local NGOs with some experience in the region, in the fields of vocational training, small business support or agricultural development. On the other hand the security situation in the country and the fact that employment positions are unaccompanied tends to negatively predispose middle-of-the-road international NGOs. The result has been very low response rates, obliging UNDP to bring in partners from the UN family and applying the rules for applicants leniently in order to find the implementing agencies required to fulfil their mandate.

The quality of the project proposals was frequently mediocre and strictly output driven. The RFPs were formulated as procurement services and as a rule, a developmental perspective was not apparent. IP's project proposals were usually prepared in their respective HQs in Kabul. Prior consultation of their field offices varies from none at all (e.g. CARE Bamyān), to intensive (e.g. GAA Mazar). This has contributed to a high diversity of proposals in terms of contents as well as the terminology used to describe the implementation procedures designed to satisfy RFP demands.

The trial-and- error nature of the process has inevitably led to shortcomings, particularly in the pilot phase, part of which have been eliminated in the main phase. In addition, proposals were often prepared for a limited number of beneficiaries, and were expanded during the implementation period due to higher than anticipated demand. This has led to bottle-necks which hampered project implementation, logistics, procurement etc. The project implementation has followed a *process approach* adapting to unforeseen circumstances as it evolved. In view of the largely reactive planning and the lack of experience of the IPs, some improvisation and learning-as-we-go-along was inevitably involved in order to serve the bulk of ex-combatants. Some irregularities of procedure have to be taken for granted. After all 50,000 soldiers were disarmed and demobilized, over less than a year, thereafter guided through the reintegration phase, which is still in process. There are 7 IPs working in the agricultural sector, 6 in vocational training and 3 in small business. The numbers of beneficiaries per project (defined per region) vary from 100 to 4300, with costs per beneficiary roughly between 700 and 1500 USD, overall budgets between 150,000- and 4,750,000 USD. Various IPs have more than one project under implementation. Annex V contains a list of IPs by numbers of beneficiaries and budgets. The collective achievement of this group of IPs under ANBP supervision is commendable from the point of processing the volume of ex-combatants.

The disarmament and demobilization phases have however been rounded off now, the dust has settled. There is no new inflow. Some of the human resources involved in the D&D have been released; the organisation has become leaner and is focusing on the Reintegration aspects now. The current exercise is in effect a mid term evaluation of the reintegration process within DDR. As such it is opportune: the time has come to structure throughput and to draw lessons from the

experience over the first two years of DDR, both for the last year of the current project as for the design of subsequent DDR projects.

## 5. Reintegration options

IP project documents are specific in terms of what the beneficiaries will receive and what they will be taught. Course outlines and lists of items are provided and priced for later procurement, distribution and reimbursement claims. The RFPs are explicit in their requirements and project documents tend to follow suit.

The objective of an RFP in vocational education would be to 'provide vocational education and job placement'. A typical RFP would stipulate envisioned areas of training and apprenticeship (carpentry, plumbing, masonry, welding, tailoring... computer and English skills) encouraging a literacy component which accompanies the vocational training. No community level objectives are stated (for example on economic absorption capacity). A scope of work and expected outputs are listed, and purchasing requirements stipulated. Contents of monthly, quarterly and final reports are specified. In some but not all RFPs it is furthermore stated that the value of an average vocational training package to be allocated directly to the beneficiary should be between \$750 and \$800 USD. As time passed the financial and narrative reporting requirements have become more elaborate.

Similarly the RFP for agriculture states as its objective 'to provide agricultural opportunities' in a particular area, adding that the goal will be achieved by 'providing the ex-combatants with opportunities for an increased *on farm income*'. The agricultural packages may include but should not be limited to

- a) Distribution of seeds, tools and fertilizers
- b) Tree or other plant nursery
- c) Beekeeping
- d) Farm fisheries
- e) Poultry raising
- f) Livestock distribution

The scope of work includes training (without specifying duration), advice and counselling where appropriate. Purchasing regulations and reporting schedules are uniform. Monthly summary reports include tracking tables, but it is not evident which obligations the IPs have towards their beneficiaries once the physical assets have been transferred.

Project proposals present a selection of packages, for example one dairy cow, plus fodder, vaccines, and medicine plus veterinary extension support, or three sheep with similar accessories, or a poultry package, agricultural hand tools sets each packaging representing a total value of \$600-800 USD. There are detailed descriptions of what will be procured and distributed without a mention of interaction with the beneficiaries, therein following the RFP which does not pay attention to process.

Small business recipients get \$700 USD in cash in two instalments, for example paying them \$250 at programme initiation and then \$450 after successful completion of two weeks of coursework. Some IPs pay cash, others carry out procurement with beneficiaries. The coursework

assists in working out the business plan which candidates must have outlined during intake. An example of a timeline for the small business programme is as follows:

- Phase 1: 45 day period including registration, assessment, start-up course and the payment of the first advance.
- Phase 2: 45 day period in which the beneficiary starts activities independently.
- Phase 3: follow-up to identify problems and achievements leading for some to direct payment of the second instalment. For others additional start-up training is given, and once considered to be successful, the beneficiary will receive the second instalment.
- Phase 4: follow-up support for 6 months.

## 6. Evaluation

### 6.1 Roles and responsibilities of IPs.

The implementation process follows an institutional chain from UNDP, ANBP, through the IPs, sometimes using subcontractors, to the beneficiaries, sometimes organized themselves. All through this chain, the understanding of *general principles of development* has proven to be weak. The overall structure of proposals usually does not follow project cycle management as embodied in the logical framework. The RFPs do not reflect longer term goals, and contain no *social* objectives or reference to measurement of social outcome (notwithstanding the emphasis some donors place on striving to use the intervention as an instrument to change local power structures). ANBP has no overall reintegration vision or strategy towards which all implementing partners are supposed to be contributing. Besides the lack of an overarching reintegration framework, the most evident shortcoming of the ANBP DDR programme thus far has been the absence of institutional development of ANBP itself, as well as of other organisations within Afghan civil society *in the field of development strategy*.

Retrospectively we would wish that shortcomings of the contracting agency in terms of *developmental expertise* would have been noted by UNDP and addressed at early stages of the project development. When confronted with colleagues who lack this background, UNDP or the donor consultative group should have secured on-the-job training or brought in the expertise through recruitment. If this had been done, ANBP would have been in a better position to oversee the reintegration implementation process. A capacity building exercise would be called for from the Management and the Programmes Department of ANBP, down to the local NGOs (LNGOs) subcontracted by the International NGOs (INGOs) and UN sister organizations (FAO, IOM, UNOPS) to carry out reintegration activities in certain areas.

The stronger NGOs such as BEST in Jalalabad or World Vision in Herat should have trained the weaker LNGOs in the region. If this would have been done they would have had a sense of direction. Competent members of the UN family such as IOM team in Herat should have built the capacity of the LNGOs they work with. If this would have been done they might take IOM's place when they leave. Institutional development has been disregarded and no development learning has taken place over the period of a year, not within ANBP, or within Afghan civil society: an opportunity missed.

Within these constraints, the M&E department of ANBP has however put a *functional monitoring system* in place translating the agreements laid down in the RFPs into monitoring guidelines. The

IPs in turn adhere to them fairly punctually. They have little choice because contractual reimbursement payments are conditional upon compliance. The contractual obligations include timely monthly and quarterly progress reports, which are checked by Contracting Officer, Regional Programme Officer and HQ Programme Officers and M&E staff, and thereafter approved by ANBP senior managers. Besides narrative reporting, financial reports are provided and checked by the Programme Associate. The content of the periodic reports is clearly stipulated in the RFP. In short, monitoring as an administrative requirement is carried out properly. This is so for project *implementation* as well as for *financial reporting*. Some cases of malpractice have been identified and the problems addressed, again evidence of good monitoring. Here institutional learning appears to have taken place. But further action is required to root out fraud. Bookkeeping rigor and financial transparency are part and parcel of the capacity building that has been lacking. This can and should be remedied over the available time period.

The organizational achievement of ANBP lies in its *implementation capacity*, in the middle management regional desk officers and finance officers at HQ, their regional partners the RPOs, with their corresponding network of outreach workers and IP counterparts. It is this operational strength that should be capitalized upon over the next year, in order to carry it forward. Unless concerted action is taken, there is a distinct possibility that the organizational capacity (achieved through continued capacity building in these sectors) will be lost.

## 6.2 Quality and relevance of the reintegration options

The respondents interviewed during the three weeks of fieldwork rarely if ever complained about the quality or content of the *training*. It was not mentioned by those following the agricultural programme. Those following small business referred to it in passing as a useful contribution. But for graduates from the Vocational Training Programme it was at the heart of their livelihood. Generally speaking appreciation was outspoken. Quality and relevance were not questioned. The sole repeated complaint heard was that it is *not enough*. The mere fact that there is a hunger for more indicates that it is considered satisfactory and relevant. There was however no request from agriculture 'graduates' for more than three days training, nor for more than two weeks for those that have followed the small business option.

Complaints over the quality and content of the *physical transfers* were rife however, particularly in the agricultural sector, but also in vocational training, not because of relevance but because of quality and utility, in simple terms were they getting their money is worth? Were they being short-changed? How does the monetary value of what they received compare to the other packages? The graduates of the small business package had no grievances in this sphere because the transfers were largely monetary. Annex IV provides insight into the type of issues addressed by the field offices during implementation. Annex VI contains a report drawn up by the Programmes Department to address issues as reported by the respondents during interviews brought to their attention by the evaluators. Annex I contains an empirical account of observations with respect to reintegration options with conclusions and recommendations of a practical nature with respect to implementation. Field visits and monitoring reports testify to continuous preoccupation with issues of timely distribution and quality of the assets. *In all fairness ANBP has done their utmost to deal with procurement and distribution and keep the customer satisfied. The product has been delivered and delivery is still going on.*

From a broader viewpoint, the issue is not whether the complaints are justified and what might be done to ensure equity and justice in distribution of the handouts. The issue is which decision-making and distribution procedure would have satisfied the beneficiaries, making them take their responsibilities for their own personal future from the outset. It's not *what* was distributed but

*how* that matters. Taking decisions *for* people rather than *with* them on what they get, and then carrying out procurement and distribution over an unspecified time period is bound to cause problems. Treating the beneficiaries on a one-to-one basis as an amorphous atomized mass is inefficient and counterproductive. Practically nowhere is the introduction of participatory procedures apparent amongst the beneficiaries. To a developmentalist this is surprising. Ownership and self-help are usually guiding principles in strategies of personal development, building partnerships with the beneficiary part of the process. Somehow trying to share decision making on what's best for the former combatant is the least one would expect.

In judging whether the reintegration options were relevant we shouldn't be asking whether the cows, the sheep or the carpentry training were perceived as useful, but whether the process was humiliating or elevating, paternalistic or participatory, fostering ingratitude and resentment or building peace and acknowledgement. Working towards the future we would like to ensure that the physical transfers which are intended as means to achieve autonomy, and partnership do not foster dependence and animosity. We should be cautious to apply techniques of planned change which minimize this risk.

With all the attention going to getting the transfer of assets right, and none to the social processes we are introducing these elements into, the social consequences desired or to the change strategy applied, the *socio-economic impact of ANBP intervention at the national, community or household level has not entered into the equation.*

### **6.3 Operational costs and costs which directly benefit the ex-combatant**

The Terms of Reference of the current evaluation (Annex IX) include a requirement to evaluate whether *the training is cost-efficient*. The corresponding analysis would consist of three consecutive stages: 1) estimate input 2) outcome and 3) compare with other ways the outcome might have been achieved.

The type of outcome required would have ideally been 'potential income increase generated'. If there were such an indicator, it could be compared with potential income gains per dollar spent on distribution of productive assets. Clearly, the monitoring data collected do not contain information of this degree of sophistication. Nor do they include information that might have been used as proxies, in order to carry out an analysis of this nature such as person/days of training provided within the different options, salaries earned after course completion compared to prior income, permitting calculation of internal rates of return of distribution of cows, milk, sheep versus training. It is suggested to carry out this type of evaluation within the last project year, and to collect data with which it can be achieved. Annex V presents a more limited analysis carried out by Regional Programme Officers on basis of data on input only: distribution of budgeted funds between direct and indirect costs, respectively referring to training and assets distributed to beneficiaries on one hand versus operational costs and overheads of the IP on the other.

The overall percentage of budgets in the reintegration projects which goes directly to the beneficiaries is 74 percent or higher in the regions studied. This is satisfactory. Overall, the percentage of the budget dedicated to training is of the order of 10 percent. It might have been good to put more emphasis on training in the RFPs for agriculture and small business, therewith increasing the percentage of expenditure on education overall.

Investments with medium term income benefits are those in education and in business (either in the non-agricultural sector or in agri-business or post-harvest activities as in the FAO projects) rather than in agricultural production. Whether they have a positive effect is dependent on

external factors beyond the control of the project, and if they do, the time lag between the investment and the benefit is too long for the beneficiaries' planning scope which is generally short-term. From this perspective, the vocational training trajectory is most satisfying since it provides immediate returns (the carpenter can start earning a decent salary from the day he terminates his apprenticeship), and also offers potential for future income growth. Training costs are of the order of 20-25% for this reintegration option, and transfers (large part of which in terms of stipends) are of the order of 50-60%. The result is an efficient package with relatively low operational costs and high utility. For the agricultural package, training usually covers the order of 5 percent of the budget while for small business the corresponding percentage varies considerably from about 5 to 20 percent.

In summary-also in view of the strong relationship between satisfaction rating and self-employment- we may ask whether more proactive attempt should have been taken to promote agri-business in the rural townships rather than embarking upon large scale procurement and distribution schemes of agricultural means of production in order to increase *farm based* incomes. Over the short run this seems to be the case, but whether the benefits of livestock and tree nurseries will become apparent over the longer term is still to be seen. Another disadvantage of investing in rural *farm based* income generation is that in doing so no effect is exerted upon traditional power bases and no change agents promoted. If contributing towards *productive innovation* would have been included amongst the objectives, social spin offs might have included realignment of partnerships from conservative to change oriented circles. This is again given as an example of making explicit what we wish to achieve *socially as well as financially*, neither of which are covered within current monitoring and evaluation activities. Annex V contains background data and further details on the distribution of direct and indirect costs.

#### **6.4 Assessment of customer satisfaction with the training offered**

Over the previous three months, the Monitoring and Evaluation Department has been collecting information on the effects of the reintegration options through a sample survey. In the course of the current mission, the data collected through this survey, contained in the "post-reintegration" database, has been analyzed, linking it up with the overall XC database. The purpose of the exercise was to learn what the data suggest with respect to a) the effect of the reintegration intervention and b) the quality of the M&E and RDB components of DDR. Our analysis has been more informative about the latter than the former.

##### **a) The effect of the reintegration intervention.**

Questions were asked in the survey on effectiveness of the reintegration packages: "how good was the training received?", "How useful is the training for your future?". A second variable studied was the economic situation of the ex-combatant: "Are you and your family now doing better economically than during your time with the Afghan Military Forces?". Also questions were included on links with the commander, such as: "Did your former commander threaten you after you demobilized?"

The analysis presented in Annex II has led to the conclusion that the *validity* of the responses to the questions on XC graduates' perceptions of the quality of the reintegration package must be placed in doubt. The same applies for the questions on relationships with the commander and their ex-comrades. Data from the Soldier's Database on the trajectory which Ex-combatants have followed (from their pre-demobilization working period, through their decision-making on reintegration options and the final choice) are *unreliable*. The survey in question has thus failed to achieve its main objective, nor will it do so by adding more cases to attain a sample of 900. Non-sampling errors can not be resolved by increasing sample size.

Even though the distribution of answers might be biased -shifting the distribution in the positive direction- interesting relations appear, on the *key importance of work status on attitudes*, and the central *role self-employed small business plays in income generation*. The data suggest that post-graduation follow-up activities should concentrate on putting business support facilities in place. Also, the general satisfaction with the reintegration options is *small business* first, *vocational training* second, and *agriculture* third.

**b) The capacity of M&E to access and process data within the RDB.**

The ICT Department has proven to be capable to access and link data from the different sources of data collection. The design of the relational database (RDB) however is deficient due to incomparability of classification system used over time. The codes used are over-complicated and not systematic therewith not permitting collapsing them into a smaller number of categories according to an underlying ordering principle. International coding conventions are not applied. The RDB is not suitable for external comparisons at the aggregate level nor for internal comparisons over time. The utility of the database –under current conditions- is limited to retrieval of individual level information. Field offices also have proven to be incapable of accessing the overall database and therefore set up independent monitoring systems of their own. Nor does the Programmes Department use the central database for planning purposes. Overall summaries of data (table 1 in annex V for example) are from these parallel databases, and not from the soldier database maintained by ICT. This procedure leads to different numbers circulating at the same time.

The M&E department is responsible to carry out activities in the following order:

1. study design (sampling, data collection technique, questionnaire development, fieldwork organization)
2. data collection
3. data entry, coding
4. data access
5. analysis
6. reporting

In each of the subsequent steps of the M&E process performance requires improvement. The data analysis indicates that an overhaul is called for of the database design. The quality of the data stored in the database is insufficient. What is measurable objectively should be properly coded. The technology however functions and the fact that information on approximately 50,000 Ex-combatants is retrievable is a valuable asset. It is recommended to cherish the database and upgrade the quality of the information it contains.

This being said, our experience suggests that data collection in Afghanistan does not permit direct transfer of orthodox social survey techniques, even if they have proven their merit elsewhere in the developing world. This is due to two factors: the first is the exceptionally high percentage of illiteracy, which makes it impossible to work with straightforward pre-coded questionnaires, also if the questions are put to the respondent through an interviewer. Asking the respondent to choose between alternative answers to a question assumes a conceptual level of thinking which is absent in many. It's too abstract and hypothetical to grasp. The second reason is that answers are given according to which option the respondent perceives will provide highest direct personal benefit. If this is not evident the reply will be "you know best" or a give simple repetition of what a dominant peer has responded, therewith showing allegiance but not answering the question. Focus groups will definitely not function as they do elsewhere, nor will standardized interview techniques.

The approach to data collection must be adapted to the *individual* and it must be *indirect*. Rather than asking “how useful was the training for your future?” the respondent’s household survival strategy and personal living standard should be mapped. The conclusion may then be drawn whether the individual uses the skills transferred and whether it is central or peripheral to the collective family output. The only way to hope to achieve valid information is face-to-face interviewing, excluding group processes or the application of non-verbal measurement techniques. This requires a high degree of empathy and understanding of the local situation. Only native speakers of the local language and researchers immersed in the cultural relationships involved are capable of interpreting the responses correctly. Questionnaire design, data collection through participatory or quantitative techniques as well as reporting should therefore be a collaborative effort combining local and expert knowledge.

## **6.5 Criteria for assessing reintegration**

Information on reintegration beneficiaries in the monthly reports is generally limited to headcounts according to the reintegration package they have chosen. Tracking tables tell us who was enrolled in which course and who received which items, as required presenting the reimbursement claim. Information on attendance, learning achievement, client satisfaction, jobs acquired, household income growth and so forth are generally absent. The monitoring reports carried out by field office staff are accounts of hit-and-run field visits. Their value added in terms of information can be improved upon, but it is important that the monitoring assistants have a field presence. Monthly reports and periodic IP meetings are more structured and substantial M&E activities. Here also the more outcome oriented requirements of the RFP are usually skipped. For example enrolment is registered but attendance, absenteeism and problems are not. Distribution of assets is registered, but their use, or satisfaction with them is not. The annexes contain an illustrative selection of monitoring reports for reference. Generally speaking the *outputs*, activities and indicators are in place and monitoring is done well at this level. Annex V contains a summary of monitoring reports of different nature from the eastern region covering January-June 2005 for reference.

Whatever way we look at integration (broad or narrow definition) it is a longer term *outcome* of the reintegration process as implemented under DDR, rather than an immediate *output*. One of the major shortcomings of the monitoring of DDR has been the absence of outcome measurement. This in turn reflects the void of longer term goals in the overall project design, at the level of ANBP as well as (practically all of) the IP proposals. The fact that the project period for the delivery of the reintegration package is one year, does not relieve ANBP or the IP of the obligation to think ahead in terms of the longer term benefits the interventions are supposed to provide. Their M&E should not only monitor outputs but also gauge the extent to which they are conducive to achievement of the outcomes and impact envisaged from the perspective of the beneficiary, but also that of the community. It is therefore proposed to expand upon current M&E practice.

In order to measure progress against the outcome of the intervention, that is achieving reintegration in the sense *that ex-combatants leave their military allegiance behind and look forward to a civilian life of gainful employment in community solidarity*, current IP monitoring should be expanded to include power structures within the community and perceptions of household coping strategies over time. The most appropriate way to achieve this is through qualitative participatory appraisal techniques.

## 6.6 Has the reintegration training helped acquire a sustainable civilian livelihood?

The mandate of ANBP lies in trying to achieve the reintegration outcome defined as '*moving away from military life, into sustainable civilian employment*'. The average ex-combatant soldier has long been weary of military service and welcomed the opportunity provided by DDR. There are no internal *push* factors which motivate demobilized soldiers to rejoin armed factions. Their experience in the AMF, as told to evaluators, was not one of glory and victory but of toil and exploitation. Not a single respondent referred to his ex-commander or officers in nostalgic terms. Nor was there any indication of community rejection towards the reintegration of former combatants, not in the perception of the demobilized soldiers themselves, or in that of community leaders.

This is not to say that *pull* factors of the environment such as an immediate threat to the well-being or lifestyle of the community would not lead to rearmament under local community leaders. There is also no denial that small town commanders and officers within the AMF -who *did* reap benefits and enjoy prestige- harbour discontent and clearly said so. But if we limit ourselves to the rank-and-file, the *achievement of DDR is undeniable*; half the job (moving away from military life) has been done. The other half (referring to gainful employment in civilian life) is proving more difficult to achieve.

Of the three main reintegration currents the *agriculture* package is most unsustainable: most of our respondents complain that it is not sufficient to sustain their families. Vocational Training is second in line and Small Business will have a lower percentage of unsustainable graduates. These impressions given by respondents of our qualitative interviews are confirmed by the results of the reintegration survey, in the sense that agriculture is perceived as the least satisfactory option, small business as the most satisfactory and vocational training in between.

The category which works in *agriculture* (representing about 40 percent) is at the lower end of the socio-economic-status hierarchy. They live in a stagnant social environment in which local power structures are unaltered and social change hardly perceptible. The additional inputs in their production system have been received, but most of them require further investment of resources before they generate income. Costs are incurred in nurturing fruit tree saplings, dairy cow and sheep for a period of one to three years before benefits are incurred. The lead period to measure the satisfaction with these inputs has thus been too short to judge their utility adequately. The general mood of those who followed the agricultural package is one of *disappointment*. Many would have preferred another reintegration option but were referred to the agricultural trajectory because they lacked the skills or motivation to follow the vocational training or small business courses. This is confirmed by the percentages initially choosing agriculture upon intake (20%), increasing when final choice was registered (35%) and even more after graduation (45% all percentages taken from the overall XC-database). The reintegration survey indicates that nearly 30 percent of those who followed the agriculture course had no previous working experience, whilst only just over a quarter had been farmers before. The rest (over 40%) of those who took the agriculture course had previous working experience as drivers (14%), shopkeepers (6.1%) and a variety of trades (Table 4 Annex III). It is clear that more elaborate training would have been useful. According to the respondents of the qualitative interviews, the agricultural package has *not made a difference* in tipping the balance of their household production from poverty to moderate food and income security.

The target group of vocational training is the urban upward striving craftsman based at the bazaars, where potential for socio-economic development is manifest. The *vocational training* courses are followed by ex-combatants (about 25 percent) ranging from enthusiasts who

genuinely wish to follow the technical career path as a central direction of their household subsistence strategy, to others who are willing to give it a try but come to realize that the profession is not easy, the work is hard and the earnings modest, thereafter half-heartedly entering into their apprenticeship, unsure whether to take up the profession at all. Those in the construction industry (carpenters, masons etc.) generally express satisfaction as do those in mechanics, whilst tailors lack confidence in their skills. The mood varies from scepticism through hope, to confidence, that they will be able to acquire the additional skills required to become a full-fledged professional. Sustained effort and training are needed, to overcome adversities and acquire adequate levels of craftsmanship. Drop out rates are bound to be high, as alternative options within the household survival strategy offer higher short term benefits.

The *small business* option tends to be followed by those (about 20 percent of XCs) with some education (although it may also be followed by the illiterate) and savings, as well as experience in the trade, usually acquired in the family business. Locations vary from rural townships to commercial outlets along the bustling streets and markets of the larger cities. The extra training and financial input has helped many feel more confident in running their business. Immediate socio-economic status is relatively secure with daily income guaranteed for the time being. Where equipment has been acquired (compressors for tires, mills for wheat etc.) it is still new and maintenance costs have not yet been incurred. Where shops have been opened the shelves are stocked and the zeal is fresh. Attrition is bound to occur, especially with the smallest of businesses, usually start-ups based upon a single source of income (charging batteries, selling gas containers). But overall the will appears to be more persistent than elsewhere. The impression is that most of them will survive.

Across the board, there is a category of beneficiaries which takes every day as it comes and is not willing to think about tomorrow, let alone invest in it, but deferred gratification patterns are talking hold and long term career aspirations driving other graduates forward. ANBP should be credited for this. The ex-combatants that are taking new risks and demonstrate a genuine will to succeed in their profession should not find themselves without access to credit, to bookkeeping and literacy courses, to advanced further training.

Have our talks with graduates led us to believe that *the reintegration training helped ex-combatants to acquire technical skills that will facilitate a durable transition to civilian livelihood?* The answer is “*not yet*”, but for many the opportunity still exists. There is a feeling amongst ex-combatants that ANBP has a moral obligation towards them to provide follow-up to the first promising inputs given. The mission believes there is a good chance of broad approval if this materializes. Follow-up support is required for many of them not to fall back into destitute poverty without a notion or care of what tomorrow will bring. The exploration of regional sources which might provide such support and the provision of referral services is within the scope of ANBP and IP implementation over the coming year.

## **6.7 Opportunities and Threats**

The question arises whether it is sound policy to single out the category of ex-combatants, striving to achieve progress on these fronts, therewith potentially privileging them over the ‘normal’ population in Afghanistan. Their relative disadvantage is admittedly modest compared to the huge catch-up required in terms of Millennium Development Goals for the population as a whole. Would it not be better to target the community for development and have the ex-combatants dissolve within their community? Treating ex-combatants as a separate category defeats the purpose of integration, does it not?

The DDR programme has been successful in disarming and demobilizing the approximately 50,000 ex-combatants of the AMF. Most of them have effectively turned their backs to military life. Hopes for a new civilian life have been inspired and the subjects have invested in their futures, starting to learn new trades and opening new businesses, reviving old occupations with new vigour. The hesitant self-confidence and self-help of the beneficiaries however requires further support to mature. One year of reintegration support is not enough to construct a sustainable civilian livelihood. Without follow-up, mass disenchantment might ensue, wiping out the programme's achievements thus far, opening the floodgates for resentment.

From the perspective of the *risk* they represent, it is advisable to keep Ex-combatants under surveillance, in order to register recidivism. They continue to pose a security hazard for the stability of the country. A sub-set of the ex-combatants has a criminal mind set and track record of unscrupulous behaviour. They are a volatile category, accustomed to brutality and intimidation, crowd agitation, making easy money with disregard of morale, eager recruits for agents of organized crime and political disruption. Vigilance is required in order to take effective corrective action where required.

From the perspective of their *potential*, innovative Ex-combatants may be considered as a spearhead for economic development in their community, if taken 'beyond the P' (for poverty). Prolongation of poverty in the peasant or informal sector is not what we are looking for, it is not resignation to subsistence level survival but individual income growth and upward social mobility that we should strive to achieve. The ex-combatants should develop into respected citizens in their community and where possible become an engine for growth, employing others, including less innovative ex-combatants and developing from small to medium sized enterprises, setting standards for progress, sending the message that demobilization works.

Social history manifests ample examples of collective excesses committed by categories, whose relative deprivation was *ignored* as well as evolutionary emancipation where it was *recognized* and where adjustments took place to achieve an acceptable equilibrium. We are thus advocating an approach of targeted *positive* sanctions over the next three to five years in which the ex-combatants continue to receive support so that they may consolidate their civilian livelihoods, reaching a situation of equity with respect their peers, no longer lagging behind on the common path towards social change. This should be combined with targeted *negative* sanctions for those who fall back into anti-social behaviour. The current evaluation is directed towards the ex-combatants' development potential leaving the law-enforcement angle of ex-combatant follow-up to others. The argument is that further *targeted attention to the ex-combatants is required as a group, so that they may become a recognized category within the community*. The longer term goal is thus recognition, not dissolution of the category of Ex-combatants. They should have a recognized place in society, not become indistinguishable.

A large part of the war is perceived to be for national liberation – a hero's war that requires a hero's welcome. This is particularly important in psycho-social healing. This scenario applies to the early days against the Soviets, but under the communist regime many of the regular officers and soldiers fought against the jihaddis (Mujahiddin), later the Mujahiddin fought each other and thereafter the Taliban (which again saw many regular officers and soldiers fighting on their behalf). In this light it is uncertain whether an institution such as a Veterans Association would be appropriate. If something of that nature were created it might contradict, to a degree, the community based model. There is a need for both collective recognition and community absorption of ex-combatants.

*The point we are underlining is that the social outcome of DDR should not be left to chance; social goals must be set and agreed upon, in order to design strategies to ensure the project optimizes desired impacts, and minimizes undesired social impacts.*

## **7. Recommendations**

Recommendations given under the next few headings should be considered feasible within the ANBP/DDR programme, and thus refer to minimum standards to fulfil the current mandate.

### **7.1 The design and implementation of the reintegration component**

A full logical framework should be drawn up for the reintegration component applying something analogous to the German ZOPP procedure within the ranks of ANBP. This is a tried-and-tested mechanism to generate an object oriented strategy, and in the process, acquire understanding of project cycle management. It is irrelevant whether the Canadian, British, US or other versions of the underlying logic are applied, but crucial that institutional consensus and common understanding be achieved on goals, objectives, strategies and indicators of reintegration.

### **7.2 Framework for monitoring and evaluation of reintegration**

It is recommended to ensure that the international M&E advisor which will join ANBP shortly works with a counterpart and trains him together with other members of the M&E team, at HQ as well as in the regions. This can and should be achieved within the last project year in order to carry out internal project evaluation (measuring progress against reintegration goals set by ANBP itself) as well as external evaluation (satisfying donor data requirements as stipulated in the corresponding project documents).

The ICT Department is understaffed in the database section and requires training as well as software to enable it to provide output in a user friendly form to the M&E department. Furthermore the M&E and Programmes Departments as well as regional offices should have direct computerized access to the raw data they require to carry out their mandates mandate. These are also immediate objectives within reach for the next year.

### **7.3 Targets and indicators**

Participatory mapping techniques of the social structure and of time use should be used to assess how the ex-combatant sees his position with respect to meaningful others in the community (where do his loyalties lie, who are his reference persons), and how he perceives his household survival strategy over time. These are visualized qualitative data collection techniques (of the type usually referred to under the heading of rapid rural appraisal) best carried out by independent observers, but feasible within the remaining project period. The indicators on which we are collecting information are *patterns of community solidarity* and *bases of household economy* over time. They correspond to the minimal definition of reintegration adopted, the outcome of the intervention.

Besides the qualitative approach suggested in the previous paragraph, the calculation of internal rates of return for the different reintegration options is recommended permitting comparisons

(albeit hypothetical rather than empirical) over a 10-15 year period of the utility of the different options. This will require collection of data on costs and benefits.

#### **7.4 Institutional aspects of reintegration**

It is recommended that a capacity building policy be put in place to provide Afghan national leadership of ANBP with a stronger and more strategic *reintegration unit*, consisting of well trained Afghan nationals, at the centre within the Programmes Department, as well as outreach agents in the periphery. The last year of reintegration within DDR should thus create a nationalized autonomous taskforce with a well developed operational network. Linkages with existing regional employment and community development initiatives should root its main functions of income generation and orientation towards civilian society in local institutional ground.

The purpose of the proposed institutional development strategy is to forge a competent operational *reintegration unit* with an up-and-running database and M&E section, which may remain largely intact, in the handover of reintegration of ex-combatants to an external national body. This *national body representing the interests of former combatants* should preferably be an association or foundation, within civil society, not a government body. This would permit covering salary costs and ensuring professionalisation during the take-off transition period. A second objective is to prepare the ground for further development of civil society at the regional level, strengthening Local NGOs in the Development field, permitting the retreat of expatriate professional change agents currently involved in the implementation of DDR.

# ANNEXES

## **Annex I**

### **Field Visit observations with respect to the quality and relevance of re-integration packages**

## 1. Agriculture

### General information

- The agricultural package has a number of specific features which distinguish it from other options:
  - Agricultural activities are seasonal, so disbursement of training and follow-up cannot take place at any given date.  
Therefore the DDR Programme's basic impact criterion of a 6 months period in which the XC makes a living based on this package, is irrelevant.
  - Agricultural packages deal with live inputs, as opposed to tools or more or less perishable merchandise. This means that the quality of the inputs is harder to evaluate objectively.
  - The agricultural option often is the only possible choice for those who live too far from a training centre and/or have too little previous knowledge (80 % is illiterate) or skills to be eligible for any other option.
  - Finally, training must be given at the appropriate time, and cannot be limited to the moment when, or just before, the inputs are received.

### Training

- Agricultural training deals with live substance, whether it be plants or animals, who have distinct and often seasonal cycles in their life-span (as opposed to timber, car-engines or land-mines), so it is not possible to impart the necessary knowledge on specific subjects at any time of the year.  
Eg : Extension on how to select seed from one's own harvest, should not be given at the moment of sowing, but at harvest time, when the characteristics of the plants can be judged.  
Extension on how to detect heat in a cow cannot be given at a time of year when no cow is in heat.
- Even the best short (2-3 days) training sessions have a very limited value, unless they are followed by regular follow-up extension, which will be based on seasonal requirements. This is true for any farmer, including those who have been continuously working in this field for a long time. It is even more vital for XCs who, even if they originate from a rural area, have had little or no everyday practice for several, sometimes more than 20, years.
- As a result of this, there is no doubt that on the whole the training in the agriculture package is insufficient and barely relevant.

However, when passing this judgment, a number of external factors must be kept in mind :

- The numbers of XCs choosing this package have turned out to exceed most IP projects by far. Such, unexpectedly high, numbers of beneficiaries, who in addition tend to be scattered over large and often inaccessible geographical areas, preclude the provision of the above-mentioned quality follow-up extension, unless the increased number of beneficiaries is, immediately, matched by a similar increase in quality field staff and logistic inputs.
- Regular quality extension, such as is needed to effectively boost farmers outputs, is not easily realized even in regular, long-term development projects, and is virtually impossible in one year.

Therefore, IP performance in this field should not only be judged by the training which they offer, but also by the question how realistic their assumptions are in this field, and how transparent they are in their own evaluation of their training performance.

An IP who admits that he is not capable of providing the extension follow-up which was planned in the project proposal, who can explain the reasons for this failure, who can show positive efforts to achieve results there where this is possible and who in addition has suggestions on how to tackle this problem on a more structural basis, can be considered to have achieved much more, than the one who produces worthless 'monitoring' reports and pretends

that he truly is implementing his project according to schedule, while it is evident that this is not the case, because it is not possible.

The attitude of the latter carries the risk that at the end of the ANBP-DDR programme, the beneficiaries of the agricultural package will be considered as having received all the subject-matter support they needed, while they have had hardly any at all.

## CONCLUSIONS

### Training

- Agricultural training of inexperienced farmers over a period of one year only is an illusion, if any tangible outputs (let alone impact), are expected.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### Training

- 'There is no use flogging a dead horse'.  
Within the context of a 'one year project, dispersed and inexperienced beneficiaries, limited IP resources', only minor improvements can be achieved within the current programme period.
- The 2-3 days training should be carefully tailored to the specific needs of each type of package. Eg no extension on wheat production to XCs who chose a live-stock package.
- Beneficiaries' suggestions for topics should be taken into account. Animal health is a major pre-occupation. As veterinary services are virtually inaccessible, emphasis should be placed on prevention, in the form of improved husbandry practices (eg GAA approach in Mazar).
- The curriculum should focus on simple and applicable subjects, such as :  
The need for ventilation, daylight, feed and water in stables in wintertime, rather than the need for specific vaccinations which are not available anyway.
- Proper seeding depth for the specific (improved) wheat seed which is being distributed, rather than fertilizer application when upland wheat is supplied.
- Training should be given as much as possible at the appropriate time. This is not always possible as the moment of de-mobilization can occur at any given time of the year, but then efforts should be made to extend essential information at a later stage during the one year monitoring period.
- Use comprehensive monitoring results for a structured exchange of information and experience among agricultural package providers. This should lead to greater harmonization of approaches and improved training contents.

### Inputs

- Initial complaints about poor quality of provided animals should diminish as they are increasingly purchased together with the beneficiary.  
Ideally, purchased animals should remain in quarantine and should at least be de-wormed before being distributed. It is doubtful whether this is feasible within actual project budgets.
- More flexibility in the choice of inputs to receive, would have a positive impact both on the subjective feeling of satisfaction of the XC, and on his potential for improving his livelihood.  
Eg :  
Including wheat seed into every package, even for those who have no land to sow it on, is economically counter-productive and leaves the beneficiary with a feeling of dis-satisfaction right from the start.  
Flexible packages certainly require more effort from the IPs, but they can be managed (GAA Mazar), and can be expected to yield more sustainable impact. On the basis of the limited sample of interviewed XCs, it is not possible to substantiate this with evidence. This could be

remedied, by specifically interviewing those XCs who chose non-standard packages, and learning from GAA's experience in managing such a flexible approach.

### Saving/Credit schemes

Discontinue the compulsory credit scheme (CFA Kunduz) and return money already paid by XCs (including admin fees!).

- Any credit-scheme must have clearly-defined, transparent and locally feasible by-laws, which are known to, and accepted by, all participants.
- On long-term, credit schemes are only viable if they are 'owned' by the participants. Therefore, rather than to start another IP –run credit scheme, it is advised to abandon this particular scheme altogether, and concentrate on the savings-/and credit schemes which are already in place, as they have true long-term potential, including a beneficial impact on re-integration in local community, provided they are properly supported during the project implementation period.
- Evaluate output and impact of these savings-/credit groups so far. As they are in place since 6 months and are expected to meet every week, there should be sufficient evidence for thorough evaluation. Basic questions to be answered (to be further completed and detailed):
  - Do all groups have clearly understood transparent and accepted by-laws?
  - Do all original groups (61) still exist and do they have the same members?
  - Have they managed to save money according to their plan?  
Is there proper book-keeping concerning the group's financial assets?  
If not, for what reasons?
  - How was the saved money used so far?
  - Have there been any disputes about how to use this money?  
If so, how were these disputes settled?
  - If loans were given to members, how was repayment and what rules govern repayment (interest)?
  - What have group members learned, either from IP support or from their own experience?
  - Has membership of the group helped in any way to improve economic situation of its members?
  - Has membership of the group helped in any way in the integration process?
  - Any other problems encountered/any suggestions for further activities?
  - Has there been any monitoring/support from the IP?  
If so, how frequent was this, and was it useful?
- A comprehensive report on the existing savings/credit groups should allow to draw conclusions and recommendations, which could still be used by other agricultural IPs within the coming programme year and beyond.
- If a group has successfully managed small loans from their savings (preferably not only for medicine in case of illness of a family member, but also for investment in petty trade, agricultural inputs, etc), it should be eligible to receive additional funds from the IP's credit fund. This will allow the group to issue bigger loans to their members. A pre-determined threshold for such additional funding should be set, as an incentive for group members to properly manage their internal credits.
- Like in all credit schemes, repayment should not be financed by secondary loans, selling property or any other un-planned activity which is detrimental to present livelihood. E.g.: There is nothing wrong with re-paying credit from income generated by working on road construction, provided this happened in the agricultural off-season and did not prevent the farmer from harvesting his crop in time, which in turn would have negative consequences on the yield.  
Selling agricultural assets, such as animals, tools, seed etc, should be out of the question.

- If ANBP and IP in spite of the above decide that they do want to continue or start an IP-run credit scheme, they should take into account the following factors:
- Check with each of those who did repay \$ 196 (or part of it) in the present scheme, how he raised the necessary money for repayment.
- Only if a vast majority (90 %) of them did so with income raised from the DDR package received or otherwise without in any way jeopardizing the current livelihood of himself and his family, any other such scheme should be considered.
  - Discuss possibility of such a credit scheme with groups of potential beneficiaries, to see whether anyone is interested at all.
  - Survey their credit needs: for what, in what season, amounts required, reasonable time span for repayment etc.
  - Explain need for inflation correction, and growth of the capital, in any credit scheme. Islam forbids charging interest, so it must be clear that if the amount returned is expected to be higher than what was borrowed, this is not for the lenders profit, but making sure that the purchasing power of the credit scheme remains at least unchanged, and preferably grows, for subsequent borrowers.
  - There should not be any admin charges. If someone is employed to administer the credit scheme there are 2 possibilities:
    - Scheme is administered by NGO, within its project budget. This should not be imputed to the participants in the credit scheme, were it only for transparency's sake.
    - Scheme is administered by the participants themselves. In this case, either each group member administers in turn, or the members choose one person among themselves as a permanent administrator and if they wish, decide to remunerate him for this, by contributing each a small amount for this purpose.
  - Scheme must be fully voluntary and should be based on savings made from agricultural income from the package, and not on part of the package being given as a loan. This is not done in any of the other packages and there is no reason for penalizing agricultural package beneficiaries.
  - Start with small amounts and short repayment periods. These should not be fixed but flexible, taking in to account seasonal fluctuations in a farmer's income.

#### Skill training for local service provision.

- The success of the agricultural package is subject to climatic fluctuations, livestock epidemics and several other factors beyond the control of the beneficiary. In addition the limited training provided cannot be expected to have contributed significantly to the beneficiaries' competence in optimally exploiting his package. Therefore there is a felt, and also objective, need for additional income sources for rural beneficiaries.
- A certain number of them (to be checked, how many ?) do have additional skills, such as literacy, carpentry or other, but could not choose to develop these into a fully-fledged occupation, because they either live too far from training centers, are totally or partially illiterate, or for any other reason.
 

Such XCs might benefit more from a flexible, mixed package, including eg a cow/sheep, some vegetable seeds for home consumption, and instead of wheat seeds (at any rate a risky enterprise, particularly if it concerns rain-fed fields), a tool-kit with a short refresher-training.
- This can be training to become a literacy/numeracy trainer at village level for those who already had some formal school training (see IOM initiative in Mazar). This would be particularly useful in remote places where there are no formal schools or teachers. The XC could act as an informal schoolteacher even for children, during the off-season, when both he and the other villagers have time to spare.
- For those who had some previous work experience and skills in any specific trade (eg carpentry), but have already received a full agricultural package and therefore are not eligible

anymore for further investments, small credits could provide basic tools and enable them to earn some additional income on the spot.

Such mixed approaches correspond with the reality of so-called 'drop-outs', who in fact may turn out to be the most versatile and among the best integrated XCs. They have at some point abandoned their initial option, as it did not yield a satisfactory income, and either completely replaced it or added another occupation, which per definition is more market-demand driven. There are those who leave their re-integration cow on the family farm and go to work in a shop, just as there is the car mechanic who during the agricultural season works on his fields and will work in his learned trade only in winter.

- A pre-requisite for such mixed packages, is more flexibility in re-adapting current project proposals on the ground. At least in ANBP HQ and as much as possible in ROs. If approval for any re-shuffling within the current programme needs to be approved in NY, there is little chance for it to become operational before the intended end of the programme.
- Check number of Agricultural package beneficiaries with other skills.
- Check trajectories of 'drop-outs' and those who changed options. Investigate reasons for these changes and outcome, impact.

The successful ones are a valuable source of information about livelihood strategies.

- Beneficiaries of this package need additional long-term support if they are expected to effectively increase their livelihoods.
- The first option is to include them in longer-term agricultural/rural development projects. There they can benefit from long-term extension together with local non-XC farmers. This will in addition have a positive impact on their re-integration in the community. This presumes timely planning of additional funding for such projects. As numbers of farming XCs and their geographical dispersion now are known, such planning must be possible on reasonable short-term, so as to minimize the time-gap between the end of the current DDR programme assistance and integration in a purely 'civil' follow-up project.

Some IPs are already working in that direction, such as GAA in Mazar province, where even women are involved, or CFA in Kunduz, who has established mixed (XC and non-XC) groups for a savings/credit scheme and literacy courses. Such initiatives are excellent ways of improving both knowledge and skills, and promoting integration and community coherence.

However, they will only be successful and of any use, if they are closely monitored and supported.

If monitoring exists only on paper, the result is bound to be the opposite: demotivation and quarrels which will divide the community instead of uniting it.

- The second option is to provide farmers with additional means of income, particularly in the (winter) off-season. Interviews with XCs point in the following directions:
  1. Small credits for petty trade (tea, sugar, matches etc) in their own village. Or, as one XC suggested, to produce cheese from his package cow's milk and sell it in the nearest bazar.
  2. Daily wage labour on construction sites, road building etc (in the off-season).

This seems in contradiction with the fact that there was little enthusiasm for this option, when offered in the waiting period between demobilization and receipt of the re-integration package. However, at that stage the XC have just received a food package (generally well appreciated, both for quantity and quality) and expect a lot from the forthcoming package. Once they are back in the village and realize how difficult it is to make ends meet with agriculture only, they may be more open to temporary migration to a reasonably remunerated cash-for-labour project.

## **2. Vocational Training / On the Job Training**

### Training

- Each IP makes up his own training package, there seems to be little coherence nation-wide. Yet this should be possible, as basically a carpenter or a car-mechanic encounter similar challenges to their skills, wherever they work.

#### Inputs

- In each VT package there is an element of tools provided. Some IPs deliver the tools which were asked for by XC, but decide themselves which quality to choose. Others provide standard tool-kits.

#### Impact

- The impact of the VT package is somewhat easier to ascertain than the one for the agricultural package, as at least the output is measurable: The graduate has or does not have employment in the acquired skill.

However, even if he is employed, that does not necessarily mean that he earns any money and is able to assure his own and his family's livelihood, unless he opened his own business.

If he remains with his former trainer (on the job training), or is accepted in an average workshop, he is likely not to be paid at all or hardly, for an undetermined period of time.

### CONCLUSIONS

#### Training

- On the basis of XC interviews, the training on the whole was satisfactory, albeit too short in some cases.
- Without a structured survey which would compare the skills of trainees from formal training and On the Job training, it is difficult to judge which gives better results.  
Judging on the basis of interviews with trainers and trainees, the formal training allows for less practical skill development, as only 3-4 hours/day are reserved for this and groups of trainees sometimes are so big (> 40), that is it doubtful whether they all can be working at the same time.
- Formal training has the advantage of :
  - eliminating the risk of an XC being placed with a workshop owner who, for whatever reason, is not a good trainer,
  - providing him with a larger scale of themes (eg windows, chairs, wedding dresses, etc) than he would learn in one shop which may be specialized in a limited number of topics,
  - providing him with more insight into the rationale of certain practices (eg types of wood joints for specific needs, etc).
- On the Job training has the advantage of providing more opportunity to practice skills, which may shorten the subsequent period of un-paid apprenticeship (no evidence available).
- A mixed VT-On the Job training option (eg AGEF Kunduz), may therefore be the best solution.

#### Inputs

- Inputs are too often considered by XCs to be of poor quality, for these complaints to be dismissed as 'typical beneficiary moaning'.

They are of essential importance, if the XC is to make a living off them. It is evident that if a carpenter has to spend his time sharpening a chisel which keeps turning blunt after every few strokes, he will not only be demotivated, but will not achieve a good professional result either.

As further employment by workshop owners who do not pay salaries is no viable issue for most XCs, many VT trainees wish to open their own shop, often together with other craftsmen, not necessarily other XCs. This is a positive factor for social integration, and should thus be encouraged. However, opening a shop is difficult enough as it is, without having to replace part of the basic tools in addition.

- Interviewed XCs were mainly from the pilot phase, and hopefully much will have improved since then. In addition, the trainees themselves were not necessarily capable of making the right choices about which tools to choose, when they were just starting their training.

### Impact

- Vocational training, whether it be formal or on the job, does not necessarily lead to remunerated employment. Usually it is followed by a prolonged period of apprenticeship, with in the best case very low payment, usually only provision of meals.  
This may be acceptable for very young, and unmarried, XCs who see this as an additional training period, but for older XCs, usually with big families, this is not a viable solution.  
The ensuing dis-satisfaction is compounded by the fact that during the training period the XCs are reasonably paid, and when they supposedly have acquired skills and feel they are valued craftsmen, they earn less instead of more.
- There is little evidence of structured market surveys (apart from AGEF), before training packages are offered. This can lead to flooding of the market with certain professions, while others are lacking. (Eg surplus of carpenters in Shebergan)
- There is some evidence of increased concern among IPs (eg IOM Mazar) about provision of job-opportunities for graduates XCs. In Mazar several job-centers have been opened recently, but it is too early to judge their impact.  
Relevant staff, whether in IPs or ANBP regional offices, is not always sufficiently aware of their existence; services offered or even geographical location. Such knowledge is essential if any graduates are to be directed there.
- No-one seems to feel particularly responsible for providing job-opportunities, whether it be the IPs ('were only supposed to train'), nor ANBP, other UN structures or the Afghan Government.
- It is debatable, whether job-placement efforts should specifically target XCs, as this might stretch the community's tolerance a bit far : sofar the communities tend to be happy that their male family members are back home and out of mischief and that peace has returned, so the fact that the XCs receive support which they themselves lack, does not bother them too much.  
However, this may turn into resentment if XCs continue to be favored members of their (generally very poor) society.
- Beneficiaries are not always sure as to whether they have received all they were entitled to (including certificates). This means that there is lack of transparency, which in turn creates dis-satisfaction even in cases where all IP's obligations were met.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### Training

- Only a comparative test of skills of graduated VT or On the Job trainees could determine which training option gives the best results from a professional point of view. However, as no initial tests were performed to ascertain XCs' knowledge and skills, this might turn out to be a sterile exercise.
- Alternatively, check satisfaction of final employers of XCs graduated from these three options.

### Inputs

- Assess (ex)-trainees' and trainers' preferences of what basic tools are needed, and which quality is best.  
At this stage there should be enough information among various IPs to be able to compile such information : IOM has prepared a book with pictures, which is a good start, AGEF has made a choice for standard tool-kits.  
On the basis of such a survey, pre-select the most important and best quality tools, prepare a collection of these, including price-tags, and take these to introductory meetings, training centers etc. Seeing a picture of a tool in a book is not sufficient to judge its quality.

Subsequent buying them in bulk should lower prices. Regular quality control will be necessary to ascertain whether delivered goods have the same quality.

If an XC wants some particular tool which is not in the basic collection, he should receive the means to purchase that himself, preferably after having received advice from a knowledgeable trainer.

### Impact

- There is no simple solution for the employment of Xcs in a context of millions of other unemployed Afghans. It is evident that counseling of each and every XC is beyond the scope of the ANBP/DDR programme. However, positive impact can be expected from the following:

- Improve pre-demobilization market survey, and counseling of XCs, in order to avoid flooding the market with the wrong craftsmen.

- Clearly determine what agency(ies) should be responsible for compiling data about job-opportunities and disseminating them.

ANBP seems to be the most logical choice for overall management of such a data-base, provided government structures are involved as early as possible in view of future sustainability.

The latter should not be dismissed as a waste of time. For instance MRRD or MoLSA do have initiatives which either already provide employment or look for existing employment opportunities (eg MRRD co-operation with UNOPS, MoLSA employment project for war widows in Bamyán, and job-placement centre in Mazar). Such initiatives, even if small scale and/or imperfect should be entered into employment data-bases, supported and improved where needed and possible.

- Actively contact also bigger commercial enterprises, as they may need skilled labour.

- On RO level, make an effort to convince employers not only to employ VT graduates, but also, if they are not willing to pay them a salary right away, at least to commit themselves as to when and how much they will ever pay them.

- There is virtually no monitoring of employed XCs (apart from AGEF?)

- All XCs in any given package, should be aware not only of what is due to them, but also when, based on what criteria (if applicable), and whose responsibility it is to provide it to them (IP or ANBP).

Only such transparency can eliminate (false) presumptions of being cheated, and the ensuing dis-satisfaction.

## **3. Small Business/Self Employment**

### Training

- In principle only literate candidates are accepted, in some cases (eg AGEF Bamyán after intervention of regional ANBP staff), also illiterate XCs can be accepted, provided they have previous small business or trade experience.

A specially adapted training course is provided to these candidates.

- Apart from literacy tests, no other entrance exam is taken. The level of previous knowledge of the participants therefore varies considerably, but interviewed ex-trainees have never complained about this. The more educated ones tend to help the weaker ones.

- Interviewed trainees from various IPs have expressed satisfaction with their training and did not want any additional subjects, when asked about this. Few (eg a 'pharmacist' in Bamyán) would appreciate additional training in his subject matter; the others did not even request this.

- There does not seem to have been any consultation among IPs in order to streamline their training packages.

### Inputs

- XCs usually choose the physical inputs themselves, sometimes with the help of trainers.
- The money (usually \$ 700) is delivered to them in 2 or more tranches. One at the end of the training for business start-up. The following tranches however, are delivered on the basis of a variety of criteria, such as
  - a fixed number of weeks after the 1<sup>st</sup> one (eg AGEF Bamyan),
  - after checking whether the business is properly managed (eg IOM Mazar),
  - they are not delivered at all, if the XC fails to ask for more (IOM Mazar).
- The XCs usually know about the total amount due to them, but little or nothing about rules governing tranche delivery and criteria applied. This lack of transparency creates unnecessary confusion and a correct or imaginary impression of being cheated.

## CONCLUSIONS

### Training

- The Small Business training generally satisfies the trainees. Whether it really was appropriate and effective, can only be ascertained on the basis of IP monitoring which would take into account specific points which were part of the training, eg are stocks and financial books kept accordingly, is the XC capable of planning purchasing his supplies, etc. However, such detailed monitoring was not found during field visits.

### Inputs

- As XCs choose their own equipment/merchandise, they do not complain about quality.
- Generally SB graduates consider the amount of \$ 700 to be insufficient.

### Impact

- The businesses visited do manage to survive, sometimes even to employ trainees. It would take a more detailed survey than this evaluation mission, to determine what role additional sources of income (such as farm income) play in this.  
As the key element of a wider survival strategy however, this option certainly seems valuable. However, not all graduated SB trainees were visited, the number of 'failed' business may be higher than would seem at first sight.
- If SB owners do not receive all that is owed to them, and on time, their business is rendered unnecessarily vulnerable. There is no excuse for IPs who do not respect this principle and do not take seriously any complaints from XCs.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### Training

- On the basis of monitoring reports, the most frequent shortcomings in XC business management should be identified, and on that basis a short refresher course at the end of the XCs' project involvement could be offered. As most of the beneficiaries with the SB/SE option are located in bazars in bigger villages and have associates or apprentices who can look after the business for a few days, it should be possible to organize such refresher courses.

### Inputs

- Virtually all respondents need additional funds, in order to expand their business or even pay merchandise which they bought on credit. They realize that the programme will not supply them with additional funding, and would welcome credit schemes, although they generally have confused ideas about the amount of money needed and how to repay.

### Impact

- If XCs' businesses are to prosper and if they are to put into practice what they learned during training, they must be able to plan investments. This implies being aware of how much money is due to them, when and on what condition.

- Full transparency should prevail on this subject. Each IP should have a clearly defined set of criteria applied for disbursement, and communicate it to its beneficiaries.
- As it is not possible to check every XC's complaint about real or imagined wrongs, all IPs should be invited to present:
  - a comprehensive list with all graduated XCs, stating already delivered and still outstanding payments to each of them, with corresponding dates. (Such a list was promised by IOM in Mazar, but has still not materialized three weeks later)
  - a clear set of conditions and criteria applied for disbursement of any funds.

#### **4. Supervisors – Technicians**

##### General

- Training for the function of Supervisor and/or Technician in construction- or road building projects is offered to better educated XCs, in particular to officers. There are specific admission criteria, viz a test at 8<sup>th</sup> grade education level.
- In pilot phase special small projects were created for the DDR programme, so XCs could learn supervision in different subjects. In main phase training is supplied in ongoing UNOPS projects only. At present only road construction is available.

##### Impact

- In Mazar supervisors are presented to NGOs/commercial companies. If employed, they will receive during three months probation period a salary of \$ 8/day from UNOPS. Eight of them already have jobs promised. UNOPS expects that all 16 will find employment.
- In Kunduz the implementation of this option was sub-standard in the pilot phase, supposedly because XCs with too low educational background were admitted. According to ex-trainees, no formal training was provided at all, and they worked in fact as daily labourers. Jobs for them are not easily found as expectations of XCs and employer tend to be incompatible:
  - XCs expect to receive higher payment than the \$ 5/day which they received during training.
  - XCs are used to command and sometimes treat their subordinates likewise, which causes trouble.
  - Freshly trained XCs have less experience and knowledge than ordinary supervisors.
- On the other hand, commercial contractors have to bid in tenders. They often have little experience in budgeting and in order to win the tender, lower their prices to a level which is not necessarily economically sound. Their profit margins become so small that even honest contractors cannot pay decent salaries.
- Now there is a monthly tracking system of job opportunities on the market. Time will learn whether this, coupled with improved training, will lead to more employment.
- IOM implements road projects, but so far does not actively support XC employment.
- MRRD is the main supplier of contracts for UNOPS.
- Active employment support from Governor, line-ministries and NGOs is weak so far.

#### **CONCLUSIONS**

##### Training

- As training concerns only road construction (as opposed to e.g. wat/san or building), there is a risk that too many road construction supervisors will be available in the region, which again will limit job opportunities. Most XCs are not eager to travel again for long periods away from home.

##### Impact

- Positive impact in the form of decently paid, steady employment is particularly important for this category of XCs, for the following reasons:
  - Some of them were paid salaries in the army, so they are more prone to regret having demobilized than common soldiers.
  - They were promised 'quality training for quality jobs', and therefore have higher expectations than average soldiers.
  - They received \$ 5-6/day during training and are not ready to work for less after graduation.
  - The higher their rank and the bigger their power was, the less they will appreciate becoming an unemployed 'nobody' in civil life, particularly after high expectations of a well paid job.
  - Their first option may have been to join the ANA or ANP, for which they were turned down.
 All these factors makes them a risk group for re-joining an armed group, if they feel not satisfied with their civilian life.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### Training

- It would seem that UNOPS in Kunduz has already improved its training. As graduates are not prone to leave home for long periods, numbers of trainees should reflect market needs in that region.

### Impact

- Check whether any XCs who chose this option, first opted for ANA or Police and were rejected, for they might be potential problem cases if they do not find proper employment.
- Employing these XCs should become more attractive for potential employers. UN agencies or NGOs could improve their market value by offering them (temporary) employment in which they could gain more, and more varied, experience.
- This sub-group of XCs should continue to be monitored after graduation, in order to avoid relapse in (irregular) army or criminal structures.

## 5. De-mining

### General

-- Job options are two-fold:

- To join a professional de-mining team, deployed wherever need arises.
  - To become a community-based de-miner. This means living in ones own village and being the regional mines/UXO expert. On top of a (low) salary as basic incentive, the XC would be paid (by whom?) for eliminating any mine or UXO in his region. In addition the XC can provide mine-awareness trainings in schools and any other members of their society.
- Both options can be expected to meet with high approval by civil communities and therefore be one of the most appreciated packages.
- This is one of the few options where the graduate XC cannot revert to self-employment.
  - If he does not find any employment he basically can look for work in his Vocational Trade, but the de-miners generally take pride in having chosen 'civil service' and like the public acclaim which this profession enjoys, so they are not all that keen on abandoning this dream.

## CONCLUSIONS

### Training

- The Mission has no way of assessing whether the de-mining training was professionally sound.

### Impact

- Out of 132 de-mining graduates, not one single one is employed as a de-miner after one month, and there are no jobs lined-up either.

About 11 are selling fruit in the bazar, a few (drop-outs) have jobs like cooks, guards etc. It is not clear whether they spontaneously dropped-out, or whether the course management used this as a way to eliminate them from the training, possibly for psychological reasons.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### Impact

- In a country with so many mines and UXOs, NO DE-MINER SHOULD EVER REMAIN JOBLESS. As self-employment is no option, it is crucial that employment opportunities are prepared well ahead of their graduation date.  
ANBP HQ should take the lead in co-coordinating job-placement efforts in this field. This should continue until all of them are absorbed (provided of course that their professional and psychological skills are adequate).
- If left to their own devices without even the perspective of a job, their newly-acquired knowledge of explosive devices (even if only passive), might become a sought-after commodity on the illegal army/criminal market.
- Check whether any XCs who chose this option, first opted for ANA or Police and were rejected, for they might be potential problem cases if they do not find proper employment.
- This sub-group of XCs should continue to be monitored after graduation, in order to avoid relapse in (irregular) army or criminal structures.

## 6. Literacy Training

- Literacy classes are frequent additions to various other training options and very needed, considering the fact that approximately 80 % of the XCs are illiterate.
- They usually are offered to those who attend long-term training (e.g. VT) or chose agricultural packages. The latter often are included in mixed groups, together with other villagers.  
This is an excellent way of promoting re-integration.
- IPs seem to consider this of minor importance, judging by the following facts:
  - There usually is no intake test for the participants. This means that on the one hand, it is not possible to check their progress, on the other hand the level of the participants may vary so much, that many get demotivated, either because they are bored or they cannot manage to keep up.
  - IOM (Mazar) employs literate XCs as literacy trainers, without having trained them for this task.  
As teaching literacy requires specific skills, it is doubtful whether these 'trainers' will achieve much more than filling quantitative monitoring sheets.
- Trainings usually do not take into account the seasonality of agricultural employment: during the summer (and particularly harvest) season, farmers have no time to attend. As they do not all live close to one another, many have to walk a fair distance to attend classes.
- The team did not pay particular attention to Literacy Training, but those XCs who were asked for their achievements in this field, generally did not mention more than writing their name, writing numbers till 50, some reading skills, in spite of supposedly having followed frequent literacy classes over a long period of time. The most positive cases were carpenters who had learned how to read a measuring tape.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

- Literacy classes should be of good quality, otherwise they only demotivate, particularly young people with potential for learning.
- Literacy groups should be formed with people of similar level.

- Regular tests should be given to the trainees, to assess their progress, not only for the trainer but also for themselves.

## **7. Teacher training**

The mission was not concerned with the Teacher Training as such, as only a very small percentage of XCs chooses this option (600 trained insofar). However, together with de-mining, this is probably the option with the highest appreciation from the civil community, and as such deserves more attention than its ranking would warrant.

Public appreciation should be taken into account when assessing cost-benefit ratios, as it constitutes considerable added value in term of re-integration not only of those particular XCs, but also of the appreciation of the whole DDR programme by the population.

In that respect it is painful, that this particular group has met with salary problems after having taken up their posts, often in remote villages where there was no teacher at all.

The problem is twofold:

- MoE has problems with determining salary levels for a group of newly appointed teachers in general, not only XCs. These teachers have not yet received any salary since March 2005. It would seem that this problem has recently been solved; however, no salary is received yet.
- MoD should transmit information about the teachers' military grade to MoE, as this has a bearing on their future salary scale. According to a group of five teachers met in one of the ROs however, MoD refuses to do anything without a bribe.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

- Although this is not part of ANBP's responsibility, follow-up of this matter is recommended; as such incidents are bound to demotivate other candidates from choosing teachers training as an option.

Bamyan province alone could easily absorb all the DDR graduates, as it needs 1000 teachers!

Therefore no effort should be spared to help those who take up this, poorly paid and unglamorous, option and to avoid any negative publicity which could discourage others from following their example.

# **Annex II**

**A selection of ex-combatant interview excerpts:  
Kabul and Jalalabad, June 20-30, 2005**

Kabul **June 20** ANBP compound: two ex-combatants

- Current ages: in their thirties, have been in the army for 15 and 23 years. Lived in Kabul and went to the military base during the daytime, the male usually spent the night there, the female XC did not. Both succeeded in keeping regular contact with their families and neighborhood during the period in the army.
- I have chosen *bicycle repair*, because I had experience in the trade. I am now self-sufficient. My educational background is chemistry, I have a university degree but can not get a job because I know nobody to recommend me. The government will build a road through our neighborhood and we will become jobless as well as homeless.
- It was not our decision to leave the army. The commanders forced us, they sent us a letter saying that the military base was being closed. We had to join DDR. If there would have been other opportunities we would not have joined DDR. We wanted to enlist in the ANA but were not accepted.
- The DDR intake experience was good, we were treated well.
- The decision on which course to take was fast. First I wanted to become a teacher, but I have no professional training so I selected Small Business.
- We received 100 kg of wheat, 14 kg of small peas, 2 kg of salt, 2 cans of vegetables, 10 USD for transportation and one Shanwar Kamiz. We were not satisfied, it was worth about 20 USD. We would have expected something like that every month. The government should give us a monthly allowance
- We both have a small shop but they will be destroyed together with our houses, without us getting any compensation. The municipality has plans to widen the road. We have no money to set up a new store and build a new house. They should at least give us a new house. We are worried and angry. There will be conflicts with the government.
- We have no problems in our neighborhoods. I am an officer and know how to behave with the people.
- There were many changes after the war finished; many people came back from Pakistan and Iran.
- We do not agree with the Mujahed commanders, only with those that know how to use their mind.

Kabul **June 21**, regional office ANBP compound: 5 *ex-combatants small business and metal work*

- All wore uniforms during their military days and all (except one) slept away from home.
- There are different types of military. The ANA has rules and laws, but we did not. If the commander would order us to stand in the sun we would not do it. We accept the things that we get benefit from. We were asked to rob and steal, from a house or search people's pockets. We did not agree. The commanders are bandits, people from other countries force them to turn against their own people. The commanders knew what the soldiers were doing but did not stop them.
- We do not agree with the local commanders, only with those that are working with the government.
- All are satisfied with their training, but need money to set up or expand their business. One said that AGEF had indicated they would provide help in getting micro-credit.
- DDR does not always keep its promises. I was told I would get \$100 a month for 6 months. After 3 months of training I was supposed to get a welding machine. But I got 60 dollars a day and did not get the welding machine.

- Generally the respondents are grateful and satisfied but further training -for example a couple of hours per week- would be welcome. They could also talk about their experience and get advice.

Kabul **22 June** 2005, ANBP compound regional office 10 ex-combatants from *AGEF and AFS*.

- All had previously been soldiers spending most of their nights at the military base.
- None mention any social problems in their community or neighborhood. We are not criminals. I am a carpenter and people thank me for my work.
- We were really tired and bored of the weapons and fighting and welcome the opportunity to lead a normal life.
- The commanders forced us to fight the enemy and then they ordered us to disarm. We are happy we did.
- It will be better to disarm all local commanders still in power. We need factories to put the people to work. And a good education programme.
- DDR is the only way forward. I am a professional and can start a business of my own.
- I received 3 sheep -two are females- and a bicycle, which is not enough for me to live on. It will take some time before they have offspring.
- I have become an auto mechanic and am working for 9 months. I know how to do about 60% of all repair jobs.
- Only one of the XCs can read and write. Of course we would be happy if there had been an opportunity to study. We are eager to follow lessons even after a whole day's work.
- I have only 100 m<sup>2</sup> of land, which is not enough to live on. The government is not able to give us more land, but we can get more cows and sheep. They can graze on collective pasture land.
- I started my business from zero, I was getting 50 USD a month doing metal work but now I earn only 30. If I could get a loan for 1500 Afghani (30 USD) I could start a business. But now I have to work as a wage labourer.
- I chose carpentry and learned about 80% of what I need to know to work independently. I have some small equipment and have rented a shop.
- I am a carpet weaver and chose small business. I bought two standing weaving frames and can make two carpets a month. If I could get some more money I could increase my business. We are working ourselves and have some trainees. The market is good, if I could make more maybe 10 to 15 and take them to Pakistan. I would be able to sell them.
- I can not learn a new trade through vocational training and have one milking cow. It hasn't calved yet. We are 9 people in the family and need more livestock to make a decent living.
- Those who are wealthy in the village go to the city to sell their products. The poor do not have enough to sell, they eat the produce themselves. So we can not ask anybody to give us credit, wouldn't be able to pay them back. It all depends on money. If I could find some money I could expand the business that I have. Everybody has their talent; we will see what we can sell very soon. We are no longer at war and can travel to other districts now. We committed no crimes to others during the war and can travel anywhere we wish, doing business.

Kabul **23 June**, regional office ANBP compound 7 *ex-combatants involved in agricultural activities*

- Most of these XCs spent time fighting at the front in the North of the country.

- The DDR program is useful but it is not good enough, we work but don't earn enough. I earn 100 Afghani a day (2 USD). I am so poor I borrowed money to come here.
- I have received 30 chickens and 10 of them have died. I cannot feed my family from 20 chickens.
- I have no idea how we might improve our situation or what kind of support we could best receive. It is better that you decide. We are waiting for the guidance of the organization that is supporting us.
- People who are not honest are rich, we are hard working honest people but we are poor.
- The IP is happy with me. I am now well trained. I have 300 m2 of land and work it with my two brothers and their families. One has two wives and 15 children.

**June 26, 2005, Khewa Eastern Territories, *agricultural and livestock workers***

- We heard about DDR from our commanders, I have received 3 sheep and a bicycle. This keeps me occupied but does not provide me with a living. We had 3 days training, but already knew how to care for livestock. They also come to look us up and ask how things are going. If a sheep is sick they help us and also vaccinate the animals.
- I chose small business, but they did not let me enter the programme because I am not literate and can not work out a business plan.
- We were one of the first groups so we received \$200, but for later groups this cash incentive was added to the reintegration package so they received it in kind, because some commanders had confiscated the money from the XCs.
- Yes I visit my ex-colleagues frequently, as well as our friends who still have their weapons.
- There should be no war, all commanders should hand in their weapons, no bribes should be taken and no extortion should take place. The commanders have a lot of money and do not care about the poor. They have their benefits in peace as well as war. I have heard the you are giving packages to them as well. The commanders do not need DDR support, they have their own resources.
- We received 3 boxes of bees and 3 sheep. The bees have to be moved from time to time so that they are in the vicinity of flowers. This is costly. Some of our bee colonies died. When we realized that the place we live is not suitable for beekeeping we organized ourselves and succeeded in multiplying the bees well. One now has 18 boxes, the other 7, but they say the product is not enough to support their family. It just covers the costs of feeding the bees and taking them from one place to another. So we have to do other work.
- The sheep they received are sterile, but they do require feeding. They are costing money and not producing any profit. They also have to be taken from one place to another.
- The vegetables take time to grow and have to be transported to the market, which costs money that we don't have. Also, the sheep are sick and AFS doctors are not coming so we took them to the vet who also has to be paid. This is not working. What we need is credit to start a shop.
- We received 600 fruit tree seeds of which only 180 grew up, but even these 180 trees take up a lot of space. I want to grow something else because the yield will be better than the trees. We received 25 chickens and vaccinated them but they all died.
- We have no problems with the community because all of them were mujahed.

**June 27, 2005 Jalalabad *welders and auto-mechanics***

- I used to be a driver and I chose the auto-mechanics package.

- I am a welder but have no previous experience. The training was good enough to give me basic skills but it is difficult to learn how to do it well. The training material we get is not enough to work, we get no drill and no generator. There are micro credit programmes but the amounts are too small to be helpful.
- We don't need more tools, the training time should be increased.
- If the training duration is increased and the stipend is reduced, we will not have enough to sustain our families. All of our time has been passed in shooting others, with these stipends we are helpless, should we go back to our commanders?
- I can service the wheels and repair the generator as well as other parts of the engine, but how can I find a customer? The people that compete with me have 5-6 years of experience and I am also short of tools.
- I am a welder and work individually but do not have a workshop. That is why I am looking for a partner.

*farmers*

- I used to earn 25-30 USD a month from the government (ex-officer) but what do you expect me to do with 6 sheep? If they had given me 600 sheep I would be in the mountains now herding them, but I will not go out with 6 sheep. My 5 children have been admitted to school. They need decent clothes and schoolbooks. The village people tease me and say that now that I am DDRd I have no opportunity to live here.
- I am a working man, not a farmer, somebody told me that DDR would give me credit. I want to transport fertilizer to the village, working the soil is hard here and the crops are poor. DDR forced me to take the agricultural package because I am illiterate. The poor get 6 sheep but those that have money and can read get a small business course. I got put in the worst programme. It was not my choice but there was no alternative. I have been dishonoured, nobody cares about my needs.
- I am a poor person and have 3 children. I have a driver's licence and have been a driver for 16 years in Pakistan. I would be satisfied if I could work as a driver.
- I am disabled. I used to get 40 USD per month from the government. Now I have one cow and cannot feed my family. I have experience as a cattle trader but no money to start up with.
- I have no idea of my own. I will follow the others. It is your choice, but neither the sheep or cow will bring us any good.
- I cultivated vegetables and received pesticides. Later I was told that they were internationally banned. The package was distributed after the season.

**June 28, Dara-e-Noor shopkeeper**

- I used to have a very good business, because the road used to end here. Everybody came to this small market to do their shopping. Now the road has been extended and there is less activity at this market. DDR gave me 700 USD and I added 3 to 400 of my own. I have a problem with people who come here and take things on credit. I can not refuse it to them it because they are my relatives but sometimes I have to remind them after a year to pay me back..
- There is no chance that there will be fight between the villages here. I don't think the XCs will rejoin armed groups, they are tired of the war, but if the income situation does not improve they may turn to the poppy trade. Most of them think the purpose of NGOs is to give them money. DDR itself is to blame for this. But XCs are not rejected by the community. Everybody is happy that they have laid down their weapons. Nearly all of them are in the same position and respect eachother.

- I am one of a group of 35 XCs that have adopted SB but I am eager to learn English and the use of the computer.
- During the Russian time many volunteered to fight because they killed religious leaders and many others. In 1985 the Russians killed 70 people in the village in a raid. After the Russians were defeated there was fighting between different groups in the country, between North and South. During this time every family was forced to send one person to fight with the commander, or otherwise to pay him. The poor could only send one of their sons. They were forced to join the commanders and fight. There were also local commanders who held road blocks and forced people to pay them. The situation was one of lawlessness. Things are better now. We are trying to get support from the Ministry to build a school in our village.

**June 28, Dara-e-Noor** *vegetable package*

- We are poor people and are not afraid of our neighbors. We have been at war for 25 years and are happy now. We might vote for the commander if he serves us well before the election. He is a big farmer. The people had no idea what the reintegration options were about. They asked their elders what to choose. If you come to our houses you can see for yourself what is good for us. The cows we got were from the plains. Here in the mountain we do not have the type of feed they need. We have a shortage of water. Come and see how far our women must go to fetch the water.
- I have taken the vegetable package. It is not useful for me, there is no market here. I have ¼ of an acre of agricultural land, need a better house, and money for a business and a second marriage. When I was with the commander I was earning more money and I was happy.
- There is no hate for us in the community. Community development is good but it is not clear what the benefit will be for us. Usually they only help their relatives. We need special attention. Micro credit is a big responsibility.

**June 28, Dara-e-Noor**

*AFS projects milking cows*

- I got a cow and some sheep, but some of them died and some of them are sick.. I would like to receive credit to solve these problems.

*vegetables*

- The place where I live has an irrigation problem as well as a shortage of land, so we have to do other work locally to support our family. The yield is low and the market is far away. It is not worth the effort or the money to take it to the market. I can drive a car and would be happy to work for DDR as a driver. DDR can also recruit people from our village to do construction work, for example building a dam for the irrigation of our land or otherwise a hospital.

*Small business*

- We are poor and shopkeeping is not lucrative enough to support our family. The population is small here and we need more stock and different items in our shops. We need a loan to stock up and will repay when we sell. If DDR gives us courses in computer and English we will follow them. The shop can be run by other members of the family. DDR should support construction work. This will convince illegally armed groups to disarm. We have a water source here but no dam to create a reservoir so that we may take advantage of the water to irrigate our land.

*carpenter*

- It is my last month of training and I try to make windows, doors and tables. The time was not long enough for me to learn how to do it perfectly, so I would like 3 months more training. I would like DDR to help me get machinery so that I can support my family. I don't want to take credit because there might be problems in paying it back. Sometimes there is work and sometimes there isn't.
- IP Training workshop Jalalabad June 29, group of *Carpentry* students . Generally satisfied with demobilization and civilian life as well as the level of skills acquired, and with teaching provided. They stated that income from carpentry is better than from most other manual jobs so that they hoped to be able to support their families. Further assistance requested in the form of generators to operate the electrical equipment they have received. Extension of the duration of training considered desirable. Complaints with respect to the quality of tools which are Chinese.

**June 29**, training centre, *tailors*

- The training we have received brings us halfway towards being a full professional. We should have the opportunity to learn more, so that our futures are secure.
- We need credit.
- We can make uniforms for the army as well as for the staff in the hospitals, but we do not get any orders from the government.
- We left the military because our commanders did so, and told us to do the same. We were fighting for the commanders with the weapons that they had given us.

**June 29** Behsoud district Shergara village

*tailor*

- The work is going well, I am receiving salary and got a toolkit. The trainers are OK, but I am not proficient in brushing the cloth and therefore would like to have the training extended (with the same trainer). I would like DDR to help me set up a shop of my own. Because the weather is hot I would like to have a fan as well, with a generator.
- I do not feel rejected by the community.

*tailor*

- It is my last month of training. I can not work alone because I am not good enough at cutting cloth. DDR gives my trainer 15 USD a month and me only 25 which is not enough to feed my family. There are some associations that give credit but they want to receive back more than they have given. This is unlawful in our religion.

*tailor*

- It is my last month of training. I need a loan to set up my business. Without it I will have difficulty supporting my family.

**June 29** Mehterlam

*tailor*

- I used to be a manual labourer, have two years experience.
- I was ordered by the commander to enter DDR. He said this had been decided by the government and they would give me further training.

- My current job is better than the one I had with the army, but I earned more then, at least I was supposed to. I did not get my 40 USD salary, sometimes \$4, \$8, \$10 or nothing. The army was like a forced labour camp. I am free now.
- I chose tailoring because it is an easy job and I thought I could learn it in 9 months, but I am not very good at it yet. I am still an apprentice. The IP has visited me 6 or 7 times. I get along well with the staff of the IP. I rented a shop in the village. The rent is 4000 Afgani (80 US: too high to be credible).
- I have 15 members in my family, we have a small plot of land, too small to live from. We live from my income and the farming. It is difficult.

#### *auto mechanic*

- I was personally threatened and had to protect myself so I joined the army. I did not earn much money in the army but I was safe. By now the dispute has been settled.
- I have chosen the auto mechanic course and hope to open a workshop in Dawlatchar. One of my relatives will be my partner. I have 12 members in my family, me and my father work to support them. He is a farmer.
- My house was far away from the training centre and I had to find a place to stay. The trainer was cooperative, he helped me get some practical work.

#### *tailor*

- I entered the tailoring course 6 months ago and received an allowance over that period. They promised us 82 dollars a month but we only received 75 or 78.
- I am not good at brushing and cutting the cloth. I can not compete on the open market. I still receive some money. There are 10 members in my family. I chose tailoring but I would rather have done carpentry.
- When I was in the Jihad I got 1000 Afghani a month plus some extra money by force from the people. The DDR was introduced in the whole country so I had to join.

#### *carpenter*

- I was in the army for 7 years. I have now chosen to become a carpenter. There is an agreement with the trainer that I have an apprenticeship with. He is getting 15 USD at the moment, and I receive 25.
- If I have to support myself I need more equipment and a generator. I think I will not be able to look after myself and support my family.
- I left the army because it was unstable. This was a chance to start something new.
- But the training was not good enough and I am worried about my future.

#### *radio mechanic*

- I was a farmer during my military service, leasing land. I was registered in the army but they only called me when there was an emergency, a conflict, or sometimes when there was a shortage in the police. The DDR made little difference to me.
- I now have a workshop and can earn 250 Afg a day (5 USD). If I have technical problems I call my ex-trainer. I need more tools. What I received is worth less than what the others got. I need a blower and a generator.
- I have 8 years of schooling.

#### *Asadullah drop out*

- I was a soldier for 2 years and earned 72 USD a month during that time. My learning has not been successful and I am not taking my apprenticeship. I am cultivating onions. We have 2 acres of land. I also work as a manual laborer, loading and unloading things. My

brother drives a lorry. I quit with the training because 25 USD is not enough to cover travel costs and look after my family as well. My tools are all made in China and bad quality. My brother is also in DDR. It is just a passing thing.

*computer and English course*

- There are 12 members in our family. I am a half time rickshaw driver. My father was a military officer, but is jobless now. I was in the army for 6 years myself. It was a miserable life, forced labour. We were afraid of the officers, they would beat us. I was a 10th class student and had first position in my class. One day I went out to get some water for our family and they took me from the street. They changed my school uniform into a military uniform. I could not escape because the commander would be cruel to my family. We received no regular salary; you had to steal it from others. I was sick of the military service so the DDR offered a welcome opportunity. I was 16 when I joined the army and am 24 years old now.
- Some people followed the commander because he said they should send some of their sons to join and protect the village. There were ethnic and religious hostilities in those days. The soldiers said they were fighting for their religion, but they were stealing from the people, earning an illegal living. Under such conditions ethnic and Islamic motives lose their meaning.
- Most XCs now hate the commanders and will kill them if they get a chance. These people have killed members of our families and stolen from us. That is why the commanders do not want to disarm. The worst criminals have left because they are running a risk in their own communities. They have lost their power and go to Pakistan. Sometimes they come back to take revenge. The people will not follow them any more though and the government will not let them carry weapons so it will not be as easy for them as before to come and disturb the peace.
- After they leave the army many XCs find new jobs in the places they went with their commanders, away from their communities. I have no relation with my commander he is in Nooristan and I am in Jalalabad.
- I am studying English and computer skills will get a good job and support my family. I am good at learning. There are 18 trainees in this course of which 4 have problems in their community. They have killed someone and do not come regularly. They are 20 days behind and are the weakest of the class. There are 3 or 4 who do not pay attention and about 10 students who are doing well.
- I will try to get a job with an NGO or otherwise start an internet café or something like that.

**June 29**, Achins District, Eastern territory. 6 ex-combatants

- Nobody in the community hates us. There are about 60 farmers in our community and there is a problem of irrigation. We will go to whoever you say to get help from them.
- From a *photographer*: I got only a camera and no other instruments.
- I am a farmer and have wheat but don't know where to sell it. Also I want vaccination for my animals.
- I have no idea what to do, spent my past fighting and nobody told me what to do.
- I am following *computer* training and have received only a computer and a monitor, but no printer. Think for yourself, if I write somebody's cv how I charge him if I can't print it?
- I received a milking *cow*, but don't have the land to support it. I would like you to give me a job. I have no education and do not know how to drive a car. I have 2 sisters and 5 brothers and I am willing to do any work to support my family.

- I have received a milking *cow*, but it got sick so I sold it for 7000 Afg. I still have the sheep but they have not produced lambs. I am an expert mason, and have worked in Iran and Pakistan and could train others. But the people at the IP offered me only 3 USD a day; I can earn more elsewhere as a laborer.
- I am DDRd but can not support my family with the help I received from DDR. The weapon I handed in was worth more than the 3 *sheep* that I received in return.

*computer and English*

- I have been following the computer and English language course for 3 months now. My father fought against the Russians. In the Taliban time he was persecuted. When Karzai became president my father registered me as a soldier. I have 6 brothers, one is in the national police, one in the army and the rest are DDRd. I will get a job in an NGO and then I will work for the government to support my family.
- I did not take part in illegal activities, only fought the jihad. If someone encroaches upon your land or insults your dignity it is the duty to raise jihad. This means you must give financial support, as well as physical support and otherwise hate them, show your dislike for them. If somebody lives a different religious orthodoxy from me there may be a fight. But we are tolerant of other religions if they respect our culture.
- The training is good but we don't have a computer at home. The teachers are cooperative but 6 months is too short.
- I have graduated from the faculty of law.

**June 30**, AFS Mehterlam, Lagman district. *honey bee* programme. 3 ex-combatants

- I have been under arms for a long time but have now realized that we can not get benefit from this fighting and hope for peace in Afghanistan in the future.
- I have received 4 boxes of bees but lost 2. Two of the swarms killed each other. The AFS staff came and showed us how to look after them, and we now have 4 boxes again. We are satisfied with the training we received. But we can not support our families with 3 boxes of bees nor with the three sheep that we received as an extra package. We would like to get micro finance to buy equipment needed to produce good quality honey, and some empty beekeeping boxes. Or we could start a shop and ask other members of our family to look after the bees.

**June 30**, AFS Mehterlam, Lagman district. *Vegetable gardening*

- I spend a lot of Money cultivating vegetables, sometimes they don't come up. In any case the production is not enough to support my family. The sheep I received as an extra package will take time before they become productive. In the past we could go to Iran or Pakistan to work but now that has become difficult because they are sending immigrants back to Afghanistan.

June 30, AFS Mehterlam, Lagman district. *Fruit Tree nursery*

- The saplings I received take three years before they bear fruit, and the sheep also need investment before they have offspring. In the meantime my family must eat, can I get micro credit to cover this period?

*carpenter*

- I want a civilized Afghanistan. I have obeyed the orders of the government to disarm. I am satisfied with the training I received as well as the tools, but would like to have more of both.

*plumber*

- I am satisfied with my work and with the training I have received, as well as the toolkit. But the \$3 US that I am receiving is not enough for my family to live on, there are 12 members in the family. I would like to have training for 12 months, so I can work independently.

*blacksmith*

- I have received a toolkit but the quality is not good, and also I need electricity, and would like the training period to be extended.

*mason*

- I am happy with the training but insist that I get a job in a construction company, since there is no work in my village. The money I get from DDR is not enough to support my family because I am the only breadwinner.

*tailor*

- I have received a toolkit from DDR and the tools are working well. I am satisfied with the trainers but do not feel my skills are good enough to work independently. I have a problem in cutting the cloth and would like to receive further training. Afterwards I would like to have credit so I can start a business and shop of my own.

# **Annex III**

## **Illustrative analysis of the Reintegration Survey**

## **Illustrative Analysis of the Reintegration Survey**

### **Table of Contents**

Introduction

The data

Background data from the XC database

Reintegration Survey Data

- Package chosen
- Attitudes towards the reintegration package
- Current source of livelihood
- Ties with commander

Conclusion

Annex: Tables and graphs

### **Introduction**

The purpose of the current exercise was to carry out a descriptive analysis of the reintegration survey insofar as data input in the ANBP database had progressed at the time of the evaluation. *What do the data in the reintegration survey have to tell us?* Since XCs have a unique identification code, which is used as key for all data collection carried out within DDR, it should be possible to link up variables from the most recent survey with those collected previously, i.e. during the registration at intake, and during the training survey. The M&E and ITC departments of ANBP/UNDP were involved in carrying out the work. In the process, data quality was examined, ITC's capacity to pull out and link information from different data sources was tested, as well as M&Es ability to analyze the data that ITC produced for them.

A simple descriptive analysis of available data is given, limiting statistics to percentages and averages ordered in frequency distributions and cross-tabulations. The main text presents an analysis of the data, footnotes (1,2,3..) refer to statistical indicators, whilst endnotes (I,II, III...) give observations with respect to M&E and the Relational Database as managed by ITC. Tables and graphs are taken up in the annex.

The work process was as follows:

1. The ITC Department was asked to provide a dataset consisting of all cases of the reintegration survey which had been entered to date and link them up with cases in the overall database, as well as the database for the training survey. After a week a dataset was produced with information on 270 cases from the reintegration survey linked with information from the XC database. The dataset for the 270 cases for the training survey was produced separately.
2. The data are in alphanumeric form and were coded by the M&E department to be analyzed in SPSS.
3. The current descriptive analysis was done, and the report written.

The sample of the survey is a simple random sample of 900 cases from the XC database containing approximately 50,000 cases. Although the sample was drawn about two months ago and the fieldwork has been going on since then, it has not been possible to trace more than 270 cases to date.<sup>1</sup>

### **Background data from the XC database**

The ethnic distribution of the sample consists mainly of Pashtoons (58.6%) and Tajiks (35.4%). The educational level is very low with 61.4% being illiterate and 11.1% having completed 3 years of primary education. Under 20% has finished 12 or more years of formal education. Just over a third of all XCs have no working experience.<sup>ii</sup> About a quarter has worked in agriculture and most of the rest were self-employed in the informal sector. Only four percent worked for a wage.

## **Reintegration Survey Data**

- **Package chosen**

The first preference for reintegration training is illustrated in Figure 1, which is collapsed in Figure 2, pooling categories with less than 5%.<sup>iii</sup> Figure 5 gives the reintegration options finally chosen.<sup>iv</sup> Table 2 gives the reintegration trajectory followed by the XCs with 45.8% having taking agriculture, 36.1% graduated from Vocational Training and 10% from Small Business. Contracting teams refers to an option initially provided to work for UNOPS as a wage laborer for example in construction.

If we look at the antecedents of those who graduated from agriculture, we observe (Table 3) that most (over 80%) had taken agriculture and related topics (beekeeping, livestock, and tree nursery) as their final preference in demobilization stage. About a tenth of those that followed agriculture had not made up their mind yet when final preference was registered. Nearly 30 percent of those who followed the agriculture course had no previous working experience, whilst only just over a quarter had been farmers before. The rest (over 40%) of those who took the agriculture course had previous working experience as drivers (14%), shopkeepers (6.1%) and a variety of trades (Table 4).

Over a third of XCs who have graduated from the vocational education courses have no working experience outside the military, whilst those that *have* worked are diverse, consisting of artisans, construction workers, metal workers etc, suggesting informal small business activities (Table 5). Indeed if compared with the working experience of those that chose the small business option, their working background is similar (Table 6). Over one third of graduated XCs have gone through the VT option whilst only about 10% chose the small business option. The difference between the two in practice is that Small Business is for independent entrepreneurs who will start a business of their own. Precondition to follow this trajectory is basic literacy and numeracy, plus some previous experience and preferably some own capital.

- **Attitudes towards the ANBP reintegration intervention**

Nine out of ten respondents indicate that the training they have followed is useful. Of the remaining ten percent 6% have received no training and 4% reported that they did not find it useful.<sup>v</sup> When asked “how much did the support received help you in finding work?” no relationship appears between time passed since graduation (less than five months or more). The time after reintegration training was finished is less than a year, obviously too short to make a difference. But those that found work (practically all of whom are still working) are more likely to say that the support was helpful (Table 9). Over a third of those who had found work said that the support had helped a lot against only 7% of those who had not yet found work.. However,

more than a fifth of those who found work said the support hadn't helped at all, and 4% hadn't received any support.<sup>1</sup>

- **Current work and livelihood**

At the moment of the interview about eight out of ten XCs that have finished the reintegration programme are working. Two occupational sectors (Figure 6) dominate the occupational dimension: agriculture with 35% and the small business/vocational sector with 29%. Interestingly more than one fifth of respondents said that their economic situation had 'improved a lot' compared to their time with the AMF, *irrespective of whether they had found work or not*. However (Table 10) those who had found work are more inclined to say that their economic condition is 'somewhat better' (62%) than it was before, than those who did not find work (49%)<sup>2</sup>.<sup>vi</sup>

In crossing current working status (working or not) against the attitude questions included in the reintegration package, a consistent and significant positive relationship is observed. Those who are currently working are:

- More content with the choice they made
- More satisfied with the quality of the training
- More likely to say that they have learned a lot
- More convinced the training will be useful for their future
- More satisfied with their life in general<sup>3</sup>

If asked whether they are doing better economically, there is no clear or significant relationship with current working status. (Table 11). Apparently the respondent's economic situation does not depend on his income alone, but on that of the sum total of household members.<sup>vii</sup> If however the question is formulated in a straightforward fashion, as '*do you earn more money now than you did during the AMF?*', the relationship is clear: the employed generally (over 80%) earn more than before and the unemployed do not.<sup>4</sup> Answers to the question on income category are invalid due to high non response, particularly amongst the unemployed (about 70 percent).

In crossing current working status against business initiative ('have you started your own business') a clear positive relationship emerges. More than two-thirds of those that are working have started their own business while less than a quarter of those who say they are 'not working' have done so. There is a strong and significant positive relationship between working status and business initiative.<sup>5</sup> Of those who have started a business of their own most (over 92%) are satisfied with how it is performing.

- **Attitudes by package chosen**

It is interesting to know whether there is a relation between the attitude towards the quality of training, and current living conditions as well as income earned one hand and the package chosen on the other (see tables 18-21 in the annex). When asked 'how useful was the training for your future' and 'how good was the training' a significant relation appeared in the sense that the small

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<sup>1</sup> Cramer's V=.325, significance .000. Cramer's V is a statistic based on chi-squared varying between 0 and 1 indicating the strength of a relationship between two nominal variables.

<sup>2</sup> Cramer's V=.184, significance .019.

<sup>3</sup> Cramer's V is generally around .2 to .3 and significance levels .03 or below

<sup>4</sup> Cramer's V=.465, significance=.000

<sup>5</sup> Cramer's V=.379, significance=.000

business package was consistently appreciated most (nearly 7 out of ten saying it was very good), with vocational training coming in second place (about 6 out of ten indicating it was very useful) and agricultural package in third place (with corresponding percentages around 3 out of ten).<sup>6</sup>

When asked about their general satisfaction with life after finishing the reintegration package, only 35 percent of those who chose the agricultural package respond that they are very content against 69 percent amongst small business and 53 percent amongst vocational training graduates. Similarly 65 percent of small business graduates say that their family is doing better than during the AMF period, compared with 29 percent for vocational training and 19 percent for agriculture.<sup>7</sup>

- **Ties with commander**

About half of the respondents say that they still meet former comrades and about a quarter affirms they sometimes see their previous commander. These are clearly minimum figures. The responses to the reintegration questionnaire affirm that:

- Practically none (about 3%) received threats from their former commander after demobilization.
- About 96% know no demobilized comrades who still work for the commander.
- 99% would never rejoin an armed group.
- 97% do not receive payment from their former commander.<sup>viii</sup>

## **Conclusion**

The current report has analyzed the reintegration survey database, linking it up with the overall XC database. The purpose of the exercise was to learn what the data suggest with respect to a) the effect of the reintegration intervention and b) the quality of the M&E and RDB components of DDR. Our analysis has been more informative about the latter than the former.

### **a) The effect of the reintegration intervention.**

The *validity* of the responses to the questions on XC graduates' perceptions of the quality of the reintegration package must be placed in doubt. The same applies for the questions on relationships with the commander and their ex-comrades. Data on the trajectory which XCs have followed (from their pre-demobilization working period, through their decision-making on reintegration options and the final choice) are *unreliable*. The current survey has thus failed to achieve its main objective, nor will it do so by adding more cases to attain a sample of 900. Non-sampling errors can not be resolved by increasing sample size.

Even though the distribution of answers might be biased, shifting the distribution in the positive direction, interesting relations appear on the key importance of work status on attitudes, and the central role self-employed small business plays in income generation. The data suggest that post-graduation follow-up activities should concentrate on putting business support facilities in place. Also, the general satisfaction with the reintegration options is *small business* first, *vocational training* second, and *agriculture* third.

### **b) The capacity of M&E to access and process data within the RDB.**

The ITC Department has proven to be capable to access and link data from the different sources of data collection. The design of the relational database however is deficient due to

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<sup>6</sup> Cramer's V is around .2, significance level is .00

<sup>7</sup> Cramer's V is around .2, significance level is .000

incomparability of classification system used over time. The codes used are over complicated and not systematic therewith not permitting collapsing them into a smaller number of categories according to an underlying ordering principle. International coding conventions are not applied. The RDB is not suitable for external comparisons at the aggregate level nor for internal comparisons over time. The utility of the database –as is- is limited to retrieval of individual level information.

The M&E department is responsible to carry out activities in the following order:

7. study design (sampling, data collection technique, questionnaire development, fieldwork organization.
8. data collection.
9. data entry, coding.
10. data access.
11. analysis.
12. reporting.

In each of the subsequent steps of the M&E process performance has proven to be sub-standard. It is recommended to bring in professional M&E staff in order to train local staff over a period of at least a year and preferably longer.

This being said it must be recognized that data collection in Afghanistan does not permit direct transfer of orthodox social survey techniques, even if they have proven their merit elsewhere in the developing world. This is due to two factors: the first is the exceptionally high percentage of illiteracy, which makes it impossible to work with straightforward pre-coded questionnaires, also if the questions are put to the respondent through an interviewer. Asking the respondent to choose between alternative answers to a question assumes a conceptual level of thinking which is absent in many. It's too abstract and hypothetical for many to grasp. The second reason is that answers are given according to which option the respondent perceives will provide highest direct personal benefit. If this is not evident the reply will be "you know best" or a simple repetition of what a dominant peer has responded, therewith showing allegiance but not answering the question. Focus groups will definitely not function as they do elsewhere, nor will standardized interview techniques.

The approach to data collection must be adapted to the *individual* and it must be *indirect*. Rather than asking "how useful was the training for your future?", the respondent's household survival strategy and personal living standard should be mapped. The conclusion may then be drawn whether the individual uses the skills transferred and whether it is central or peripheral to the collective family output. The only way to hope to achieve valid information is qualitative face-to-face interviewing excluding group processes. This requires a high degree of empathy and understanding of the local situation. Only native speakers of the local language immersed in the cultural relationships involved are capable of interpreting the responses correctly. Data collection and reporting should therefore be a collaborative effort combining local and expert knowledge.


The data analysis indicates that an overhaul is called for of the database design. The quality of the data stored in the database is insufficient. What is measurable objectively should be properly coded. The technology however functions and the fact that information on approximately 50,000 XCs is retrievable is a valuable asset. It is recommended to cherish the database and upgrade the quality of the information it contains. The ITC Department is understaffed and requires training as well as software to enable it to provide output in a user friendly form to the M&E department. Furthermore the M&E Department should have direct computerized access to the raw data it requires to carry out its mandate.

**Table 1: Background characteristics of respondents from reintegration database.**

| variable            | Reintegration sample  |         | Overall database <sup>8</sup> |
|---------------------|-----------------------|---------|-------------------------------|
|                     | category              | percent | percent                       |
| ethnicity           | Pashtoon              | 58.6%   | 30.7%                         |
|                     | Tajik                 | 35.4%   | 48.3%                         |
|                     | other                 | 6.1%    | 21.0%                         |
|                     | Total                 | 100%    | 100%                          |
| education           | illiterate            | 61.4%   | 64%                           |
|                     | 3 yrs primary         | 11.1%   | 10%                           |
|                     | 9 yrs elementary      | 9.3%    | 10%                           |
|                     | 12 yrs high schl      | 10.0%   | 13%                           |
|                     | Higher                | 8.2%    | 4%                            |
|                     | Total                 | 100%    | 100%                          |
| Work experience     | none                  | 34.3%   | -                             |
|                     | agriculture           | 23.7%   | -                             |
|                     | shopkeeper            | 6.4%    | -                             |
|                     | Small business        | 20.2%   | -                             |
|                     | driver                | 9.3%    | -                             |
|                     | Wage labour, employee | 4%      | -                             |
|                     | other                 | 2.1%    | -                             |
|                     | Total                 | 100%    | -                             |
| SD preference       | none                  | 13.9%   | -                             |
|                     | agriculture           | 19.7%   | -                             |
|                     | shopkeeper            | 1.4%    | -                             |
|                     | Small business        | 45.6%   | -                             |
|                     | driver                | 1.1%    | -                             |
|                     | Contracting team      | 5.7%    | -                             |
|                     | Wage labour, employee | 2.9%    | -                             |
|                     | Demining              | 6.1%    | -                             |
|                     | Vocational training   | 3.6%    | -                             |
|                     | Total                 | 100%    | -                             |
| SD Final preference | none                  | 18.2%   | -                             |
|                     | agriculture           | 35%     | -                             |
|                     | shopkeeper            | 1.1%    | -                             |
|                     | Small business        | 33.4%   | -                             |
|                     | Contract team         | 1.8%    | -                             |
|                     | Wage labour, employee | 1.9%    | -                             |
|                     | demining              | 2.5%    | -                             |
|                     | Vocational training   | 6.1%    | -                             |
|                     | total                 | 100%    | -                             |

<sup>8</sup> data proved from M&E department from overall database

Figure 1: first preference



**Figure 2: first preference collapsing categories with less than 5%**






Figure 3: work experience as registered in database




**Figure 4: work experience collapsing categories with under 5%**



**Table 2: RD Which reintegration package did you choose**

|         |                                       | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------|---------------------------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid   | Agriculture                           | 114       | 40.7    | 45.8          | 45.8               |
|         | Vocational Training and Job Placement | 90        | 32.1    | 36.1          | 81.9               |
|         | De-Mining                             | 8         | 2.9     | 3.2           | 85.1               |
|         | Small Business                        | 26        | 9.3     | 10.4          | 95.6               |
|         | Contracting Teams                     | 7         | 2.5     | 2.8           | 98.4               |
|         | Other                                 | 4         | 1.4     | 1.6           | 100.0              |
|         | Total                                 | 249       | 88.9    | 100.0         |                    |
| Missing | Non-Response                          | 31        | 11.1    |               |                    |
| Total   |                                       | 280       | 100.0   |               |                    |

**Figure 5: reintegration options chosen**



**Table 3: SD Final Preference for those who followed agriculture**

|       |                     | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|---------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | null                | 12        | 10.5    | 10.5          | 10.5               |
|       | National Army       | 1         | .9      | .9            | 11.4               |
|       | Live Stock          | 5         | 4.4     | 4.4           | 15.8               |
|       | Agriculture         | 70        | 61.4    | 61.4          | 77.2               |
|       | Beekeeping          | 18        | 15.8    | 15.8          | 93.0               |
|       | Vocational Training | 1         | .9      | .9            | 93.9               |
|       | Car Repair          | 2         | 1.8     | 1.8           | 95.6               |
|       | De-Mining           | 1         | .9      | .9            | 96.5               |
|       | shop keeping        | 1         | .9      | .9            | 97.4               |
|       | Small Business      | 1         | .9      | .9            | 98.2               |
|       | Tree Nursery        | 1         | .9      | .9            | 99.1               |
|       | Electrician         | 1         | .9      | .9            | 100.0              |
|       | Total               | 114       | 100.0   | 100.0         |                    |

**Table 4: SD Work Experience for those who chose agriculture**

|       |                  | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | null             | 33        | 28.9    | 28.9          | 28.9               |
|       | TubeWell Driller | 1         | .9      | .9            | 29.8               |
|       | Agriculture      | 7         | 6.1     | 6.1           | 36.0               |
|       | NGOEmployee      | 1         | .9      | .9            | 36.8               |
|       | Driver           | 16        | 14.0    | 14.0          | 50.9               |
|       | Cook             | 1         | .9      | .9            | 51.8               |
|       | Wage Labour      | 4         | 3.5     | 3.5           | 55.3               |
|       | Farmer           | 31        | 27.2    | 27.2          | 82.5               |
|       | Mechanic         | 1         | .9      | .9            | 83.3               |
|       | Shopkeeper       | 7         | 6.1     | 6.1           | 89.5               |
|       | LiveStock        | 3         | 2.6     | 2.6           | 92.1               |
|       | Painting         | 2         | 1.8     | 1.8           | 93.9               |
|       | Gardening        | 1         | .9      | .9            | 94.7               |
|       | Small Business   | 2         | 1.8     | 1.8           | 96.5               |
|       | Masonry          | 3         | 2.6     | 2.6           | 99.1               |
|       | Photography      | 1         | .9      | .9            | 100.0              |
|       | Total            | 114       | 100.0   | 100.0         |                    |

**Table 5: SD Work Experience for those who chose vocational education**

|         |                       | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------|-----------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid   | null                  | 32        | 35.6    | 35.6          | 35.6               |
|         | Agriculture           | 4         | 4.4     | 4.4           | 40.0               |
|         | Driver                | 7         | 7.8     | 7.8           | 47.8               |
|         | MetalWorks            | 3         | 3.3     | 3.3           | 51.1               |
|         | Cook                  | 1         | 1.1     | 1.1           | 52.2               |
|         | WageLabour            | 3         | 3.3     | 3.3           | 55.6               |
|         | Farmer                | 6         | 6.7     | 6.7           | 62.2               |
|         | Embroidery            | 3         | 3.3     | 3.3           | 65.6               |
|         | Mechanic              | 3         | 3.3     | 3.3           | 68.9               |
|         | Shopkeeping           | 7         | 7.8     | 7.8           | 76.7               |
|         | Livestock             | 4         | 4.4     | 4.4           | 81.1               |
|         | Painting              | 3         | 3.3     | 3.3           | 84.4               |
|         | Tailoring             | 3         | 3.3     | 3.3           | 87.8               |
|         | MotorBike<br>Mechanic | 1         | 1.1     | 1.1           | 88.9               |
|         | Gardening             | 1         | 1.1     | 1.1           | 90.0               |
|         | Small<br>Business     | 2         | 2.2     | 2.2           | 92.2               |
|         | Car<br>Mechanic       | 3         | 3.3     | 3.3           | 95.6               |
|         | Electrician           | 1         | 1.1     | 1.1           | 96.7               |
|         | Masonry               | 1         | 1.1     | 1.1           | 97.8               |
|         | TinSmith              | 1         | 1.1     | 1.1           | 98.9               |
| Butcher | 1                     | 1.1       | 1.1     | 100.0         |                    |
| Total   | 90                    | 100.0     | 100.0   |               |                    |

**Table 6: SD Work Experience of those who chose small business**

|       |                | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|----------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | null           | 11        | 42.3    | 42.3          | 42.3               |
|       | Agriculture    | 1         | 3.8     | 3.8           | 46.2               |
|       | Driver         | 1         | 3.8     | 3.8           | 50.0               |
|       | Embroidery     | 1         | 3.8     | 3.8           | 53.8               |
|       | Mechanic       | 1         | 3.8     | 3.8           | 57.7               |
|       | Shopkeeping    | 2         | 7.7     | 7.7           | 65.4               |
|       | Doctor         | 2         | 7.7     | 7.7           | 73.1               |
|       | Tailoring      | 2         | 7.7     | 7.7           | 80.8               |
|       | Small Business | 1         | 3.8     | 3.8           | 84.6               |
|       | Car Mechanic   | 1         | 3.8     | 3.8           | 88.5               |
|       | Teaching       | 2         | 7.7     | 7.7           | 96.2               |
|       | Shoe Making    | 1         | 3.8     | 3.8           | 100.0              |
|       | Total          | 26        | 100.0   | 100.0         |                    |

**Table 7: RD Province \* RD which reintegration package did you choose**

| RD province | RD Which reintegration package did you choose<br>(absolute numbers and column percentages) |                     |             |                |                   |             | Total         |
|-------------|--|---------------------|-------------|----------------|-------------------|-------------|---------------|
|             | Agriculture  | Vocational Training | De-Mining   | Small Business | Contracting Teams | Other       |               |
| Paktia      | 61<br>53.5%  | 24<br>26.7%         | 0<br>.0%    | 6<br>23.1%     | 0<br>.0%          | 1<br>25.0%  | 92<br>36.9%   |
| Logar       | 18<br>15.8%  | 4<br>4.4%           | 0<br>.0%    | 0<br>.0%       | 1<br>14.3%        | 0<br>.0%    | 23<br>9.2%    |
| Kandahar    | 9<br>7.9%  | 27<br>30.0%         | 0<br>.0%    | 13<br>50.0%    | 0<br>.0%          | 2<br>50.0%  | 51<br>20.5%   |
| Kabul       | 1<br>.9%   | 10<br>11.1%         | 1<br>12.5%  | 0<br>.0%       | 3<br>42.9%        | 0<br>.0%    | 15<br>6.0%    |
| Kunduz      | 21<br>18.4%  | 8<br>8.9%           | 6<br>75.0%  | 5<br>19.2%     | 2<br>28.6%        | 1<br>25.0%  | 43<br>17.3%   |
| other       | 4<br>3.5%  | 17<br>18.9%         | 1<br>12.5%  | 2<br>7.7%      | 1<br>14.3%        | 0<br>.0%    | 25<br>10.0%   |
| Total       | 114<br>100.0%  | 90<br>100.0%        | 8<br>100.0% | 26<br>100.0%   | 7<br>100.0%       | 4<br>100.0% | 249<br>100.0% |

**Table 8: RD how many months ago did you graduate \* RD How useful is the training for your future**

| RD how many months ago did you graduate | RD How useful is the training for your future<br>(absolute nrs and row percentages) |                 |            |                            | Total         |
|---|---|-----------------|------------|----------------------------|---------------|
|   | Very Useful   | somewhat useful | not useful | no training received (2.3) |               |
| more than 5 mnths                       | 62<br>44.0%   | 59<br>41.8%     | 8<br>5.7%  | 12<br>8.5%                 | 141<br>100.0% |
| five months or less                     | 64<br>61.5%   | 33<br>31.7%     | 4<br>3.8%  | 3<br>2.9%                  | 104<br>100.0% |
| Total                                   | 126<br>51.4%  | 92<br>37.6%     | 12<br>4.9% | 15<br>6.1%                 | 245<br>100.0% |

**Table 9: RD Did you find work after the reintegration package from ANBP ended \* RD How much did the support you received from ANBP help you in finding work after reintegration Cross tabulation**

| RD Did you find work after the reintegration package from ANBP ended |         | RD How much did the support you received from ANBP help you in finding work after reintegration |                 |              |                           | Total         |
|--|---------|---|-----------------|--------------|---------------------------|---------------|
|  |         | didn't help at all  | helped somewhat | helped a lot | no support received (2.5) |               |
| No   | Abs num | 17  | 51              | 5            | 3                         | 76            |
|  | Row %   | 22.4%   | 67.1%           | 6.6%         | 3.9%                      | 100.0%        |
| Yes  | Abs num | 17  | 78              | 57           | 5                         | 157           |
|  | Row %   | 10.8%   | 49.7%           | 36.3%        | 3.2%                      | 100.0%        |
| Total  |         | 34<br>14.6%   | 129<br>55.4%    | 62<br>26.6%  | 8<br>3.4%                 | 233<br>100.0% |


**Table 10: RD Did you find work after the reintegration package from ANBP ended \* RD Are you and your family now doing better economically than during your time with AMF**

|  | Are you and your family now doing better than during your time with AMF |                   |             |               |
|--|---|-------------------|-------------|---------------|
| RD Did you find work after the reintegration package from ANBP ended | the same as before  | moderately better | much better | Total         |
| No   | 17<br>22.4%   | 37<br>48.7%       | 22<br>28.9% | 76<br>100.0%  |
| Yes  | 15<br>9.4%  | 99<br>62.3%       | 45<br>28.3% | 159<br>100.0% |
| Total  | 32<br>13.6%   | 136<br>57.9%      | 67<br>28.5% | 235<br>100.0% |

**Table 11: RD Are you currently working \* RD Are you and your family now doing better economically than during your time with AMF**

|                              | Are you and your family now doing better than during your time with AMF |                   |             |               |
|------------------------------|---|-------------------|-------------|---------------|
| RD Are you currently working | the same as before  | moderately better | much better | Total         |
| No                           | 10<br>21.3%   | 21<br>44.7%       | 16<br>34.0% | 47<br>100.0%  |
|                              | 3.7   | -6.2              | 2.4         |               |
| Yes                          | 20<br>11.2%   | 109<br>61.2%      | 49<br>27.5% | 178<br>100.0% |
|                              | -3.7  | 6.2               | -2.4        |               |
| Total                        | 30<br>13.3%   | 130<br>57.8%      | 65<br>28.9% | 225<br>100.0% |

**Figure 6: current work sector**



|         |   | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------|---|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid   | Other please explain  | 43        | 15.4    | 22.5          | 22.5               |
|         | office  | 2         | .7      | 1.0           | 23.6               |
|         | ANP   | 2         | .7      | 1.0           | 24.6               |
|         | Agriculture   | 66        | 23.6    | 34.6          | 59.2               |
|         | Construction work   | 7         | 2.5     | 3.7           | 62.8               |
|         | Small Business  | 13        | 4.6     | 6.8           | 69.6               |
|         | Food preparation  | 1         | .4      | .5            | 70.2               |
|         | ANA   | 2         | .7      | 1.0           | 71.2               |
|         | Vocational work,i.e., metal work, Car repair, carpentry, tailor | 55        | 19.6    | 28.8          | 100.0              |
|         | Total   | 191       | 68.2    | 100.0         |                    |
| Missing | Non-Response  | 89        | 31.8    |               |                    |
| Total   |   | 280       | 100.0   |               |                    |

**Table 12: RD Are you currently working \* RD Have you started your own business**

| RD Are you currently working |       | RD Have you started your own business |       | Total  |
|------------------------------|-------|---------------------------------------|-------|--------|
|                              |       | No                                    | Yes   |        |
| No                           | count | 34                                    | 11    | 45     |
|                              | Row % | 75.6%                                 | 24.4% | 100.0% |
| Yes                          | count | 50                                    | 108   | 158    |
|                              | Row % | 31.6%                                 | 68.4% | 100.0% |
| Total                        |       | 84                                    | 119   | 203    |
|                              |       | 41.4%                                 | 58.6% | 100.0% |

**Table 13: RD Are you currently working \* RD Do you earn more money now than you did in the AMF**

| RD Are you currently working |          | RD Do you earn more money now than you did in the AMF |       | Total  |
|------------------------------|----------|---|-------|--------|
|                              |          | No  | Yes   |        |
| No                           | Abs num  | 15  | 2     | 17     |
|                              | Row perc | 88.2%   | 11.8% | 100.0% |
| Yes                          | Abs num  | 31  | 135   | 166    |
|                              | Row perc | 18.7%   | 81.3% | 100.0% |
| Total                        |          | 46  | 137   | 183    |
|                              |          | 25.1%   | 74.9% | 100.0% |

**Table 14: RD Did your former commander threaten after you demobilized**

|         |              | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------|--------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid   | No           | 237       | 84.6    | 97.1          | 97.1               |
|         | Yes          | 7         | 2.5     | 2.9           | 100.0              |
|         | Total        | 244       | 87.1    | 100.0         |                    |
| Missing | Non-Response | 36        | 12.9    |               |                    |
| Total   |              | 280       | 100.0   |               |                    |

**Table 15: RD Do you know demobilized comrades who still work for the commander**

|         |              | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------|--------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid   | No           | 203       | 72.5    | 96.2          | 96.2               |
|         | Yes          | 8         | 2.9     | 3.8           | 100.0              |
|         | Total        | 211       | 75.4    | 100.0         |                    |
| Missing | Non-Response | 69        | 24.6    |               |                    |
| Total   |              | 280       | 100.0   |               |                    |

**Table 16: RD Would you ever rejoin an armed group**

|         |              | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------|--------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid   | No           | 240       | 85.7    | 99.2          | 99.2               |
|         | I don't know | 2         | .7      | .8            | 100.0              |
|         | Total        | 242       | 86.4    | 100.0         |                    |
| Missing | Non-Response | 38        | 13.6    |               |                    |
| Total   |              | 280       | 100.0   |               |                    |

**Table 17: RD Do you receive payment from you former commander**

|         |              | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------|--------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid   | No           | 113       | 40.4    | 96.6          | 96.6               |
|         | Yes (4.11)   | 4         | 1.4     | 3.4           | 100.0              |
|         | Total        | 117       | 41.8    | 100.0         |                    |
| Missing | Non-Response | 163       | 58.2    |               |                    |
| Total   |              | 280       | 100.0   |               |                    |

**Table 18: RD which reintegration package did you choose? \* RD How useful is the training for your future (absolute numbers and row percentages).**

| RD which reintegration package did you choose? | RD How useful is the training for your future |                 |            |                            | Total         |
|--|---|-----------------|------------|----------------------------|---------------|
|  | Very Useful                                   | somewhat useful | not useful | no training received (2.3) |               |
| agriculture                                    | 43<br>39.4%                                   | 46<br>42.2%     | 6<br>5.5%  | 14<br>12.8%                | 109<br>100.0% |
| Vocational Training                            | 57<br>63.3%                                   | 29<br>32.2%     | 4<br>4.4%  | 0<br>.0%                   | 90<br>100.0%  |
| small business                                 | 18<br>69.2%                                   | 8<br>30.8%      | 0<br>.0%   | 0<br>.0%                   | 26<br>100.0%  |
| other  | 8<br>40.0%                                    | 9<br>45.0%      | 2<br>10.0% | 1<br>5.0%                  | 20<br>100.0%  |
| Total  | 126<br>51.4%                                  | 92<br>37.6%     | 12<br>4.9% | 15<br>6.1%                 | 245<br>100.0% |

**Table 19: reintegration package by learning perception (absolute numbers and row percentages)**

| RD which reintegration package did you choose? | a lot       | some things  | nothing at all | no training received | Total         |
|--|-------------|--------------|----------------|----------------------|---------------|
| Agriculture                                    | 28<br>26.2% | 62<br>57.9%  | 5<br>4.7%      | 12<br>11.2%          | 107<br>100.0% |
| Vocational Training                            | 45<br>50.6% | 42<br>47.2%  | 2<br>2.2%      | 0<br>.0%             | 89<br>100.0%  |
| small business                                 | 18<br>69.2% | 8<br>30.8%   | 0<br>.0%       | 0<br>.0%             | 26<br>100.0%  |
| other  | 7<br>35.0%  | 12<br>60.0%  | 0<br>.0%       | 1<br>5.0%            | 20<br>100.0%  |
| Total  | 98<br>40.5% | 124<br>51.2% | 7<br>2.9%      | 13<br>5.4%           | 242<br>100.0% |

**Table 20: quality of training by reintegration package (absolute numbers and row percentages)**

|  |              | RD How good was the training you received after demobilization |                      |               |  |
|--|--------------|--|----------------------|---------------|--|
| RD which reintegration package did you choose? | Very Good    | not good   | no training received | Total         |  |
| Agriculture                                    | 29<br>26.9%  | 7<br>6.5%  | 14<br>13.0%          | 108<br>100.0% |  |
| Vocational Training                            | 54<br>61.4%  | 0<br>.0%   | 0<br>.0%             | 88<br>100.0%  |  |
| small business                                 | 18<br>69.2%  | 0<br>.0%   | 0<br>.0%             | 26<br>100.0%  |  |
| other  | 8<br>42.1%   | 1<br>5.3%  | 1<br>5.3%            | 19<br>100.0%  |  |
| Total  | 109<br>45.2% | 8<br>3.3%  | 15<br>6.2%           | 241<br>100.0% |  |

**Table 21: help received in finding work by reintegration package (absolute numbers and row percentages)**

| RD which reintegration package did you choose? | RD How much did the support you received from ANBP help you in finding work after reintegration |                 |              |                           | Total         |
|--|---|-----------------|--------------|---------------------------|---------------|
|  | didn't help at all  | helped somewhat | helped a lot | no support received (2.5) |               |
| Agriculture                                    | 17<br>15.3%   | 71<br>64.0%     | 20<br>18.0%  | 3<br>2.7%                 | 111<br>100.0% |
| Vocational Training                            | 11<br>12.2%   | 48<br>53.3%     | 27<br>30.0%  | 4<br>4.4%                 | 90<br>100.0%  |
| small business                                 | 1<br>3.8%   | 9<br>34.6%      | 16<br>61.5%  | 0<br>.0%                  | 26<br>100.0%  |
| Other  | 6<br>31.6%  | 8<br>42.1%      | 4<br>21.1%   | 1<br>5.3%                 | 19<br>100.0%  |
| Total  | 35<br>14.2%   | 136<br>55.3%    | 67<br>27.2%  | 8<br>3.3%                 | 246<br>100.0% |

## Endnotes on RDB and M&E quality of work

<sup>I</sup> It is likely that the sample is selective: those who have no interest in maintaining further contact with ANBP and are therefore not available for the interview probably have a more negative attitude towards its utility than those who do respond. What we are looking at is a non-response of about 75%, which invalidates the data. In second instance (after the current analysis based on the first 270 cases) some non-response cases were replaced by others changing the territorial distribution. This violates the basic principles of random sampling design. The design inefficient to begin with, taking 900 random cases out of the list of 50,000. A cluster sample would have been more appropriate and a sample size of 900 would have been adequate for this purpose.

<sup>II</sup> Table 1 is a recode of the occupational categories as entered in the database. Figure 3 illustrates all categories used and figure 4 collapses categories with under 5% of cases. The large number of categories with under 5% is apparent, when pooled they represent about one third of all cases. This is clearly not a useful classification system. It is also evident that the classification system is not *exclusive* in the sense that each case should fit only one category. A case in point are for example 'farmer' and 'agriculture' (which is not an occupation but a sector), 'mechanic' and 'motor bike mechanic', 'wage labour' and 'photography' or 'small business' and 'shopkeeping' or 'embroidery'. Classifications which refer to occupations are mixed with sectors (education, agriculture, national security, photography) and occupational categories (employee, wage labour).

The classification system used to capture 'work experience' does not follow ILO convention and violates intuitive thinking. The large number of categories across different dimensions make it difficult to recode reliably, there is no underlying hierarchy or order, different observers would group the categories together according to different criteria. Therefore the usefulness of the classification system for external comparisons is low. Also it is complicated, time consuming to input and manipulate.: inefficient and ineffective.

III The classification system used for 'first preference' suffers from the same deficiencies as that for work category. At this stage it should have been evident which alternatives there were, since it may be assumed that first preference for a reintegration package would refer to a choice from a menu containing a discrete number of options.

<sup>IV</sup> The classification system is not only of little use for external comparison, but also for internal purposes. The confused and myriad categories of the different variables makes it difficult to follow previous work experience, the development of preference for further training and final choice in a straightforward manner. The purpose of a relational database is to relate variables from one dataset with those from another (data collected during the demobilization stage with those collected after training for example). The design of the relational database is not effective. M&E has no direct access to the RDB. It has to request data from ITC and wait for them to produce them. The ITC Department is incapable of producing a frequency distribution or a cross-tabulation upon request from the M&E Department. The raw dataset has however be accessed and reproduced, albeit with some difficulty because of networking problems. Analysis is done with Excel only. The M&E staff are not familiar with statistics, and do not know how to use any statistical or other packages of data analysis. Data access is effective but inefficient, analysis is straightforward but sub-standard. A confidence estimate can not be given for an estimate, nor a significance level for a statistic.

<sup>V</sup> The interviews were carried out by DDR regional offices choosing interviewers from caseworkers. The attitude questions were formulated naively, making it obvious for the respondent which response the DDR interviewer wanted to hear. Therefore the validity of the responses may be placed in doubt. The coding of attitude responses in SPSS was carried out by the M&E Department, admittedly after very brief training by the consultant. Still the non-thinking classification of obvious ordinal attitude scales in counter intuitive order (somewhat useful, very useful, not useful) is baffling. Even income categories were not coded in ascending order. The data collection and coding are manifestly unprofessional which is forgivable, and can be solved by training, but that common sense was not applied is more difficult to remedy. In this instance again the database is ineffective (data quality is low) and inefficient (the time it takes to recode questions ordered incorrectly is wasted).

<sup>VI</sup> Current working sector data reflected in the pie chart (Figure 6) and reference table do not permit direct comparison with previous working experience, because the classification system used was not uniform.

<sup>VII</sup> Note that the answer categories for the question 'are you and you family now doing better...' does not contain the option that things are *worse* now than they were before. This should have been a five point scale ranging from 'much better' to 'much worse', rather than from 'much better' to 'the same as before'

VII As was the case with questions striving to capture attitude towards DDR, those directed towards the comrades and the commander will tend to be biased, for similar respondent motives: ingratiation. There is a tendency to respond in compliance with what the respondents expect the interviewer wants to hear. Observe the high non response in the respective tables in the annex. The validity of the data must be placed in doubt.

# **Annex IV**

## **Summary of Monitoring Reports Eastern Region over January-June 2005.**

The following pages provide an illustration of the monitoring reports contained in the IP files at ANBP headquarters.

They refer to

- Caseworker reports
- IP coordination meetings minutes
- Emails on monthly report checks
- Illustrative pages from monthly reports by IPs

The references are given without introduction and are indicative of the topics monitored, as well the quality of the reporting.


# **Annex V**

## **Cost-distribution within Reintegration Options: Training, Transfers, and Operational Costs**

Reintegration is provided through IPs according to different modalities with each of the three main trajectories (agriculture, small business, vocational training). Overall percentages based on the total soldier database by July 12, 2005 are given in the corresponding table. The function of formal training is marginal within the agricultural package where it is generally limited to three days. The RFPs do not require more than training on the use of the agricultural packages provided, nor does longer term extension generally form part of the agricultural project proposals. Within small business there is a formal training period of two weeks and usually follow-up mentoring covering half a year. Finally within the vocational training option, education occupies central stage, covering half a year in terms of formal training and an additional three months in apprenticeship. Besides these income related forms of training, literacy courses are a general component of vocational training packages.

The worksheet with information on all IPS (updated 19 June, 2005) indicates that overall costs fluctuate around one thousand USD per beneficiary, except for the de-mining option where costs are higher. We will look into the fluctuations within the main reintegration tracks by region. Upon request by the evaluators the Financial Programme Associates split up the overall cost per head into indirect (or operational) costs, direct costs and overheads. The first category refers to running costs of the programme (salaries of management, administrative costs of the IP, logistics etc.), while the second category refers to funds that directly benefit the ex-combatant. These are in turn divided into transfers (material or in cash) and training costs (training material, teacher salaries, workshop rents). Overheads are charges by IPS to cover costs of their headquarters, therefore not used in the project in the narrow sense of the word. Besides costs outside the project, there are also sometimes incomes from outside the projects, such as contributions towards the package from their own funds by FAO and AGEF. In these cases the items in the budget do not add up to the cost to ANBP (they are slightly higher).


**Graph 1**



For the Central *Regions and Central Highlands* the direct costs (operational costs and overheads) fluctuate between 58% (FAO agricultural package) to AGEF (98%). The latter percentage is so high because AGEF contributes 14 percent of the direct package as a contribution from its own

funds. AFS is second highest with 92% of the budget going directly to the beneficiaries. Amongst organizations involved in implementation of agricultural projects, COOPI (Kabul) spends most on training (7%) and Care (Bamyan) and AFS (Kabul) do not budget the training at all. The highest percentages of overall expenditure per beneficiary on training in the Central regions are 18% and 19% for AGEF under vocational training and small business respectively. Overall in the Central regions 78% of reintegration expenditures directly benefit the ex-combatants.


**Graph 2:**




For the IPs working in the *Southeast, East, South, West and countrywide* direct costs vary from a minimum of 58 percent for COOPI (agriculture) to a maximum of 85 percent for GTZ with its local partners. COOPI is budgeting about 450 USD per beneficiary, in terms of operational costs, a similar amount to what FAO charges for its projects in the Central Regions. IPs in the agricultural field generally spend about 5 percent of their costs per beneficiary (with AFS not budgeting it at all). In the vocational training sector (GTZ and AGEF) training costs add up to about a quarter of the budget per ex-combatant. For small business it varies between 5 and 10 percent. IOM does not budget training because it does not give a two week formal introduction course. Rather it provides on the job mentoring on an individual basis. In the Southeast, East, South and countrywide projects we have studied, 74% of reintegration costs goes directly to the beneficiaries.

In the North and limiting ourselves to the three main trajectories under consideration, direct costs vary from a high of 87 percent for CFA in agriculture (due to contributions from the own budget), to a low of 67 percent for IOM in vocational training. CFA is budgeting more than other IPS on training in agriculture (8 and 14% in two different projects in the region), which appears as best practice. IOM's spending of 14 percent on training (in the pilot phase) is below the average for vocational training. AGEF reaches levels of 20 percent in the main phase. In the North of Afghanistan 74 percent of budgets within reintegration are spent on the beneficiary.

**Graph 3**



**Graph 4:**



Investments with medium term income benefits are those in education and in business (either in the non-agricultural sector or in agri-business or post-harvest activities as in the FAO projects) rather than in agricultural production. Whether the latter have a positive effect is dependent on external factors beyond control of the project, and if they do, the time lag between the investment and the benefit is too long for the beneficiaries' planning scope which is generally short-term. From this perspective the vocational training trajectory is most satisfying since it provides immediate returns (the carpenter can start earning a decent salary from the day he terminates his apprenticeship), and also offers potential for future income growth. Training costs are of the order of 20-25% for this reintegration option, and transfers (large part of which in terms of stipends) are of the order of 50-60%. The result is an efficient package with relatively low operational costs and high utility.

In retrospect -also in view of the strong relationship between satisfaction rating and self-employment- we may ask whether more proactive attempt should have been taken to promote agri-business in the rural townships rather than embarking upon large scale procurement and distribution schemes of agricultural means of production. Over the short run this seems to be the case, but whether the benefits of livestock and tree nurseries will become apparent over the longer term is still to be seen.

The percentage of budgets in reintegration projects which goes directly to the beneficiary is 74 percent or higher in the regions under consideration.

Summary of Demobilization & Reintegration for Pilot Phase and Main Phase as of 12<sup>th</sup> July, 2005

| Reintegration                  |                          |                       |               |        |                      |        |                |        |              |      |              |       |            |      |                   |      |                  |      |            |      |                                    |      |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|---------------|--------|----------------------|--------|----------------|--------|--------------|------|--------------|-------|------------|------|-------------------|------|------------------|------|------------|------|------------------------------------|------|
|                                | Total Reintegrated Pilot | Total Reintegrated MP | Agriculture   |        | VT and Job Placement |        | Small Business |        | De-mining    |      | ANA          |       | ANP        |      | Contracting Teams |      | Teacher Training |      | Others     |      | Not participating in reintegration |      |
|                                |                          |                       | Pilot         | MP     | Pilot                | MP     | Pilot          | MP     | Pilot        | MP   | Pilot        | MP    | Pilot      | MP   | Pilot             | MP   | Pilot            | MP   | Pilot      | MP   | Pilot                              | MP   |
| Kunduz                         | 1,049                    | 6,037                 | 639           | 3,895  | 215                  | 850    | 34             | 1,072  | 126          | 0    | 1            | 80    | 2          | 4    | 24                | 78   | 0                | 11   | 8          | 43   | 0                                  | 4    |
| Kabul                          | 1,844                    | 19,880                | 413           | 6,434  | 974                  | 4,821  | 129            | 4,484  | 278          | 197  | 14           | 3,495 | 10         | 16   | 26                | 103  | 0                | 300  | 0          | 11   | 0                                  | 19   |
| Gardez                         | 608                      | 1,752                 | 277           | 702    | 230                  | 532    | 32             | 236    | 0            | 0    | 39           | 278   | 8          | 1    | 19                | 2    | 0                | 0    | 2          | 1    | 1                                  | 0    |
| Mazar                          | 1,868                    | 5,255                 | 713           | 2,588  | 756                  | 617    | 95             | 1,542  | 231          | 70   | 9            | 235   | 0          | 13   | 0                 | 101  | 0                | 69   | 32         | 14   | 32                                 | 6    |
| Kandahar                       | 719                      | 4,417                 | 344           | 1,687  | 214                  | 1,053  | 33             | 1,101  | 92           | 232  | 14           | 74    | 4          | 75   | 1                 | 134  | 0                | 2    | 5          | 43   | 12                                 | 16   |
| Bamyan                         | n/a                      | 2,615                 | n/a           | 2,174  | n/a                  | 242    | n/a            | 188    | n/a          | 0    | n/a          | 4     | n/a        | 6    | n/a               | 0    | n/a              | 0    | n/a        | 0    | n/a                                | 1    |
| Jalalabad                      | n/a                      | 3,476                 | n/a           | 885    | n/a                  | 1,823  | n/a            | 550    | n/a          | 0    | n/a          | 62    | n/a        | 30   | n/a               | 89   | n/a              | 18   | n/a        | 15   | n/a                                | 4    |
| Herat                          | n/a                      | 5,475                 | n/a           | 1,910  | n/a                  | 1,021  | n/a            | 2,372  | n/a          | 0    | n/a          | 12    | n/a        | 0    | n/a               | 82   | n/a              | 26   | n/a        | 34   | n/a                                | 18   |
| Totals:                        | 6,088                    | 48,907                | 2,386         | 20,275 | 2,389                | 10,959 | 323            | 11,545 | 727          | 499  | 77           | 4,240 | 24         | 145  | 70                | 589  | 0                | 426  | 47         | 161  | 45                                 | 68   |
| Percentage:                    | 100.0%                   | 100.0%                | 39.2%         | 41.5%  | 39.2%                | 22.4%  | 5.3%           | 23.6%  | 11.9%        | 1.0% | 1.3%         | 8.7%  | 0.4%       | 0.3% | 1.1%              | 1.2% | 0.0%             | 0.9% | 0.8%       | 0.3% | 0.7%                               | 0.1% |
| <b>DDR wide</b>                | <b>54,995</b>            |                       | <b>22,661</b> |        | <b>13,348</b>        |        | <b>11,868</b>  |        | <b>1,226</b> |      | <b>4,317</b> |       | <b>169</b> |      | <b>659</b>        |      | <b>426</b>       |      | <b>208</b> |      | <b>113</b>                         |      |
| <b>DDR wide in percentage:</b> |                          |                       | 41.2%         |        | 24.3%                |        | 21.6%          |        | 2.2%         |      | 7.8%         |       | 0.3%       |      | 1.2%              |      | 0.8%             |      | 0.4%       |      | 0.2%                               |      |

| Demobilization |                         |                      |
|----------------|-------------------------|----------------------|
|                | Total Demobilized Pilot | Total Demobilized MP |
| Kunduz         | 1,008                   | 6,161                |
| Kabul          | 1,816                   | 20,190               |
| Gardez         | 584                     | 1,603                |
| Mazar          | 1,920                   | 5,261                |
| Kandahar       | 861                     | 5,161                |
| Bamyan         | n/a                     | 2,676                |
| Jalalabad      | n/a                     | 3,825                |
| Herat          | n/a                     | 5,640                |
| Total:         | 6,189                   | 50,517               |
| DDR wide:      | 56,706                  |                      |

**Costs breakdown of Programme cost, Operational cost and overhead cost for the IPs working in Southeast, east, south, west and country wide SB**

| IP    | Sector      | No. of beneficiaries | Total cost/XC | Operational cost/XC | Direct cost/XC |          | overheads |
|-------|-------------|----------------------|---------------|---------------------|----------------|----------|-----------|
|       |             |                      |               |                     | Package        | training |           |
| FAO   | Agriculture | 1500                 | 1320.12       | 332.25              | 842.7          | 64.6     | 80.57     |
| AFS   | Agriculture | 925                  | 1034.92       | 210.92              | 810            | 0        | 14        |
| COOPI | Agriculture | 850                  | 1332.26       | 468.6               | 712.5          | 64       | 87.16     |
| VARA  | Agriculture | 1507                 | 1077.23       | 167.42              | 786            | 68       | 55.81     |
| ARAA  | Agriculture | 1400                 | 939.26        | 261.85              | 598.23         | 35.54    | 59.14     |
| GTZ   | VT/JP       | 2550                 | 1293.14       | 141                 | 760            | 340      | 47.18     |
| BEST  | VT/JP       | 800                  | 1180          | 185.93              | 693.75         | 265.96   | 34.36     |
| AGEF  | SB          | 3500                 | 1011.88       | 262.88              | 700            | 49       | 0         |
| IOM   | SB          | 5610                 | 968           | 231.9               | 700            | 2.79     | 33.31     |
| BEST  | SB          | 1100                 | 1019          | 183.68              | 700            | 86.82    | 48.5      |
|       |             |                      | 11175.81      | 2446.43             | 7303.18        | 976.71   | 460.03    |
|       |             |                      |               | 0.22                | 0.65           | 0.09     | 0.04      |

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# **Annex VI**

## **ISSUES IN REINTEGRATION: REGIONAL PROGRAMME OFFICER WORKSHOP REPORT**

Monitoring and Evaluation Exercise  
ANBP- DDR  
July 2, 2005

During a two – day workshop by regional programme team in Central Office Kabul on July 2, 05 the field visit /observation/ report of Monitoring Consultants was reviewed. Please find our findings below in narrative and attached Reintegration Matrix and Action Plan.

After reviewing each individual case the problems were referred to one of the following:

1. concerning the unhappiness of ex-combatants (XCs) regarding the quality and quantity of toolkits, expectation of longer term training period, long term financial support and lack of immediate income the following actions have been taken.
  - For better quality the training period has been extended from 6 months to 9-12 months.
  - For better quality toolkits an additional USD200 has been added to the input package with at least 25% allocated as an addition to the cost of toolkits. XCs are now also involved in purchasing of toolkits.
  - Toolkits were redesigned in Main Phase contracts in consultation between ANBP, IPs and Vocational Training Experts with consideration of XCs wishes.
  - Regarding long-term financial support XCs are encouraged to create group businesses.
  - Linkages were coordinated between XCs and micro-credit units but it was noticed to that XCs want only loan and they are not ready to pay it back including the admin cost or interest rate. This aspect of the programme will be terminated with XCs receiving back all capital inputs and the programme redesigned and piloted.

XCs expectations are not in line with ANBP current capacities and mandate. ANBP will increase its counseling training to its staff, engage in a more robust PI campaign and develop a 3 -5 year reintegration/development plan in line with CCA and UNDAF, engage with government partners, link to national priority programmes and UNC.

2. The causes concerning the lack of employment opportunities relate to low market demands due to limited economical activities in the country combined with poor social behavior and lack of efforts of XCs in identifying job opportunities.
  - ANBP has coordinated with government entities and NGO's to identify employment opportunities and prioritize XCs for employment projects. It will be considered in future 3-5 year development plan.
  - Psychosocial reintegration addressed through de-mining corps, countrywide workshops (based on a MoU) with Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, UNDP Peace/Civic Education and drug treatment with WADAN yielding positive results.
  - Enhanced public information campaign on awareness raising on the part of both XCs and communities is being conducted by public information section of ANBP and IPs therefore improvement in acceptance of XCs by the community and higher motivation of XCs in finding jobs was noticed.
3. ANBP admits the fact that to some beneficiaries reintegration packages were not distributed in timely manner due to seasonal implications of agriculture and contract bottlenecks.
  - Increased coordination with UNDP's CAP decreased bottlenecking with LTAs being developed for upcoming contracts.

- UNDP/ANBP held regular coordination meetings with UNDP Programme Support Unit and through them with New York and relevant stakeholders effectively expediting the approval process.
  - Increased awareness on seasonal implications conveyed to XCs by relevant IPs and ANBP CWs.
  - Effective distribution plan were designed and submitted by implementing partners.
4. In order to have Small business as a reintegration option available for both literate and illiterate XCs, IPs program policy was changed, curriculums were revised and illiterate XCs got access to Small Business Option.
  5. Cases of inappropriate selection of option by XCs have been reported. In this regard ANBP and IPs have put all their efforts to advise XCs on selection of a suitable option. XCs were briefed on several occasions on all packages and reintegration policy.
    - ANBP & IPs are flexible to change options several times before XCs receive any assistance from IPs. They may have a month to think about their reintegration option.
  6. Lack of market for products depends on poor access to market because of bad road conditions, transportation cost and rate fluctuation.
    - Proper business training on market demand and supply has been provided to XCs which has resulted in sustainable income.
  7. Because of existence drought, low water table and lack of irrigation structures in the country, specific irrigation packages were designed packages such as water pump, dug wells 'karezes' (subterranean canals) were incorporated into IPs contracts.
    - Groups of XCs opted to dig wells and some XCs added their own contribution.
    - In low water table areas water pumps were distributed.
    - All agriculture packages require land assessment for suitable by IP.

For more information please see Reintegration Matrix and Action Plan

*Drafted by YH & DP  
July 11, 2005*

**Reintegration Matrix and Action Plan**

| No        | Problem Definition  | Causes  | Solutions Developments   | Action taken   | Evaluation  | Further Solutions Developments  | Action to be taken  | Remarks |
|-----------|---|---|--|--|---|---|---|---------|
| <b>VT</b> |   |   |  |  |   |   |   |         |
| 1         | XCs are complaining of Quality/Quantity of toolkits. (PP) | High expectation of XCs are not in line with ANBP capacities and mandate  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stakeholder to be involved in purchasing of toolkits.</li> <li>• Toolkits to be redesigned in MP contracts.</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ANBP/IP/Training Institution (XC) got involved in purchasing/distribution of toolkits (MP)</li> <li>• Toolkit packages redesigned in close consultation between ANBP/Training Institution with due consideration for XCs' wishes.</li> </ul>  | Quality/quantity improved and led to higher satisfaction rate.  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a)ANBP to make sure that quality and quantity of toolkits are maintained accordingly.</li> <li>b) Monitor quality of training and toolkit provided by IPs</li> <li>c) ANBP increases its PI campaign</li> <li>d) ANBP increases staff capacity (CWs) through more intensive trainings and workshops</li> </ul> | For better quality of training and toolkits Regional Program Officer and Monitoring Assistants will continue to carry out serious monitoring of IPs |         |
| 2         | XCs are complaining from training period                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Polite phase</li> <li>• Expectation for longer term support (stipend)</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extension of training period from 6 to 9 or 12 with stipend increment</li> <li>• Set more realistic curriculums and skill expectation.</li> <li>• Monitor quality of VT capacity of workshops.</li> <li>• In apprentice programs provide</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New contracts issued with extended training period</li> <li>• Amount of stipend increased by 30%</li> <li>• Programme team worked with IPs to ensure that partners prepares realistic curriculums and skill expectations, extended training time, good capacity of workshops and in apprentice</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Client satisfaction</li> <li>• Skills training quality improved</li> </ul> | ANBP to ensure quality training within the said period through close monitoring based on the curricula developed for various trades   | Continue the recommended solutions on regular basis towards to end of R   |         |

**Reintegration Matrix and Action Plan**

| No | Problem Definition                | Causes   | Solutions Developments  | Action taken  | Evaluation   | Further Solutions Developments  | Action to be taken   | Remarks  |
|----|-----------------------------------|--|---|---|--|---|--|--|
|    |                                   |  | <p>equipments not cash.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitor better progress of XCs and keep them interested</li> </ul>   | <p>programs providing equipments not cash.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• For better quality of VT and keeping the XCs interested regional Program Officer and caseworkers have carried out serious monitoring of IPs</li> </ul>  |  |   |  |  |
| 3  | Lack of employment opportunities. | <p>a) Low market demands due to limited economical activities.</p> <p>b) poor social behaviour of XCs.</p> <p>c) lack of efforts in identifying job opportunities.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coordinate with concerned government entities and NGOs to prioritize XCs for employment &amp; link reintegration program with development projects.</li> <li>• Improve behavioural changes</li> <li>• Awareness raising on the part of both XCs and</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Link established with NEEP, GAGP and PRT projects</li> <li>• Signed MoU with AIHRC for civic education workshops to raise awareness and workshops conducted</li> <li>• Conducted enhanced and coordinated public information campaign by both ANBP, IPs and JoPIC</li> <li>• Enhanced counselling through out the program by both ANBP and IPs.</li> <li>• Programme team has worked with IPs to improve quality of training for better</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• More employment opportunities availed.</li> <li>• Positive behavioral changes of XCs.</li> <li>• Improved acceptance of XCs by the community.</li> <li>• Higher motivation of XCs in finding jobs.</li> <li>• Based on the better quality of training graduates can compete with the</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Initiation of large scale development projects by government and private sectors.</li> <li>• Continue the public awareness campaign through community Shuras.</li> <li>• Continue the AIHRC workshops on a regular basis.</li> <li>• Continue effective counselling.</li> <li>• Linkage with 3-5 year UNDP/ Government partnerships and national program will increase absorption capacity in country</li> </ul> | <p>RPOs must ensure the regional labor market survey requirements are fulfilled and the partners have good flexibilities on their training opportunities regularly throughout the program with central office increasing coordinated effort with</p> | Please see attached the peace education reports and related documents. |

**Reintegration Matrix and Action Plan**

| No        | Problem Definition          | Causes             | Solutions Developments  | Action taken  | Evaluation   | Further Solutions Developments   | Action to be taken   | Remarks |
|-----------|-----------------------------|--------------------|---|---|--|--|--|---------|
|           |                             |                    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• communities</li> <li>• Effective counselling</li> <li>• Improvement in training quality will it self help in sustainable job placement.</li> </ul> | sustainable job placement.  | professionals in the markets   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identify employment opportunities at the regional level</li> <li>• Increase working relationship with ILO and UNCT</li> </ul> | relevant employment and reintegration stakeholders   |         |
| 4         | Long term financial support | High expectation   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Link XCs to the micro credit units.</li> <li>•Pooling resources together to start a bigger business.</li> </ul>                                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Link coordinated between XCs and credit units.</li> <li>•XCs encouraged to develop group business.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•XCs only want loan, not ready to pay interest rate.</li> <li>•Increasingly higher rate of joint business with better results.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Redesign micro credit programme for XCs</li> <li>•Decrease admin cost fees on XCs in micro credit programs.</li> </ul>         | Programme team will coordinate with MISFA, USAID and other organization who are offering micro credit programs |         |
| <b>SB</b> |                             |                    |   |   |  |  |  |         |
| 5         | Long term financial support | High expectations. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Link XCs to the micro credit units.</li> <li>•Pooling resources together to start a bigger business.</li> </ul>                                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Link coordinated between XCs and credit units.</li> <li>•XCs encouraged to develop group business.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•XCs only want loan, not ready to pay interest rate.</li> <li>•Increasingly higher rate of joint business with better results.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Redesign micro credit programme for XCs</li> <li>•Decrease admin cost fees on XCs in micro credit programs.</li> </ul>         | Programme team will coordinate with MISFA, USAID and other organization who are                                |         |

**Reintegration Matrix and Action Plan**

| No                 | Problem Definition                         | Causes                                    | Solutions Developments  | Action taken   | Evaluation                          | Further Solutions Developments   | Action to be taken  | Remarks   |
|--------------------|--|---|---|--|-------------------------------------|--|---|---|
|                    |  |   |   |  |                                     |  | offering micro credit programs  |   |
| 6                  | unavailability of SB option to Illiterates | IPs program policy                        | Make SB packages available to illiterate XCs.   | Curriculum revised for both literate and illiterate XCs.<br><br>Programme worked with related IPs and developed a program for small business development for illiterates.  | • Illiterate XCs have access to SB. | • Follow up, monitor and business counselling support.   | ANBP and IPs will follow up and conduct frequent monitoring and business counselling support on regular bases towards end of R.   |   |
| <b>Agriculture</b> |  |   |   |  |                                     |  |   |   |
| 7                  | Poor package suitability                   | Inappropriate selection of option by XCs. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ANBP/IPs put their all efforts to advise XCs on selection of a suitable option.</li> <li>• IPs should be flexible to change options based on market demands and XCs interest before the packages are delivered.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• XCs were briefed on several occasions on all packages and reintegration policy.</li> <li>• Multiple components were added to the package</li> <li>• Literacy was mandatory in all programs to increase involvement.</li> <li>• Livestock programs are integrated</li> </ul> | Higher contentment rate.            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continue taken actions.</li> <li>• Increase monitoring effort for input quality and outcome indicators, especially as related to training for XCs.</li> </ul> | ANBP programme team will meet agricultural partners to create more new ideas of multiple components packages, livestock veterinary care, feed, marketing for landless XCs | Some XCs strongly insist on some packages like livestock, while they do not fulfil the requirement, and change of options based on IPs survey which might be against the XCs wishes can lead to serious |

**Reintegration Matrix and Action Plan**

| No | Problem Definition             | Causes   | Solutions Developments   | Action taken  | Evaluation  | Further Solutions Developments  | Action to be taken   | Remarks  |
|----|--------------------------------|--|--|---|---|---|--|--|
|    |                                |  |  | veterinary care, feed, marketing  |   |   |  | security for both ANBP and IP staff.                                 |
| 8  | Late distribution of packages. | Delayed contracting process due to highly political nature of DDR project affecting caseload variation. Market capacity. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coordination with UNDP and relevant stakeholders.</li> <li>• Development of effective distribution plan.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Held regular coordination meetings with UNDP PSU and procurement sections in order to expedite the approval of pending contracts and amendments.</li> <li>• Effective distribution plan designed and submitted by IPs.</li> <li>• ANBP representative got involved in procurement and distribution.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Approval process expedited which enabled IPs to deliver inputs in a timely manner.</li> <li>• Distribution plans developed and submitted by IPs.</li> <li>•</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improvement in IPs invoices and financial reporting received in a timely manner</li> <li>• IPs accountability</li> </ul>   | ANBP CO team will coordinate with IPs regarding the improvement in reports criteria and financial report and invoices format in order to expedite the money transfer process to enable IPs to deliver services in a timely manner. | Some times XCs are not available on due time in their given address. |
| 9  | Lack of market for products    | Poor access to market (bad roads, trsp cost, rate fluctuation)   | Proper business training on market demand and supply. Perform a need assessment at the regional level in conjunction with all IPs, What do                   | XCs trained on market evaluation.   | Resulted in good income.  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training on proper market assessment needs to be continued.</li> <li>• Market survey conducted nationwide that tailors sectors more specifically that older surveys</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continue the recommended solutions on regular basis towards to end of R</li> <li>• Utilize market survey to target employment</li> </ul>  |  |

**Reintegration Matrix and Action Plan**

| No | Problem Definition                         | Causes   | Solutions Developments  | Action taken  | Evaluation  | Further Solutions Developments  | Action to be taken  | Remarks |
|----|--|--|---|---|---|---|---|---------|
|    |  |  | the normal civilians do for a living?<br><br>Focus on broadening the agriculture packages |   |   |   | opportunities and match XCs with market linkages                          |         |
| 10 | Poor comprehension of the limited training | Poor literacy rate and poor attention.                           | To develop a revised version of curriculum and improve the training quality.              | Programme team with the help of IPs came up with new ideas to broaden the agriculture package options<br><br>Revised version of curriculum were developed and improvements have been noticed in quality of training | Decreased mortality and disease rate in livestock and poultry; and crops failure. Increased yield and generated income. | Forming farmers cooperatives, and further counselling.<br><br>literacy should be a mandatory on all programs<br><br>Monitor better progress of XCs and them interested<br><br>Independent training and monitoring IPs and consultants hired |   |         |
| 11 | Lack of satisfaction about the income      | . High expectation.<br><br>Poor quality and quantity of package. | To increase the input of the package.   | The 200\$ cash distributed in PP added to the package to increase the quality and quantity.   | Increased income.   | Long term agriculture development. (Field to markets roots, agro industries)  | UNDP and government 3-5 year project plan in line with CCA and UNDAF will |         |

**Reintegration Matrix and Action Plan**

| No | Problem Definition               | Causes  | Solutions Developments                                 | Action taken   | Evaluation   | Further Solutions Developments             | Action to be taken   | Remarks   |
|----|----------------------------------|---|--|--|--|--|--|---|
|    |                                  |   |  |  |  |  | give the priority to XCs   |   |
| 12 | Expectation for immediate income | Seasonal variation (crops & livestock). High expectation. | Temporary job opportunities (wage labor)               | ANBP provided WL facilities through NEEP and GAGP & PRT.                         | Employment opportunities utilized.                         | Long term job opportunities by government. | UNDP and government 3-5 year project plan in line with CCA and UNDAF will give the priority to XCs |   |
| 13 | Irrigation problem               | Drought/low water table, lack of irrigation structures.   | Specific irrigation packages designed based on needs . | Assistance packages (water pump, dug wells, Karez) incorporated in IPs contract. | Irrigation specific problems solved for the concerned XCs. | Community based irrigation projects.       | UNDP and government 3-5 year project plan in line with CCA and UNDAF will give the priority to XCs | In areas suffered from drought wells were dug based on demand and contribution of XCs; and where low water table, water pumps were distributed. |

# **Annex VII**

## **Suggestions for Longer Term Reintegration Policy and Evaluation**

**Integration** can be described as *the process by which individuals and groups participate in their society, with equitable access to income and employment, social benefits and services, and to various aspects of cultural and community life.* It includes ethnic and cultural diversity from a viewpoint of social justice and equity but also from a concern that socially excluded population might pose a threat to the well-being of society due to their limited stake in the existing order.

Following this definition, the *integration of ex-combatants within their communities* should be addressed with respect to the key policy areas:

1. Labour market participation.
2. social protection systems and pensions.
3. health service.
4. education and training.
5. child poverty and gender.
6. housing standards.

It is not realistic to assume that the ANBP/DDR will be able to implement policies in each of these areas, but in developing an exit strategy from reintegration, the goal should be to transfer further reintegration support to an organization which will *put these topics on the agenda*. It is not sufficient to work with short term goals only, longer term objectives must be formulated and channels sought to realize them. If we are to strive towards policy formulation for the beneficiaries in the key areas identified, ideas should be developed and first steps taken towards founding a national body representing the interests of ex-combatants. This implies a major institutional development strategy, beyond direct ANBP implementation of support to ex-combatants.

The definition of integration describes it as a multi-dimensional concept, a cluster of interrelated variables. In this sense it is akin to what is termed 'social inclusion' within the European Union's social policy development strategy. Reintegration as longer term desired impact thus refers to overcoming low incomes, lack of job opportunities, quality of the dwelling, lack of access to education, to health care, and to other public services. Although income and place in the community are key elements, integration is concerned with a broader range of capabilities.

Integration in the broader sense should be measured in terms of:

1. Consumption Income (monetary as well as in kind)
2. Condition of the dwelling
3. Water and sanitation, public services
4. Education
5. Health
6. Social security
7. household assets
8. gender

The question becomes “how do ex-combatants compare to the population as a whole on these variables?” If we wish to measure the effect of DDR on household living standards this is the direction in which we should think.

The tools to measure such variables are well developed within poverty research. Poverty reduction is high on the international development agenda. This is reflected in the Millennium Declaration of September 2000 which was embraced by the United Nations. Afghanistan

represents one of the lower points on the poverty range within the family of nations. As such it poses a data collection challenge and acquires special significance. Since the donor community has embraced these goals, the majority of developing countries have designed Poverty Reduction Programmes. In order to monitor progress against anti-poverty objectives, the World Bank in its turn has been giving support in carrying out Living Standard Measurement Surveys across the developing world. This includes reorganizing the methods of collecting statistical data. If the decision were to be taken to go beyond the minimum, it is proposed to draw upon the techniques developed within this research tradition. A careful of adaptation of existing questionnaires and elaborate field-testing would be required to ensure valid and reliable data collection instruments.

In order to study the development of household economy over time, it would be advisable to carry out a series of household living standard surveys starting with a baseline study, including income as well as non-income dimensions. An elaborate questionnaire collecting consumption income data as well as non-income indicators of poverty should be designed and applied at two moments in time, four years apart. In the intermediate period non-income living standard measurements should be held on an annual basis, therewith bringing the total number of studies to four. Ex-combatant as well as a control group should be included. The study design will permit a comparison of developments between those who have undergone the intervention (and will hopefully continue to receive attention) and those who have not. The economic effect of the DDR project can then be assessed at the household level and important data collected on living standards for the population as a whole. This is an ambitious undertaking with utility well beyond the DDR programme, and cannot be included within the domain of ANBP.

# **Annex VIII**

## **WORKPLAN**

## **WORKPLAN**

### **EVALUATION of the REINTEGRATION ASPECTS of DDR in AFGHANISTAN'S NEW BEGINNINGS PROGRAMME**

#### **Introduction**

The current workplan has been drawn up as a collaborative effort of the consultants with the M&E and Programmes Sections of the DDR, within ANBP, and with UNDP Afghanistan. Agreement has been reached upon participation of the M&E and Programmes sections of ANBP in the implementation of the evaluation. The variables to be analyzed in the course of the mission are those previously presented in the TOR drawn up by UNDP and the proposal by Edburgh consultants.

#### **Objectives**

The primary objective of the reintegration component of ANBP's DDR process is to help ex-combatants achieve sustainable *social* and *economic* integration into civilian society. The main *goal of the current mission* is to assess whether the reintegration programme is likely to be successful in achieving this objective. Is it on track, and if not which options for amendment are suggested?

The reintegration options are targeted towards sustainable livelihoods in civilian life. Approximately 95 percent of all reintegration placements are in the sectors of Agriculture, Vocational Training/Job Placement, Small Business Training and De-mining. We will strive to assess to which degree these four reintegration tracks lead to sustainable livelihoods.

Two blocks of information will be collected:

- On the *intervention*, that is the reintegration programme within DDR.
- On the *context* within which the intervention takes place, that is the social and economic structures within which the ex-combatants are intended to reintegrate.

#### **Target group, counterpart and contact persons**

As of 17 May 2005, a total of 48,182 men have been demobilized in Kunduz (7,156), Gardez (2,137), Kabul/Parwan (16,290), Mazar-e-Sharif (6,907), Kandahar (5,780), Bamyan (981), Jalalabad (3,825) and Herat (5,106). Reintegration options had been provided for 28,984 former combatants by the end of 2004.

The target groups<sup>9</sup> of the evaluation are:

Target group 1: ex-combatants who have finished their reintegration training.<sup>10</sup>

Target group 2: stakeholders, such as government officials, community leaders, community based organizations, regional verification committees, and IPs.

The consultants will work with the M&E section of ANBP, which will assist with data collection and collaborate with the analysis of their own data.

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<sup>9</sup> Defined here as the parties we wish to collect information *about* (XC) and/or *from* (stakeholders).

<sup>10</sup> Data-collection directly from XCs *currently enrolled in training projects* has been excluded after discussion in the workgroup meeting of June 12, 2005, and accepted by UNDP on June 15. Information on the perception of the training programme will be collected from secondary analysis of M&E data and from XCs who have graduated.

Stakeholders to be informed or interviewed are the Ministry of Defence, the diplomatic representation of Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, the Netherlands and Switzerland. A sample of the commanders currently enrolled in the redundancy programme will also be interviewed.<sup>11</sup>

Contact persons for the evaluation will be Mr. Sher Wali Wardak (National Programme Officer, UNDP), Ms. Shapari Enshayan (Special Assistant to the Programme Director), Mr. Dean Piedmont (Deputy Senior Programme Advisor), Mr. Gilbert Gitelman Despicht (Senior Programme Advisor) and Mr. Ali Ahmad (M&E within ANBP/DDR), and for Edburgh consultants Patricia de Bruijn desk manager and the international consultants. Electronic information exchange on progress meetings and agreements with respect to the evaluation should be copied to the contact points so that they are informed of developments at all times during the evaluation implementation period.<sup>12</sup> Edburgh consultants will ensure that presentation of documents to UNDP is carried out according to contract.

### **Data collection techniques**

There is some primary data collection through qualitative techniques, and quantitative analysis is carried out on the data collected by the M&E Department of DDR.

Three data collection techniques will be used,

- Individual and group discussions with *ex-combatants* who have finished reintegration training programmes, and
- Face-to-face structured interviews with *regional government officials, donors, community leaders, community based organizations, and staff of IPs.*
- Quantitative analysis will be done on *secondary data*. Data from the DDR M&E Unit as well as the Programmes Unit of ANBP will be used for this purpose.
  - a) a Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) for each of the three main Reintegration options (Agriculture, Vocational Training, Small Business) plus the De-mining option.
  - b) An analysis of a recent retrospective survey on ex-combatants who have graduated from the reintegration programme.

Counterparts will be the *Monitoring and Evaluation and the Programmes Sections of ANBP*<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>11</sup> By the end of 2004, 42 of the 96 commanders were given a financial redundancy package.

<sup>12</sup> Email addresses are attached as an annex.

<sup>13</sup> ANBP established its Monitoring and Evaluation unit in July 2004. A survey was conducted concentrating on client satisfaction, training effectiveness, information effectiveness, skill development and lessons learned. It is proposed to carry out a secondary quantitative statistical analysis of these data.

**Deliverables:**

- A. The consultants will produce a brief report<sup>14</sup> on each of the three data sets.
- B. A Fourth report<sup>15</sup> will define criteria for assessing reintegration and draft an outline for a monitoring and evaluation framework over the longer term.
- C. Workshop with stakeholders/ key personnel to present results and the draft reports.
- D. The Final report<sup>16</sup> will summarize results of the other reports incorporating feedback from the workshop.

**Assumptions:**

- Assistance from UNDP/ANBP in providing contact details of stakeholders/ and in making arrangements for meetings with stakeholders.
- Assistance from M&E and Programmes staff during field visits.
- Target group 2, ex-combatants who finished the programme will be located and brought together at central points in each region in order to carry out group discussions, and individual interviews.
- Access to the M&E and Programmes databases for information referring to the Integration of XCs.

**Division into two teams:**

In order to reach most of the regions we propose to form two teams: I: the team leader and local expert, team II: International expert and interpreter. Team I will cover Kabul, Herat and Jalalabad, while team 2 will travel to Bamyan, Mazar-e-Sharif and Kunduz. It has been agreed that selected personnel of the M&E staff join these teams.

**Task distribution between consultants.**

The team leader and international expert will work with considerable autonomy, each focusing specifically on certain regions (see previous paragraph) and sectors. The international expert will look mainly at context variables, while the team leader will study the intervention. The quantitative analysis will be coordinated by the team leader, while the international expert will organize individual and group interviews in the field. Stakeholder interviews will be distributed between the international expert and the team leader, visiting the diplomatic Missions of Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. A sample of the commanders and local opinion leaders will be included in the interviews. A list of all stakeholders to be visited is attached as an annex. Data collection will be a shared exercise (using previously agreed common protocols) with support from the programmes and M&E Departments together with the regional offices of ANBP. The consultants will draft the paragraphs of the reports corresponding to the task distribution indicated here. The final draft and end reports will be composed by the team leader and presented to UNDP by Edinburgh consultants.

**Work Schedule**

The timetable of the work schedule is attached in the form of a spreadsheet which is self-explanatory.

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<sup>14</sup> Internal reports for discussion

<sup>15</sup> internal report for discussion

<sup>16</sup> Official report for UNDP of maximum 40 pages with annexes as required by TOR.



# **Annex IX**

## **Terms of Reference**









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<sup>i</sup> It is likely that the sample is selective: those who have no interest in maintaining further contact with ANBP and are therefore not available for the interview probably have a more negative attitude towards its utility than those who do respond. What we are looking at is a non-response of about 75%, which invalidates the data. In second instance (after the current analysis based on the first 270 cases) some non-response cases were replaced by others changing the territorial distribution. This violates the basic principles of random sampling design. The design inefficient to begin with, taking 900 random cases out of the list of 50,000. A cluster sample would have been more appropriate and a sample size of 900 would have been adequate for this purpose.

<sup>ii</sup> Table 1 is a recode of the occupational categories as entered in the database. Figure 3 illustrates all categories used and figure 4 collapses categories with under 5% of cases. The large number of categories with under 5% is apparent, when pooled they represent about one third of all cases. This is clearly not a useful classification system. It is also evident that the classification system is not *exclusive* in the sense that each case should fit only one category. A case in point are for example ‘farmer’ and ‘agriculture’ (which is not an occupation but a sector), ‘mechanic’ and ‘motor bike mechanic’, ‘wage labour’ and ‘photography’ or ‘small business’ and ‘shopkeeping’ or ‘embroidery’. Classifications which refer to occupations are mixed with sectors (education, agriculture, national security, photography) and occupational categories (employee, wage labour).

The classification system used to capture ‘work experience’ does not follow ILO convention and violates intuitive thinking. The large number of categories across different dimensions make it difficult to recode reliably, there is no underlying hierarchy or order, different observers would group the categories together according to different criteria. Therefore the usefulness of the classification system for external comparisons is low. Also it is complicated, time consuming to input and manipulate.: inefficient and ineffective.

<sup>iii</sup> The classification system used for ‘first preference’ suffers from the same deficiencies as that for work category. At this stage it should have been evident which alternatives there were, since it may be assumed that first preference for a reintegration package would refer to a choice from a menu containing a discrete number of options.

<sup>iv</sup> The classification system is not only of little use for external comparison, but also for internal purposes. The confused and myriad categories of the different variables makes it difficult to follow previous work experience, the development of preference for further training and final choice in a straightforward manner. The purpose of a relational database is to relate variables from one dataset with those from another (data collected during the demobilization stage with those collected after training for example). The design of the relational database is not effective. M&E has no direct access to the RDB. It has to request data from ITC and wait for them to produce them. The ITC Department is incapable of producing a frequency distribution or a cross-tabulation upon request from the M&E Department. The raw dataset has however be accessed and reproduced, albeit with some difficulty because of networking problems. Analysis is done with Excel only. The M&E staff are not familiar with statistics, and do not know how to use any statistical or other packages of data analysis. Data access is effective but inefficient, analysis is straightforward but sub-standard. A confidence estimate can not be given for an estimate, nor a significance level for a statistic.

<sup>v</sup> The interviews were carried out by DDR regional offices choosing interviewers from caseworkers. The attitude questions were formulated naively, making it obvious for the respondent which response the DDR interviewer wanted to hear. Therefore the validity of the responses may be placed in doubt. The coding of

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attitude responses in SPSS was carried out by the M&E Department, admittedly after very brief training by the consultant. Still the non-thinking classification of obvious ordinal attitude scales in counter intuitive order (somewhat useful, very useful, not useful) is baffling. Even income categories were not coded in ascending order. The data collection and coding are manifestly unprofessional which is forgivable, and can be solved by training, but that common sense was not applied is more difficult to remedy. In this instance again the database is ineffective (data quality is low) and inefficient (the time it takes to recode questions ordered incorrectly is wasted).

<sup>vi</sup> Current working sector data reflected in the pie chart (Figure 6) and reference table do not permit direct comparison with previous working experience, because the classification system used was not uniform.

<sup>vii</sup> Note that the answer categories for the question ‘are you and you family now doing better...’ does not contain the option that things are *worse* now than they were before. This should have been a five point scale ranging from ‘much better’ to ‘much worse’, rather than from ‘much better’ to ‘the same as before’

<sup>viii</sup> As was the case with questions striving to capture attitude towards DDR, those directed towards the comrades and the commander will tend to be biased, for similar respondent motives: ingratiation. There is a tendency to respond in compliance with what the respondents expect the interviewer wants to hear. Observe the high non response in the respective tables in the annex. The validity of the data must be placed in doubt.