

## DDRRP LIBERIA LESSONS LEARNT AND SUMMARY

### I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

#### The mandate

1. The DDRRP was executed as part of the overall mandate of UNMIL and as foreseen by the CPA. While DDR proved to be one of the priorities, UNMIL's mandate as defined by the UN Security Council Resolution 1509 of 19 September 2003 was articulated around four different axes : a) support for implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement; b) Protection to United Nations staff, facilities, and civilians; c) Support for Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance, and d) Support for Security Reform<sup>1</sup>. The DDR process was a part of the Implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement under point 3. f). The DDR process did not unfold according to the necessary technical requirements as the time-frame for the political agendas did not support the time-frame for the technical support structures to be in place.

#### Programme Design

2. A common Programme Strategic and Implementation Framework (SF) was developed in early October 2003 and finalised by 31 October 2003 as a result of a collaborative process driven by the SRSG and UNDP.
3. The design was comprehensive in scope, covering all areas and attributing clear roles and responsibilities, and had a specific strategy for each target group (women, children, disabled etc.). It is the first UN integrated DDR framework produced.
4. The SF also contained some weaknesses : it did not define the key terms, such as "reintegration", "rehabilitation" or programme objectives, such as "national security" and "peace". It did not establish benchmarks or indicators to measure success. It did not foresee any mechanism for tracking assumptions.

#### Disarmament

5. The disarmament and demobilisation process started in Monrovia on December 7, 2003 with a peacekeeping force of some 5,000 but only started in the counties on 15 April 2004 when the full force of 15,000 was deployed. Disarmament was officially completed country-wide on November 4, 2004.
6. By the end of the DD process, 103,912 persons had been disarmed and had received a DDRRP card with the corresponding entitlements (e.g. twice a US\$ 150 TSA –Transitional Safety Allowance- payment). 28,312 weapons had been collected by the end of the exercise, comparatively one of the lowest weapon to man ratio in recent DDR history (0,28). However criteria in Liberia included ammunition and UXO, substantially changing the ratio. In other countries (e.g. Afghanistan) only serviceable weapons are accepted, so the evaluation has used the smallest common denominator to compare Liberia to other country where DDR operations have taken place to allow for comparison.

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<sup>1</sup> S/RES/1509/(2003) "3. *Decides* that UNMIL shall have the following mandate: Support for Implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement ... (includes points a) through i), Protection of United Nations Staff, Facilities and Civilians (point j), Support for Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance ... (points k) through m) and Support for Security Reform (point n) through s))", pages 3 and 4.

7. The DDR Programme started on 7 December 2003 with the first disarmament taking place at Camp Schieffelin. The incidents at Camp Schieffelin which left nine dead could have and should have been avoided. The evaluation team was unable to obtain any evidence which supported the rushed time-frame for the start of the disarmament on 7 December 2003 at Camp Schieffelin. Evidence that the technical support structures were not ready for the exercise have been gathered by the evaluation from various sources. Documentary evidence seems to indicate that the time-frame was established in view of a donors' conference scheduled for December 2003.
8. The Camp Schieffelin incidents could have had a very negative impact on the rest of the programme. Luckily this did not occur, but the decisions that were taken at Camp Schieffelin had lasting consequences on the DDRP and the manner in which the rest of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process was carried out. In terms of disarmament, Camp Schieffelin clearly yielded the highest weapon take of the entire disarmament exercise, with 10,312 weapons for 12,770 participants. The ratio is of 0.81 weapon per person. The high weapon ratio is partly the result of participants' understanding that the programme was designed as "one weapon per person" to be eligible.

### Timeliness

9. In terms of timeliness the DDR process started four months after the signing of the peace agreement, placing Liberia in 5<sup>th</sup> rank of the fastest starting DDR processes of 17 countries surveyed. In terms of the length of the DD process, Liberia is shorter, with a DD phase lasting less than 12 months, than the average 16 months of other DD operations<sup>2</sup>.

### Demobilisation

10. The length of the stay in cantonment sites was originally planned to be 30 days for adults. Children followed a different procedure, as all under-aged were taken to Interim Care Centres (ICC) for a duration which varied from a few days up to three months (depending on the delay and feasibility of family reunification). In the Joint Operation Plan (JOP) the stay was shortened to three weeks, while in practice the stay was further reduced to five days per adult participant.
11. The range of services as provided in the SF were provided to the participants interviewed, with one notable exception: Women did not have a lead agency to cater for their needs (despite UNIFEM having been nominated in the SF as the lead agency for women in the process) beyond the DD phase and as such lacked adequate and differentiated reintegration assistance.
12. There was no handbook or manual to ensure a common approach by Implementing Partners (IPs) at the different sites. Therefore demobilisation services were not standardised. The services were generally deemed to be good by interviewees.<sup>3</sup>

### Psycho-social counselling

13. Counselling sessions were found to be particularly useful. However unlike for Children Associated with Fighting Forces (CAFF) who benefited from a continuation of the counselling through the community based Child Welfare Committee (CWC) after their stay in ICC, adults were left on their own once they were discharged from

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<sup>2</sup> Barcelona School of Peace, ECP, Barcelona, Analysis of DDR Programmes existing in the world in 2005, February 2006, Albert Caramés et al., p. 9

<sup>3</sup> Although no handbook was produced to guide the implementing partners, however, the JOP delineated the scope of tasks and services expected from the IPs and agencies. They were also outlined in the TORs for engaging the agencies. Therefore, differences in demobilization services in various sites were more on quality of administrative capability and managerial capacities of the different agencies, which reflects their differentiating experience over time.

the cantonment sites. Psycho-social counselling together with reconciliation were two very necessary components which received insufficient attention and support.

### Rehabilitation

14. Despite the title of the programme, rehabilitation was never developed for adults as a component. It was not defined by the programme, and simply got lost in the operation, without any specific programmatic reality. Eventually some reinsertion projects did include a rehabilitation component, but this was not standardised.

### Reintegration

15. Reintegration projects started in June 2004, only three months after disarmament and demobilisation were re-started in April 2004, and six months before the end of the DD phase. This is a major accomplishment and needs to be highlighted. A total of 57,080 participants have received or are currently enrolled in reintegration projects according to the JIU. This includes parallel programmes not under the UNDP TF. Of these 43,425 are covered by the UNDP TF. This is a rapid response and shows programme flexibility to adapt to changing conditions. 99% of the reintegration projects fall in three categories: formal education, vocational skills training, agriculture.
16. The programme has 101,873 participants eligible for reintegration assistance. Of these there remain 41,920 still awaiting reintegration assistance. Of these, 19,409 are under the UNDP TF and 22,511 are to be covered by parallel programmes.
17. Economic reintegration was the focus of the programme as social reintegration was largely left aside. The assumption that economic reintegration leads to social reintegration does not hold true. The lack of attention to the social dimension, in particular as regards both to reconciliation and psycho-social support, was a major gap. Once adult participants were discharged, community and religious leaders were left up with the task of facilitating reconciliation, while the DDRP provided very little support to the social aspects and no additional psycho-social support than the one received during the five days at the cantonment sites.

### Vulnerable groups

18. Vulnerable groups had each a comprehensive strategy developed in the SF. However in the actual implementation, only children, through UNICEF and their partners network, were actually able to receive specialised attention as a specific programme target category. Women did not benefit from a specific programme tailored to their needs during the reintegration phase. During DD women were largely treated as men during the process, with two exceptions: separate quarters were provided at cantonment sites (together with CAFF), and some specific gender projects were undertaken (e.g. UNFPA). But women, especially those who did not fight, had more difficulties during screening to be admitted in the programme, especially during the first phase of DD (3,2% of the caseload, versus 29% in phase III)<sup>4</sup>, and there was no pro-active network of partners working around the women's issue or their reintegration in civil society as there was for children.

### Results

#### *a) caseload*

19. The original planning figure of 38,000 programme participants rose to over 103,000 people despite documented evidence from UNDP calling for caution in the rapidly expanding numbers. Minutes of TCC and PAC meetings show donor awareness to the rapidly expanding caseload. It is unclear why no limit was set on a maximum number. Lists of combatants provided by two of the three factions indicate that the

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<sup>4</sup> see figures on Statistical Report from JIU included as annex and table in the body of the report under III Main Findings b) disarmament

caseload would clearly have been within the original target figure had the lists been validated at the end of January 2004.

20. The DDRP did not request any programme planning update to guide the actual implementation based on a different scenario (JOP minimum pre-conditions) and different assumptions (SF clause 2.7 points i and v). As a result the reintegration phase was done largely on the basis of ad hoc decisions, looking essentially at economic reintegration as a quick intermediary transitional measure, designed to buy peace, rather than as a comprehensive reintegration measure. A number of activities originally foreseen in the SF were simply not undertaken (result four of annex A, economic fund annex C, Social reintegration annex D, Assistance to women Annex E).
21. A major success has been the very high rate of enrolment in formal education, with some 38,535 people who expressed their wish to return to formal education from the 101,873 who expressed their desire for reintegration assistance (or 38% of the total caseload). This is probably the highest turnout in formal education of any DDR process and indicates that interest in pursuing formal education is not limited to school age children, contrary to what was previously believed. However this high enrolment will put pressure on government to facilitate access to the labour market for an increased graduated students mass. The evaluation had no time to judge the quality of the education given. As students were taking their final examinations, the evaluation also had no data to judge how well programme participants had fared as compared to the other students enrolled.
22. The DDRP has developed an excellent management information system (MIS), very useful for validation of data. However insufficient resources were placed for its monitoring and evaluation function. As a result during the presentation of the preliminary evaluation findings in Monrovia some questions were raised regarding the actual attendance of programme beneficiaries in formal education. The M&E unit, together with IPs, must be able to adequately report on attendance for each project and monitor any potential abuse. (The attendance criteria to be eligible for the stipend is set at 75% of class time or vocational training) A recent survey of M&E DDR practices among 11 countries has shown that M&E units are generally insufficiently resourced, both in financial terms and regarding the number of skilled staff, for the M&E requirements of DDR programmes.<sup>5</sup>

*b) security*

23. The immediate objective of the DDRP was to “consolidate national security...”. Yet the evaluation team was unable to find within JIU or UNMIL a specific unit or person who could provide supporting data showing that progress was in fact being made in that sense. JIU does not have security data. In UNMIL separate units each work on their own part of the process, with a crime information unit (which has been changing its reporting procedure and contents since 2004, currently placed at the LNP HQ), a JMAC (Joint Mission Analysis Cell) which as the name indicates is supposed to be “the focal point for fusion of information from all sources”<sup>6</sup>, plus other units such as the UNSECOORD, which records some of the security incidents involving UN personnel. But there does not seem to be a focal point able to provide a comprehensive picture of the state of “national security” in Liberia and provide supporting data. Certainly this critical information should be centralised in one office.
24. In this context the evaluation team used therefore the available statistics from three sources, given the absence of a comprehensive database on national security indicators : a) trauma injuries of combatants based on hospital records, b) weapons

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<sup>5</sup> C. Bugnion, Survey of M&E DDR practices, UNDP BCPR, September 2006

<sup>6</sup> Mark Malan, KAIPTC paper no 7, August 2005

- collection information based on JMAC information, c) crime statistics based on CIVPOL information (which is supposed to include LNP statistics).
25. Based on some quantitative statistical evidence (e.g. hospital records of combatants trauma cases) and qualitative information collected, the evaluation concludes that the programme has contributed to consolidating national security. However it is clearly largely due to the deployment of 15,000 peace keepers and cannot be attributed to the DDRRP alone. By identifying a programme objective which is the sum of different factors most of which are outside the programme's control, the DDRRP makes evaluating its contribution to national security difficult.
  26. The command structure amongst a majority of ex-combatants still exists, although weakened. It will be difficult to break the chain of command as long as alternative livelihood opportunities are not being developed. It is particularly important that DDRRP makes good on its promises for reintegration benefits (payment of stipends, handing out of toolkits) as implementation delays favour the mediation of former commanders as spokespersons on behalf of programme participants.
  27. Therefore the DDRRP must ensure timely payment of stipend as a number of examples of rioting and lock-in of UN and IP staff have taken place because payment promises were not kept. This is a security threat and both IPs and UNDP must ensure the timely preparation, release and payment of the stipend and supply of toolkits. This puts added pressure on a stronger monitoring capacity of the implementing partners, as some have shown weaknesses in their project performance.
  28. Given the current capacity at field level and the rather lengthy procedure from the time a reintegration project proposal is submitted by IPs until it is actually approved and financed by JIU/UNDP, the evaluation concludes that it will be unlikely that the reintegration of the remaining caseload of 19,409 to be covered directly under the DDRRP and the additional 22,511 to be covered by parallel programmes will be completed within the life of the programme, with a programmatic end date in June 2007 and a closing of the programme by December 2007. Failure to cover the remaining caseload on time constitutes an additional security threat as unkept promises amongst programme participants have often led to rioting.

*c) Overall appraisal*

29. The DDRRP has been undertaken in a complex and difficult environment, and was initiated under a transitional government. Now that elections have successfully been held and a democratically elected government is in office, there are a series of challenges which must be addressed by the different players : NCDDRR, JIU/UNDP, UNMIL RRR. At the same time new opportunities arise as the democratically elected government has appointed a new leadership within NCDDRR that should be able to proactively steer the DDRRP forward to its completion while the government is developing a national framework for recovery and development that may provide the basis for an exit strategy of the NCDDRR in the close future.
30. JIU/UNDP should cover the remaining caseload of reintegration assistance participants expected to number 19,409 individuals. It is difficult to change the programme mid-way through its implementation without causing some form of resentment which may lead to security threats if participants are seen to be benefiting differently from the same programme. Therefore in view of avoiding any additional conflict the evaluation recommends that a specific field mission takes place to identify how best the DDRRP should continue and develop its exit strategy, and present its conclusions to NCDDRR/UNDP/JIU/UNMIL/UNICEF. However there should be a linkage with the communities insofar as the actual number of participants shows under subscription of programme participants (e.g. 13,505 attended the first 20 reintegration projects versus a target of 18,675 according to JIU figures). Therefore some thought should be given as to the possibility of having

- communities contribute a number of participants based on transparent community-based self selection criteria. NCDDRR should be closely consulted and define with the JIU on the manner into which the DRRP should continue its programming.
31. The DRRP does not have an exit strategy. It must look for a manner of integrating itself into the wider national recovery framework. At the time of the evaluation such as framework is still not entirely developed. However by the end of 2007 and of the DRRP it is essential that other comprehensive development packages be put in place to create the connection for longer term sustainable reintegration of programme participants and that of the general population.
  32. The DRRP does not foresee any benchmarks or success indicators. As a result focus is placed on outputs, and therefore in undertaking the activities, rather than on the actual outcome of the programme. This leaves an open question as to the programme's level of success. As a long-term framework the NCDDRR will need to go beyond output measures to consider outcome and impact measures. We recommend that the NCDDRR review the current design of the DRRP and develop M&E framework including both qualitative and quantitative impact indicators.
  33. The DRRP has further not given working definitions of the terms used as programme objectives. The interpretation of the terms is left up to the evaluation team. And yet these definitions are critical to identify what are the parameters against which the programme needs to be evaluated. The DRRP should immediately develop, as part of its exit strategy, the benchmarks and success indicators it intends to accomplish by the end of 2007, so that the final evaluation may be able to use some of the programme specific tools used to plan the activities, rather than having to struggle to find relevant data and information on which to evaluate the programme results.
  34. Despite a difficult context, some major constraints, and a number of shortfall and weaknesses, the programme has been able to operate to a satisfactory level in regards to its immediate objective. Some improvements are suggested in the recommendation section for the remaining programme life cycle.

### NCDDRR

35. NCDDRR is currently undertaking its own internal review exercise, coupled with a comprehensive financial audit. The new government has somewhat modified the NCDDRR (Executive Order N° 4) and has appointed a new leadership structure with a view to fomenting ownership and participation in the DRRP process. How much can be done by the new NCDDRR will depend essentially on two aspects : 1) the result of the financial audit, 2) the support and credibility of the new structure in leveraging resources and showing actual management and implementation capacity.
36. While it is not a part of the TOR to evaluate the NCDDRR it should be recognised that the new team has a great challenge ahead. On the one hand it must already project its short-term goals for the end of the DRRP, and see how some transfer of responsibilities can be undertaken in this programme. The evaluation recommends that M&E capacity and responsibility be transferred over to the NCDDRR for the remainder of the DRRP, subject to satisfactory financial audit and a proper plan from NCDDRR detailing activities and resources necessary for the next 18 months. This M&E responsibility should be extended to include parallel programmes funded by USAID and the EC as well as the child component placed under UNICEF responsibility, as in the current DRRP no oversight of these components have been given to the JIU or NCDDRR, resulting in a lack of centralised and coordinated overall monitoring of DDR projects.
37. Over the longer term, in agreement with the President's remarks at the NCDDRR Consultative Forum on July 6-7, 2006, the NCDDRR should be considering its phasing out as the focus of efforts should be shifting to national recovery,

reconstruction and development instead of targeted assistance to specific groups. In accordance with good practice in DDR it is important that the ex-combatants be treated as rapidly as possible, subject to security constraints and threats, as civilians, as part of the demobilisation and sustainable reintegration exercise. In this manner community-based programmes are able to offer equitable opportunities to all people, rather than favouring a specific group over another. Therefore over the medium-term, the NCDDRR should also develop its exit strategy and merge its activities into the wider national recovery/development plan.

38. Another main challenge is to maximise synergies amongst the primary stakeholders as some difficulty has been found in terms of articulating efforts and undertaking both a clear division of labour and of responsibilities between JIU/UNDP/UNMIL/NCDDRR. While according to the programme SF, the JIU was supposed to be the overall responsible for the DDRP under the NCDDRR, in practice some of the components, such as DD, were run directly from UNMIL without the necessary degree of close collaboration that was requested in the framework. On the other hand, JIU/UNDP was tasked with M&E and rehabilitation and reintegration, while JIU/OCHA was to be in charge of information and sensitisation. Two issues arise from the JIU set up: 1) that JIU was an integrated unit in name only, partly given the weakness of the transitional government and therefore of the NCDDRR, and operational responsibilities for DD solely allocated to UNMIL DDR (see JOP) and not under JIU responsibility, with an information unit working closely with the NCDDRR and the reintegration component essentially under UNDP supervision and responsibility.
39. In theory the JIU was a positive and consultative structure allowing buy-in from all stakeholders. However in practice it was essentially (and contrary to the SF scheme) placed under UNMIL DDR in the DD phase, and considered as a UNDP responsibility in the reintegration phase, with a late set-up of field offices and unclear divisions of responsibilities between UNMIL RRR, NCDDRR and JIU/UNDP field offices.
40. The evaluation recommends an immediate review of the collaborative arrangements between NCDDRR/UNMIL/JIU/UNDP/UNICEF in order to ensure that the best use of available resources is being made to facilitate proper programme corrections and completion within the anticipated time-frame for implementation.

## LESSONS LEARNED

DDRRP are political in nature. But it is important to be informed by technical preparedness in order to minimise the security risks linked to the process and the setbacks that they can create. Therefore the political decision making process, based on competing political agendas, should strive to be supported by technical preparedness. Camp Schieffelin could potentially have derailed the DDR process, and all actors undertook great efforts to ensure that this would not happen.

It is always difficult to work with an interim government, but it is better to have an inclusive and collaborative approach, rather than to leave the transitional government on the side-line, even if said government does have leadership and credibility problems. Greater involvement of the NCDDRR in the DDRP would have been possible and could have contributed to a smoother DD phase, particularly for keeping the caseload within a reasonable figure and screening of legitimate participants with the support of the different commanders.

A clear and unambiguous sensitisation campaign on the programme including eligibility criteria and programme benefits has to reach all participants before the programme is launched.

Commanders should be given a specific attention in a DDR process, through an inclusive strategy that allows to use their knowledge and skills for screening and bringing all participants into the programme, and giving commanders some incentive for cooperation within the process. At the same time and in order to break the chain of command, separate reintegration schemes can be devised for commanders (such as in Sierra Leone where some commanders were given scholarships or placed in jobs away from areas where they had influence).

Engagement of programme participants in reintegration activities appears to be a strong factor in limiting the continued contacts with their ex-commanders. On the other hand, confusions and dissatisfactions with reintegration programs tend to provide an opportunity for commanders to take the role of mediators between program participants and reintegration service providers.

Programme fragmentation is not conducive to an integrated approach and a holistic response. Even within the reintegration component, fragmentation induced by different partners under different standards and requirements (EC and USAID) has had negative impact on the programme.<sup>7</sup> JIU, as a Joint Implementation Unit, was supposed to reflect synergies between the three constituents (NCDDRR, UNMIL and UNDP). However in practice, actual decision making between the three constituencies and the JIU proved to be less than optimal, as the JIU was tasked with responsibilities for which it was not designed, such as the coordination of parallel programmes. It is unfair to expect the JIU with its resources to address the lack of a national recovery framework, especially given that such a framework was a pre-condition for the DDRP.

The National Commission (NCDDRR) must be mandated for the overall coordination, monitoring and evaluation of all DDRP projects. The absence of an overall M&E

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<sup>7</sup> Comment from JIU: "Program fragmentation became inevitable in the absence of a strong national institution to coordinate the implementation of the program in demonstration of national ownership. The absence of such institution during the transition period made the coordination of parallel programs difficult."

mechanism has led to inefficient monitoring of the projects and a lack of coordination and synergies between the different actors (UNDP TF, EC, USAID).

In regards to the DDRRP SF, three lessons must be extracted:

- 1) if the assumptions are not correct, pre-conditions are not met, and the situation changes, a revised framework must be developed to incorporate changes and plan under the different conditions (something the DDRRP did not do);
- 2) A clear definition of all key terms, particularly programme objectives, must be provided and agreed upon by all actors, to avoid individual interpretations and sometimes conflicting agendas as well as facilitate monitoring and evaluation of the programme;
- 3) M&E must be a management function, streamlined into RBM practices. As such the SF must determine clear benchmarks and indicators for success. An external evaluation is not merely a compliance exercise, it must bring added value to the programme and major stakeholders and as such must be carefully planned for in the SF.

## **VI. CONCLUSION**

The evaluation hypothesis of a fractioned DDR rather than an integrated and streamlined process proved to be correct. The integration and coordination mechanisms did not provide the necessary coherence for an integrated process. Fragmentation was damaging both between the DD and RR phases of the programme, and in the reintegration component by having different programmes (UNDP TF and parallel programmes financed by the EC and USAID) fund specific projects under different standards and requirements.

The political requirements drove the DDR process against the technical and operational realities leading to the Camp Scheffelin incident and challenging the technical work that had been prepared.

However, despite the lack of an integrated approach, the programme proved to have performed satisfactorily in regards to its immediate objective of consolidating national security.

The DDR process was the most inclusive to date, allowing non-fighting groups to register, and applying the Cape Town Principles as eligibility criteria for screening. However its openness was widely abused, leading to a substantial increase in the caseload.

Regarding the weapons collection, despite and beyond the low figures, the disarmament process visibly contributed to peace consolidation and security. Demobilisation, however, did not play its original role of screening potential participant to the programme.

Reintegration has both a social and economic dimension. In the absence of a national recovery framework, the DDRRP contributed partially to reintegration but it is too early to appraise sustainability of economic reintegration.

Community reintegration and reconciliation mechanisms have played an important role although they were not directly supported by programme activities.

Recent changes within the NCDDRR leadership resulting from the democratically elected government should lead to a necessary hand-over of part of the programme to enhance and affirm government ownership and leadership.

## VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

At the policy level :

1. There is an urgent need to define the areas of competence of NCDDRR, JIU/UNDP DDRR, UNMIL RRR. The internal review of NCDDRR together with the external mid-term evaluation of the DDRRP should be urgently completed with a review of each stakeholder's area of responsibility, and particularly that of UNMIL RRR in relation to the changes in NCDDRR and JIU/UNDP. A specific mission from Senior Management of UNMIL, NCDDRR, UNDP and UNICEF should be fielded to identify the possible exit strategy of the DDRRP into the wider recovery framework (which is still not fully developed), address the issue of the DDRRP's continuation and re-focusing of the implementation mode (and consider including a participation from communities instead of only targeting programme participants, as suggested under point 2. of operational level recommendations).
2. The transfer of responsibilities to NCDDRR from the JIU must be reflected in policy decisions and a transition plan must be prepared and validated by the stakeholders.
3. The ownership and the future of the database needs to be determined, as this raises a number of issues regarding confidentiality and protection of participants.

At the operational level

1. Division of labour between NCDDRR, JIU/UNDP DDRR, UNMIL RRR at field level must be clarified and the work of field offices streamlined. Efficient coordination mechanisms must be set up at local level to assure better cooperation and synergies between the different actors. A critical review of the number and size of field offices must be undertaken, considering the outstanding needs;
2. The remaining reintegration programme should study a possible broadening of its participants category, considering the current programme's under subscription, to include a percentage of community members. These should be identified by the communities themselves through traditional community mechanisms and a list of eligible participants should be posted publicly, with special attention to other war affected groups within the community. In addition, programs for persons with disabilities must also be designed to cater for their reintegration needs.
3. The skills training component in Maryland (and possibly other parts of the south) has not yet started, and should do so immediately, as there have been reports of disgruntled participants and a plea from local authorities to ensure that the programme will soon start, providing a necessary security buffer to the county.
4. It is necessary to increase outreach programmes based on the capacity of the field offices and identify partners that can reach participants in remote areas.
5. A limited database should urgently be developed for field offices, with the necessary internet connection and facilities, to ensure efficient monitoring and supervision of the programme.
6. All monitoring and evaluation responsibility should be transferred to NCDDRR, including DDRRP, parallel programmes and UNICEF projects, to ensure that there is one overall coordinator for all DDR programmes.

7. NCDDRR should further be able to provide referral and counselling services to DDRRP participants, and their field offices capacity should also reflect this need.
8. There is an urgent need to strengthen and develop business skills as a transversal issue in all skills training to improve sustainability of the skills acquired by participants.
9. There is also a need to support necessary conflict transformation outreach programmes at community level as a transversal issue, in conjunction with other programmes where possible.
10. This should be coupled with a redefinition of the sensitisation campaign at community level, and particularly tackle the issue of perceived inequity by the programme.
11. Some mechanisms should be installed in order to ensure local and decentralised ownership of the programme.
12. District Development Committees (DDC) appear to be a good structure for absorbing participants after training. A clear inter-phase of CBR with the DDRRP should be ensured wherever possible;
13. Special attention to the time payment of stipends and provision of toolkits must be ensured to avoid security problems.

At the overall strategic level, NCDDRR has a difficult role to play, as its new leadership must simultaneously address very different issues :

- Role of the NCDDRR in the remaining life cycle of the DDRRP;
- Role of the NCDDRR in relation to the other parallel programmes;
- Role of the NCDDRR in relation to the UNICEF child projects;
- Role of the NCDDRR after the completion of the DDRRP and other projects.

It is recommended that after 2007 the NCDDRR change its name and structure. In line with the President's position, the evaluation believes that the best possible result of NCDDRR's work is that ex-combatants cease to be an issue, and become a part of the community life through community-based initiatives. Therefore the programmatic focus should in 2007 shift to the communities rather continuing targeted individual support. However this requires a national recovery framework that will certainly exist soon as it is currently being developed.

- To ensure this multiple transition NCDDRR should also plan its exit strategy beyond 2007, along with the corresponding exit strategy of UNMIL's RRR.

In order to follow up on recommendations and suggested improvements contained in this report, the evaluation team recommends the creation of a task force from senior managers of the primary stakeholders (NCDDRR, UNMIL, UNDP, UNICEF and possibly donors) to oversee the change and improvement process of the DDRRP, as a sort of "evaluation management committee", something that did not exist in the evaluation design and TOR.