

Report of the Evaluation of DDR and CIP in AFGHANISTAN

*Qatra Qatra darya meshad –
One drop at a time makes a river -
Collecting one gun at a time makes peace -*

PART 2

LESSONS LEARNED & RECOMMENDATIONS



Is it junk? No, it is a sawn off Kalashnikov, a concealed criminal weapon.

PART 2¹

LESSONS LEARNED & RECOMMENDATIONS

Lessons to be Learned from the ANBP experience

- **2.1. Strategic lessons**
- **2.2. DDR – Disarmament for SALW**
- **2.3. DDR - Disarmament for Heavy Weapons**
- **2.4. Destruction of weapons and ammunition**
- **2.5. Demobilization of Afghan Military Forces**
- **2.6. Reintegration of XComs and the other ‘Rs’**
- **2.7. CIP – Commanders’ Incentive Programme**
- **2.8. Lessons from ANBP staff**

Lessons to be Learned for DDR in other countries

- 2.9. Defining DDR – or 3D4R**
- 2.10. DDR & SSR in peace building**
- 2.11. Structuring a DDR programme**
- 2.12. Components of DDR differ in each country**

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Kabul, 6 September 2007

¹ Part 1 is the Summary Report. Parts 3 & 4 present greater detail and analysis of the Commander Incentives Programme and of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). Part 5 contains Annexes.

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Introduction to Lessons Learned & Recommendations

We circulated a draft report on 16 August, three weeks before the end of the mission to invite comments. We presented the main recommendations on 25 and 26 August to the H.E. Vice-President Karim Khalili, Chairman of the D&R Commission, to H.E. Mohd Massum Stanekzai, Deputy Chair of the D&R Commission and to H.E. Habibullah, Deputy Minister of Defence. UN officials, donors and partners attended a briefing at UNAMA on 26 August.

Adverse comments have come from some people with a military background. Despite the fact that we consider DDR a huge success on the basis of its political achievements and the excellence of its disarmament implementation, our characterization of demobilization as too administrative, and our criticism of the reintegration design rankles. This is the clash of cultures: in the military people take orders, while development people are always questioning. It is as if we are saying that ANBP is a BUS. It is running fine, has a great engine and sound body, but it better seats and safety features. Even without seats, the bus can take us to our destination, but it is safer if we install seats and belts, and repaint the interior. The BIG picture is the bus = DD, but discussing interior design involves a lot of detail = RRRR. Reintegration is less spectacular and more complex than disarmament. That takes nothing away from the DD achievements of ANBP.

2.1. Strategic Lessons Learned

2.1.1. - The UNAMA-UNDP partnership worked very well

ANBP benefited from a well-coordinated partnership between the development and peacekeeping departments of the UN. UNAMA provided political guidance at critical junctures (such as heavy weapons cantonment) and UNDP provided efficient field support for implementation. This combination between UNDPKO and UNDP has worked before; it worked well in Afghanistan and DDR was a political success.

2.1.2.- The D&R Commission Chaired by Vice-Pres Khalili,

is an appropriate GoA high-level mechanism for coordinating DDR.

The D&R Commission is well-composed and well-coordinated. It provides a coherent mechanism for the Afghan government partnership with UNAMA and UNDP in this delicate sector. Such a commission, seated above any individual ministry, has the necessary influence to bring ministries together and to ensure that decisions are implemented. The commission has an important role in bringing the MoD and MoI and other government entities to devise and coordinate government policies on weapons, ammunition and other security issues.

If the Commission has not always worked as comprehensively as everyone hoped, this is because many of the member ministries are overwhelmed by the multitude of tasks thrown upon them. Partly this is due to the capacity limitations of individual ministries, but also to the fact that a multiple donors are thrusting too many tasks at ministers. More

decentralization to the provinces by donors, and by the functional ministries themselves, would improve central coordination of policy initiatives including the D&R Commission.

2.1.3.- Continued support to D&R Commission

As the DDR process was winding down, the BCPR mission recommended in 2006 that UNDP should “engage with the GoA in order to revisit the ToRs of the National Commission. The ToRs should include new responsibilities in line with its role in implementation and policy making on the DIAG project. Its membership should also be reviewed to reflect this new role.”

The present evaluators find that four years is not enough. The D&R Commission will need – and should receive - continued support from the GoA and the UN for its supervision of the DIAG and other security issues. The UN should continue to ensure international standards and recognition, and to support consolidation of the disarmament and reintegration process over at least the next three years. We find that pulling out UN support too early carries the risk of losing the positive results and diminishing the positive impacts already achieved.

Recommendation to GoA

The evaluators recommend that the role of the D&R Commission should be strengthened and its mandate extended to provide technical and political supervision of the Ammo Project and Mine destruction in the MoD in addition to the DIAG project. We further recommend that the D&R Commission should receive a mandate from the President to ensure that all surplus weapons, ammunition and explosives will be destroyed as they become surplus to need.

Recommendation to UNAMA and UNDP

The evaluators recommend that the DIAG and Ammo projects should not be handed over to GoA at present and that further, appropriate support should be extended to the D&R Commission to supervise these projects for at least three years.

2.1.4.- Threat of exports of arms and ammunition from Afghanistan

Experience in countries across the world shows that surplus stocks in official military or police armouries that are not destroyed, inevitably leak into the criminal market or are sold - legally or illegally – on the world market. Afghanistan has become the region’s largest reservoir of small arms and ammunition. The numbers of weapons and munitions surplus-to-usage will increase significantly, as the ANA and ANP receive NATO standard weapons and equipment beginning in 2007. The Deputy Minister of Defence has stated to the evaluators that he wishes all surplus arms and ammunition to be destroyed.

Recommendation to GoA

The evaluators recommend that a major destruction ceremony of soviet era surplus weapons should be organized on 9th July 2008 (UN International Weapon Destruction Day) – in view of impending change over of ANA and ANP to NATO standard

weapons. We recognize that destroying weapons is a sensitive – even emotional – issue in Afghanistan, but the political value of such a ceremony far outweighs the monetary value of ageing surplus weapons.²

A documentary film should be made of the event for television broadcasting worldwide. President Karzai should present the world-premiere of the film and announce the destruction during a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2008.³

Recommendation to NATO and the international community

The evaluators recommend to NATO and to donors that they should continue to support destruction of weapons and explosives by GoA. Unless the international community engages with the GoA on this issue, and implements a complete inventory and destruction programme, Afghan SALW and explosive stocks will remain a source of regional instability for years to come.

2.1.5 Donors established a partnership for success with GoA

The commitment of GoA and donors was largely responsible for this disarmament success. As BCPR noted, “Unlike other DDR programmes that have suffered because of partial funding for different components of the process, the upfront dedication of donors allowed the GoA and its partners to plan and implement from the outset a coherent and comprehensive DDR programme. The success of DDR programmes is often dependent on this critical element. In Afghanistan, thanks to the commitment of the stakeholders, and principally of the donors, funding shortfalls were avoided.”

2.1.6.- Disarmament was innovative, efficient and successful

ANBP excelled at implementation, under UNAMA political guidance and UNDP management. Micro-disarmament arrangements benefited from military planning and precision that were widely admired, bringing back safely 94,262 SALW with ingenuity and good implementation.

Cantonment of 12,248 heavy weapons took place between January 2004 and October 2005, and was officially completed February 2006. Observers agree that the HWC changed the balance and level of potential violence in Afghanistan and created the

² “A recent poll carried out by the Afghan Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium reveals that two-thirds of Afghans think that disarmament is the single most important path to security. In fact, Afghanistan's famous gun culture is motivated as much by fear as by cultural norms. From Kabul to Kandahar, people are not willing to surrender their weapons if they feel vulnerable to criminals, warlords, or Taliban insurgents.” Quoted from the article “**Afghan 'gun culture' is fuelled by fear**” by Mark Sedra and Robert Muggah, *Ottawa Citizen*, Thursday, 6 September 2007

³ A similar ceremony and UN speech were organized by Cambodia in 2001, and a film ‘Fighting Weapons for Development’ was funded by the Dutch government and shown at the UN. The impact was enormous.

conditions for political dialogue. This was a remarkable triumph for UNAMA and ANBP, for the GoA and for international cooperation which – for once – was quick, focused and effective.

2.1.7.- Demobilization was very efficient but less effective

Demobilization efficiently entered 62,376 XCs into a database, provided them with instant photo IDs and passed them through to the reintegration training stage. Normally demobilization leads into reinsertion activities that include health checks and treatments (which ANBP neglected), training in civic education and human rights, literacy and numeracy. Participative teaching methodologies encourage returning fighters to respect the village hierarchy, eschew domestic violence, protect women and children, understand the rule of law. These are important parts of the interface between military and civilian life, between demobilization and reintegration. They were missing from the ANBP strategy, and that is a pity.

Recommendation to UN

Demobilization and reinsertion activities – including health, literacy and human rights training - should always be carried out before the reintegration phase is introduced.

2.1.8.- Reintegration needs more time to get sustainable livelihoods

We find that three years is not long enough for DDR. Although the vocational training delivery exercise was efficient and most XCs liked their training, it is not clear how many XCs have been able to establish themselves with ‘sustainable livelihoods’. It is too early to evaluate this. Most XCs believe they were promised jobs by the government. Some government ministries have not been helpful in finding employment for XCs, despite the best efforts of the ANBP and the D&R Commission.

The reintegration mandate for ANBP was mainly limited to providing training, and this was done (even if some training subjects were questionable and the duration not always adequate). To provide training to 55,000 people in 18 months provides further proof of ANBP’s excellence in implementation. The mistake lies in designing a DDR project for only three years.

Recommendation to donors and to UNDP and UNDPKO

A DDR programme should never be designed for only three years. If the DD take a year or two, the RRRR will last at least a further four years: making a minimum of five or six years. If donors should be persuaded that they may provoke further conflict unless they commit to the full peace process. Disarmament without successful reintegration and reconciliation does not bring peace.

2.1.9.- Government cooperation with ANBP

The BCPR mission of 2006 heard complaints from officials that they were ‘not engaged

in the process from the outset, in terms of consultation in programme design and were subsequently 'out of the loop' during the implementation and uninformed. The evaluation team finds that the D&R Commission provided an adequate and effective government coordination mechanism at the formal level. If government officials wanted information, it was there and available and DDR processes were transparent.

We find that the reintegration design process was insufficiently participative, but in general we cannot fault the ANBP staff for forging ahead and getting the programme done - with or without ministry participation. In 2003 most ministries were new and weak, and even today they are overloaded. The fact that Afghanistan had a successful DDR programme was thanks to the fact that the D&R Commission, UNAMA and UNDP pushed ahead to implement the President's policies in the most expeditious manner possible, and using a decentralized implementation strategy.

Recommendation to donors and UN agencies

More decentralized planning and project implementation at the provincial level would reduce the overload on central government ministries, giving them the chance to be more efficient and to focus on national planning, while improving project implementation and developing national capacity in the regions.

Recommendation to UNDP

We recommend that UNDP should take over and maintain the ANBP regional office structures as an asset for decentralized support to further reintegration, to UNDP projects, to decentralized management and capacity building in the provinces.

2.1.10. Who should design a DDR programme and how?

We find a major weakness of ANBP in the original conception, which was carried out by a handful of people (initially just three men) rather than a structured group of experts bringing different skills and experiences to share at the table. Specialized UN agencies, DDR analysts and experienced international NGOs⁴ were not involved, so the Lessons Learned from other DDR programmes were lost. This, we believe, explains the failure of demobilization to go beyond the purely administrative, the absence of reinsertion activities, the delays in reintegration planning, the failure to create an M&E system, the lack gender awareness in DDR, the forgetting of ammunition, the lack of market surveys for the vocational training programmes, etc.

Recommendation to donors and to UNDP

Future DDR programmes should begin with inter-agency collaboration, and a group of men and women with multiple skills and experiences. At the same time, strong and dynamic leadership is essential, and DDR leaders should not hesitate to tread on a few toes in order to get disarmament and demobilization done in a timely manner.

⁴ No DDR programme should be designed without including technical experts from relevant ministries, UNICEF, UNOPS, WHO, WFP, ILO, IOM and NGOs working in the field. A disarmament researcher from UNIDIR or another security research group should be included, to ensure that lessons are drawn from the analysis of other programmes.

Recommendation to donors and GoA

Greater coordination is needed between the pillars of SSR and especially with counter-narcotics strategies, which are a counter-productive failure and need to be radically changed. The alienation of southern provinces by repressive counter-narcotic actions undermines the achievements of DDR and CIP, reinforces elements of a narco-state, and threatens to bring instability to the rest of Afghanistan.

Du tarbuz da yak dest gerefta namesha Dari proverb

Two watermelons cannot be carried in one hand

Meaning:

You cannot do everything by yourself

Or

If you are do too many things at once, you will succeed with none

Or

DDR needs to combine several different skills to make it succeed

2.2. Lessons Learned - Micro-Disarmament of SALW

2.2.1.- ANBP achieved its main objectives supporting the peace process

Afghan DDR project was aimed specifically at reducing the size of the Afghan Military Forces (AMF) and removing their SALW from circulation. This it achieved, paving the way for the creation of a new Afghan National Army (ANA) and wider security sector reform. While DDR contributed significantly to the transition to peace in Afghanistan by reducing the numbers of armed units under the MoD and collecting their weapons, its special contribution was helping to create the political dynamic that led to further negotiations over heavy weapons and bringing Commanders into the political process.

2.2.2.- Successful Micro-Disarmament in the context of DDR

Although the number of weapons collected did not significantly dent the supply of illegal weapons in Afghanistan (running in the millions), SALW disarmament was a big success. Few DDR programmes have achieved such a high ratio of weapons per ex-combatant: 63,380 XCs were disarmed, and 94,262 SALW weapons were collected (which, added to the 12,248 heavy weapons, makes a total of 106,510). This was achieved by taking in old

.303 rifles and poor quality Pakistani-made weapons, and then refusing them as a passport to DDR - insisting that XCs must first come back and surrender a proper assault rifle.

2.2.3- Questionable weapon supply policies

The number of weapons destroyed is 56,163 - slightly more than half of the number collected. Other weapons and ammo were returned to the MoD because they are 'national property' – but whether they should be re-used for aggression is a matter of policy, not law. We can find no evidence that MoD actually needed these arms – indeed we know they received large numbers Kalashnikovs in 2003 from Eastern Europe. The MoD repeatedly complains about the poor quality of DDR weapons, and replenishing stocks of weapons during wartime runs contradictory to our understanding of a 'disarmament' mandate.

Recommendation to UNDP and UNDPKO

The evaluators believe that no UN project should supply additional light weapons, especially in a country that is awash with SALW and still at war. Even though we recognize the symbolism of firearms in Afghanistan, we believe that disarmament in a post-conflict zone should include destruction.⁵

Recommendation for future DDR programmes

NEVER issue cash. The early decision to award a \$200 Transitional Safety Allowance was a mistake, and this is known from previous DDR experiences. TSA was designed to be paid in two tranches of \$100 several weeks apart to help the XC to feed his family while awaiting the start of his reintegration package, but it was appropriated by Commanders. The TSA was seen across Afghanistan as 'cash-for-weapons'.

2.2.4.- ANBP's innovative and impressive mobile disarmament system and transparency suited the needs of Afghanistan

We find innovative and impressive the record of Mobile Disarmament Units collecting weapons and Regional Verification Committees checking the ID of every candidate for DDR. It seems remarkable that more than 106,000 weapons and 32 tons of ammo have been moved out of places as remote as Badakhshan and the southern Hazarajat without any reported serious casualty or accident. This is a tribute to meticulous planning and execution.

2.3. Heavy Weapons Disarmament Lessons

⁵ Cambodia is another poor country with 30 years of war and a warrior tradition that venerates firearms. Nevertheless the government destroyed 200,000 SALW as a confidence building measure to promote sustainable peace.

2.3.1.- Successful heavy weapons disarmament

All stakeholders and observers agree that results attained by the Heavy Weapons Cantonment were exceptional, and the impact was very positive. We concur with the BCPR team that, to the best of our knowledge, no other UN supported DDR programme has succeeded in securing such an important number of heavy weapons. This achievement has a potentially important impact on the medium-term security of Afghanistan and the resumption of war. It may inspire other, future DDR programmes.

2.3.2.- Excellent international cooperation

The HWC came about as the result of exemplary cooperation between the GoA, UNAMA and certain donors – notably the US and Canada. The ISAF force covered the Kabul region, while ANBP collected weapons across the rest of the country, with US and Canadian support. The political initiative emerged from UNAMA, and it changed the nature and level of potential violence in the country, while becoming a carrot that succeeded in bringing seriously dangerous, recalcitrant commanders into the political process.

2.3.3.- Flexible response brought dividends

Once again, the ANBP pragmatic genius for implementation found solutions where others might have found problems. The partnership with Halo Trust produced both synergy and safety. Heavy weapons that could not be moved immediately were demobilized (loading breeches and mechanical motor parts removed) until means could be found to bring them into MoD depots. Junk was disarmed and left where it lay, but recuperable weapons were brought in for repair.

2.4. Destruction of Weapons and Ammunition - Lessons

2.4.1.- Ammunition collection and destruction sends positive messages

Political commitment from GoA and its partners has improved the image of Afghanistan as a peace-seeking nation. We are not required to evaluate the Ammo Project, but it would be unfair to pass over without mentioning the positive impact of the Ammo Project and the destruction of stockpiles of anti-personnel mines. Thanks in part to ANBP and Halo Trust – and the vision of UN and EU donors - only one Province remains uncleared for Afghanistan to meet the conditions for accession to the Ottawa Treaty on Landmines. Only the province of Panshir has not yet destroyed its stockpiles.

The collection of Ammo has brought 9,443 tons of good quality munitions into MoD depots and assured the destruction of 15,883 tons so far, as well as 496,717 anti-personnel mines.

2.4.2.- Increasing the GoA stocks increases risks of leakage

We have reservations about the increase by ANBP of government stocks of ammo, especially in view of the imminent changeover to NATO standards which will render obsolete all these Soviet stocks from the point of view of the ANA... but not from the point of view of rebels and terrorists. This explains our insistence on the importance of destroying surplus stocks.

2.4.3.- Collected weapons should be destroyed, and their destruction used as a confidence-building measure in support of peace.

We are unconvinced by the argument that weapon refurbishment ‘saved the Afghan government millions of dollars.’ We believe that all collected weapons should be destroyed. Afghanistan’s problem is having too many weapons, not too few, and they keep coming. In 2007 NATO will begin supplying new weapons to ANA and ANP, rendering all these collected Soviet era weapons obsolete. What will happen to them?

We recognize the attachment of Afghans and soldiers to firearms, but the objective of DDR is to promote peace. The argument that these weapons were needed is weak, and the political impact of their destruction could be strong. We find that the failure to destroy all collected weapons diminished ANBP’s positive impact on peace building.

2.4.4.- Destruction mechanism was efficient but as had little impact

Other DDR operations have destroyed more weapons and in a more spectacular manner. ‘Chopping’ is an effective destruction mechanism and it was handled well by Halo Trust – but ‘secret’ destruction has little impact because it does nothing to build public confidence in peace.

Recommendation to GoA and NATO

As NATO weapons arrive and are phased in, so all weapons and ammunition from other sources should be destroyed so that they cannot be sold to rebels or terrorists.

bae la bada pane na khwazegae

Pashtu proverb

A tree does not move unless there is wind.

Meaning: Every effect has a cause.

Or: You cannot make progress without exerting some effort

Or: **People will not believe in peace
until they feel the breath of peace**

2.5. Lessons Learned from Demobilization

2.5.1.- Successful demobilization of 62,376 XCs

The ANBP programme planned meticulously the efficient administrative demobilization of 62,376 ex-combatants. Each XC received a photo ID card on the spot, and their identification was exemplary. DDR was negotiated politically for a maximum number of 100 000 XC participants. Once the MoD lists were established, the GoA and its partners set up rigorous and verification mechanisms and – to quote the BCPR mission - applied ‘sufficient political pressure to prevent an over-inflation of the caseload.’ This was a clear success.

2.5.2.- Partial success in reducing commanders’ military networks

No DDR process is totally successful in screening XCs to ensure that only legitimate participants enter the programme. The Afghan DDR process was controlled by MoD officials and commanders who had the power of decision concerning who would be registered and who would not. This allowed some commanders to use the DDR process as additional patronage and self-enrichment, while others gave up their weapons and, with them, their influence. Some commanders have stopped commanding, while others continue to control or influence their former fighters, especially where they are local *qawm*. Some commanders have even taken their militias and weapons into the highway police, or turned them into PSCs.

2.5.3.- Demobilization was very efficient but not totally effective

The efficiency of DDR was not entirely matched by its effectiveness. Demobilization emphasised military and bureaucratic elements at the expense of reinsertion activities that focus on the XC and his family: health, family, community, education and reintegration. Future DDR programs should include reinsertion activities that move the XC emotionally towards reintegration: health checks for the XC and for his family; treatments of physical and mental ailments (‘all XCs have mental trauma’); numeracy and literacy; training in civil and human rights. All of these would have enhanced the self-esteem of Afghan XCs and equipped them for reintegration.

Recommendation to UN and international community

Demobilization should lead into reinsertion activities that are the crucial interface between disarmament and reintegration. It needs to be short, constructive and effective in moving ex-combatants from a military to a civilian mentality and equipping them with minimum skills for civilian life including good mental and physical health, basic literacy and numeracy, an understanding of human rights and the rule of law, and of the responsibilities of men in family and community life. Demobilization should be planned with military precision and development objectives, executed and funded as the first step of a civilian, reintegration process.

2.5.4.- DDR staffing must combine development and military skills

We admire the military precision of ANBP's management and its implementation of the first 'D' – and we recognize that DDR is a military operation first. However, staffing was not adequate for the 'DR'. The UNDP should have realized that ANBP's development people were too few and too weak. Meanwhile some expatriate military officers operated with a happy-go-lucky disregard for UN rules, ideals, and purposes. The officers got things done very fast, but discipline was lax and some serious incidents were reported. Senior management certainly reacted swiftly against bad behaviour and hiring procedures improved later.

Recommendation to UN on staffing

Orientation on Human Rights, DDR, gender and UN ethics should be provided to all staff, just as all receive UN security training. Good leaders are precious, military initiatives are vital, and ANBP was well-led. But good managers are equally important: finance and HR managers, and also managers to plan and execute successful reintegration components. UNDP and UNDPKO must ensure that all jobs are described precisely, and that the right balance is achieved between DDD and RRRR.

2.6. Lessons Learned from Reintegration Component

2.6.1.- Success in Reintegration

The BCPR team in 2006 remarked that reintegration is “a long term process, especially in the context of Afghanistan where soldiers have been engaged in different conflicts for many years, during which they have abandoned their civilian lives and means of earning their living.” Many XCs were only part-time fighters. We find that ANBP did a remarkable job in making the vocational training package available to 55 000 XCs before 30th June 2006. This required strong commitment from donors, ANBP and its implementing partners (IPs), whose flexibility and responsiveness allowed it to happen ... but it was not really ‘reintegration’.

We find that the ANBP project should have been designed to last for a minimum of six years - and probably seven years would be more realistic, as new, successor projects are being cobbled together. Future DDR programme designs should recognize that reintegration will take four or five years. The failure of the design phase to recognize that reintegration needed more time and adequate follow-up, may yet lead to the failure of this component of ANBP. It is too soon to judge.

2.6.2.- DDR needs three Ds and several Rs

There is more to peace building with ex-combatants than just the one word ‘reintegration’, which conceals a number of inter-related steps better described separately: Recognition and Respect (especially for Afghan *jihadis*), Rehabilitation of infrastructure and people (including youths, widows and orphans, disabled veterans, trauma counseling), Reconciliation, and

probably Resettlement (remembering there are still 2 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan who are potential reintegration rivals for XCs).

We find that '3D4R' is less misleading than the shorthand version DDR which makes the process sound easier than it is (Congo has a DDRRR programme). Does our 3D4R concept include too many different aspects under the same roof? Reintegration will fail if we miss key issues. Not enough analysis was by made ANBP of how many widows each XC must care for, and how many angry young men still seek vengeance, and too many *jihadi* commanders feel they have not received the respect they deserve.

Recommendation to UNDP and international donors

Future DDR programme designs should recognize that reintegration takes at least five years. Every DDR or RDD or 3D4R programme will be complex, and should therefore be designed and funded for a minimum of six or seven years.

2.6.3.- Don't spoil the DDR ship for a ha'penny worth of tar

We believe ANBP was designed for only three years, partly from fear that donors would not be willing to fund a longer programme. We believe this underestimates the wisdom and serious intentions of the Japanese government, although we recognize that European and American donors tend have short attention-spans due to a rapid staff turnover. Yet we find it a pity to invest \$120 millions in a three-year programme design that actually needed \$150 millions over six years. The additional money, spent on further training, caring and follow-up of XCs and their families, will make the initial investment succeed. Our proverb comes from wooden sailing ships: having built a whole ship, it is foolish to economise on the tar that caulks the hull to ensure it remains waterproof. Saving money by using too little tar may cause the whole ship sink - and you will lose everything.

Recommendation to UNDP

We recommend that UNDP should pursue the present ANBP transition strategy, through RSPE and by seeking integration of XCs into ongoing development programmes such as NSP, and NABP which can offer recognition to the XC while bringing benefits to the communities into which each has reintegrated. In the meantime the DIAG and Ammo projects should continue under UNDP management, since their transfer to Afghan national control at the present time would undermine their effectiveness.

2.6.4.- The D is a military operation, but the R is a development project

We find that leadership of the D portions of DDR should be led by a military officer with the rank of Colonel or General. The R portions, however, need a very different type of implementation that requires a long-term understanding of village, community and regional development mechanisms. The same style of leadership does not suit every type of programme, and different skills must be brought to bear on different problems.

2.6.6.- Experience & skills of Implementing Partners should be used fully

ANBP treated the international organizations and NGOs as contractors, rather than as partners – although some of the IPs had more reintegration experience than ANBP. We find that the reintegration process would have been better designed and better implemented if a participative design process had been initiated with IPs. INGOs might even have persuaded donors to invest in a six-year project. The lesson is that future DDR and development programmes will benefit from a more participative design process.

At the same time we recognize that the ANBP leadership was creative in persuading INGOs to support DDR by opening training projects in areas of the country where development and security were both absent.

2.6.7.- Making continued use of the best IPs

The standards of quality and professionalism offered by Implementing Partners were variable, and performance was not linked necessarily to the reputation of the IP. In Jalalabad we found the remnants of a rather poor international performance (the agency has closed its regional programme) being picked up and saved by a local training NGO doing excellent work with few resources.

Since the reintegration process of ANBP was mainly training, an extension should be offered by UNDP to some of the original IP contracts so that they can provide further reintegration assistance to XCs: additional training, job placement, health and trauma counseling, etc, and providing data for monitoring. Here is a lesson to be learned by other DDR programmes, that long-term commitment and on-going support to XCs brings better results than short-term training.

Recommendation to UNDP

We recommend that new contracts should be offered to some of the IPs so that they can provide further reintegration assistance and support to XCs.

2.6.8.- Study how to update and maintain a monitoring database

The BCPR review emphasized that “efficient management of information on XC is key to a high impact reintegration phase and its monitoring.” ANBP recognizes that it was slow to create a Monitoring and Evaluation system. ANBP’s central database was not shared adequately with its partners, and as a result, most IPs created separate databases of some sort which – by themselves - add nothing to the overall understanding of success or failure of the ‘R’. So far as we know, the problem of multiple, partial databases has not been resolved.

Recommendation to UNDP

UNDP should contract the company Digistan Tamim.samee@digistan.com (Samee, Tamim created the original database as a UNDP staff member) to study technical questions associated with the database and to see what it would take to prepare it as a development monitoring tool to be exploited by RSPE and other project – and whether

this is feasible and cost-effective. Discussions with UNFPA and other agencies will determine the potential value of the DDR database. This approach for long-term support to the reintegration process is one that every future DDR programme should study, and apply to their own circumstances.

Recommendation to UNDP and the international community

In future we recommend that the M&E system should be set up on Day 1, that some form of baseline data should be collected at once (even if it cannot provide complete data because of security limitations), and that planning for the ‘R’ should start at the same time as planning for the ‘D’. The database should become the main tool for monitoring and evaluation of the DDR process.

2.6.9.- Literacy training should be a standard part of DDR

There is evidence that educated XCs do better than those with no literacy or numeracy. Self-esteem is notably enhanced among XCs who learn to read and write and handle written arithmetic – and self-esteem is generally an important part of Afghan XCs’ reintegration into civilian society. This is especially true among commanders who attended the business management course.

Recommendation to UNDP and the international community

Literacy and numeracy training should be included in every demobilization and reintegration programme.

... obscured the government's continued accommodation with mid- and lower-level commanders, often with the acquiescence of external donors. One major haven for these commanders has been the highway police, with responsibility for securing the ring road linking the country's four major cities as well as the main roads connecting Afghanistan with its neighbours. This arrangement is fraught with risks, not least because it facilitates narcotics trafficking by commanders. A private American security company, U.S. Protection and Investigations (USPI), has been paying high wages to highway police commanders for guarding the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) supported Kabul-Kandahar road project without imposing any apparent accountability on them. The result of these relationships has been to strengthen the commanders politically, militarily, and economically, thus undermining DDR.

International Crisis Group report on DDR
Asia Briefing No. 25, 22 February 2005

2.7. Lessons from the Commanders’ Incentive Programme

2.7.1.- The CIP was a reasonable and creative mechanism

The CIP brought commanders into the political process of joining civilian life. It provided some salary for two years, and some training to change their ideas. It was a good investment which bought time and space for new political and democratic processes to emerge and offers a possible model for future DDR programmes.

2.7.2.- Commanders had differing strategies to exploit DDR for themselves

As one would expect, some commanders took advantage of the DDR process for themselves. MoD officials and field commanders had full and complete control over the choice of who should benefit from DDR and who should not. In the event certain commanders were able to use DDR as patronage to strengthen their influence over the men under their command. This is a lesson learned, but not necessarily a problem that can be avoided.

2.7.3.- Some of the long-serving *jihadis* were left out

Some former *jihadis* are bitter men who feel they fought against communism to win the liberation of their homeland, and have been forgotten. In the case of Afghanistan the ‘R’ component should necessarily include Recognition of service, and Respect for sacrifice to the benefit of the nation. While these remarks are true for many XCs, they are accentuated in the case of commanders and officers whose sense of self-worth is greatly heightened. DDR contains many cultural aspects, and each country or culture is specific in this regard. This dangerous issue is being addressed by DIAG.

2.7.4.- A wider public relations campaign was required.

If a wider public relations campaign had been possible in this rugged country, and after thirty years of fighting, the demobilization process might have become more democratic. The GoA has been remarkably successful and broad-minded in opening the airwaves to radio, television and telephone connections, and this is one of its big achievements.

2.8. Lessons Learned from ANBP STAFF

Among the many interesting and positive suggestions made by ANBP staff for any future ANBP (‘if we were going to do this all over again, what are the important lessons we would learn?’), the most significant were:

- international staff should be better selected, trained and orientated (some foreign military officers were seen to be too impatient, too focused on getting quick results, unwilling to adapt to the humanitarian and national development objectives of ANBP or its cultural, Afghan environment);

- too many foreign military personnel were hired in the early years of ANBP, both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of the ANBP staff;
- the project design was poorly conceived because reintegration and ‘sustainable livelihoods’ cannot possibly be achieved in only three years;
- better job profiling is needed for international positions, to ensure that only the correct people, with the most appropriate experience, apply and are appointed;
- better orientation is needed for international staff working in Afghanistan and working for the UN;
- NEVER issue cash: the early decision to award the Transitional Safety Allowance was a mistake, and this could have been known from previous DDR experiences (TSA – it was designed to be paid in two tranches of \$100 several months apart to allow the XC to keep his family while awaiting the start of his reintegration package, but it caused trouble and was appropriated by Commanders. The TSA was seen across Afghanistan as ‘cash-for-weapons’);
- Design the ‘R’ before you design the ‘DD’;
- Start M&E with baseline data collection at the beginning of the programme. Earlier M&E would have allowed ANBP to redirect reintegration efforts in different regions and to focus earlier on family and community issues;
- better market research was needed to prepare the reintegration ‘packages’, for remobilized people in different regions want and need different things.
- too many people received training that they couldn’t use to generate incomes;
- better coordination between IPs would reduce duplication, and training too many people in the same craft;
- vocational training in rich countries lasts 5 or 7 years, but ANBP provided just a few months;
- better and longer demobilization process (with literacy and numeracy training, health visits, civil rights and rule of law teaching, etc) would have resulted in better choices by XCs in some cases;
- the management of expectations was not successful, and it could have been done better during the demobilization phase: XCs believe they are owed jobs, and many believe they were promised jobs, therefore many of them consider DDR a failure;⁶
- too much focus on administering the individual soldier and the military unit, meant that the human side of the man and his wife (wives) and family and community were neglected;
- most Afghan XCs need psychological or medical treatment, which was not offered to them;
- ANBP had some health and drug-related treatments in a Gardez clinic (in Paktia province), but this could have been more developed;
- more could have been done to link DRR to national programmes like the skills training programme;
- more ‘gender sensitivity’ would have improved ANBP: more could and should have been done to integrate widows and wives and to make sure the families and communities were benefiting from what they need;

⁶ We were quoted the example of one XC who said, ‘I am happy and I am fortunate. I have a wife and a house, but DDR should get me a second wife and a second house.’

- more pressure should have been brought onto ministries to support DDR by hiring XCs for projects;
- ANBP should have done more to create jobs, or to encourage IPs to stick to the task and help create jobs;
- better follow-up would be needed to support XCs, but this cannot take place in just three years;
- ‘group packaging’ (ie encouraging XCs to work in groups to create wealth) might have been tried;
- when IPs did a poor job, the instincts of senior management were often to cover up the problem rather than solve it and bring better services to the XCs – so numbers took over from impact in the driving seat;
- since we are not following up on XCs, we have lost the opportunity to influence their behaviour and to keep them away from joining up with the Taliban;

* **Lessons Learned for DDR in other countries**

2.9. Defining DDR , or perhaps we should call it: 3D4R

DDR - Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration – is a short-hand that can be very misleading. We feel that the expression ‘DDR’ distorts program design – this has been the case in Afghanistan and is the major cause of the ANBP’s weaknesses. ‘RDD’ would be better⁷, because it brings to the front the Reintegration part which is longer, more complex and more complicated than the DD. Disarmament (and even demobilization) are more dangerous, and they require rigorous planning and execution. ANBP excelled in this. Yet a good ‘DD’ is not enough to bring sustainable peace. The lessons learned on five continents show that success in resolving conflicts and building peace demands a complex, integrated package for ex-combatants and local communities that includes all the following components. We call the programme 3D4R.

Micro-Disarmament and DDDRRRR

- Disarmament of all armed groups
- Destruction of illegal and surplus weapons and ammunition
- Demobilization of units and individual ex-combatants, and
- Reintegration of the members of armed groups into civilian life
- Rehabilitation of infrastructure and people, including youths
- Resettlement of displaced populations, and

⁷ This was suggested by the BICC e-conference of 2002 for ANBP, but it was not adopted although some of the ANBP senior staff participated in the exchanges.

- Reconciliation between communities.

Miss one of these steps, and you may miss them all.

We often present the 3D4R programme as DDDRRRR, or DDD+RRR+R (or: 3D3R+R?) in order to make planners think hard about the content that is most appropriate to the circumstances in which they find themselves. This ‘R-business’ is a culturally-sensitive construct. DDD are standards. Their performance can be largely reproduced from previous models (although the Afghan HWC was a dramatic innovation). But ‘R’ is complex, depending on multiple social and cultural factors ... therefore we think it useful to ask in each different country, “which ‘R’ is missing in the 4R model?” Resettlement of internally displaced people (IDPs) is often crucial for reintegration (that was the case in Liberia and Sierra Leone). Resettlement of refugees is sometimes vital (look at Rwanda, or DR Congo where the UN actually calls the programme ‘DDRRR’). Both refugees and IDPs were important in Afghanistan, without having any direct influence on the ANBP programme.

In Afghanistan, however, many ex-combatants (XCs) were upset because they felt that they did not receive sufficient Respect and Recognition. 3D4R is culturally-specific. The Afghan case is unusual in that we were not dealing with a peace treaty between ‘rebel’ and ‘government’ soldiers. In Afghanistan, many *mujaheddin* felt that they deserved recognition after fighting for decades to save their country from enemies (Soviets, communists, atheists, Taliban or whomever, even if they had spent almost as much time fighting each other). This is a country where the primary religion is HONOUR, and it is clear that the reintegration process did not sufficiently offer the respect and recognition that many XCs craved.

The 3D4R programme design therefore needs thought and sensitivity. The first two Ds are military terms that require military organization. From Demobilization onwards, however, we need to move into long-term development mode which requires a different, non-military form of planning and implementation lasting several years.

2.10. Security Sector Reform and Peace Building with DDR

The DDR process was announced by President Karzai at the Berlin Conference, and described as one of the pillars of Security Sector Reform (SSR). This should always be the case. Separating DDR from SSR always leads to disappointment: police forces fail to provide security that disarmed families require; borders remain porous if border police cannot perform their functions; armouries prove to be ‘leaky’ and criminal violence increases, etc. DDR should always be considered an integral part of a larger SSR programme. Experience from successful peace building programmes across the globe leads us to recommend a holistic approach involving a range of actions that are often neglected under the label of DDR:

- Confidence building (with written codes of conduct) between armed forces and civilians
- Redefining respect and the roles of police and military forces

- Creating a coherent legal framework for peace and disarmament
- Building cross-border cooperation between neighbouring countries
- Mobilizing civil society for peace building and reducing violence
- Using the media, developing legends and rewriting textbooks to build a culture of peace
- Reducing the number of illegal weapons, caches and official armouries
- Destroying surplus arms and ammunition to build confidence and reduce leakage
- Ensuring that official armouries are well managed and controlled

In the case of Afghanistan, linking SSR to counter-narcotics strategies is important – except that these have completely failed and are now actually counter-productive in that they are helping the Taliban insurgency. The ultimate objective of DDR and SSR is to return the country to a state of peace. Counting weapons is a sterile exercise, unless it is part of a cumulative set of measurements for peace and stability. Peace building is the process, peace is the goal, DDR and SSR are steps along to path to reaching the goal.

2.11. Structuring a DDR programme

Managing the interface between disarmament and reintegration

Integrating the Ds and the Rs requires an appropriate management structure. No one doubts that disarmament should be led and carried out by military officers using military planning and implementation. The ANBP management provided a brilliant demonstration of an efficient disarmament programme organized across the country under difficult, often dangerous, circumstances.

Demobilization is the ‘interface’ between military and civilian life. The Afghan demobilization process was efficient in a bureaucratic sense, but it missed out reinsertion which introduces the human aspects of the interface process: and it therefore failed to show enough ‘respect’ and ‘recognition’ of the XCs as people. Lectures, films and participatory teaching about civil rights, human rights and the rule of law can greatly improve the self-respect and social status of XCs when they return to civilian and community life. The same is even more true of literacy and numeracy classes, which greatly enhance the image of XCs and their capacity to succeed in civilian life.

One of the lessons from Afghanistan is that demobilization-reinsertion should always include health examinations and treatments that ensure the beneficiaries start their new civilian life healthy. Probably some form of counseling should have been included. Group therapy can help XCs adjust to the effects of their violent past, and through

controlled discussions and exchanges of experiences with others who have lived through war. This may reduce domestic violence and gender-based violence during the reintegration process.

Reintegration is not a military operation: on the contrary, it is precisely a non-military operation since XCs are ending their military life and entering a new, civilian life in which they are encouraged to abandon their fighting habits and to end their allegiance to former commanders. Just as refugees leave their camps and ‘humanitarian emergency’ situations in order to move into ‘sustainable development mode’, so XCs are leaving military camps to rejoin civilian life. The four RRRRs are steps into civilian life, new livelihoods, and sustainable development. Logically they should be run by development people, who will almost certainly be civilians.

In the Mali DDR of 1995, for example, government military officers ran the disarmament and demobilization camps with very light UN political and military support, but the UNDP sub-contracted the reintegration process entirely to IOM.

Designing the right management structure

It seems therefore that our DDR (or 3D4R) programme needs both military and civilian skills and the same is true of the management. There appear to be three possible, alternative management structures that will facilitate the military-civilian interface. Of the three, it is the first one that we prefer.

1. A single Director oversees the whole programme and handles fundraising, with a Deputy Director for DDD and a Deputy Director for RRRR.

This combines the advantage of ‘keeping the whole programme under one roof’ (attractive for programme unity, host government organisation, donor coordination, and fundraising) with the separation of powers which we believe is necessary to avoid the downgrading and neglect of the reintegration process - which has so often happened in DDR programmes.

The Director in this management model will be have the profile of a manager-diplomat responsible for monitoring and evaluation, as well as finance and personnel.

The DD for DDD will be a Colonel or Brigadier with expertise in SALW and ammunition, and he would be in charge of organizing the Disarmament as well as Destruction of weapons, munitions and explosives.

The DD for RRRR – the other Deputy Director - will be a senior development manager with experience of reintegration and resettlement issues, and knowledge of reconciliation and rehabilitation in conflict areas. (S)he will organize baseline data collection and help set up the monitoring and evaluation systems that are essential to provide information that allow the Director to make programme adjustments when XCs actually reach the communities. (S)he will begin a participative process of programme design, including government departments, local businesses and

associations, and international NGOs. (S)he will launch early market surveys of job opportunities to plan the vocational training and employment creation which leads XCs from demobilization to reintegration.

Demobilization-reinsertion will be organized jointly by the two Deputy Directors: DD for DDD will take the lead and will handle the administrative mechanisms that take men out of the service and provide them with a new, civilian ID card. Health checks should be provided as part of this process, as well as training in laws and human rights, civilian lifestyles, domestic violence and correct behaviours – and these should be run jointly by the two Deputy Directors in such a way that their departments come to realize that they are interdependent.

The process of reconciliation for ex-combatants (with themselves and between each other) needs to begin during demobilization. XCs need help and encouragement to come to terms with their violent past, and to confront their peaceful future. Some form of socialization training and group therapy needs to take place during this period, before former fighters choose their future lifestyles and move into vocational training. The success of the DDR programme will not be judged ultimately by the numbers of ID cards issued or the quantities of weapons and ammo destroyed, but by the successful social integration of the XCs into their families and communities after several years of peaceful, civilian employment.

2. Appoint a strong Director of DDD and a strong Deputy Director of RRRR who takes over in two years.

In the case of Afghanistan, the weakness we perceive was not in the DDR leadership itself, but in the failure of the leadership to plan early on for the complex processes of reintegration. DD turned out to be a brilliant exercise in administration and logistics, dominated for good and sufficient reasons by concerns for safety, weapon management, and (very soon) ammo management and heavy weapon cantonment. Meanwhile the military organizers did not have sufficient time to focus on RRRR.

It was the absence of forward planning for the next, post-demobilization phase that caused M&E to begin late, that missed out the need for a market study of employments opportunities, that neglected the health and family and community aspects of demobilization and reintegration. Military organization was also one reason that the ANBP programme was designed to last for only three years – leaving UNDP and the donors scrabbling around to create successor projects that can ensure some perennity to employment and social stability of XCs and commanders during the ongoing reintegration process.

In this second management scenario, the whole operation will be kept under one roof, but the Deputy Director (Reintegration) will be a strong and experienced manager whose appointment starts on the same day as the Director's and with a clearly defined, separate mandate. The Deputy will begin the planning of reintegration from Day 1. His boss the Brigadier (or Colonel) will have overall control of the DDR programme for two years, after which we assume that disarmament would be ended

and he will move on to graze in different pastures – allowing the Deputy to move up into the top spot.

The attraction of this formulation is that the programme keeps its unity and donors keep their commitment, while changing personnel movements at the top of the organisation match the changes in programme emphasis. The programme will be designed to last for 6 years. By year 3 the DD will be ended and reintegration process will be dominating project activities. We can assume that the military aspects of the programme will have dwindled to mopping up operations for remaining explosive materials and destroying surplus weapons and munitions – activities that can be handled by the new Deputy Director who may well have a military background but whose profile and functions will be different from those of the former Director.

3. Separate the DDR programme into two different projects

The third possibility is to design DDD as one project lasting three years, and have the RRRR as a separate programme designed to last five or six or seven years. This allows short-term donors to fund disarmament and work with security sector reform, while donors who are interested in building sustainable peace can invest in both the military and the reintegration processes.

It can be argued that ‘keeping it all under one roof is best’, but in the end this has not happened in Afghanistan because of the poor programme design. After three years (stretched to four-and-a-half as a result of the BCPR assessment in early 2006) we face the imminent disappearance of ANBP in March 2008 while a plethora of successor projects under myriad different roofs try to pick up the pieces. In April 2008 we will have the DIAG project under the D&R Commission, the Ammo project continuing under the MoD, RSPE run by the ILO, the ASMED and ARIES projects for commanders created by USAID, a scattering of projects underfunded with various NGOs, and still no one will believe that the reintegration process was completed or was a real success.

Our third management solution might have allowed the military-political DD success story to unfold under a UNAMA-UNDP disarmament umbrella, while an entirely separate, professional, well-planned reintegration programme was created by UNDP and IOM or a consortium of NGOs. The first project would have been designed for three years (or four-and-a-half years) and the second could have been designed for six or seven years since we know that is how long the reintegration process really lasts.

The decision comes down to the donors. Are the donors willing to fund two different projects? Are they prepared to fund reintegration separately from disarmament, or is it the ‘sexy’ aspect of the latter that persuades them to fund the former?

Ambassadors are surprisingly amateurish when it comes to discussing and measuring results. We have met ambassadors (and this did not happen in the case of ANBP in Afghanistan) who were happy to count the number of weapons collected after one year and then stop funding the project. This may pander to financial expediency back

home, but it does little to ensure lasting peace in a conflict-zone where weapons are plentiful and civilian jobs are few. Unless the reintegration and reconciliation succeed, even the best-organised disarmament and demobilization ultimately fail.

In the end the greatest strength of ANBP was the combination of UNAMA-UNDP, and the commitment of a small number of donors. ANBP was a success, thanks to the Japanese government's decision to provide funding, together with the UK and Canada and USAID, as well as Netherlands and Norway and others. ANBP was their success.

2.12. Components of DDR – or 3D4R

One of the striking successes of ANBP has been its capacity to handle a wide number of components, some of them quite unexpected. Not every programme Director will have the opportunistic flair and exceptional organizational ability that was found in ANBP. We conclude from this experience that the planning of DDR programmes should always seek out the unexpected. DDR should not be narrowly focused simply on demobilizing soldiers. In their project design, DDR planners should analyze with the host government, and with the most experienced donors, international agencies and NGOs, what elements are key for peace building in each target country. DDR is culture-specific: what works in Afghanistan may not work in Nepal or in Sudan, but certain lessons can be taken from every new DDR experience.

As each DDR programme is being developed, the UN staff should ask the question, “What are the local ingredients that will make peace here?”

Let us list again here *pour mémoire* **the eight components we identified inside ANBP:**

- **Micro-disarmament for SALW**
- **Disarmament of heavy weapons**
- **Destruction of weapons and ammunition**
- **Demobilization of XCs**
- **Reintegration and the other ‘Rs’**
- **CIP - Commanders’ Incentive Programme**
- **Anti-Personnel Mine & Ammunition Stockpile - ‘Ammo’ project,**
- **DIAG - the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups programme.**

To make the list more complete, we should break out the ‘R’ component into a more detailed menu of things that planners need to bear in mind when they design DDR. When we talk about 3D4R, we are deliberately seeking to emphasise that the ‘R’ component is more complex and takes longer than the Ds. There may be more than

four Rs in any one programme. If we were redesigning the ANBP with the benefit of hindsight, six years after the original design, we would make it more complete.

Here are the ‘R’ factors we see as important for building lasting peace in Afghanistan.

- **Reintegration of the members of armed groups into civilian and community life**
- **Recognition (of the role of the *mujaheddin* in nation building)**
- **Respect (in a country where Honour is more important than employment)**
- **Reduction of the influence of corrupt Commanders and drug-lords**
- **Rehabilitation of infrastructure and people (after thirty years of destructive warfare)**
- **Reinforcement of respect for women and youths (in a culture which gives them low value)**
- **Resettlement of displaced populations (of the 5-8 million refugees, 2 million remain in Pakistan) who are competing for resources with XCs⁸**
- **Reconciliation between communities and between Commanders**

Planners designing a more complete peace and disarmament programme in a new post-conflict country may decide (as the UN did in DRC) that the short-hand appellation ‘DDR’ is not enough. We wish them good luck, and PEACE.

⁸ In Takhar province the two XCs who chose to learn tailoring from CFA were sure they could make a good living. When they came to open their shops, however, they found two refugee professional tailors had just returned from Peshawar and had opened shops. There was room for two tailors in town, but not for four.