**Report of the Evaluation of DDR and CIP in AFGHANISTAN**

***Qatra Qatra darya meshad –***

## *One drop at a time makes a river -*

# *Collecting one gun at a time makes peace -*

# PART 4

# DISARMAMENT

# DEMOBILISATION

# REINTEGRATION

## Findings, Lessons Learned & Recommendation

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# DDR Findings, Lessons Learned & Recommendations

## *1. Political and Strategic Considerations*

### 1.1. Linkages between Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration (DDR)

DDR as one of the pillars of the SSR of Government of Afghanistan, shares the objective of contributing to a countrywide process toward peace and stability and to creating better conditions for development. The success of one depends on the success of the other. We find that the DDR process was successful at the political level. The DDR process was key to laying the foundation and contributing to the restructuring and reorganization of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. DDR has been the most successful pillar of SSR so far. Unless all parts work together as a coherent whole (including counter-narcotics strategies) then in the long run, none will be successful.

### ***<u>Recommendation to donors and GoA</u>***

***Greater coordination is needed between the pillars of SSR and especially with counter-narcotics strategies, which are a counter-productive failure and need to be radically changed. The alienation of southern provinces by repressive counter-narcotic actions is undermining the achievements of DDR and CIP, reinforce elements of a narco-state, and threaten to bring instability to the rest of Afghanistan.***

### 1.2. United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan-UNDP partnership

ANBP benefited from a well-coordinated partnership between the development and peacekeeping departments of the UN. UNAMA provided political guidance at critical junctures (such as heavy weapons cantonment) and UNDP provided efficient field support for implementation. This combination of DPKO and UNDP has worked before, and it worked well in Afghanistan.

The success of the DDR process was also made possible through the quality of the support from the UNAMA and UNDP, and the complementary role they played in keeping the programme on track both politically and technically. Other DDR programmes have failed through a lack of political vision, or from the reluctance of lead agencies to become involved in disarmament. The success of the DDR in Afghanistan is a tribute to coordination and synergy between UNAMA and UNDP.

### 1.3. National Ownership/Leadership

The D&R Commission, Chaired by Vice-President Khalili, was the appropriate GoA high-level mechanism for coordinating DDR. The D&R Commission was well-composed and well-coordinated. It provides a coherent mechanism for the Afghan government partnership with UNAMA and UNDP in this delicate sector. Such a commission, seated above any individual ministry, has the necessary influence to bring ministries together and to ensure that decisions are implemented.

If the Commission has not always worked as comprehensively as everyone hoped, this is because many of the member ministries are overwhelmed by the multitude of tasks thrown upon them. This is partly due to the capacity limitations of individual ministries, and partly due to the fact that a multiplicity of donors is thrusting too many tasks at the ministers. More decentralization to the provinces by donors, and by the functional ministries themselves, *would improve central coordination of policy initiatives including the D&R Commission.*

### ***Recommendation to donors and UN agencies***

***More decentralized planning and project implementation at the provincial level would reduce the overload on central government ministries, making them more efficient while improving implementation and national capacity in the regions.***

### 1.4. Continued support to D&R Commission

As the DDR process was winding down, the BCPR mission recommended in 2006 that UNDP should "engage with the GoA in order to revisit the ToRs of the National Commission. The ToRs should include new responsibilities in line with its role in implementation and policy making on the DIAG project. Its membership should also be reviewed to reflect this new role."

The evaluators believe that the D&R Commission will need – and should receive - continued support from the UN for its supervision of the DIAG project, and to support consolidation of the reintegration process over at least the next two years. Pulling out support too early risks losing the positive results and diminishing the positive impacts already achieved.

### ***Recommendation to GoA to extend the mandate of the D&R Commission***

***The evaluators recommend that the role of the D&R Commission should be strengthened and extended to provide technical and political supervision of the Ammo Project in the MoD. In addition we recommend that the D&R Commission should receive a mandate from the President to ensure that all surplus weapons, ammunition and explosives will be destroyed.***

### ***Recommendation to UNAMA and UNDP***

***The evaluators recommend that further, appropriate support should be extended to the D&R Commission.***

## *2. Participants[1], Beneficiaries[2] and Partners*

**IDDRS 2.30 recommends** that ***"Eligibility should be considered for each component of DDR. For example, unarmed members of armed forces and groups are not eligible for***

[1] All persons who will receive *direct* assistance through the DDR process, including male and female combatants, those associated with armed forces and groups, including women and children, the disabled and chronically ill, dependants and others identified during negotiations of the political framework and planning for a UN-supported DDR process. (IDDRS 2.30)

[2] Both individuals and groups who receive *indirect* benefits through a UN-supported DDR operation or programme. They are communities in which DDR programme participants resettle, civil society organizations that are empowered and capacitated, businesses where excombatants work as part of the DDR programme, etc. (IDDRS 2.30)

***disarmament, but should be eligible for demobilization and reintegration; dependants are not eligible for disarmament and demobilization, but should be eligible for reintegration; while abductees and children may need to be disarmed, but may not be formally demobilized, and should be eligible to receive reintegration assistance".***

## 2.1. Participants

(IDDRS 2.30) Participants will *"receive direct assistance through the DDR process"*.

DDR in Afghanistan was a unique process. It was more a process to downsize the Afghan Military Forces than a result of peace negotiations. The absence of a peace accord was the reason for not including certain armed groups in the DDR process.

Initially ANBP was to process 100,000 soldiers, but later this number came down to 62,376. The selection was made by the Ministry of Defense based on its payrolls.

No DDR process can be totally successful in screening XCs to ensure that only legitimate participants enter the programme. In the Afghan case, this was made especially difficult because large numbers of XCs did not belong to a professional army, but were in *jihad* units that received Afghan Army status and numbers in 2002.

In Afghanistan, the GoA and its partners set up rigorous and successful verification mechanisms and – to quote the BCPR mission - applied 'sufficient political pressure to prevent an over-inflation of the caseload.' This was a clear success.

On the other hand, the DDR process was largely controlled by MoD officials and commanders who had the power of decision concerning who would be registered and who would not. Thus certain genuine *jihadi* XCs were excluded, while cronies and family members were included - this allowed some commanders to use the DDR process for additional patronage and self-enrichment.

This means that some commanders continue to control or influence their former fighters, especially where the commanders and their men are locally based and have ties of family, village, or community *qawm*. Some still run local protection rackets or tax farmers illegally. DIAG programme continues to address this problem.

A wider public information campaign and a refusal to be tied exclusively to MoD lists would have brought more people into the process; but at the same time it is difficult to see how any real form of control could have been imposed. Once the lists were opened up, the numbers would quickly have exceeded 100,000, and no one could have said if claimants were 'real combatants' or not. On balance the evaluators believe that the least-worst solution was adopted and it was very well implemented.

## ***Recommendations for future DDR programmes***

***DDR programmes should provide non-discriminatory, fair and equitable treatment to all eligible members of armed forces and groups, and take account not only of armed individuals but also of the families and communities into which XCs will be reintegrating.***

## 2.2. Beneficiaries

IDDRS 2.30 defines ***"beneficiaries as individuals and groups who receive indirect benefits through an UN-supported DDR operation or programme".*** Entry into a DDR programme should *not* depend on people possessing weapons and/or ammunition, as participants may include individuals in non-combat and support roles. Some may have had their weapons redistributed either as a result of an incapacitating injury or because commanders may not wish to acknowledge their role as combatants, as is sometimes the case for women, children and the disabled. These specific roles, though they did not qualify for the disarmament process, should have been included for demobilisation and reintegration. We will discuss this later in the report.

### 2.2.1. Children /UNICEF

Child soldiers were not really taken into the DDR equation by ANBP. This is a field in which UNICEF takes the lead, but ANBP was bound to find some under-age soldiers turning up in the DDR process. ANBP refused to accept the UN legal guidelines[3] for dealing with 'youths affected by war', ignored UN definitions of 'age' and insisted - against all previous DDR experience - that 'only soldiers with weapons' would be accepted. Military labourers, carriers, intendants and sex-slaves were excluded from DDR by ANBP's rigid and idiosyncratic criteria. Were there any? We shall never know!

ANBP criteria in some ways negated the *Cape Town Principles and Best Practices* (1997), in the term 'child soldier'[4] which was the base for disagreement between ANBP and UNICEF. According to ANBP, there were too few child soldiers to be given special treatment and ANBP wanted to include youths who had carried arms and who were involved in active combat. In fact in 2004 UNICEF estimated at 8,000 the number of Afghan child soldiers. To this could be added an unknown number of child brides taken by commanders.

The ANBP criteria for DDR included insistence that a weapon be handed over. In Afghan culture, children are no more children long before they reach the age of 18. It is culturally accepted to see youths carrying guns. Unlike in Africa, in Afghanistan the 'child soldiers' remained close to their families and there seems to be no evidence of abductions or abuse of children. Future DDR planners may want to keep in mind that child soldiers become invisible as they grow into, and become demobilized as, adult soldiers - and the question of lost childhood arises or is forgotten.

None of the ANBP staff who told us they had come across under-age soldiers knew what happened to them. 'They were referred to UNICEF' sounds suspiciously like an admission that no follow-up was attempted – unsurprising since by this time ANBP had alienated UNICEF and their managers were barely on speaking terms. While we hope the young men

[3] One major sticking point was age: ANBP considered that 'under 18' had no meaning in Afghanistan and they are correct: an Afghan boy leaves infancy at circumcision time (around 7 years old) and enters the world of men. 'Childhood' is not an Afghan concept after that rite of passage. Yet we feel that the personal opinion of ANBP managers should not have taken precedence over international guidelines, which UN officials are supposed to uphold. Under-18 is the international standard, and ANBP should have supported UNICEF not because one was right or wrong, but because they were supposed to be assisting Afghans.

[4] "Any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including, but not limited to: cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms."

did make it to the UNICEF system, we fear they may easily have fallen through the cracks. Every XC has mental trauma and adjustment problems. One of the IPs of ANBP noted that 15% of the XCs referred to them were children and this ANBP did not know.

### 2.2.2. People with Disabilities

The proportion of AMF disabled combatants was reported to be low. They were able to join the programme if they satisfied the eligibility criteria and featured on MoD lists, whereas others who had participated in combats and who were injured and disabled were completely left out of the process. The reason for their exclusion was that they were discharged in a downsizing process prior to the DDR process. The argument given is that these people are on the rolls of Ministry of Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled and were receiving pension benefits. However the pension amount is too small for survival, and perhaps they should have been registered for demobilisation and reintegration activities. Verifying if a person was injured in combat is a fairly easy process and inclusion of such people in the reinsertion and reintegration process could have made them and their communities feel gratified.

### 2.2.3. Women and Gender

Conservative religious and social attitudes remain strongly rooted in Afghanistan and this is maybe one of the reasons why there were no gender considerations in the analysis, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

The UN Security Council Resolution 1325 a follow-up of the Beijing Platform for Action[5] calls on all parties involved in DDR to take into account the needs of women and girls at all stages of DDR programs and their management. In order to meet this objective, the UN agencies are committed to mainstreaming gender into DDR programs.

Wives and families wanted to get their menfolk home alive and with two legs and two arms. Most women hoped that economic security would arrive along with their men. Afghan women do not have hang-ups about wealth and status. A quiet life is what they want, without hunger. Physical security is the key thing for a woman's survival in this tough land, and the presence of men as farmers and herders, merchants and negotiators definitely makes the lives of women easier.

ANBP did not have much in the way of activities or interest in women. The military management dealt with the four women who passed through the DDR process, and left it at that. There was no thought given to gender aspects of development and disarmament, nor much thought about the fact that XCs returning home from war may become a source of abuse and

XC dependents trained as teachers

[5] The Beijing Platform for Action stated that: "governments and other actors should promote an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective in all policies and programmes so that, before decisions are taken, an analysis is made of the effects on women and men respectively" (UN, 1995).

domestic violence more easily than other men.

In general, the wives and families of XCs have been mostly and primarily glad that their husbands and sons and brothers are back from the war, and that fighting has ceased. The joy and celebration has its economic drawbacks: one woman told us she has had four children in five years since her husband stopped fighting! But children, who cost money and demand food in the short term, will provide a future source of wealth, comfort and social security for their parents' old age.

The vast majority of families, however, were left out of the DDR and CIP equations. All attention was focused on the demobilized soldier as an individual[6], and nothing was attempted in terms of supporting extended families and communities in which numbers of XCs – including unknown numbers of disabled veterans and martyrs' widows –have to be integrated.

The 2005 Charney Omnibus survey of Afghan public opinion showed that only 22% of respondents felt that the UN had done enough to empower women – which concurs with the evaluation team's regrets about ANBP's neglect of gender issues. At the same time, 86% of Afghans felt in 2005 that the situation of women has improved since 2001. This would seem to be a vote of approval for the Government's continued stubborn resistance to Taliban rebels in the South of Afghanistan.

The number of women belonging to the AMF was small and unexpected. All the 4 women XC have been reintegrated.

### ***Recommendations to UN:***

***Dependent women and widows of war should also be eligible to access demobilisation/reintegration benefits. More could and should be done to integrate widows and wives, to make sure the families and communities are benefiting from what they need as part of a reintegration process.***

### 2.2.4. Communities (Other War-Affected Populations)

Community involvement and support to families are critical for long-term stability. The provision of targeted assistance to ex-combatants may in some cases raise issues with respect to access, exclusion, and equity *vis-à-vis* other war-affected groups. There is some concern that the provision of greater benefits to ex-combatants could lead to perceptions of injustice and possibly frustration among some of these groups. In some countries (Liberia and Sierra Leone both come to mind) the neglect of communities in favour of individual XCs led to aggressive reactions against both DDR and against the XCs themselves. There is also a fear that targeted individual assistance could undermine the process of social reintegration.

In certain parts of Angola, (as is the case with Afghanistan) UNITA forces are well-regarded and welcomed back to returning villages. In Sierra Leone once community reconciliation and purification ceremonies have been completed, some community members have viewed support to XCs as an investment in peace that would ultimately benefit the population at-large. The unfavourable economic environment in which Afghanistan's DDR is being

[6] For the small number of disabled XCs that came within the purview of DDR, however, the handicapped veteran was allowed to nominate a member of his family to receive vocational training in his place, so that the training might lead to income creation to support the XC and his family - a sensitive ANBP innovation.

implemented may impact negatively on the reintegration of ex –combatants - raising serious concerns about the future stability of the country.

In theory the Community Development Committee should be a great bonus for any community, and for DDR by providing an institution that can help reintegrate XCs. If they had been asked, the CDCs would have been enthusiastic reintegration partners. They would have developed objectives and strategies with and for XCs.

In practice ANBP did not seek to use the CDCs. We see great potential for UNDP to develop relations with them for ongoing reintegration support, and for this there is a natural partnership available with UN Habitat, which is one of the leading partners of the NSP.

## ***Recommendation for UNDP/ANBP***

***It is absolutely essential to establish linkages between DDR and other long-term reintegration and reconciliation programmes, and this should be done now for the post-DDR reintegration follow-up projects.***

## 2.3. Partner organisations

DDR cannot be planned and implemented in isolation from key national and international actors and stakeholders. DDR is a ***"multi-stakeholder process, which necessarily requires the creation of information-sharing, consultation, coordination and partnership mechanisms that bring key actors and stakeholders together"*** (**IDDRS 2.30**).

For many of the UN Agencies and INGOs, DDR was also a hoped-for partnership. ANBP was a huge project needing implementing partners, and many hoped or expected to find a share, a role, even a vocation for those whose mandate or expertise fitted them to work in DDR.

### 2.3.1. Synergies and partnerships between ANBP/UNDP and Ministries

ANBP was most closely involved with the Ministry of Defence which had the main task of downsizing the Afghan Military Forces (AMF) and creating a new Afghan National Army (ANA) with regional and ethnic balance. The secondary aim of MoD was to collect as much hardware and ammunition as possible, irrespective of real or calculated equipment needs, and remove it from illegal hands so that- for the first time in many years – dissuasive force could become the sole preserve of a legal Afghan government.

The BCPR mission of 2006 heard complaints from officials that they were 'not engaged in the process from the outset, in terms of consultation in programme design and were subsequently 'out of the loop' during the implementation. They were dissatisfied with the flow of information relating to the programme, noting embarrassment in being unable to answer questions from Parliament.'

While information flows are often complicated to manage, the evaluation team finds that the D&R Commission provided an adequate and effective government coordination mechanism at the formal level. The D&R Commission and ANBP received full and active participation from the Ministry of Defense. The participation of other ministries was often perfunctory, and practical help from several line ministries was disappointing when it came to finding employment for XCs or offering them priority hiring for government projects. If government officials wanted information, it was there and available and DDR processes were transparent.

Generally speaking, however, Ministers have done little to impress on their staffs that President Karzai labeled DDR a national priority. Potential ministries (governmental agencies) that could have played a much more active role right from the beginning of the DDR process include Ministry of Interior (MoI), Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation Development (MRRD), Ministry of Education (MoE), Ministry of Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled, Ministry of Women's Affairs (MoWA), Ministry of Public Health and others. Though the institutional capacity of these ministries was weak at that time, the DDR process could have served as a good platform for capacity building without making it too tedious. They could have been brought in at the design and planning stages of demobilisation and reinsertion, and then reintegration, and assisted in assessing the real needs of XCs.

Most ministries are interested in survival, which means the accumulation of funding and power – that, after all, is what ministries exist for. When ANBP was seen to offer funding or other advantages, collaboration was forthcoming; when ANBP asked for support to make a success of reintegration and finding jobs, most sectoral ministries have proved quite unhelpful. "We knew that MRRD was launching a big project with a need for lots of labourers," one ANBP programme officer told us, "So I went there to talk with them in the field. I told them we have all these XCs with some training and they need jobs. But the ministry people were not really interested."

However when we put this to him, a senior Ministry official quipped that "there are jobs for them: either they don't want to work as labourers or they do not want jobs outside their area of residence". The Ministry of Education is said to have been more helpful than other ministries, and some educated XCs and their wives received teachers training.[7] But now the MoE fails to recognize this certificate and disqualifies the trainees for regular jobs.

### 2.3.2. Synergies and partnerships between ANBP/UNDP other UN agencies

Whereas ANBP provides a good example of coordination between UNAMA and UNDP (between the peacekeeping and development arms of the UN secretariat), the coordination of ANBP with other international partners was something of a disappointment. Getting UN Agencies to work together is often tricky, for it depends more on the egos and petty jealousies of the local staffs than on the political commitments of their bosses in New York or elsewhere. No one doubts the technical competencies of the UN Agencies[8]. In other cases the UN agencies were ignored more-or-less because ANBP was so focused on its military and disarmament mission. If ANBP had been better equipped to plan and manage its reinsertion and reintegration mandate, it would have achieved synergy with many of the UN Agencies. Perhaps UNDP should be faulted for allowing the R&R side to be neglected, and for not recruiting stronger development people into the ANBP team.

The **World Food Programme** was particularly helpful in providing 130Kg food to each XC as part of the reinsertion assistance, with the aim of improving the XC capacity to meet immediate household food security objectives. There are no records of continued food support

[7] For a certain number of literate wives of XCs, ANBP signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Education and provided a six-month upgrading course leading to a teaching certificate issued by the MoE. Yet in Kunduz, Heart, Mazar and Nangahar provinces we found ladies whose certificates had later been refused by the MoE – even though they hold MoE certificates! And we are desperately short of teachers!

[8] IDDRS recommends that "In the context of integrated DDR approaches, DDR programmes also provide a common framework for the implementation and management of joint activities among actors in the UN system".

to this group, it can be assumed that some of them might have received continued support not as XC but as members of the community in food deficit areas. A letter of intent was signed with WFP to facilitate the inclusion of women in WFP related projects from 2008 through 2010.

In the initial stages of the DDR process, **UNICEF** had seconded an officer to oversee activities related to child soldiers. This positive collaboration came to a premature end following disagreement on inclusion criteria that we explained above. We understand that the failure of ANBP to work well with UNICEF illustrates weaknesses on both sides, but there is a presumption of competence for UNICEF on the issue of child soldiers which ANBP should have been prepared to recognize.

The collaboration between **UNMACA** and ANBP was a particularly successful (read further under **Reintegration**) experience, in the way in which the XCs were selected and reintegrated in a sustainable way into mine clearance activities. UNMACA has transferred their entire XC database to ANBP.

On the other hand, the evaluators feel that **ILO** should have been brought in early during the design of reintegration, and included in the implementation phase. ANBP could have better collaborated with ILO in providing a professional perspective to vocational training, and ILO has expertise in DDR programmes. The **RSPE** is a new **ILO** project that has been designed for the continuation of reintegration activities.

The **UNOPS** was involved in training XCs in road construction activities, whereas **FAO** was involved in agricultural activities, both as Implementing Partners.

### 2.3.3. Synergies and partnerships between ANBP/UNDP, international and national NGO's

ANBP treated the international organizations and NGOs as contractors, rather than as partners – although some of the IPs had more reintegration experience than ANBP. We find that the reintegration process would have been better designed and better implemented if a participative design process had been initiated with IPs. Local market studies of employment needs and opportunities would have been carried out in a more thorough way if IPs had been given more responsibility: instead of being consulted, they were given an ANBP 'menu' to execute.

At the same time we recognize that ANBP had great difficulty in finding IPs in some regions, and at a time when insecurity was rife. The ANBP leadership did a good job in persuading INGOs to support them by opening training projects in certain areas of the country where development and security were both absent.

The standards of quality and professionalism offered by IPs were variable, and performance was not linked necessarily to the reputation of the IP. In Jalalabad we found the remnants of a rather poor international performance (the agency has closed its regional programme) being picked up and saved by a local training NGO doing best work with few resources.

Since the reintegration process of ANBP was mainly limited to training, we recommend that an extension should be offered to some of the original IP contracts so that they can provide further reintegration assistance to XCs: additional training, job placement, health and trauma counselling, etc. Here is a lesson to be learned by other DDR programmes, that long-term commitment and on-going support to XCs brings better results than short-term training.

An exception must be made for **Halo Trust** that reports good working relation with ANBP: there seem to have been good synergies here. "Our relationship was symbiotic, they needed us and we needed them," comments the manager of Halo Trust. We suspect that ANBP managers were more comfortable dealing with people in the familiar military area of de-mining and weapon destruction, than in the development field where re-integration fits and where the command structures are less formal.

***<u>Recommendation to UNDP</u>***

***Make better use in future of experience & planning skills of Implementing Partners. We recommend that new contracts should be offered to some of the IPs so that they can provide further reintegration assistance and support to XCs***.

### 2.3.4. Synergies and partnerships between ANBP/UNDP and communities

Communities received nothing specific out of DDR, except peace which is what they wanted most of all after 30 years of war. If they had more help with their widows and orphans, they would be happier. If their disabled veterans had received more help and greater recognition, they would feel better about the DDR process. There seems to be no evidence of direct collaboration of local structures such as *shuras*, or CDC's. Community level projects have a better chance of providing visibility and trust for the DDR process.

### 2.3.5 International observers of the DDR process

The International Observer Group (IOG) was a small body staffed largely by Japanese and German ex-servicemen, which followed the MDUs around the countryside to supervise and observe the DDR process. Their objectives were equity and transparency in the DDR process: indeed the IOG and ANBP each held one of the two padlock keys sealing containers filled with SALW, and jointly proceeded on each occasion to the handover of weapons to the MoD at the Pul-i-Charki weapon depot outside Kabul. Like the EU and other observers, the IOG gave credibility and support to the general political objectives of the DDR process and its execution, in terms of its promotion of peace, stability and Security Sector Reform. We did not interview members of the IOG, since their job finished long ago.

## *3. Processes and Structures*

According to **IDDRS 3.10**, ***"DDR is a multi-sectoral, multi-stakeholder and multi-phase process requiring coordination and adequate links among various post-conflict planning mechanisms. The implementation of DDR programmes often requires difficult compromises and trade-offs among various political, security and development considerations. It also relies very much on establishing an appropriate balance between international involvement and national ownership".***

DDR programmes have a better chance of success when the DDR planning process starts early, builds on the accumulated experience and expertise of local actors, is based on a solid understanding of the conflict (causes, perpetrators, etc.), and deliberately encourages greater unity of effort among UN agencies and their community of partners.

## 3.1. Processes

### 3.1.1. Mapping of the planning and delivery capacity

Planning should be based on comprehensive assessments as to the needs of weapons for the country, the reinsertion and reintegration needs of participants and beneficiaries. A market study on the available opportunities (including both UN and national institutional capacities) is essential. Early identification of potential key DDR personnel for the integrated DDR unit/team is also important.

The innovative MDU system suited the needs of Afghanistan very well since many of the AMF units were really local militias which had been newly registered as units of the MoD after the fall of Kabul. Meticulous planning of the disarmament process was highly successful, even though ANBP faced enormous logistical and security challenges.

### 3.2.1 Coordination

efforts should focus on establishing a **common strategic framework** a joint funding mechanism, and other common consultation and decision-making processes.

ANBP worked closely with the Demobilization & Reintegration Commission established by the Afghan Transitional Authority. The D&RC has been instrumental in bringing together key actors in Afghanistan to develop a DDR policy framework. These stakeholders included UNAMA, UNDP, Afghan government agencies, specifically the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defence, and donors.

The commitment of GoA and donors was mainly responsible for this disarmament success. As BCPR noted, "Unlike other DDR programmes that have suffered because of partial funding for different component of the process, the upfront dedication of donors allowed the GoA and its partners to plan and implement from the outset a coherent and comprehensive DDR programme. The success of DDR programmes is often dependent on this critical element. In Afghanistan, thanks to the commitment of the stakeholders, and principally of the donors, this shortfall was avoided."

### 3.1.3. Identified needs for an information management system (IMS)

Early in the planning stage the design of a standardised IMS should be a clear priority, based on identified needs - and partners should be involved in collecting information. The IMS should adopt common standards for collecting and managing information to ensure compatibility. The collection of detailed and inclusive quantitative and qualitative data should be supported by information management systems. Internal and external monitoring and evaluation mechanisms (M&E) should be established from the start, and built into the IMS – which was not done by ANBP. For detailed discussions refer to M&E section below.

### 3.1.4 An information and sensitization strategy

should be prepared as early as possible. The strategy should be adapted to suit the needs of different audiences, and should employ multiple and locally appropriate means of communication. Here too, ANBP waas weak. Public information is important not only to ensure transparency and to reassure the DDR beneficiaries, but especially to create public confidence in the DDR and peace processes. The more public confidence in peace can be bolstered, the more the promise of peace will enter the national psyche and become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

***"For ex-combatants, their dependants and surrounding communities who are being sensitized, it means being prepared for and made aware of what will happen to them and their communities after being disarmed and demobilized, e.g., taking on new livelihoods, which will change both their lifestyle and environment. Such sensitization processes can occur with a number of tools: training and issue-specific workshops; media tools such as television, radio, print and poster campaigns; peer counselling, etc".*** **(IDDRS 4.60)**

### 3.1.5. Transition and Exit Strategy:

The project was planned to be implemented for three years and ANBP was successful in meeting this deadline. Donors had decided on how long to stay. We find that this was a strategic error. Since it is physical and social impossibility to complete a reintegration process in less that 5-7 years, the three-year design condemned ANBP's reintegration process to failure. ANBP's mandate was fulfilled in that the project document defined reintegration as 'vocational training'; but redefining a difficult problem does not solve it. Nor is it clear that UNDP or ANBP devised any form of **transition and exit strategy.**

The new RSPE and other development projects run by UNDP and other donors will provide some form of transition, but there is little evidence of strategic planning. The RSPE started much later than the end of the DDR process. We recommend that UNDP should seek integration of XCs into ongoing programmes such as NSP, and NABP which can offer recognition to the XC while bringing benefits to the communities into which each has reintegrated.

Transition and exit strategies should be defined as early as possible. The transfer of programmes and services to government and/or national NGOs and/or development actors should be based on a capacity development strategy. In this regard the evaluators find that it would be most inopportune to transfer the DIAG and Ammo projects to Afghan national control at the present time. The D&R Commission needs more time to carry out its coordination mission: its mandate should be strengthened and UN support for the D&RC should continue at least into 2011.

### ***<u>Recommendation to UNDP</u>***

***We recommend that UNDP should pursue the present ANBP transition strategy, through RSPE and by seeking integration of XCs into ongoing development programmes such as NSP, and NABP which can offer recognition to the XC while bringing benefits to the communities into which each has reintegrated. In the meantime the DIAG and Ammo projects should continue under UNDP management, since their transfer to Afghan national control at the present time would undermine their effectiveness***.

## 3.2. Structures

**IDDRS 3.10** suggests that the ***"objective of an integrated UN approach to DDR in the context of peace operations is to combine the different experiences, competencies and***

***resources of UN funds, programmes, departments and agencies within a common approach and framework for planning and developing DDR programming, and to ensure a consistent and decentralized approach to implementation".***

### 3.2.1. Managing the interface between disarmament and reintegration

Integrating the Ds and the Rs requires an appropriate management structure. No one doubts that disarmament should be led and carried out by military officers using military planning and implementation. The ANBP management provided a brilliant demonstration of an efficient disarmament programme organized across the country under difficult, often dangerous, circumstances.

Demobilization provides the 'interface' between military and civilian life. The Afghan demobilization process was efficient in a bureaucratic sense, but it missed out on the human aspects of the interface process: it failed to show enough 'respect' and 'recognition' for the XCs as people, and missed out the important reinsertion activities. Reinsertion brings lectures, films, literacy, participatory teaching about civil rights, human rights and the rule of law aid with gender awareness, and can greatly improve the self-respect of XCs when they return to civilian and community life. Literacy and numeracy classes greatly enhance the image and social status of XCs and their capacity to succeed in civilian life.

One of the lessons from Afghanistan is that demobilization-reinsertion should always include health screening and treatments that ensure the beneficiaries start their new civilian life healthy. Probably some form of counselling should be included. Group therapy can help XCs adjust to the effects of their violent past, and through controlled discussions and exchanges of experiences with others who have lived through war. This may reduce domestic violence and gender-based violence during the reintegration process.

Reintegration is not a military operation: on the contrary, it is a non-military operation since XCs are ending their military life and entering a new, civilian life in which they are encouraged to abandon their fighting habits and to end their allegiance to former commanders. Just as refugees leave their camps and 'humanitarian emergency' situations in order to move into 'sustainable development mode', so XCs are leaving military camps to rejoin civilian life. The four RRRRs (Reinsertion, Reintegration, Resettlement, Reconciliation) are steps into civilian life, new livelihoods, and sustainable development. Logically they should be run by development people, who will almost certainly be civilians.[9]

### 3.2.2. Designing the right management structure

It seems therefore that our DDR (or 3D4R) programme needs both military and civilian skills and the same is true of the management. There appear to be three possible, alternative management structures that will facilitate the military-civilian interface:

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[9] In the Mali DDR of 1995, for example, government military officers ran the disarmament and demobilization camps with very light UN political and military support, but the UNDP sub-contracted the successful reintegration process entirely to IOM.

1- A single Director oversees the whole programme and handles fundraising, with a Deputy Director for DDD and a Deputy Director for RRRR

2- A strong Director of DDD is appointed simultaneously with a strong Deputy Director of RRRR who takes over as Director after two years.

3- Separate the DDD from the RRRR into two distinct projects

Of these alternatives, we prefer the first **Option 1:**

**A single Director oversees the whole programme, handles fundraising and monitoring, with a Deputy Director for DDD and a Deputy Director for RRRR.**

This combines the advantage of 'keeping the whole programme under one roof' (attractive for programme unity, host government organisation, donor coordination, and fundraising) with the separation of powers which we believe is necessary to avoid the downgrading and neglect of the reintegration process - which has so often happened in DDR programmes and not only in ANBP.

The Director in this management model will have the profile of a senior manager-diplomat, who will oversee strategy, evaluation and monitoring. The M&E function will report to the Director, just as the finance, human resources, administration and asset managers will.

The DD for DDD will be a Colonel or Brigadier with expertise in SALW and ammunition, and he will be in charge of organizing the Disarmament as well as Destruction of weapons, munitions and explosives. Above all he needs to be efficient as a manager and effective as a leader who gets things done. Fast.

The DD for RRRR – the other Deputy Director - will be a senior development manager with experience of reintegration and resettlement issues, and knowledge of reconciliation and rehabilitation in conflict areas. (S)he will organize baseline data collection and help set up the monitoring and evaluation systems that are essential to provide information that allow the Director to make programme adjustments when XCs actually reach the communities. (S)he will begin a participative process of programme design, including government departments, local businesses and associations, and international NGOs. (S)he will launch early market surveys of job opportunities to plan the vocational training and employment creation which leads XCs from demobilization to reintegration. (S)he needs to be efficient and effective in different ways from the DD for DDD. The two will be complementary in their skills and their management styles.

Demobilization will be organized jointly by the two Deputy Directors: DD for DDD will take the lead and will handle the administrative mechanisms that take men out of the service and provide them with a new, civilian ID card. Health checks should be provided as part of this process, as well as reinsertiaon training in laws and human rights, civilian lifestyles, domestic violence and correct behaviours – and these should be run jointly by the two Deputy Directors in such a way that the demobilization-reinsertion phase runs as a smooth transition and their departments come to realize that they are interdependent.

The process of reconciliation (with themselves and between each other) needs to begin during demobilization-reinsertion phase. XCs need help and encouragement to come to terms with their violent past, and to confront their peaceful future. Some form of socialization training and group therapy needs to take place during this period, before former fighters choose their future lifestyles and move into vocational training. The success of the DDR programme will not be judged ultimately by the numbers of ID cards issued or the quantities of weapons and ammo destroyed, but by the successful social integration of the XCs into their families and communities after several years of peaceful, civilian employment.

In the case of Afghanistan, the weakness we perceive was not in the DDR leadership itself, but in the failure of the leadership to plan early on for the complex processes of reintegration. DDD turned out to be a brilliant exercise in administration and logistics, dominated for good and sufficient reasons by concerns for safety, weapon management, and (very soon) ammo management and heavy weapon cantonment. Meanwhile the military organizers did not have sufficient time to focus on RRRR.

It was the absence of a strong, experienced, dynamic development leader taking on from the very first day the forward planning for the next, post-demobilization phase, that caused M&E to begin late and missed out the need for a market study of employments opportunities, that neglected the health and family and community aspects of demobilization and reintegration, and failed to mobilise IPs as partners in the design process. Military organization was also one reason that the ANBP programme was designed to last for only three years – leaving UNDP and the donors scrabbling around to create successor projects that can ensure some sustainability to employment and social stability of XCs and commanders during the ongoing reintegration process.

**Option two:** Appoint at the same time strong Director of DDD and a strong Deputy Director of RRRR who will take over leadership in two years.

In this second management scenario, the whole operation would be kept under one roof, but the Deputy Director (Reintegration) will be a strong and experienced manager whose appointment would start on the same day as the Director's and with a clearly defined, separate mandate. The Deputy will begin the planning of reintegration and information collection from Day 1. His boss the Brigadier (or Colonel) will have overall control of the DDR programme for two years, after which we assume that disarmament will be ended and he will move on to graze in different pastures – allowing the Deputy to move up into the top spot.

The attraction of this formulation is that the programme keeps its unity and donors keep their commitment, while changing personnel movements at the top of the organisation match the changes in programme emphasis. The programme will be designed to last for 6 years. By year 3 the DD will be ended and reintegration process will be dominating project activities. We can assume that the military aspects of the programme will have dwindled to mopping up operations for remaining explosive materials and destroying surplus weapons and munitions – activities that can be handled by the new Deputy Director who may well have a military background but whose profile and functions will be different from those of the former Director.

**Option 3**: Separate the DDR programme into two different projects

The third possibility is to design DDD as one project lasting three years, and have the RRRR as a separate programme designed to last five or six or seven years. This allows short-term donors to fund disarmament and work with security sector reform, while donors who are interested in building sustainable peace can invest in both the military and the reintegration processes.

It can be argued that 'keeping it all under one roof is best', but in the end this has not happened in Afghanistan because of the poor programme design. After three years (stretched to four-and-a-half as a result of the BCPR assessment in early 2006) we face the imminent disappearance of ANBP in March 2008 while a plethora of successor projects under myriad different roofs try to pick up the pieces. In April 2008 it is planned that we will have the DIAG project under the D&R Commission or the MoI; the Ammo project continuing under the MoD; RSPE run by the ILO and MRRD; the ASMED and ARIES projects for commanders created by USAID; a scattering of projects underfunded with various NGOs and IPs, and still no one will believe that a sustainable reintegration process will be completed or was a real success.

Our third management solution might have allowed the military-political DD success story to unfold under a UNAMA-UNDP disarmament umbrella, while an entirely separate, professional, well-planned reintegration programme was created by UNDP, UNICEF and IOM or a consortium of NGOs. The first project would have been designed for three years (or four-and-a-half years) and the second could have been designed for six or seven years since we know that is how long the reintegration process really lasts.

**The decision comes down to the donors**. Are the donors willing to fund two different projects? Are they prepared to fund reintegration separately from disarmament, or is it the 'sexy' aspect of the latter that persuades them to fund the former? Are donors prepared to recognise that reintegration takes several years? Yes! Disarmament can be achieved in a few weeks or months – but it is the rest of DDDRRRR – the Rs sections - that actually brings durable peace.

Ambassadors are surprisingly amateurish when it comes to discussing and measuring results. We have met ambassadors (and this did not happen in the case of ANBP in Afghanistan) who were happy to count the number of weapons collected and then stop funding the project. This may pander to financial expediency back home, but it does little to ensure lasting peace in a conflict-zone where weapons are plentiful and civilian jobs are few. Unless the reintegration succeeds, even the best organised disarmament and demobilization ultimately fail.

In the end the greatest strength of ANBP was the combination of UNAMA-UNDP, and the commitment of a small number of donors. ANBP was a success, thanks to the Japanese government's decision to provide funding, together with the UK and Canada and USAID, as well as Netherlands and Norway, Switzerland and EC (for mine destruction). ANBP was their success.

### 3.2.3. Physical Structure

ANBP's central office located in Kabul was established in July 2003. Regional offices became operational throughout 2003 (Kunduz, Kabul/Parwan, Gardez and Mazar-e-Sharif) and 2004 (Kandahar, Bamyan, Jalalabad and Herat). ANPB has employed up to 60 international and 630 national staff in various capacities in its central and regional offices.

Decentralization is one theme that comes up approvingly: ANBP was successful in decentralizing its efforts through 8 regional offices, and this is thought by many observers to be a better model than centralized donor efforts based on building bureaucratic capacity in centralizing, Kabul-focused ministries. Donors ask too much of ministries with their limited staffs, and too many donors are asking the same small number of Afghan ministry people (especially the ones with good English) to do too many things all at the same time. ANBP emerges as a decentralized model for efficient and appropriate development implementation, building national capacity in the provinces.

***Recommendation to UNDP***

***UNDP should transform the ANBP regional offices into UNDP regional offices, and use the staff to update and develop the database as a reintegration monitoring tool and development database covering many of the districts in Afghanistan. Further support for reintegration and wealth creation, community development and training, medical and trauma management should be offered to XCs out of these regional offices.***

## *4. Programme Design*

**According to IDDRS 3.20, *"DDR programme and implementation plans are developed so as to provide further details on the activities and operational requirements necessary to achieve DDR goals and carry out the strategy identified in the initial planning of DDR. In the context of integrated DDR approaches, DDR programmes also provide a common framework for the implementation and management of joint activities among actors in the UN system".***

DDR should be a seamless process, and the R should not be an afterthought. Given the lack of adequate information on the number of soldiers to be demobilized at the time of DDR design, neither strategic nor detailed operational 'R' planning was carried out. In particular, estimated numbers and specific needs for assistance were not known at the time of project design, and little consideration was initially given to how they would be reintegrated.

We have come to the conclusion that one of the major weaknesses of ANBP was the lack of structure in the original conception, which was carried out by a handful of people (initially just three men) rather than a structured group of experts bringing different skills and experiences to share at the table. Specialized UN agencies, DDR analysts and experienced international NGOs[10] were not involved, so the Lessons Learned from other DDR programmes were lost. This, we believe, explains the failure to start Reintegration planning early, the failure of demobilization to go beyond the purely administrative, the failure to create reinsertion actions, the failure to create an M&E system until 18months into the programme, the failure to turn the database of 60,000 XCs into a monitoring tool, the failure to examine gender aspects of DDR, the forgetting of ammunition at the start, the lack of market surveys for the vocational training programmes, etc.

These comments are perceived as criticisms – and are therefore not accepted - by the military wing of ANBP and its partners, since they saw and still see the urgency and danger of disarmament as overriding priorities. In this they are quite right. It is precisely because the urgency and high-risk nature of the DDD takes up so much of their energy, that a different strategy must be put in place to prepare the RRRR. To emphasise the R does not in any way denigrate the D, nor take away from ANBP the political and technical success it achieved.

[10] No DDR programme should be designed without including technical experts from relevant ministries, UNICEF, UNOPS, WHO, ILO, IOM and NGOs working in the field. A disarmament researcher from UNIDIR or another security research group should be included, to ensure that lessons are drawn from the analysis of other programmes.

INGOs and other IPS recognize that ANBP was very successful in implementation, efficient in management, and innovative in its flexible response to the unexpected challenges of commanders, heavy weapons, unexpectedly large ammunition stores and anti-personnel mine stockpiles. Some of them feel, on the other hand, that the long-term strategic planning was deficient. If the ANBP design process had been participative, NGOs would have organised reintegration market studies, rehabilitation, reconciliation, micro-credit operations, and family/gender sensitivity. They would have worked with UN Habitat and other NSP partners to help CDCs design coherent community development plans with full participation of men and women (separately) that would have taken account of reintegration and XCs as well as returning refugees, child soldiers and people with special needs. Some of the NGOs did bring complementary funding to the DDR programme, but more would have raised DDR funds from other sources if ANBP had been planned better and more participatively.

Conservative religious and social attitudes remain strongly rooted in Afghanistan and this may be one of the reasons why there was no gender approach in the design of the DDR project. Gender-sensitive M&E is key to ensure that the commitment to include gender in programs' strategies is indeed implemented and adequately followed up on the ground. Performance indicators of M&E designs should adequately measure the impact of gender-concerns and such indicators should be able to measure the level of performance of female-specific interventions. Though such indicators were not formulated during the design stage, there is some evidence that ANBP collected information regarding women beneficiaries.

Health issues were left out of the reinsertion process – in fact the whole reinsertion phase was forgotten by ANBP despite the clear recommended UN guidelines for DDR, and this is an area many NGOs consider important. (The health issue is discussed in detail later). Literacy and numeracy could have been provided to all XCs, but this was done in only certain places. Training in civil and human rights was not covered by ANBP, although they have been important components of previous DDR experiences during the demobilization phase and widely disseminated using the skills of civil society organizations (CSO).

Likewise CSOs consider that the length of the project – three years – could and should have been recognized as inadequate for the task of reintegration. If INGOs had been involved in the programme design, they might have persuaded the donors of the necessity to plan for six years instead of three. The project document almost equates 'reintegration' with 'vocational training' and this is unacceptable to an NGO community committed to long-term sustainable development. The 'interface' between DDR and Development was not worked out, and this is why we find UNDP struggling in 2007 to work out the post-DDR phase which should have been prepared back in 2002.

A lot of NGOs believe ANBP has no real handle on impacts and results, because each IP has a different idea of what impacts mean, and a different way of measuring results. This is recognized as a weakness shared by NGOs and ANBP which was directive in implementation but neglectful of monitoring. The claim of 65% success for reintegration is widely challenged. Better follow-up would be needed, but this is not happening and it cannot happen since ANBP was planned to last just three years.

Some NGOs question the original idea of a fixed 'menu' of training options, and wonder whether – in the absence of any sort of market-based survey - the choice on offer was always appropriate. As stated in the ToR for the DDR portion of the current evaluation:

> " .. choice was considered an important element of ANBP's reintegration philosophy.

ANBP developed a broad-based menu of careers, training and job options, and provided a system of directed counselling that would assist XCs to make a sensible and informed choice. A focused public information campaign aimed at potential participants and their families preceded the initiation of the DDR process while in the course of a 'demobilization day' XCs were briefed in groups and individually about the various 'opportunity packages' on the reintegration 'menu'.

NGOs were not consulted on the composition of the menu. Called Implementing Partners (IPs) they were treated as contractors, not partners, and their institutional expertise was largely ignored even though some of the INGOs have long experience of DDR in other countries. Rural development specialists in certain regions who proposed changes to the menu, were turned down (ie COOPI wanted to provide small credits to XCs, to assist the sustainability of their chosen career paths which was especially relevant as a coping mechanism in view of the coming winter season – this was refused by ANBP).

ANBP was supposed: "to provide former combatants with sustainable and appropriate means of making a living." To achieve that, vocational training by itself is not enough and this is the main criticism of the INGO community and we have heard the same criticism repeated by several Afghan government ministers.

ANBP failed to recognise the need for integrated planning from the earliest stages. ANBP should have kept a focus on prioritising and linking reintegration more fully to disarmament and demobilisation, and on clear and articulated objectives for all components of the DDR program. ANBP should have made better efforts to manage the expectations of ex-combatants, and should have paid attention to inequities that DDR programs create between ex-combatants and community members.

Dependants may also be considered eligible for food assistance if they fulfil the vulnerability criteria and/or if the main household income was that of the combatant. Eligibility for food aid and vulnerability criteria should be agreed upon and coordinated among key national and agency stakeholders in the DDR programme. In this case WFP 'came up trumps.'

**Program design** needs to consider the direct inclusion of the broader community in the benefits of the Reintegration Program. We find the original design of DDR flawed not only in terms of its neglect of fashionable themes like 'gender equity' and 'child soldiers' and 'equality for people with disabilities', but also in terms of its approach to reintegration: there was no room for women or families in the DDR implementation This was partly because staff were not recruited who could handle these issues, and partly because there was not enough time to develop sustainable livelihoods, community development or family wellbeing in a project conceived to last only three years.

There needs to be flexibility in the design of DDR programmes, to take account of the difficulty in generating hard data - leading to weaknesses in databases. Lack of reliable data can negatively impact the DDR programs during the pre-planning phase because there's often no way to accurately predict the number of people who will require services. This was certainly true in Afghanistan during the early stages of project design.

DDR should have been designed to ensure that reintegration will benefit wider elements of the targeted communities than the ex-combatants alone. In other countries this has been deemed to be necessary for reconciliation purposes.

## 4.1. Finance and budgeting (IDDRS 3.41)

The primary purposes of DDR are to remove weapons from circulation and to build the conditions for sustainable reintegration and reconciliation at the community level. Therefore early, adequate and sustainable funding - and effective and transparent financial management arrangements- are vital to the success of DDR programmes.

Unlike most DDR missions, donor money was provided adequately to ANBP, in a timely manner, and in sufficient quantities to ensure that all phases were able to function as planned. Compliments are due to the Japanese government (which donated $91,692,655), for its farsightedness and generosity as lead donor; and also to the UK ($18,636,214 + $500,000), and Canadian ($15,906,425) governments for the flexibility of their funding which allowed ANBP management to get over the cash-flow problems that bedevil many DDR operations. The other donors were USAID ($9,000,000), The Netherlands ($3,828,990), Norway ($757,636), Switzerland ($500,000), and the European Commission ($114,395). (The EC has also given six million Euros for anti-personnel mine destruction, which is an ANBP activity beyond the scope of this evaluation).

Typically when the UN launches a DDR operation, there is money for D and D and then donors slow up or lose interest. If the re-integration process fails for lack of funding – or if ex-fighters become disillusioned with the repeated postponement of training courses or promised financial contributions for their resettlement – then the whole of the DD process can be undone and war can break out anew (Sierra Leone is the most flagrant example of this, where the failure of the demobilization-reinsertion process led to the destruction of Freetown in January 1999). In Afghanistan, this did not happen.

**Note: IDDRS 3.41** suggests that ***"within DDR funding requirements, for example, creating an integrated DDR plan, investing heavily in the reintegration phase and increasing accountability by using the results-based budgeting (RBB) process can contribute to the success and long-term sustainability of a DDR programme. Funding and financial management must be combined with cost-efficient and effective DDR programme strategies that both increase immediate security and contribute to the longer-term reintegration of ex-combatants".***

ANBP financial management appears to have been efficient and rigorous, and the same is true of asset management. From the management point of view we find the programme systems and strategies both efficient and cost-efficient. A KPMG audit team started work on the same day as the evaluation team. They seemed satisfied with what they were finding when we lunched with them, but we have not had the benefit of reading their findings.

## 4.2. Personnel and staffing

**IDDRS 3.42 states** that ***"the success of a DDR strategy depends to a great extent on the timely selection and appointment of qualified, experienced and appropriately trained personnel deployed in a coherent DDR organizational structure".***

One of the main sustainability impacts of ANBP will be the excellence of its national staff. Both in selection and in training on the job, ANBP had excellent results and the staff is second to none. UNDP has pinched several of them. In the future large swathes of Afghanistan's socio-economy will be run by former members of this remarkable team.

### 4.2.1. International Staff

One lesson from the ANBP experience is that careful job profiling is needed for international positions, to ensure that only the correct people, with the most appropriate experience, apply and are appointed. Better orientation is needed for international staff working in Afghanistan and working for the UN. We understand that orientation was proposed by ANBP, and they were discouraged by UNDP from organising training because 'we hire people who are competent to carry out the work they have to do.' We find it a pity that AMBP management didn't go ahead with the orientation, and we find it a pity that UNDP didn't participate and indeed insist on it. Technical competence in disarmament is quite different from ethical understanding of human rights, UN values and objectives.

While we are admiring of the military precision of ANBP's management and its duccessful, dynamic and innovative implementation of the first 'D', it turns out that the staffing was not appropriate for the 'DR'. We have heard criticisms concerning the composition and attitude of some of the military staff, especially in the early phases of the programme. A large number of expatriate military officers - many of whom received no United Nations human rights orientation - operated with a happy-go-lucky disregard for United Nations rules, ideals, purposes and ways of doing business. While we admire the 'can-do' approach that achieved the disarmament results for ANBP, discipline was not always sufficiently tight. Some of the reported incidents were very serious. Senior management were prepared to act against bad behaviour when it became intolerable, but hiring procedures were rather too relaxed and managers were slow to impose discipline.

Everyone agrees that the ANBP's staffing patterns improved later, when stricter rules were applied, the staff became more international, and people were hired who had more appropriate qualifications matching more precise job descriptions.

We hear that some foreign military officers were seen by Afghan staff to be too impatient, too focused on getting quick results, unwilling to adapt to the humanitarian and national development objectives of ANBP or its cultural, Afghan environment. On the other hand, they were probably the officers who led the MDUs and got things done.

Monitoring and Evaluation managers were appointed late during implementation. The M&E manager should have been given a much higher grade from the beginning, and the chosen candidate should have started right away during the planning process. Reintegration staff were too few and they started too late. Staffing for DDD was plentiful, for R it was inadequate.

## ***Recommendation to UN on staffing***

***Orientation on Human Rights, DDR, gender and UN ethics should be provided to all staff, just as all receive UN security training. Good leaders are precious, military initiatives are vital, and ANBP was well-led. But good managers are equally important: finance and HR managers, and also managers to plan and execute successful reintegration components. UNDP and UNDPKO must ensure that all jobs are described precisely, and that the right balance is achieved between DDD and RRRR.***

### 4.2.2. National Staff

In the evaluators' opinion, the level of expertise and motivation in the organization was and is exceptional, its management systems and implementation skills were and are unrivalled in Afghanistan. Without exception, ANBP staff and former staff are proud of what has been achieved. As the former ANBP Director wrote to us, "The collection of 12,000 heavy weapons and 55,000 light weapons, and the destruction ammunition should be regarded as a 'miracle' … in this society."

We found the staff and former staff ready to talk, and we found them extremely open to discussing the strengths and weaknesses of ANBP. The decentralized nature of the organization is praised; all staffers are proud of the way the MDU-RVC-IOG structure worked and the remarkably smooth DDR process it administered.

Running the DDR, CIP, DIAG and Ammo projects has required great moral and physical courage from both national and international staff. The ANBP staff play down the risks of their chosen profession, but it is important to remember that they have been frequently threatened with weapons, and have sometimes come under fire from armed militias who did not want to surrender their weapons or their stocks of ammunition. Even during our evaluation mission, one regional manager of ANBP-DIAG received death threats to himself and his family. This ANBP may provide a well-paid position, but it is not an easy mission.

Training and promotion were available to national staff. We found young men and women of exceptional talent throughout the organization, often exercising with great skill and knowledge some high responsibilities that few organizations would leave to such young people. This is entirely to the credit of ANBP and its senior management.

## *5. Monitoring and Evaluation*

According to the **IDDRS 3.50**, **Monitoring** is a management tool and it ***"is the systematic oversight of the implementation of an activity that establishes whether input deliveries, work schedules, other required actions and targeted outputs have proceeded according to plan, so that timely action can be taken to correct deficiencies"***, whereas **Evaluation** is also a management tool and it ***"is a time-bound activity that systematically and objectively assesses the relevance, performance and success of ongoing and completed programmes and projects"***. Evaluation is carried out selectively, asking and answering specific questions to guide decision makers and/or programme managers. Evaluation determines the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of a programme or project.

Monitoring and evaluation are critical for programme adjustments to ensure success. M&E started late, and the databases have not been used as well as they could have been – showing that there were few senior managers with any grasp of sustainability issues or the intricacies of reinsertion, reintegration and reconciliation. M&E has been one of the weakest areas of DDR programme management, partly due to a lack of proper planning, no standardised M&E framework, and inadequate human and financial resources specifically dedicated to M&E. Past experiences of DDR have repeatedly highlighted the need for more effective M&E in order to develop an effective, efficient and sustainable DDR programme that will achieve the objectives of improving stability and security.

One of the remarkable achievements of ANBP was to create a mobile database for all 63,380 of its disarmed XCs, picking up the information through its Mobile Disarmament Units and feeding it weekly into the national ANBP database. It seems to have been underused for monitoring purposes: instead of IPs updating it, each organization collected information separately on Excel sheets for reporting to ANBP. There was no practical system to screen and verify combatant status on the ground, yet a robust identification and management information system to track beneficiaries and the delivery of benefits are critical to the success of any DDR programme.

Specific objectives should be set up for each group of beneficiaries intended to be targeted. Indicators would measure each objective, sensitive to each target group. Disaggregated data would be collected for each group of beneficiaries, as well as the contribution of program activities and inputs for each target group.

M&E should start with baseline data collection at the beginning of the programme. Earlier M&E would have allowed ANBP to redirect reintegration efforts in different regions and to focus earlier on family and community issues.

The achievement of organizing Mobile Disarmament Units supported by Regional Verification Committees and a national computer system carried into the middle of the Hindu Kush mountains on the backs of trucks - producing an apparently accurate database covering more than 63,000 XCs – was a triumph of ingenuity and implementation. Each XC received a photo ID card on the spot, and their identification was exemplary. Once it was created, however, this treasure was not used for monitoring. In effect, it is simply a sophisticated list of former combatants.

The BCPR review emphasized that “efficient management of information on XC is key to a high impact reintegration phase and it’s monitoring.” ANBP recognizes that it was slow to create a Monitoring and Evaluation system, and it failed to share its database adequately with its partners. As a result, most IPs created separate databases of some sort which – by themselves - add nothing to the overall understanding of success or failure of the ‘R’. So far as we know, the problem of multiple, partial databases has not been resolved. Data from the IPs has not been integrated into the ANBP database (despite the recommendations of BCPR in 2006), nor has the original data been ‘cleaned up’.

**The DDR database should have been the principle ANBP monitoring tool,** allowing managers to see on a quarterly basis how programme activities were reaching the supposed beneficiaries, how the training course were progressing, and how the XCs were reacting**.** Instead of using it for monitoring DDR, the M&E section ignored the IPs and created new monitoring tools, using separate (and doubtful) sampling to produce their four, annual Client Satisfaction Surveys. There were crossover questions, however, that fed into the DDR database, and these concerned between 5,000 and 6,000 XCs each time – the last one being in July 2006 as DDR was closing down. For the past year the database has been dormant, its managers have mostly moved on to graze new pastures. At present unused, the database has obvious potential as a development resource if it is maintained and updated. We recommend that UNDP should study immediately whether this can and should be done.

**Sustainability was raised in the Edburgh evaluation of July 2005.** Many of these issues were addressed, but not the M&E. Edburgh Consultants made proposals for improving and prolonging M&E, and expressed concern that the sustainability factor was receiving scant attention from management whose 3-year project was due to end in June 2006.

> The point that we are underlining is that the social outcome of DDR should not be left to chance; social goals must be set and agreed upon, in order to design strategies to ensure the project optimizes desired impacts and minimizes undesired social impacts. (p18) If this challenge to UNDP was not adequately met, the reintegration process can still be turned into a success and the database may be a key factor. (Edburgh Consultants Evaluation July 2005)

Edburgh provides a good analysis of the weaknesses in ANBP's data analysis systems, concluding: "The fact that information on approximately 50,000 Ex-combatants is retrievable is a valuable asset. It is recommended to cherish the database and upgrade the quality if information it contains." (p13)

On the next page they give a very accurate description of data-gathering difficulties in Afghanistan, which should be used to guide every researcher.

What should be done with the ANBP data legacy to ensure sustainability of the reintegration process? Other UN agencies such as UNFPA (which is helping GoA to organize a National Census in 2008), UNICEF, UN Habitat, FAO and RSPE project (ILO) should be interested in the value of such a database, which potentially provides information on 63,380 families scattered through many of Afghanistan's 40,000 villages and more than half the 364 districts.

The evaluators recommend that UNDP should look at the DDR and CIP databases to see what needs to be done to prepare them for use as at development monitoring tools, so that the flow of data inform Afghan development policies. $120 million have already been invested in this statistical tool (and in the rest of ANBP), and we suggest that its value should be studied with a view to planning its maintenance and further development.

There are worries inside ANBP concerning the confidentiality of the database information, and they are important concerns that must be addressed. They seem easy enough to handle, however: the main problem is that no one has asked ANBP to focus on the database since the end of DDR. The first three pages of each XC profile contain personal data, the following pages contain military information (rank, unit, etc). The military part could be removed from the database before it is passed on to civilians to use as a development monitoring tool.

## *Recommendation to UNDP*

***UNDP should contract the company Digistan Tamim.samee@digistan.com (Samee, Tamim created the original database as a UNDP staff member) to study technical questions associated with the database and to see what it would take to prepare it as a development monitoring tool to be exploited by RSPE and other projects. Discussions with UNFPA and other agencies will determine the potential value of the DDR database. This approach for long-term support to the reintegration process is one that every future DDR programme should study, and apply to their own circumstances.***

BCPR has now created a software for DDR programmes and is providing it free of cost. Future DDR programmes should begin with this tool. The evaluation team did not analyse the usefulness of the BCPR programme, however UNDP might want to explore this tool and see whether it has any value for future monitoring in Afghanistan.

## *Recommendation to UNDP*

***If the technical review of the database is favourable, UNDP should use the decentralised structures of ANBP to maintain the database as a UN development resource.***

## ***Recommendation to the international community***

***There is evidence that educated XCs have done better than those with no literacy or numeracy. Self-esteem is notably enhanced among XCs who learn to read and write and handle written arithmetic. In terms of sustainability, education has some obvious long-term benefits. Every demobilization programme should therefore include numeracy and literacy training.***

A very serious weakness is the near total absence of information and data, and no systematic monitoring or evaluation, concerning the relative situations of women and men amongst target groups and beneficiary populations.

The absence of data and information on gender in project monitoring and reporting, and in the management information systems in general, is a critical constraint. This is compounded by the lack of capacity and institutional support for gender mainstreaming, and a weak strategy for learning and dissemination.

The lack of specific objectives concerning gender equality, and the absence of gender analyses and of gender-sensitive monitoring as tools for project management, also contribute to this serious situation.

## ***Recommendation to UNDP and the international community***

***In future we recommend that the M&E system should be set up on Day 1, that some form of baseline data should be collected at once (even if it cannot provide complete data because of security limitations), and that planning for the 'R' should start at the same time as planning for the 'D'.***

While we are aware that ANBP is planned to close in March 2008, we believe there are good reasons for UNDP to continue some of the ANBP facilities as a support mechanism to the reintegration process, to ensure its success and its longer-term evaluation. We feel UNDP would gain advantage in maintaining the ANBP regional offices as UNDP regional offices into which some of the central office project management functions can be decentralized.

Inside these regional offices the database can continue to be updated; medical and trauma support could be offered to XCs; literacy could be offered; further support for reintegration and wealth creation can be proposed. Since there is a National Census planned for 2008, UNDP should discuss with UNFPA how the value of the ANBP database of 63,000 XCs can be enhanced and turned into a long-term development tool alongside the national census.

Would we recommend that UNDP adopt a regional structure if ANBP didn't already have one? Well we might easily have proposed it (except that it would be way outside the scope of the ANBP evaluation). The failure of Kabul ministries to deliver development constitutes a major constraint on national development, and this will always be true because of the 'court' nature of government systems in Afghanistan. Building provincial capacity seems the best solution. Decentralization of donor activities is one of the keys to producing peace in Afghanistan. Since UNDP has this opportunity set out for it, the opportunity should be seized.

## ***Recommendation to UNDP***

***We recommend that UNDP should take over and maintain the ANBP regional office structures as an asset for decentralized support to UNDP projects, decentralized management and capacity building in the field,***

## 6. Public information and strategic communication

**IDDRS 4.60** states that ***"Information and sensitisation play and a key support function to the entire DDR process, from design to implementation. It plays a vital role in informing the public, participants and beneficiaries of the full range of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process and activities. This would ensure that the participants and beneficiaries have accurate information about the process. Correct information also prevents unrealistic expectations and misinterpretations of false promises which could otherwise result in frustration and despair".***

One of the major obstacles for a smooth DDR process was the lack of awareness and knowledge about DDR on the part of the general public. One of the findings of the internal M&E suggested that feedback from regional offices indicated that ANBP had not been successful in sufficiently informing soldiers about the DDR activities.

In terms of resources for international consumption, the World Wide Web has no lack of sources and references. One of the richest is http://www.ddrafg.com/contacts.htm put together by Richard Scarf who worked on public information for D&R Commission on USAID funding during 2005.

For Afghans, however, living in a large country of high mountains and deep valleys, the best outreach medium is rural radio. A large-scale distribution of mechanical, wind-up radio-cum-flash-lamps is the best public information tool that Afghanistan can find. The establishment of rural radio networks and the distribution of wind-up radios is a vital mechanism for education and any other development activity in Afghanistan.

## 7. Disarmament

**IDDRS 4.10 defines *"Disarmament as the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes".* (Secretary-General, note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005).**

ANBP created Mobile Disarmament Units (MDUs) based in each one of its eight regional offices. MDUs were tasked with travelling throughout their region to disarm military units. Each MDU was prepared to carry out operational, security and administrative functions. The MDUs comprised both military staff provided by the Ministry of Defence and ANBP national and international staff. Demobilization and reintegration have been carried out mainly through the ANBP regional offices.

An International Observer Group (IOG) was also formed by the principal donor (Government of Japan) to supervise the process and to co-verify the safety of collected weapons and their delivery to the MoD. This combination worked very well.

ANBP excelled at implementation. The combination of UNAMA political guidance and UNDP management worked well, and the ANBP arrangements which benefited from military planning and precision were admired.

The achievement of organizing Mobile Disarmament Units supported by a national computer system carried it into the middle of the Hindu Kush mountains on the backs of trucks - producing an apparently accurate database covering more than 63,000 XCs – was a triumph of ingenuity and implementation. Each XC received a photo ID card on the spot, and their identification was exemplary.

The Mobile Disarmament Unit operation was a masterpiece of good management, as the eight ANBP teams – sometimes sub-dividing to make twelve at the peak of disarmament action - spread out across the country, carrying out disarmament and collecting SALW[11] in extremely difficult and often dangerous conditions.

The achievement of organizing Mobile Disarmament Units supported by Regional Verification Committees and a national computer system was a triumph of ingenuity and implementation.


[11] Small arms and light weapons are lethal conventional weapons and ammunition that can be carried by an individual combatant or a light vehicle, that also do not require a substantial logistic and maintenance capability. There are a variety of definitions for SALW circulating and international consensus on a 'correct' definition has yet to be agreed. Based on common practice, weapons and ammunition up to 100 mm in calibre are usually considered as SALW. For the purposes of the IDDRS series, the above definition will be used.

Poulton's Micro-Disarmament Proverb from Cambodia

The illegal firearm knows not the name of its owner;

it knows only the name of its next victim.

**This American poster is widely distributed across Afghanistan, and it conveys precisely the wrong message, exactly the opposite message of what DDR is trying to achieve. DDR does NOT give money for weapons. Creating a market for firearms is the opposite of what DDR tries to achieve!**

**The small print says the poster is intended to encourage people to sell back their Stinger Missiles to the US government. What people actually see is cash being handed over in exchange for a mortar.**

## 7.1. Successful Micro-Disarmament in the context of DDR

Although the number of weapons collected did not significantly dent the supply of illegal weapons in Afghanistan (running in the millions), the quality of weapons collected is said to be high, and few DDR programmes have achieved such a high ratio of weapons per ex-combatant: 63,380 XCs were disarmed, and a total of 106,510 light and heavy weapons were collected and 56,163 were destroyed.

**DDR Serviceable LW&HW handed over with the CWCP PIC**

| Serviceable Light Weapons | | |
|---|---|---|
| No. | Types of Weapons | TOTAL |
| 1 | RPK | 1 |
| 2 | PK 7,62 | 4 |
| 3 | RPD | 5001 |
| 4 | DECTAROVE | 2365 |
| 5 | PKT | 35 |
| 6 | RPG-2 | 578 |
| 7 | RPG-7 | 8 |
| 8 | Colt Machine gun | 1 |
| 9 | AT MACHINGUN | 2 |
| **TOTAL:** | | **7995** |

| Serviceable Heavy Weapons | | |
|---|---|---|
| No. | Types of Weapons | TOTAL |
| 1 | Anti Tank | |
| | 75mm recoilless | 165 |
| | 82mm recoilless B10 RR) | 477 |
| | M.40 US Recoilless | 4 |
| 2 | Anti Aircraft | |
| | Grinov Machine Gun | 517 |
| | Zego ZPU 14,5 mm (1,2,4 barrels) | 1319 |
| | ZPU | 1 |
| | ZU-23/2 | 161 |
| | ZSU 23/4 barrels | 18 |
| 3 | Mortars | |
| | 60 mm | 44 |
| | 75mm Mor | 2 |
| | 82 mm | 1771 |
| | 107 mm | 56 |
| | 120 mm | 25 |
| 4 | BMs | |
| | BM 1 (Single Tube) | 733 |
| | BM 2 (TwoTube config) | 215 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | BM 4 (four tub config) | 61 |
| | BM 12 (12 Tube Config) | 31 |
| | BM 21 | 2 |
| 5 | Artilery | |
| | 122mm M-30 | 2 |
| | 122 mm D-30 | 1 |
| | 76 mm cannon | 28 |
| | 85 mm cannon | 5 |
| | 57 mm AA cannon | 10 |
| | 100 mm AA cannon | 4 |
| 6 | Others | |
| | Anti Tank Milan 2km | 6 |
| | Anti Tank Faggot 4km | 4 |
| | 20mm Type TG | 1 |
| | Rullcan 12.7 A.Anti craft | 8 |
| | GSH CANNON Air Craft 30m | 54 |
| | Air craft cannon 12.7 | 9 |
| | air craft cannon23/2 | 91 |
| | **TOTAL:** | **5825** |

**Note:** In total 13820 DDR LW&HW were stored at CWCP at the time when the facility has been handed over to MOD, Afghanistan

| **SUMMARY for Light and Heavy Weapons collected during DDR** | | |
|---|---|---|
| **No** | **DDR Light and Heavy Weapons** | |
| **1** | Serviceable LW&HW handed over with the CWCP PIC (Table 1) | 13820 |
| **2** | LW&HW Handed Over during DDR (Table 2) | 24279 |
| **3** | DDR LW&HW Chopped Off (Table 3) | 56163 |
| | **Total DDR LW&HW at CWCP PIC** (Table 3)**:** | **94262** |
| **4** | DDR HW in Cantonment Sites countywide | **12248** |
| | **Grand Total DDR LW&HW :** | **106510** |

## ***Recommendation for future DDR programmes***

***NEVER issue cash. The early decision to award a $200 Transitional Safety Allowance was a mistake, and this should have been known from previous DDR experiences. TSA was designed to be paid in two tranches of $100 several weeks apart to allow the XC to keep his family while awaiting the start of his reintegration package, but it caused trouble and was***

***appropriated by Commanders. The TSA was seen across Afghanistan as 'cash-for-weapons').***

## 7.2. Heavy Weapons Cantonment (HWC) was innovative and successful

The HWC took place between Jan 2004 and October 2005, and the activity was officially completed in Feb 2006. All observers agree that the HWC changed the balance and level of potential violence in Afghanistan and created the conditions for political dialogue. This was a remarkable triumph for UNAMA and ANBP, for the GoA and for international cooperation which – for once – was quick, focused and effective.

Mortars being registered and collected by ANBP as part of Heavy Weapon Cantonment

ANBP photo courtesy Anton Ivanov

All stakeholders and observers agree that results attained by the Cantonment of Heavy Weapons process were exceptional, and the impact was very positive. We concur with the BCPR team that, to the best of our knowledge, no other UN supported DDR programme has succeeded in securing such an important number of heavy weapons. This achievement has a potentially important impact on the medium security of Afghanistan and the resumption of war. It may inspire other, future DDR programmes.

The claim that 98% of heavy weapons have been collected and turned over to the ANA must be treated with caution. Precise figures of the total weapon stocks are impossible to know. It is clear however that most of the heavy weapons have been taken out of circulation and this changes the political and military context in which peace building is taking place. Levels of potential violence in Afghanistan have been greatly reduced, disarmament efforts can now be focused on SALW.

The HWC came about as the result of exemplary cooperation between the GoA, UNAMA and certain donors – notably the US and Canada. The ISAF force covered the Kabul region, while ANBP collected weapons across the rest of the country, with US and Canadian support. The political initiative emerged from UNAMA, and it changed the nature and level of potential violence in the country, while becoming a carrot that succeeded in bringing seriously dangerous, recalcitrant commanders into the political process.

Once again, the ANBP pragmatic genius for implementation found solutions where others might have found problems. Heavy weapons that could not be moved immediately were demobilized (loading breeches and mechanical motor parts removed) until means could be found to bring them into MoD depots. Junk was left where it lay, but recuperable weapons were brought in for repair and all explosive material was removed by Halo Trust.

The cantoning of heavy weapons was an essential element of the DDR success. Their implied threat had clearly been demonstrated in two incidents in late 2003 in Mazar-i-Sharif and in early 2004 in Herat, when various factions used heavy weapons against each other causing considerable damage to both life and property.

The cantoning process started in Mazar-i-Sharif as part of the brokered peace between Generals Dostum and Ustad Atta Mohammed in late 2003 and developed countrywide. Fifteen cantonment sites were created around the country. The four major sites around Kabul were organised and funded by ISAF while the remaining sites were organised and directed by ANBP with significant funding from the Unites States military and Canada. Without the excellent support of all these partners, this process would not have been successful.

ANBP photo of cantonment site in Herat showing MBT = Main Battle Tanks.

Courtesy of Anton Ivanov

All HWs which belonged to the AMF countrywide were surveyed and a database was established. This database served as a cornerstone for the actual cantonment of HWs throughout Afghanistan. For reporting purposes, the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) stipulated that HWs would be divided into nine categories, each being of 14.5mm calibre or heavier and crew-served. In addition, HWs were divided into three general categories regarding their status – Operational, Repairable or Wreck. Due to the enormous task to collect/transport this number of HWs it was decided to canton/transport only the Operational and Repairable HWs. Wrecked metal was left where it lay.

As an ANBP Implementing Partner, the Halo Trust provided technical teams during the process of cantonment. Their task was to remove the remaining ammunition from the HWs and to make them safe for transportation. Later stage at the assigned cantonment site, the teams properly deactivated the weapon systems (e.g. removal of the breech blocks and fuel pumps from tracked/wheeled armoured vehicles) and marked the cantoned HWs. In a few cases, HWs were deactivated in-situ due to rugged terrain and an inability to lift/recover the weapons. The decommissioning was completed during 2006. Parts were removed, labeled, and delivered to the MoD. Many of these weapons have not been recommissioned, for reasons that remain unclear to the evaluators.

ANBP has identified the lessons learned from this activity, and we recap them here:

- For ease of identification and inventory control, it is important that each cantonment site should be mapped.

- Some of the HWs listed in the original survey data as operational/repairable were subsequently found to be wrecks. Experienced specialists with military backgrounds are required to carry out surveys very carefully.
- Weapons must be disarmed and ammunition removed by specialist teams, before anyone tries to move them.
- Moving parts of both weapons and motors must be removed, labeled and stored.
- Some "light" HWs were collected up by the Mobile Disarmament Units, which at a later stage created confusion since Heavy Weapons Cantonment Teams were looking for the already collected weapons.
- It is of great importance that a useful and customer friendly database of the cantoned HWs is established and should be used throughout the entire process.
- The HWCT Leaders must be briefed on the safety measures of using Heavy Equipment Trailers and cranes.

**Summary of HWC by categories and Cantonment sites throughout Afghanistan**

| Category | CS Kabul* | CS Herat | CS Kandahar | CS Konduz** | CS Jelalabad | CS Gardez | CS MES | Handed over to ANA | TOTAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AA | 3492 | 218 | 92 | 121 | 33 | 23 | 292 | 51 | 4322 |
| APC | 112 | 97 | 43 | 54 | 20 | 74 | 37 | 0 | 437 |
| ARTY | 360 | 174 | 84 | 91 | 142 | 142 | 108 | 46 | 1147 |
| AT | 1321 | 3 | 23 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 139 | 1501 |
| MBT | 208 | 108 | 71 | 70 | 51 | 53 | 72 | 0 | 633 |
| MLRS | 1128 | 22 | 77 | 57 | 13 | 10 | 22 | 0 | 1329 |
| Mortar | 2504 | 1 | 18 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 290 | 2821 |
| TBC | 24 | 5 | 2 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 3 | 4 | 58 |
| Total : | 9149 | 628 | 410 | 413 | 265 | 310 | 543 | 530 | 12248 |

* Kabul Region has 6 Cantonment Sites.

** Kunduz Region has 4 Cantonment Sites

ANBP 2007

**Heavy Weapon Categories:**

| | |
|---|---|
| **AA** | Anti-aircraft guns |
| **APC** | Armoured personnel carriers |
| **ARTY** | Artillery |
| **AT** | Anti-tank weapons |
| **MBT** | Main battle tanks |
| **MLRS** | Multiple-launch rocket systems |
| **Mortar** | Mortars |
| **SAM** | Surface to air missiles |
| **TBC** | Unassigned |

## SUMMARY OF WEAPONS COLLECTED DURING DDR

| No. | Types of Weapons | Handed over to : | | | | TOTAL handed over | Unserviceable / obsolete weapons (destroyed by HT)** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | MOD | | MOI | ISAF | | |
| | | During DDR | CWCP* | | | | |
| **Serviceable Light Weapons** | | | | | | | |
| 1 | AK 47 | 16757 | | 415 | | 17172 | 994 |
| 2 | RPK | 780 | 1 | | | 781 | 302 |
| 3 | PK 7,62 | 437 | 4 | | | 441 | 95 |
| 4 | PKM | 226 | | | | 226 | |
| 5 | RPD | | 5001 | | | 5001 | 1783 |
| 6 | DECTAROVE | | 2365 | | | 2365 | 2897 |
| 7 | PKT | | 35 | | | 35 | 80 |
| 8 | DSHK | 1197 | | | 6 | 1203 | 2983 |
| 9 | RPG-2 | | 578 | | | 578 | 315 |
| 10 | RPG-7 | 2586 | 8 | 75 | 2 | 2671 | 303 |
| 11 | Colt Machine gun | | 1 | | | 1 | |
| 12 | AT MACHINGUN | | 2 | | | 2 | |
| 13 | KPVT | | | | | | 103 |
| 14 | Pistols (PM,TT,Ruger,Astra) | | | | | | 205 |
| 15 | Obsolete weapon systems*** | | | | | | 33916 |
| **TOTAL:** | | **21983** | **7995** | **490** | **8** | **30476** | |
| **Serviceable Heavy Weapons****** | | | | | | | |
| 1 | Anti Tank | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Anti Tank Milan 2km | | 6 | | | 6 | |
| | Anti Tank Faggot 4km | | 4 | | | 4 | |
| | SPG 9 | 118 | | | | 118 | 10 |
| | 75mm recoilless | 293 | 165 | | | 458 | 220 |
| | 82mm recoilless B10 RR) | 286 | 477 | | | 763 | |
| | M.40 US Recoilless | | 4 | | | 4 | |
| 2 | Anti Aircraft | | | | | | |
| | Grinov Machine Gun | | 517 | | | 517 | 1469 |
| | Zego ZPU 14,5 mm | 35 | 1320 | | | 1355 | 7912 |
| | ZU-23/2 | | 161 | | | 161 | |
| | ZSU 23/4 barrels | | 18 | | | 18 | |
| | Rullcan 12.7 A.Anti craft | | 8 | | | 8 | |
| | GSH CANNON Air Craft 30m | | 54 | | | 54 | |
| | Anti Air craft cannon 12.7 | | 9 | | | 9 | |
| | Anti Air craft cannon 23/2 | | 91 | | | 91 | 1904 |
| | AA cannon 57 mm | | | | | | 7 |
| | AA cannon 20 mm | | | | | | 2 |
| 3 | Mortars | | | | | | |
| | 60 mm | 10 | 44 | | 4 | 58 | 5 |
| | 75mm Mor | | 2 | | | 2 | |
| | 82 mm | 775 | 1771 | | 6 | 2552 | 489 |
| | 107 mm | | 56 | | | 56 | |
| | 120 mm | 100 | 25 | | | 125 | 1 |
| 4 | Multiple Launch Rocket Systems | | | | | | |
| | BM 1 (Single Tube) | | 733 | | | 733 | 91 |
| | BM 2 (TwoTube config) | | 215 | | | 215 | 1 |
| | BM 4 (four tub config) | | 61 | | | 61 | |
| | BM 12 (12 Tube Config) | | 31 | | | 31 | 9 |
| | BM 21 | | 2 | | | 2 | |
| | S-5 | | | | | | 3 |
| 5 | Armored Personnel Carrier | | | | | | |
| | BTR 60 | 1 | | | | 1 | |
| | BRDM | 10 | | | | 10 | |
| 6 | Artillery | | | | | | |
| | 122mm M-30 | | 2 | | | 2 | |
| | 122 mm D-30 | 51 | 1 | | | 52 | |
| | 76 mm cannon | | 28 | | | 28 | |
| | 85 mm cannon | | 5 | | | 5 | |
| | 57 mm AA cannon | | 10 | | | 10 | |
| | 100 mm AA cannon | | 4 | | | 4 | |
| 7 | Unassigned | | | | | | |
| | Recovery Vehicles | 4 | | | | 4 | |
| | AGS - 17 | 105 | | | | 105 | 64 |
| | 20mm Type TG | | 1 | | | 1 | |
| **TOTAL by Recipient:** | | **1788** | **5825** | **0** | **10** | **7623** | |
| **TOTAL LW&HW:** | | **38099** | | | | | **56163** |
| **TOTAL DDR:** | | **94262** | | | | | |

Notes:

* CWCP - Central Weapon Collection Point at Poul-i-Charki,Kabul

** There are destruction certificates from HT countersigned by ANBP for all listed weapon systems destroyed including their Serial No if readable.

*** In this category are rifles, carabines, Light and Heavy Machine guns etc. which are unserviceable, exotic or no longer in use anywhere in the world.

**** In addition to these HW there are 12248 HW cantoned in 15 Cantonment Sites countrywide. See the Summary for HW cantoned in Afghanistan under DDR.

## 7.3. SALW[12] Control[13], Security and Development (IDDRS 4.11)

The Afghan DDR project was aimed specifically at reducing the size of the Afghan Military Forces (AMF) and removing their SALW from circulation. This it achieved, paving the way

[12] A programme of activities carried out with the overall goal of minimizing, and where possible eliminating, the negative consequences of inadequate SALW control by carrying out an appropriate combination of SALW advocacy, SALW risk education and media operations/public information campaigns, which together work to change behaviours and introduce appropriate alternative ways attitudes over the long term. Wherever it exists, the operational objectives of a national SALW control initiative will dictate the appropriate type of SALW awareness activities. SALW awareness is a mass mobilization approach that delivers information on the SALW threat. It may take the form of formal or non-formal education and may use mass media techniques. In an emergency situation, due to lack of time and available data, it is the most practical way of communicating safety information. In other situations it can support community liaison.

[13] Activities that, together, aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of uncontrolled SALW spread and possession. These activities include cross-border control issues, legislative and regulatory measures, SALW awareness and communications strategies, SALW collection and destruction operations, SALW survey and the management of information and SALW stockpile management.

for the creation of a new Afghan National Army (ANA) and wider security sector reform. While DDR contributed significantly to the transition to peace in Afghanistan by reducing the numbers of armed units under the MoD and collecting their weapons, its especially contribution was helping to create the political dynamic that led to further negotiations over heavy weapons and bringing Commanders into the political process.

Experience in countries across the world shows that surplus stocks in official military or police armouries that are not destroyed, inevitably leak into the criminal market or are sold - legally or illegally – on the world market. Afghanistan has become the region's largest reservoir of small arms and ammunition. The numbers of weapons and munitions surplus-to-usage will increase significantly, as the ANA and ANP receive NATO standard weapons and equipment beginning in 2007. The Deputy Minister of Defence has stated to the evaluators that he wishes all surplus arms and ammunition to be destroyed.

## ***Recommendation to NATO and the international community***

***The evaluators recommend to NATO and to donors that they should support large-scale destruction of weapons and explosives by GoA. Unless the international community engages with the GoA on this issue, and implements a complete inventory and destruction programme, Afghan SALW and explosive stocks will remain a source of regional instability for years to come.***

Only around half of the weapons were destroyed: 56,163 out of a total of 106,510. This diminishes the peace impact of ANBP since the rest were placed in the armouries of the MoD. There is no evidence that MoD actually needed these arms – indeed we hear only complaints from MoD about their poor quality. The same complaints are made about the 30,000 AK-47 Kalashnikov assault rifles the Afghan MoD received from Bulgaria in 2003. These were refurbished in the original factory, so we find ministry complaints about their 'inferior quality' are unconvincing. Others are believed to have been received in 2003-4 from Roumania. In the absence of exact numbers of weapons in government stores – and with the imminent arrival of new NATO weapons for the ANA and ANP - we do not believe that weapons are in short supply.

Whatever arguments may have been advanced by the Afghan Minister of Defence about 'national sovereignty' and MoD weapon ownership, whatever the reservations of ANBP military officers about destroying 'good' weapons, despite deep reservations among Afghans in general about destroying weapons with their emotional attachment to firearms (feelings echoed eloquently by ANBP staff members who are clear that Soviet era weapons were paid for by Afghans and NATO weapons will have to be paid for again in one way or another), and whatever the enthusiasm of the American military for recuperating 'good' weapons, the idea of the UN increasing stocks of weapons in a conflict zone runs counter to our understanding of any DDR mandate. Increasing weapon stocks (even marginally) in a country awash with literally millions of SALW cannot increase peace.

From what we have been able to understand from various discreet sources, the MoD was never short of weapons (we have seen no figures about ammunition). Putting additional weapons into a country at war cannot be a good idea, and we believe weapon refurbishment should again be included in a DDR project. We also have reservations about the increase by ANBP of government stocks of ammo, especially in view of the imminent changeover to NATO standards which will render obsolete all these Soviet stocks of ammo from the point of view of the GoA... but not from the point of view of rebels and terrorists

From the above, it is obvious that we are unconvinced by the ANBP argument that weapon refurbishment 'saved the Afghan government millions of dollars.' Afghanistan's problem is having too many weapons, not too few, and they keep coming. In 2007 NATO will begin supplying new weapons to ANA and ANP, rendering all these collected Soviet era weapons obsolete. What will happen to them?

### ***Recommendation to UNDP and UNDPKO***

***The evaluators believe that no UN project should encourage the distribution of (or spend money on supplying) additional light weapons in a country that is awash with SALW and still at war. Collected weapons should be destroyed, not refurbished, and their destruction should be used as a confidence-building measure in support of peace.***

### ***Recommendation to GoA and NATO***

***As NATO weapons arrive and are phased in, so all weapons and ammunition from other sources should be destroyed so that they cannot end up in the hands of rebels or terrorists.***

### 7.4. Ammunition collection and destruction sends positive messages

We are not required to evaluate the Ammo Project, but it would be unfair to pass on without mentioning the positive impact of the Ammo Project. Thanks in part to ANBP and Halo Trust, only one Province remains uncleared for Afghanistan to meet the conditions for accession to the Ottawa Treaty on Landmines. Nearly 500.000 anti-personnel mines have been destroyed. Only the Governor of Panshir stands in the way of Afghanistan meeting its obligations under the Ottawa Treaty. The collection of Ammo has brought 9,000 tonnes of good quality ammo into MoD depots and assured the destruction of 15,000 tonnes. Meanwhile 32,000 tons of ammo have been surveyed in 1,648 caches, and an estimated further 70,000 tons have been identified. These are major achievements, but there is a long way still to go.

## *8. Demobilisation[14]/Reinsertion*

**Demobilisation (IDDRS 4.20)** is the ***"formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups".***

The ANBP programme was successful in the efficient administrative demobilization of 62,376 ex-combatants. It was originally planned (or negotiated politically) for a maximum number of 100 000 XC participants.

No DDR process can ever be totally successful in screening XCs to ensure that only legitimate participants enter the programme. In the Afghan case, this was made especially difficult because large numbers of XCs did not belong to a professional army, but were in

[14] The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose. The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion (Secretary-General, note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005).

*jihad* units that received Afghan Army status and numbers in 2002.

In Afghanistan, the GoA and its partners set up rigorous and successful verification mechanisms using Regionl Verification Committees composed of retired Afghan army officers who checked and validated every DDR candidate, and – to quote the BCPR mission - applied 'sufficient political pressure to prevent an over-inflation of the caseload.' This was a clear success.

On the other hand, the DDR process was largely controlled by MoD officials and commanders who had the power of decision concerning who would be registered and who would not. Thus certain genuine *jihadi* XCs were excluded, while some cronies and family members were included - this allowed some commanders to use the DDR process as additional patronage and self-enrichment. This means that some commanders continue to control or influence their former fighters, especially where the commanders and their men are locally based and have ties of family, village, or community *qawm*. Some still run local protection rackets, or tax farmers illegally. The DIAG programme continues to address this

Demobilization is more than an administrative act: it needs to include welfare aspects that lead into a reinsertion[15] process. The Demobilization – Reinsertion phase is the launch pad for Reintegration. Technical specialists are needed, and it is important that the personnel involved should be well-trained in the area of demobilization. Reinsertion should not be carried out by the Ministry of Defence but by the Ministry of Social Welfare. This important phase was missed out entirely by the ANBP planners.

As a result, the effectiveness of DDR was less impressive than its efficiency. Demobilization was carried out with administrative efficiency, in a way that emphasised the military and bureaucratic elements at the expense of health, family, community and reintegration aspects. As an interface between disarmament and reintegration, we find that the demobilization/reinsertion process was a disappointment.

Demobilization processes normally include health checks and treatments, which ANBP neglected. Typically, newly demobilized fighters receive training in civic education and human rights, literacy and numerical skills. Demobilization experience favours using participative teaching methodologies to encourage returning fighters to respect the village hierarchy, eschew domestic violence, protect women and children, understand the rule of law, and facilitate the re-establishment of values, behaviour and norms that regulate and give meaning to family and community life through training and other community activities.

Some of the DDR units were originally from the full-time Afghan army, and officered by professional career soldiers. These officers did not wish to end their careers, and it is true to say that they were demobilized against their will. This has left 'high and dry' some very bitter men in their 40s and 50s, many of whom told us they have only one career – that of a professional military officer – and they wish for no other. In this country built on Honour, these men feel they have lost Respect and that they deserve Recognition – even more than

[15] **Reinsertion** (**IDDRS 4.20)** is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year" (Secretary-General, note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005).

they feel they deserve a decent pension.

Most of the ordinary soldiers, on the other hand, were happy to leave military service. Only a few of the demobilized men had ever been full-time soldiers. Many were part-time *jihadi* fighters who returned to their farms after the war ended, and for them this DDR process was an unexpected bonus. Some of the long-serving *jihadis* were left out, however: and these too are bitter men who feel they fought against communism to win the liberation of their homeland and they have been forgotten.

Future programs should make a point of emphasizing aspects that valorise the XC and move him actively and emotionally towards reintegration: health checks for the XC and for his family; treatments of physical and mental ailments ('all XCs have mental trauma'); numerical skills and literacy training; training in civilian life skills: all these would all have enhanced the self-esteem of XCs and equipped them for more successful integration into civilian life. Reinsertion does not forget the need to work with the communities that will receive the XC, but the first step is to prepare him mentally, physically, and spiritually for reintegration.

These are important parts of the interface between military and civilian life, between demobilization and reintegration. They were missing from the ANBP strategy, and that is a pity. In future these aspects should be an important part of each and any DDR programme.

Better and longer reinsertion preparation (with literacy and numeracy training, health visits, civil rights and rule of law teaching, etc) would have resulted in better reintegration choices by XCs in some cases. Too much focus on administering the individual soldier and the military unit meant that the human side of the man and his wife (wives) and family and community were neglected. Most Afghan XCs need psychological or medical treatment, which was not offered to them. ANBP had some health and drug-related treatments in a Gardez clinic (in Paktia province), but this could have been more developed. Commanders were reluctant to admit that they had drug addicts among their men, but the addicts would have been easily recognised and gracefully handled if the demobilization phase had included medical personnel, check-ups and treatments.

The **management of expectations** was not successful, and this should have been done better during the demobilization phase. There is little doubt that many XCs were told they government would provide them with jobs, even if that was not ANBP policy. We have seen a short public information film that was made for Afghan television, where the DDR briefer specifically tells XCs that the case worker will help them find training and a job. XCs believe they are owed jobs, and many believe they were promised jobs, this leads many of them consider DDR a failure;[16]

## ***Recommendation to UN and international community***

***Demobilization is not a military exercise, but provides the crucial interface between disarmament and reintegration. It needs to be short, constructive and effective in moving ex-combatants from a military to a civilian mentality and equipping them with minimum skills for civilian life including good mental and physical health, basic literacy and numeracy, an understanding of human rights and the rule of law, and an understanding of their roles and responsibilities in family and community life. Demobilization needs to lead into a reinsertion phase of training and preparation for reintegration into civilian life. It***

[16] We were quoted the example of one XC who said, 'I am happy and I am fortunate. I have a wife and a house, but DDR should get me a second wife and a second house.'

***should therefore be planned with military precision, but executed and funded as the first step of a civilian, reintegration process.***

## 9. Social and Economic Reintegration

*"**Reintegration (IDDRS 4.30)** is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance"* (Secretary-General, note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005).

### 9.1. Training targets were achieved but Reintegration is incomplete

Reintegration was late to start, and the process stopped before it could complete its task - a programme design fault for which UNDP is currently trying to compensate. UNDP's reintegration mandate for ANBP was mainly limited to providing training, and this was completed (even if training design was questionable, subjects were selected without market research, and the duration was often inadequate). To provide training to 55,000 people in the space of only 18 months is proof of ANBP's excellence in implementation.

> The massive and expensive use of 'vocational training' in the reintegration processes has also been criticised on the grounds that, although vocational training might seem a smart measure to balance security and rights, it does not lead to economic reintegration in a developmental sense, due to the difficulty of trained combatants finding employment in the post-war economy.
>
> Giustozzi DDR p 4

In 2007 it is still too early for us to judge whether the reintegration process was a success, but we know that many unemployed XCs question its success.

The planning, design and delivery of reintegration assistance that responds to the profiles of the ex-combatants and labour market demands is complex. Afghanistan's volatile environment, lack of systematic and reliable labour market information, and the number and capacity of training providers and other labour market institutions provided huge challenges to the socio-economic (re)integration programme. Although ANBP was not expected to launch a job-creation programme, the international coalition's failure to create a peace economy or to tackle the enormous employment challenges of DDR is likely to weaken the sustainability of peace.

Communities were not caught unawares by the DDR process, for many of the XCs had never really left home. "There was no reintegration," a senior official at the MRRD told us, "because no reintegration was necessary: most of these part-time fighters never left home."

The problem is more poverty than social disruption. Many ordinary XCs have returned to their farms where they eke out a living, and which many of them only left on an occasional basis for short campaigns. They sometimes feel they have lost out because DDR removed the tool with which they made a living: the gun. Guns have always been a serious prestige item for Afghans, so it is tough for them to give up a weapon. They may not like DDR's results, but that doesn't mean that DDR was bad for the country – only bad for them!

XCs want benefits, wealth, or at least a steady government job. Some were happy just to get home and live with their wife and kids, but most were hoping for economic security in exchange for giving up the firearms with which they and their commanders had been making a living. And many of them believe they are owed, and were promised, jobs.

We have met a large number who feel let down by the failure of DDR and GoA to provide them with a job. It seems pretty certain that many of these XCs did hear officials promise during the demobilisation process that DDR would bring them a job (rather than vocational training for prepare them to find a job). Certainly most of them think that is what they heard.[17] These are men who believe they have fought for the nation and deserve recognition (and a respectable living) in exchange for their effort and sacrifice.

The men in uniform are XCs reintegrated into the Afghan National Police - with CM & JB

We met XCs who were delighted to get out of the military, relieved to break away from their commanders, and happy to see the demise of the AMF. On the whole, the most satisfied DDR customers are soldiers, officers and commanders who already own and cultivate land. Other satisfied men are those who have found a paid job, or who managed to start a business that feeds their family; and older men who have become tired of fighting and 'running up mountains' as one put it.

There is some evidence that educated XCs have done better than those with no literacy or numeracy. Some have found government positions. Shopkeepers and businessmen who can keep accounts tend to do better than those who have to remember everything in their head. Those XCs who return to their communities with literacy have greater prestige than the uneducated and there is even some spiritual benefit: education is highly prized in Islam, for *the pen is mightier than the sword*.

Incomes and jobs are the main problem. ANBP showed imagination in bringing teacher training to a small number of (mostly urban upper class) women, some of whom have found jobs – although the Ministry of Education has not been as supportive as expected in getting placements for these qualified and certified teachers. Maybe some of the MoD's disappointed, early-retired colonels could be retrained as teachers. This would bring them incomes and employment, along with the prestigious title of *moalem sahib.*

It is inevitable that Afghan public opinion will be divided concerning the benefits of DDR. Literate XCs have found jobs as teachers, in the ANA and ANP, or in government administrative positions. Some have found jobs in the problematic but lucrative security

[17] The 3-minute *Demobilization* film, funded by USAID and made by Richard Scarf for D&R Commission and Afghan television broadcasts to promote DDR, shows a DDR briefer telling XCs sitting in a class room: "As you know, weapons oppose construction. Think about which option will suit you best. When you leave this room, you will go to see the caseworker who is in charge of finding you jobs (or reintegration options). You can tell him which job suits you best."

sector, working for unlicensed Private Security Companies (a licensing system will be one of the outcomes of the DAIG project, hopefully reaching the statute book during 2008).

Commanders who combine accumulated wealth with commercial acumen have made a good living out of business. Plenty of them have chosen drugs as their most profitable option. They are probably the happiest XCs of all, but they don't necessarily make the rest of Afghanistan happy, for their financial influence may be as pernicious as their military influence was before. The 2005 Charney Omnibus Survey showed 34% of Afghans worried about corruption, and 41% saying that getting rid of the warlords was a top priority (and some of the respondents are presumably XCs who want to be rid of their Commanders). That is a mandate for DIAG, and shows the importance of the work that ANBP has been doing. There is more still to be done.

DDR programmes in Africa have demonstrated that reinsertion support should be based on needs of family units, using strategies to ensure that inputs are used in the most effective fashion. Providing support to community-based reintegration activities for ex-combatants sometimes have a higher multiplier effect (since they also support broader economic and social benefits for the community). These are ideas the UNDP should consider as it plans follow-up activities for the Afghan XCs. (read further in section 9.3)

### ***Recommendation to UNDP***

***Follow-up activities for the Afghan XCs should be considered, for disappointed men may bear a grudge and be tempted to take up arms again. RSPE has already begun work. Community-base approaches could use NSP, Community Development Councils and Area-Based Development Programme mechanisms. New initiatives should take account of the needs of active and disabled XCs, show respect to the widows of martyrs who missed out on DDR, and explore ways to integrate XCs into community actions that will also to bring them personal recognition.***

## 9.2 How to achieve success in Reintegration

The BCPR team started their findings in 2006 on the reintegration of XCs by remarking that reintegration is "a long term process, especially in the context of Afghanistan where soldiers have been engaged in different conflicts for many years, during which they have abandoned their civilian lives and means of earning their living."

**Good training and appropriate tools create a happy DDR mechanic**

Kamal Sendigul Shinwar is a resolute and resolutely cheerful man.Whatever way we turn the questions about DDR, he pushes his head forward, smiles through his grey beard and crooked teeth and assures us that he is perfectly happy.

"From 1979 until 2002, I will love and remember most of all the DDR process."

Not only is Kamal a loyal and committed DDR fan: all his friends are equally happy. He cited a painter, a blacksmith and a plumber, all of whom are convinced that DDR is the best thing that ever happened to them. "We were 250 in the DDR training, and we are all happy. We all received tools that we could not have purchased otherwise."
This makes us wonder whether the secret to successful DDR is a combination of good market orientation (choosing a sector where there are customers) and delivery of good quality, appropriate tools with which to rebuild their lives. We have heard of other cases where DDR trainees were upset when they received the wrong tools. Kamal himself mentions people who chose the agricultural package and received 'only a cow'. A cow can be valuable, but it is not so durable as tools.
Nothing we could say would turn this cheerful mechanic from his satisfaction with DDR! He was a driver for 5 years, so 6 months' training was enough for him – though not for everybody, he admits. For people without his 5 years of driver-mechanic experience, he would not have been able to turn a mere 6 months' training into a profitable profession. Now he trains other mechanics in his workshop – they pay Kamal as a teacher, so he is making money from the trainees as well as from his business and their labour in it.
Smart guy!
Kamal joined the anti-communist *jihad* under Mullah Kandar, a neighbor of his in Jalalabad. Soon they were forced to flee to Pakistan, before entering Afghanistan clandestinely and fighting for Afghanistan's freedom from Soviet occupation. When Kandar was killed, Kamal switched to serve under Cdr Ghalib. The latter did not benefit from DDR because when he was Chief of Police in Gheinkhel in 2003 the Americans took him. While Kamal was being trained in mechanics, Ghalib was in Guantanamo.
He came back in early 2007, but Kamal says they have not met.
During the Taliban time, it seems that Kamal was driving a Datsun between Jalalabad and Landi Kotal. Kamal is reluctant to reveal details of his life in *jihad* or in Landi Kotal, but he swears he was not smuggling anything: in which case he must have been the only non-smugg

Pakistan frontier! He must have been the only poor man in Landi Kotal, where be packed with electronics, weapons and other goods.

We agree with the BCPR finding that ANBP did a remarkable job logistically in making their reintegration package of vocational training available to 55 000 XC before 30th June 2006. This required strong commitment from all stakeholders - especially ANBP and its implementing partners (IPs), whose flexibility and responsiveness allowed it to happen.

We find, however, that the ANBP conceptual design was flawed, and that ANBP project should have been designed to last for a minimum of five years. Six years would have been better, and probably seven years would be more realistic. Future DDR programme designs should recognize that reintegration will take four or five years, whereas the D pieces may be completed in a few months. Indeed, failure to recognize that reintegration needs more time and adequate follow-up may yet lead to the failure of this component of ANBP.

The Afghan peace economy remains slow, but there are signs it is picking up. More jobs will become available as roads and bridges become functional. Shops and crafts that cannot provide a decent living to XCs in 2007 may become profitable in 2008. It normally requires 3-5 years in any country to know whether a small business will make profits or cease to trade.

The 2005 report on Afghanistan's Millennium Development Goals (MDG) recognizes that stable and secure livelihoods are inextricably linked with security perceptions[18]. Since the slow expansion of Afghanistan's economy makes it unlikely that a majority of XCs will obtain sustainable livelihoods in the short term, this sector of the population still poses a security risk.

If IPs had been involved in the ANBP planning process, certain NGO partners would have started community based programmes which would have included dependent women in the process of reintegrating XCs. These could have included vocational/life skills training alongside soft skills such as social and civil rights and responsibilities, reconciliation, conflict management literacy and numerical skills. Such a programme would contribute to reconciliation within communities, developing conflict mitigation skills that are traditionally absent in many Afghan communities. More could have been done during the programme design phase to link DRR to national programmes like the national skills training programme, and the National Solidarity Programme.

It remains unclear how many XCs have been able to establish themselves with 'sustainable livelihoods' by mid-2007 following their ANBP-supplied vocational training. Nor is it clear that any definitive evaluation is possible so early in the process. Although the training delivery exercise was efficient and XCs liked their training, many XCs are not making a good living, and few have found the jobs they think they were promised by the government. In some cases Afghan government ministries have been very unhelpful in giving employment to XCs, despite the best efforts of the ANBP and the D&R Commission.

> If we want to change Afghanistan for the better, we need to invest in infrastructure: especially more roads, and bridges, country-wide rural radio and cell phones. Afghans need access to the sort of communications that seem normal to us. Simply being able to move goods along a smooth road would change the economy of Afghanistan, where people have been traders since before the invasion of Alexander the Great in 303 BC. There is nothing we can teach Afghans about economic development or peace building. If we build the basic communications infrastructure for a peace economy, natural Afghan resilience will sort out the mess that foreigners have largely created – first the Russians, then Osama ben Laden, and now us!
>
> Extract from an editorial in The Nation July 2007

The quality of ANBP vocational training is criticized for the following reasons:

- better market research was needed to prepare the reintegration 'packages', for remobilized people in different regions want and need different things;

- too many people received training that they couldn't use to generate incomes;

- better coordination was needed between IPs to reduce duplication and avoid training too many people in the same craft;

[18] 2005, Millennium Development Goals Report Islamic Republic of Afghanistan; Chapter 12: Enhance Security (Goal 9) : http://www.ands.gov.af/mdgsgroups.asp

- vocational training in rich countries lasts 5 or 7 years, but ANBP provided just a few months.

ANBP managers will reply that they were tasked only with reintegration training, and they only had three years – which brings us back to the basic design flaw, that ANBP should have been designed to last six or seven years (which in effect is what is going to happen, but without the benefit of coherent initial planning).

There is some evidence that educated XCs have done better than those with no literacy or numerical skills. Self-esteem is notably enhanced among XCs who learn to read and write and handle written arithmetic – and self-esteem is an important part of Afghan XCs' reintegration into civilian society. ANBP could have integrated its XCs into existing literacy programmes. UN Habitat is running a large-scale $50 million, 7-year literacy programme with CDCs in 16 provinces. In the North-East Region 17,000 young people (including girls, child soldiers and XCs) were given literacy training by CFA, but this policy was not generalized to XCs across the country. If policy of partnership had been adopted by ANBP, it would have improved sustainability and offered more chances to XCs to find employment or to create profitable livelihoods. In general terms, the best Afghan reintegration results were produced by IPs which had other funding sources[19] with which they could continue the work started by ANBP.

While we find that the ANBP reintegration design process was insufficiently participative, in general terms we cannot fault the ANBP staff for forging ahead with the D parts and getting the programme done - with or without ministry participation. In 2003 most ministries were new and weak. The fact that Afghanistan had a successful DDR programme was thanks to the fact that the D&R Commission, UNAMA and UNDP pushed ahead to implement the President's policies in the most expeditious manner possible.

**If ANBP sustainability had been better planned, managers would have learned there is more to peace building with ex-combatants than just to one word 'reintegration'** – or rather, the word 'reintegration' disguises a number of inter-related pieces that are better described separately: Respect and Recognition (especially among Afghan *jihadis*), Rehabilitation of infrastructure and people (including youths, widows and orphans, disabled veterans), Reconciliation between former enemies, and probably the Resettlement of displaced populations (remembering there are still said to be 2 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan).

These questions would have led ANBP to examine the need for working with communities from where the XCs came. As a strategy for promoting economic reintegration, the efficiency of targeting male ex-combatants over their female dependents is questioned by some specialists. More broadly, issues of equity are raised when targeted assistance to ex-combatants is compared to the level of assistance provided to other war-affected groups and communities.

## ***Recommendation to UN and other DDR programmes***

***It is always wise to find out what other programmes are functioning or starting, so that ex-combatants had take advantage of other sources for integration support. Not only does this make DDR resources go farther, it also creates partnerships and synergies. DDR should never be isolated from the social economy.***

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[19] In the case of CFA, a lot of this funding for work with child soldiers came from UNICEF and the US Department of Labor.

### 9.3. Learning lessons from community reintegration success stories

The Multi Donor Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (administered by the World Bank, http://www.mdrp.org/) of the great Lakes regions (Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, etc.) in Africa recognises a need to "proactively harmonize and coordinate assistance to ex-combatants with that to the more general war-affected populations, and to support community-based reintegration approaches that would have positive multiplier effects".

The World Bank is increasingly applying the Community-Driven Development (CDD) approach in conflict affected countries. This is an approach the WB argues "gives control over planning decisions and investment resources to community groups. Through support for collective action, CDD operations aim to strengthen local governance, local service delivery and social capital."

Furthermore, CDD approaches in the context of DDR programmes provide a common incentive to rebuild trust, confidence and relationships that have been destroyed through war. Collective action for the common good serves to enhance interdependence, heal the divides, provide hope, and thus support the reintegration process. Local ownership engendered through the CDD process furthermore helps develop practices of accountability and transparency.

In Rwanda for example, reintegration assistance to ex-combatants was explicitly channelled through local community development committees; providing support to ex-combatants that would have a positive secondary effect on the larger community (e.g., rehabilitation of roads, health centres and schools). Whereas in Angola, the European Commission funded a whole new component for vulnerable populations within a larger DDR programme.

## *10. DDR and Health (IDDRS 5.70)*

The overall goal of health action is to **reduce avoidable illness and death**. In the context of DDR, this requires that the health programmes focus on providing: **basic, preventive and curative**, specifically designed and good-quality health care that is easily accessible. This service needs to be supported by **effective referral systems**. Health information and advice must be made available **(IDDRS 5.70)**.

### 10.1. Health is a popular and important DDR benefit

One criticism we have of the Afghan DDR programme was the lack of any medical component. No one seems to have considered whether DDR should send back to his family an XC with tuberculosis, who may then infect his children and siblings. Demobilization-reinsertion programmes normally include health check-ups and treatments as a matter of standard practice. This was not done by ANBP. Apart from haphazard isolated cases, health action was completely absent from DDR activities.

In each regional office, teams of case workers (some of whom happened to be medical doctors) did the profiling of XCs and acted as advisors on reintegration options. During this process and as part of a questionnaire, ANBP case workers identified 66 drug addicts. There was no systematic search for drug abusers and no medical check-ups were provided to XCs presenting themselves for demobilization.

At the same time, no medical services were provided to people left out of DDR (those who had lost parts of their bodies, members of the former MoD, trained soldiers and officers who had lost their jobs through down-sizing of the AMF, *mujaheddin* and resistance forces who were no longer able to fight because of their disabilities). These former fighters could have been considered for reintegration services, but they were not on the MoD lists for DDR and were therefore excluded.

ANBP could have sought the assistance from the Ministry of Public Health. Medical services in Afghanistan in principle are free of cost at public hospitals. Assigning MoPH staff as part of the demobilization teams would have increased trust and boosted the confidence of the XCs. Many might have come up to speak freely about their health problems, including drug addiction, if professional counsellors had been present to advise them. Ministry of Public Health staff confronting over 55000 XCs would have gained new clinical experience, thereby strengthening their capacity. The evaluators recognise that the capacity of the MoPH was limited at that time; nevertheless quite a few international medical NGOs were working alongside the Ministry, who could have helped MoPH contribute to the short and long term goals of DDR. UNICEF used the services of such NGOs for its D&R activities with underage soldiers, and ANBP could have done the same.

Medical screening is a gratifying service for XCs. In the Afghan context, it is one way of offering Recognition and Respect. Providing health screening for dependents would have been extremely popular in the communities, in addition to helping build trust and confidence. This demonstrates once more how DDR planners lacked a global vision of DDR, and ANBP failed to take on board lessons learned from other DDR programmes where health was an important component.

UNHCR would have been another source of advice and expertise for ANBP. Like refugees, *mujaheddin* XCs are a moving population that may carry communicable diseases, increasing the risk that outbreaks may become epidemics.

### 10.2. Physical Rehabilitation

Three decades of war have left Afghans with handicaps and disabilities. Many limbs were lost by people fighting for their country. In the context of Afghan society today, they are heroes. Armies need strong, healthy and energetic fighters. Those who lose their legs, arms, eyes or other parts of their body are quickly excluded from the combat lines. Each country has rules and regulations concerning pension payments, retirement funds, honorary medals, other privileges and benefits which can help the disabled run their lives. Though these benefits cannot restore their damaged bodies, we can try to give them the sense of being recognized by government and by society, so they feel proud of themselves. Recognition and Respect we can, and should, offer them.

The DDR program goal was to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate only those military troops who were active members of the MoD. ANBP therefore did not have disabled XCs in their sights.

However, ANBP beneficiaries from the DDR process have their injured comrades very firmly in their sights when they return home through the 'R' process. Many XCs have to feed and care for injured brothers, or find themselves caring for the widows and orphans of fallen martyrs. Ignoring the widows and the disabled, means that any DDR programme will miss one of the main problems facing reintegrated ex-soldiers and afflicting their communities.

Because of the narrow focus of the DDR process in ANBP, the handicapped were left out. As they were no longer on the MoD register at the time of DDR implementation, they were excluded. The MoD's procedure for the disabled and handicapped is to refer them to MoSAMD, the Ministry of Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled. All disabled except for *jihadis* are receiving 500 afs per month from the MoSAMD. *Jihadis* receive 100 or 200 more than other disabled veterans. The total number of disabled on Ministry records is 1560 (data from disabled veteran Musa Khan's Note Book records).

Previously there was a Coupon system in place, together with monthly payment based on their military rank and position in the army. At that time the coupon and payments were enough for families' expenses whereas the amount has reduced to a paltry sum in today.

It is not very clear as to the number of XCs who needed specific medical or rehabilitation services. Though anecdotally we were given the number of 1000 XC with disabilities, it was not possible to confirm either this number, or the criteria that were used to include them as people with disabilities (PWD). There is some evidence that in ANBP regional offices, where XC needed specialised physical rehabilitation services (prosthetics and re-education) they were referred to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Meanwhile services for the chronically ill (including those afflicted with HIV/AIDS) were totally absent.

The following table concerns prostheses provided by ICRC to clients referred to them by ANBP in the Kabul region. Clearly this is not a very complete record of disabled veterans eligible for DDR, but no other figures have been located. We are not impressed with ANBP's approach to the disabled and to health issues in general, nor to their record keeping: the DDR database was not updated with any health information. No supplementary data is available from any relevant Ministry, so their records are no better!

Prostheses supplied by ICRC Kabul to a number of disabled veterans referred by ANBP:

| No | **Type of disability** | **No. of cases** |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Both leg amputations | 2 |
| 2 | Leg amputation | 30 |
| 3 | Arm amputation | 10 |
| 4 | Eye (Blindness) | 6 |
| 5 | Ear (Deafness) | 3 |
| 6 | Tongue (Dumbness) | 3 |
| *7* | ***Total*** | ***54*** |

## 10.3. Dealing with XC addiction to Drugs

One of the objectives of ANBP was to provide services to XC drug addicts. The reasons for drug addiction are many. In the case of XCs they could include:

- war time stress and trauma
- joining the armed groups at an early age of 10–12 years
- feelings of lost youth

- death or disability of close family members during the war
- bad companions
- increasing poppy production which is making opium more easily available
- emigration to neighbouring countries like Iran and Pakistan which have high rates of drug addiction

The following reasons could motivate drug users in remission to return to addiction:

- A main reason for returning to addiction is lack of employment
- Lack of follow-up programs for addicts to keep them 'clean'
- Lack of mutual support groups in the locality to help addicts keep 'clean'
- Easy availability of drug in markets
- Poppy cultivation increasing (it has increased again 2007)
- Lack of government control over remote areas
- Encouragement by criminal groups to join them to get easy money and drugs

Returnees from Iran make the largest number of addicts to heroin (roughly 66% of addicts in Afghanistan). Drug addiction has become one of the main public health problems in Afghanistan, especially among XCs. Drugs are taken either by smoking, sniffing or they are taken intravenously. Taking drugs intravenously not only creates long-term and strong addiction, but is also way for spreading diseases and infection through shared needles. Thus XCs may pick up and transmit diseases to communities, their wives and families.

ANBP's project document identified and anticipated that they would be faced with a high number of drug addicts. Yet it was left to non-medical caseworkers to identify problems of addiction. Diagnosing drug addiction does not take place by just asking "do you take drugs?". Specific skills and knowledge are required to identify addicts. Ideally therefore, professionally qualified staff with specific knowledge and diagnostic tools should undertake this task. The reason why ANBP did not identify as many drug addicts as it expected is that commanders and XCs were unwilling to admit to addiction. Most addicts do not want to be exposed to the community.

It is not easy to accept drug addiction. Diagnosis needs time for the doctor (with specific expertise) and the 'patient' to exchange information and build confidence. Most of the cases identified by ANBP were captured at the request of families, because the addicts were not willing to leave addiction and start a normal life. Without family intervention, it is likely that they would have sold the food packages to support their drug habit.

ANBP through one of its IPs (WADAN) established a treatment centre for addicts in Gardez (South West Region, Paktia province). This clinic provided health services to addicts referred from all the other regions. As the largest number of addicts was from the South-West region, the centre was located geographically at Gardez. This centre provided services only from 2004 to 2005.

The duration of treatment in this centre for each case was 30 to 45 days. ANBP paid for all the expenses including for an accompanying family member. There was no follow-up system in place, because of difficulty in reaching patients (addicts) in their areas of residence spread around the country. There is always need for a long term follow-up program if you want to help addicts stay 'clean'. Experience in other countries shows that ex-addicts who receive medical treatment and benefit from a follow-up system for up to 6 years, have an excellent chance of avoiding relapses. Most of those who are not supported, on the other hand, quickly return to taking drugs. This demonstrates that long-term follow-up for ex-addicts is essential. For DDR in Afghanistan, it did not happen.

We do not know the exact number of XCs who had drug problems. According to some ANBP records, 66 XC addicts (especially those with heroin problems) were referred to WADAN anti-addiction centre at Gardez. It is obvious that only a small number could make it to the clinic. Given the total number of XCs who have undergone DDR, this 66 represents a meagre 0.1% of the total caseload and presumably there were many more. There were no follow-up services, and WADAN closed its activities when the DDR programme came to an end.

| | |
|---|---|
| Total no. of addicts referred to DDR Clinic | 66 |
| Successful cases supposed to have left drugs | 58 |
| Unsuccessful cases/drop-outs | 8 |

Apart from the 30-45 days on hospital treatment and food, ANBP also provided transportation expenses for the XC and for the accompanying family member.

MoPH seems to have various de-addiction centres across the country. A good collaboration with the Ministry might have given the opportunity for treatment to many more XC drug addicts. Organisations like IOM are also experienced in this area, and have specific knowledge and expertise to deal with such cases. All this needed more stringent planning.

It is widely recognised in Afghanistan, as it is elsewhere, that there are serious negative impacts of drug addiction on society, and on security:

1. It is obvious that drug users need money to buy drugs. At the initial stages of addiction addicts easily find money to buy drugs from family members, friends, relatives, but in later stages when their addiction is exposed they find it difficult to get money. Since addicts are not able to leave addiction, they find new ways to get drugs (or money for drugs) which may include robbery, stealing, housebreaking, banditry and joining insurgent groups.

2. Since XCs addicts have been professional fighters, militias and insurgents find it beneficial to have them in their groups, supplying them with drugs to fight against the government. This leads to insecurity, instability and savagery in the country.

We find that ANBP's was ineffective in its approach to XCs' health (which was ignored) and drug addiction (which was identified as a problem but was poorly handled). The health and drug issues were treated in a way that was sadly amateurish, bordering on the frankly negligent.

### 10.4. Psycho-social services

Some form of psychotherapy is needed for all XCs. ANBP senior Afghan staff and former staff recognise that young men have been recuperated from the war with acute stress, and nothing was done to help them adjust. No systematic medical or trauma-related psychological examination was carried out during the demobilization process.

The appropriate form of psychotherapy will vary from culture to culture, just as the reality of what is possible will vary according to the terrain and the available psycho-social resources. Sometimes it is group therapy that works best, bringing people with common traumatic experiences together to 'talk it out'.

In West Africa we have seen youth groups dealing with their war trauma through song and dance and spiritual sharing. In Europe we have witnessed priests 'casting out devils' and exorcising the wicked. In Darfur we have seen women's groups sitting in 'protected spaces' where only women and infants are allowed, and where they talk through the trauma of gang rape and plan strategies to avoid it happening again in future. In Sierra Leone there are purification rituals that often involve the slaughter of a 'scapegoat' or monkey whose blood purifies the village and bleeds away the sins of returning former young combatants. In Uganda they have a peace ritual called 'the bending of the spears'. South Africa invented the Truth and Reconciliation healing process.

Each culture must find its own way of healing the trauma of violence. Women are important for healing and trauma: mothers, sisters, wives, daughters … they must therefore be included in the planning and implementation phases of psycho-social work.

The evaluation's finding on this issue of trauma healing is that there is no obvious 'best practice', other than the one that stipulates that the problem should always be addressed during the demobilization-reinsertion phase. The Afghan DDR programme did not address the issue at all, and that is regrettable.

## Conclusion

We consider that within the DDR programme in Afghanistan, basic health activities during the demobilization-reinsertion phase should have included at least:

- medical screening and diagnosis for all XCs (and preferably for their dependants too)
- counselling for all former combatants, probably in group therapy sessions
- referrals to the national health care system or appropriate non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for basic preventive and curative services; voluntary testing and counselling services for sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS; treatment for drug addiction; etc\
- assistance to vulnerable XC groups with special needs such as people with disabilities (PWD).

- Treatment for all drug addicts organized through MoPH centres around the country with some form of follow-up process to support addicts in their struggle to stay 'clean'

## ***Recommendation to UNDP***

***Health and trauma issues should be handled as an integral part of the demobilization-reinsertion phase. In future UNDP should make health screening and treatment mandatory for all DDR programmes***

## ***Recommendation to UNDP***

***Any DDR programme that ignores war veterans' widows and the war-disabled, will fail to address one of the main problems facing reintegrated ex-soldiers when they return home. These vulnerable groups have become economic burdens that afflict their communities. Future DDR programmes should seek to include XC widows and the war-disabled in its reinsertion, reintegration and rehabilitation planning.***