

Report of the Evaluation of DDR and CIP in AFGHANISTAN

Qatra Qatra darya meshad –

One drop at a time makes a river -

Collecting one gun

at a time makes peace -



The shrine of Hazrat Ali in Mazar-i-Sharif

PART 5

ANNEXES

ANNEXES TO THE EVALUATION REPORT

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ANNEX 1.

The Evaluation Team

A team of three international consultants and one national consultant was requested to evaluate the DDR and CIP aspects of the ANBP programme, to analyze the direct and indirect impacts of the programme, and to make recommendations to the Government of Afghanistan, UNDP and the donor working group concerning future policies and strategies in support of ANBP's objectives, drawing out from the ANBP experience the key Lessons Learned about good practices, and presenting them in ways that will encourage other DDR programmes (starting with Nepal, Sudan, Congo) to rethink or refine their DDR strategies..

The team members were

- * **Dr Robin-Edward Poulton, Team Leader**
- * **Ms Jayseeli Bonnet, DDR Evaluator**
- * **Ms Chimène Mandakovic, CIP Evaluator**
- * **Dr Jawid Ahmadi, Coordinator and medical specialist**

Dr Robin-Edward Poulton, Team Leader, has collected weapons in West Africa and Cambodia, and written extensively on DDR, SSR and development issues relating to small arms. Senior Research Fellow at UNIDIR he has designed and managed SALW projects for the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in Geneva. In 1979 he defended his PhD on rural development in Afghanistan, based on his work with UNICEF in mountain villages of the Hazarajat, province of Balkh. repoulton@epesmandala.com

Ms Chimène Mandakovic, CIP Evaluator worked for five years with Médecins Sans Frontières, taking on increasing responsibilities in Serbia, Angola, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan, becoming Chef de Mission in Uganda and then Haiti. She moved to UN positions in human rights in Angola, Haiti, then to work on DDR Rwanda and DRC with United Nations Peacekeeping missions. After this evaluation she will take up a child protection position with UNDPKO in Nepal. mandakovic@hotmail.com

Ms Jayaseeli Bonnet, DDR Evaluator has experience of conflict management and cross-cultural conflict resolution in Afghanistan, Europe, India, SE Asia and SW Africa. Specialized in gender and health aspects of conflict management (HIV aids and family mediation, mine-victim assistance in post-conflict zones), she has also been closely involved with disarmament and reintegration conflict issues. jayaseeli.bonnet@gmail.com

Dr Jawid Ahmadi is a medical practitioner with a diploma in business administration and a great love of the English language. He speaks Pashtu and Dari, studies and writes in three languages. He worked with Japanese medical professors before being hired by US army for translating and interpreting duties. He has also worked in the field of counter-narcotics with Adam Smith Institute in Kabul. ahmadijawid@hotmail.com

ANNEX 2.

Terms of Reference

Originally a part of the evaluation, the 'Ammo Project' was dropped at the last minute from the Terms of Reference (ToR). This should be born in mind when reading the objectives of the Evaluation below.

The Strategic Objective of the evaluation is described in the detailed ToR for DDR and Ammo as follows:

To measure the impact of the DDR and Ammo projects on the stabilization of Afghanistan and to draw lessons learned from Afghanistan's experience with disarmament., demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants for application in the national poverty and conflict mitigation strategies, as well as for UNDP's corporate knowledge ... and draw best practices for UN global corporate knowledge and the benefits of other partners.

The specific objectives are:

- Assess the overall relevance, impact and sustainability of the DDR (and Ammo) in relation to the ultimate goal of supporting security sector reforms towards sustainable peace
- Assess and document the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the Afghanistan DDR (and Ammo) projects in relation to the programme's immediate objective;
- Identify "lessons learnt" with a view to contribute to improving the future policies, strategies and operational aspects of DDR, including design, organization, financial management, and implementation with particular reference to assessing the effectiveness of DDR-Afghanistan's unique initiatives.
- The application of the evaluation's findings and lessons learnt to support the improvement of security sector reforms in Afghanistan.
- Identify and outline best practices in the planning and implementation of the Ammo and Heavy Weapons Cantonment projects - HWC (the latter completed in October 2005) and further evaluate whether HWC objectives were accomplished. Also, determine short to long-term contributions of these two projects to security sector reforms in Afghanistan.

ANNEX 3.

Methodology

The ToR offered the following guidance:

The evaluation should be based on a participatory approach, utilizing the knowledge and experiences of all relevant stakeholders, who played important roles during the process. This includes:

- Government of Afghanistan, and its institutions involved particularly in security sector reforms (MoD, MoI, MoJ) and other ministries such as Ministry of Social affairs, Martyrs and Disabled, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Ministry of Education.
- Afghanistan civil society and general public.
- Various other stakeholders, i.e UNDP, UNICEF and other UN-system agencies, international humanitarian organizations (governmental and non-governmental, including commercial), and DDR & Ammo implementing partners (IPs) i.e. AGEF, IOM, Halo Trust, CSTC-A.
- DDR Donors.
- Ex-combatants.
- Ex-combatants' wives (these two points have been added by the evaluators)
- Communities including martyrs' widows and disabled veterans

Furthermore the development community at large, academics and the general public interested in the area of transition from emergency to rehabilitation and development are an important target audience in relation to the findings of the evaluation.

Finally, the evaluation should be put into perspective by comparing the findings with relevant research and experiences from other conflict areas.

The team started with desk research, involving an analysis of the considerable literature and statistical information produced by the ANBP and provided by UNDP. A lot of very impressive work has been carried out and documented by the programme.

We also focused on comparative research, searching out results and analyses of DDR programmes in other countries, using literature from UNDP, UNIDIR, BICC, GTZ, NGOs and donors as well as our own combined experience in the field.

Team meetings with UNDP, ANBP and UNAMA staff were immensely important for our early understanding the background and for analyzing implementation difficulties experienced by ANBP.

As well as meetings group discussions, we made use of **qualitative interviews** with ANBP staff, former staff, UNDP staff and other observers of the ANBP process. Most of the people interviewed were no longer occupying the positions they had in ANBP – remembering that the

DDR process ended in June 2006. This gave the advantage of hindsight and *distanciation* and removed the need for most staff members to feel defensive about their project; but of course the memory recall factor meant that some pertinent points may have been forgotten. Instead of a smooth process of understanding by observation and discussion, we found ourselves piecing the jigsaw together to recreate an image of what ANBP was like one, three and five years ago.

An informal SWOT analysis was carried out as a team-building exercise, highlighting the considerable strengths of ANBP as well as the weaknesses, opportunities and threats. The absence of key ANBP players who largely created the first three years, was compensated only partly by the excellent documentary record they left behind them. Among donors, it was noted that nearly all the leading players in DDR had been transferred, especially from the Japanese, Canadian and British Embassies.

It was therefore decided to **send out a short questionnaire by email to departed officials** and ‘absent friends’ whose opinions were considered important) both in UNDP – ANBP and among the partners and donors) inviting their opinions and participation in the external evaluation. We received some interesting and helpful replies, but overall participation was disappointing.

Then we moved to an action-research methodology. We were instructed to assess the direct and indirect impacts of ANBP’s work, and these necessarily include unexpected impacts as well as planned direct impacts and hoped-for indirect impacts. Using the field experience of UNIDIR’s participatory evaluation studies of voluntary weapon-for-development programs in several countries (cited in the bibliography), we opted to use **1-on-1 interviews and small focus groups using informal questionnaires**. We also included **before-and-after analysis**, asking people to recall their lives before DDR and to compare them with their lives today.

We conducted a wide range of **qualitative interviews in the field**, in addition to detailed **discussions with government and donor officials** (individually and in groups), and other regional officials directly involved in ANBP’s implementation. We also focused strongly on **UN specialized agencies and NGO Implementing Partners** which had worked with ANBP, and other NGOs that had not. This included **site visits to meet NGOs** and also **to meet ex-combatants in their place of work** for more intimate and detailed discussions. These included Kabul, Kunduz, Shir Khan Bandar, Mazar-i-Sharif, Balkh, Jalalabad, Herat. Some of this movement was hampered by security restrictions. Notably we were discouraged from traveling to the south.

For Kandahar we experimented with **telephone focus groups**, but it was not entirely satisfactory because of the lack of visual context and body language, and because of a tendency for interviewees to repeat the previous answers.

‘The most significant change’ strategy was used in some focus groups’ This question allows for comparison and contrast of opinions between groups of men and women and youths, and is also good for stimulating debate within a focus group. When each person explains what has changed the most for them, patterns emerge that allow the evaluator to appreciate different priorities and perceptions. As change occurs, so the various actors react differently and this provokes more change: a classic action-research scenario.

Participative action-research provides a valuable and scientific method for impact evaluations, bringing into the quality equation a wider range of opinions than can be achieved by other forms of survey. UNIDIR's work on participative evaluation of weapon collections programmes has been invaluable. Fortunately the ANBP project completed several significant statistical opinion surveys of demobilized soldiers, and we have exploited their results with gratitude. The ANBP database was something of a disappointment, but with the Client Satisfaction Surveys we have attempted to base our conclusions on **both qualitative and quantitative analyses.**

The participative action-research model necessitated design and translation of simple questionnaires. Focus groups and interviews cannot be carried out effectively unless the questions have been prepared in advance. Questionnaires can be used formally (in surveys) or informally (preferable for interview formats) but in both cases the quality of translation is critical to ensure that the right question is asked in the right way, using culturally appropriate images and language. Questionnaires were prepared for CIP and DDR groups, for wives of DDR beneficiaries, and for implementing partners, as well as for provincial government officials. Due to the large number of donors whose staff had changed leaving no institutional memory, we prepared a separate questionnaire for 'absent friends' with just thirteen questions (as described above).

Finally we studied the numbers. Of course, we were looking at (and for) the numbers from the very beginning, but with a healthy dose of scepticism. It was very difficult to obtain statistics from ANBP, because management was not focused on our work. Eventually friendly faces in the organization produced the numbers we needed. Evaluation by numbers is an unreliable way of measuring impacts, especially the unexpected impacts that result from any outside intervention. Evaluation-by-Results encourages a focus on pre-determined statistical indicators that tend to guide evaluators onto paths traced by the original project planners, and therefore lead them away from examining the unexpected.

Numbers can be especially misleading in DDR where baseline data is notoriously lacking. DDR should be evaluated in terms of its contribution to peace, stability and security sector reform, and not simply in terms of the number of weapons collected or destroyed. How many small arms and light weapons (SALW) are there in Afghanistan? We have no idea. According to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 5 million Kalashnikovs were brought in by the Soviet time. According to disarmament research about the *jihad* period, another 3 million AKs were brought in by the CIA and the ISI. This was before the Taliban came in with their own ISI supplies.

Does this add up to eight or ten million light weapons, many of them now ageing? We do not know. Judging the significance of weapons/combattants/ stockpiles in terms of numbers and percentages assumes that we have some idea of the total picture. Researchers in this tricky field know all too well that the statement: 'There are estimated to be x million weapons/landmines/rounds of ammunition,' all too often means that a single Military Attache, or one well-intentioned academic, has made a guesstimate that will be repeated gratefully by journalists and report writers until it becomes a conventional wisdom without any real basis in fact.

We do not refuse numbers: we have made guesstimates ourselves in war zones where nothing resembling real data could be found, but we try always to steer clear of believing in ‘numerical truth’. Numbers are beloved of donor committees and make for beautiful – and misleading - reports. This report deliberately tries to balance the quality of opinions and statistics with the possibility that they may not show the whole truth. We do not shy away from statistics, but we have tried to take account of real, evidence-based findings as well as dissident views, in line with recommendations in the excellent guideline document from the United Nations Evaluation Group: *Norms for Evaluation in the UN System*, April 2005.

ANNEX 4

Organization of the team's work

The Team Leader began work on July 9th and the full team was in Kabul from July 21st. The final report was delivered as planned on 6th September 2007.

- Week 1:** Desk research, statistical research. Team Leader meetings in Kabul
- Week 2:** CIP member reaches Kabul. Comparative and Statistical research
Action-research phase, preparing? aires, focus groups
- Week 3:** DDR member arrives. 28th travel to Kunduz and Mazar, focus groups
- Week 4:** Travel to Jalalabad 02 Aug, action-research, interviews, focus groups
Progress briefing for deputy Minster of Defence Nuristani August 6th
- Week 5:** TL absent Aug 9-21, rest of team travel to Herat 12-15 August.
CIP-DRR focus groups, interviews, analyze results,
CIP & DDR experts collect and analyze statistics
- Week 6:** Preparation of CIP & DRR reports Draft Report due August 19
UNDP sends to stakeholders
- Week 7:** Preparation of Annexes and oral presentations
- Week 8:** Presentation of draft report at a Stakeholders' Workshop Aug 26th
Team leaves Kabul Aug 28
Stakeholders analysis and comments
- Week 9:** Revisions, corrections and presentation of final report September 6th

Annex 5

Pashtunwali and Honour in Afghanistan

The official Code of Honour of the Pashtuns, called *pashtunwali*, has greatly contributed to defining the Taliban brand of Islam and its repression of women. The Pashtun code is based on four fundamental rules.ⁱ

Hospitality: The first law of *Pashtunwali* requires the showing of hospitality *melmastia* to all visitors without hope of remuneration or reward. Some Pashtun claim descent from Abraham and Isaac, both nomads, and this is the Law of the Desert which (for example) forbids anyone to charge for water (for water is Life). This law includes *badragga*, meaning a tribal escort for visitors. If a *badragga* is violated, a tribal feud will follow.

Revenge: The second law of *Pashtunwali* demands the taking of revenge *badal* over time or over space to avenge a wrong. Never allow yourself to be slighted. If two Pashtuns accidentally brush feet under the table, they will immediately shake hands to show that neither intended to offend, nor has taken offense. Here we can recognize the ancient Biblical law “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”. Such practice leads eventually to a land of blind and toothless people.

Sanctuary: *Nanawatay* derives from the verb to go in and is used when the vanquished party seeks refuge, or goes to the victors to beg forgiveness. There is no *nanawatay* when the dispute involves injury to women. *Tor* (black) cases concern the honor of women. *Tor* can only be changed to *spin* (white) by death. I remember a UN colleague in 1972 requesting three days leave to pay blood money, for his cousin had just killed a man as part of a 100-year-old blood feud. My friend would be the next target for revenge; he preferred to offer *nanawatay*. Evidently women were not involved.

Rules: A Pashtun must obey - to protect his honour - decisions and rules *nang* of Elders and tribal Councils *jirga*. The rules include service in the *lashkar* the tribal army, which implements decisions of the *jirga*. *Nagha* is a tribal fine imposed upon the wrongdoer by the *jirga*, which can be collected if necessary by the mobilization of a *lashkar*. A wrongdoer may have his house burned. *Nang* includes correct behavior towards your *tarboor* (cousin), who may be a rival for a female cousin's hand in marriage. Hence the Pashtun proverb ‘there is no hatred, like that between cousins.’

Although *Pashtunwali* is very much the code of the Pashtuns who live on either side of the Afghan-Pakistan frontier, myriad ethnic groups in Afghanistan have intermingled over the millennia so that they share some of the same values. While the Taliban's protestant *Salafa Deobandi* interpretation of Islam derives from (and is bankrolled by) Saudi *Wahhibism*, it is the mixture of Pashtun tribal values and Pakistani politics which has made the Taliban's creed appear so repressive, so violent and alien to western observers, and so anti-Islamic according to many Moslem commentators.ⁱⁱ

Islam, village politics and refugees

Every tradition and superstition is said by Afghan villagers to derive from the Holy Koran, which few of them actually read or understand. Islam is central to every aspect of life, yet intimately mixed with pre-Islamic ritual. In the village mosque young boys learn by rote a few passages of the Koran - receiving what passes for a religious education. 'Childhood' as invented by Victorian Europeans does not exist in Afghanistan. An Afghan boy remains with his mother, secluded behind the walls of their house, until the age of 6 or 7 years. Then he passes through circumcision into the harsh world of men, of economic survival and protection of honour. A Pashtun boy traditionally receives his first knife at age seven, his first rifle at age 12 or 14. From then on, he can hunt game and kill enemies to protect the honour of his family.

The role of Islam in Afghanistan cannot be overemphasized. Islam is the umbrella under which all Afghan mujahedin can fight the *jihad* (struggle, *not* holy war). However, the terms "moderate" and "fundamentalist" are used to describe the various political parties in Peshawar. Only a few "conservative" (a better term) Afghans want to go back to an idealized golden age of Islam, which never existed except in the minds of a few romantics. Virtually all leaders want to use Islam as a weapon to move Afghanistan into the 21st century - Islam's 16th century. ⁱⁱⁱ

Meanwhile the women are excluded from the mosque. Women have a second-rate status in Afghan society, influenced by the Indian caste system and linked to pre-Islamic notions of 'impurity'.^{iv} This removes women from the central decision-making space of the community. A girl remains with her mother behind the walls, until she reaches puberty. By this time she has been trained as a wife, and is ready for marriage and motherhood.

Life in the Afghan refugee camps of Pakistan and Iran has been miserable for twenty-eight years. Infant mortality and malnutrition have often been as high in the camps as they have been inside Afghanistan. While displacement has brought women new ideas, and experiences beyond the walls of their husband's house, the radicalization of political parties by the ISI and Saudis has meant greater restrictions, and the imposition of *pardah* on groups which previously did not wear the veil. Repression of women has become almost a token of religious purity; Islam has moved steadily away from the soft, mystical *sufi*^v influences of Central Asia towards a hard, linear, Saudi desert *Wahibbism*.

Notes extracted from an academic lecture on Central Asian Studies

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ANNEX 6.

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ANBP/UNDP DDR EVALUATION

JULY – SEPTEMBER 2007

INTERNET LINKS

- Children and Child and Young Adults Soldiers- Recruitment Prevention
- Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers
- GINIE - Global Information Networks in Education
- HRW Demobilization of Children - DRC- Reluctant Recruits
- War Child War-Affected Children - Links treaties to activist
- BICC - Bonn International Center for Conversion
- HRW - Human Rights Watch, Arms Division
- IANSA - International Action Network on Small Arms
- International Crisis Group - Conflict prevention and resolution
- IISS - International Institute for Strategic Studies
- INDG - Peace Wire, International Network on Disarmament & Globalization
- ISN - International Relations and Security Network
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ANNEX 7 and 8 are on separate Word documents

List of People we met

List of meetings we held

ⁱ There are numerous sources for the *pashtunwali*, including Caroe, Sir Olaf, *The Pathans* (London: Macmillan, 1958); Dupree, Louis, *Afghanistan* (Princeton, N: Princeton University Press, 1973); Ali, Mohammed, *The Afghans* (Kabul: Kabul University, 1969). In compiling these paragraphs I have also used helpful observations from Pashtun scholars Mohamed Nader Ayubi and Ghazi Amirul Momineen.

ⁱⁱ Rashid, Ahmed, *Taliban* (New Haven, CN: Yale Univ Press, 2000), pp.88-90. Ahmed Rashid traces the spread of Deobandism from its origins in the aftermath of the 1857 Indian Mutiny, to its 12 *madrassas* in 1879 with numerous Afghan *talebs* (Arabic plural – *taleban*), to the 9000 *madrassas* with which it celebrated its centenary.

ⁱⁱⁱ Dupree, Louis, “Afghanistan: Return, Repatriation, Reconstruction” in the *Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs*, 1989. The late Professor Louis Dupree, my friend and mentor, was the greatest American expert on

Afghanistan. This title now rests with his widow Nancy Hatch Dupree, who continues from her base in Peshawar, to work for Afghan peace and development, culture and historical research.

^{iv} The Brahmanist caste system includes the *sati* tradition of the submissive woman. To understand the position of women in a nomadic society such as the Pashtun, I recommend *The Red Tent*, a best-selling novel about the Old Testament personalities of Rebecca and Dinah, members of Isaac's household. The red tent is a place where women stay during menstruation, isolated from society until they are 'pure' again. Diamant, Anita, *The Red Tent* (New York: Picador, 1997).

^v Sufism was always an important component of Central Asian Islam. Jalaluddin Rumi, for example, one of the most popular *sufi* poets and founder of the whirling dervishes, was born in Balkh, near Mazar-i-Sharif in 1207. He moved to Anatolia with his father around 1220 to avoid Genghis Khan (who destroyed Balkh in 1226). Rumi died in Konya (Turkey) in 1273.