

# Nigeria: Living in the Shadow of Islamist Violence: Assessment of Citizens' Response to the Boko Haram Insurgency

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**Abstract.** *The Jama'atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda'wati wal jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad), popularly called Boko Haram, which literally means 'Western Education is Sin' was established in 2002 with the objective of restoring Islamic legal system (Sharia) in Northern Nigeria. It, therefore, started as a fundamental Islamic sect intended to supplant government structures that allegedly politicised, corrupted and bastardised proper implementation of Sharia in the North. In place of those structures, it will install an Islamic theocratic regime, in which Sharia law would be applied to the fullest. The sect carried out series of attacks on government facilities, security forces and later churches. In 2009, massive clampdown on the group by federal forces led to the death of one of its founders, Mohammed Yusuf. Boko Haram regrouped under a new*

*leader, Abubakar Shekau, in 2011 and embarked on a revenge mission for Yusuf's murder, leading to suicide bomb attacks on police, military and civilian targets. Although the Boko Haram violence occurs mostly in the Northeastern region of Nigeria, bringing the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja (the seat of the Federal Government of Nigeria) within its orbit raises the profile of the terror group. Attack on the FCT would also taunt the state over the vulnerability of the capital city as it also projects the state as incapable of fulfilling its primary responsibility of security of the lives and property of residents. The sect's violence on the FCT and its environs thus successfully imposed a climate of fear over the city and on the residents. In order to assess how residents of the FCT and its environs responded and are responding to the Boko Haram violence, this study adopts an eclectic blend of both survey and descriptive*

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research methodologies. The study found out that the responses of residents of FCT to Boko Haram violence is spatio-temporal relating to space (area) or time. Areas (city centre or satellite towns) where residents lived or worked played a role in contributing to feeling of vulnerability and the fear of the sect was heightened among residents after the high-profile attack of the UN House Abuja in August 2011. However, with the inauguration mid 2015 of a new government headed by a Northern Muslim, the fear of potential Boko Haram attacks in the FCT and its environs has significantly abated.

**Keywords:** Boko Haram, Islamist, Violence, Suicide Bomb Attacks, Federal Capital Territory, Residents.

## Introduction

The sophistication, precision and strategic attacks by the *Jama'atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda'wati wal jihad* (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad), otherwise widely known as the *Boko Haram* sect, since 2011, when the sect brought its vicious attention on Abuja - Nigeria's seat of power, did indeed raise concerns over the scepter of Islamists violence in Nigeria which began since 2009. Boko Haram's attack in Abuja first occurred on December 31, 2010 at a market in the Mogadishu Army Barracks where soldiers and civilians often gather for leisure (Vanguard, 2010). Strategic as the attack was, occurring at a walking distance to Aso Rock Villa, the seat of the Nigerian government, it symbolically exposes the vulnerability of both the state and sent shock waves not only among the Abuja residents but also across the length and breadth of the country. Military barracks usually are considered safe and secure in Nigeria. Since that initial attack, 11 other attacks have been executed by the sect in Abuja and the satellite towns in which scores of security operatives and civilians have lost their lives. These include the attack on the Police Force headquarters in June 2011, the United Nations House, later in August, the Christmas Day 2011 attack on St. Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla, Suleja (a satellite town of Abuja located 40 km from the city center), the April and May 2014 attacks at bus stations in Nyanya (another Abuja suburb), the attack on a shopping mall in the heart of the city in June 2014 and the October 2015 simultaneous attacks on Nyanya and Kuje, also an Abuja suburb. In Nyanya, the target was a police station while a market and a police station were targeted in Kuje.

Since 2009, when the Boko Haram sect formally declared a war on Nigeria, its violence was concentrated on other parts of northern Nigeria, particularly the North-East. Although the sect's violence in Nigeria, especially in the North-East part of the country, preceded the year 2009, however, not until 2011 did the Nigerian authorities become confronted with the reality of a vicious home-grown terrorism mounted by an Islamist sect. But it was the attack on the Police Force headquarters that exposed how daring the sect had become. In particular, quite spectacular were the audacity of attacking the convoy of the country's Police Chief, Hafiz Ringim, the symbol of the country's internal security, who only a few days back had boasted how he would wipe out the sect in a

matter of days. Executing the attack in the Police Czar's fortress was quite impudent. The Nigerian state has taken a lot of measures to contain the sect and its virulent violence including the use of extensive roadblocks and security patrols. Countering terrorism indeed is a doubled-edged strategy aimed at neutralising planned terrorist attacks and mitigate the effects. While the State take measures to contain the terror, the citizenry is on the edge. The frequency of terror attacks of the Boko Haram and its geographical spread has prompted security agencies to intensify joint counter-terrorism operations. While the successful execution of the attack probably helped boost Boko Haram's standing among global jihadi movement, it also exposed the vulnerability of Abuja, the seat of power in Nigeria, and subsequently imposed a climate of fear on residents; it casts doubts on the ability of the state to protect the citizenry.

For a city like the FCT, whose teeming population experiences rush periods (in the mornings and evenings), adoption of the suicide mode of attack by the Islamists heightened the anxiety and made the situation even more scary and traumatic. Bombs could explode anytime from the next fellow either in the morning rush hours, when people are anxious to get to their places of works/businesses, or in the evenings, when they are returning to their homes. It could also happen in many of the recreational facilities that dot the city. The FCT residents, like other Nigerians, began to raise the question of how they could protect themselves against a perpetrator who uses his/her life as a weapon. Before the Police headquarters attack, the only instance of suicide bombing involving a Nigerian, was Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's, (a.k.a, Underwear bomber), who attempted to blow up a Detroit-bound Northwestern Airlines Flight 253 on December 25, 2009. Despite being from a prominent family, many Nigerians blamed his action on the fact of his having spent most of his life abroad, thus dismissing suicide bombing as alien to Nigerian culture. The Police headquarters attack thus shattered that myth in Nigeria and the sense of security within the FCT. The attack on the UN House, which followed the same mode as the attack on the Police headquarters, further reinforced the fact that suicide as a *modus operandi* for the sect's operations as come to stay. The random nature of suicide bombing also worsened the climate of fear and insecurity. The climate of fear was further heightened by the brazenness of the attack on *ThisDay* newspaper, Abuja office, where the sect not only successfully executed yet another suicide bombing, but also took time to video the operation which was later posted on You Tube social media platform. In 2014, there were 31 suicide attacks by the group in Nigeria, with an average of nearly 15 deaths per attack according to the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) report of the Institute for Economics and Peace, (IEP, 2015, p. 22).

Expectedly, the Nigerian state has adopted several strategies in order to secure the FCT and residents alike. Checkpoints manned by soldiers were introduced at the city's entry points and in several parts of the FCT. Roads close to major government buildings such as the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation

(NNPC), Federal Secretariat, Defense Headquarters and a host of other security formations were also either condoned off or partially closed. Concrete barricades were also mounted around potential targets which include shopping malls, churches, government buildings and others. Patrons were subjected to screening, using bomb detectors and manual searches before accessing public places. But the closure of several lanes on city streets and the military checkpoints posed their own challenges. They contributed to massive traffic build-ups, especially at rush hours, even on intra-city road networks. But the Nyanya-Maraba-Masaka axis, leading into the FCT from eastern flank, where three bomb blasts occurred, including one that claimed 100 lives, bore much of the brunt of the traffic snarl. The number of checkpoints on the road inflicted untold hardship on commuters and other road users, with many spending as much as four hours to get into the city from a distance of about 12 kilometers. Many residents reported having to leave home as early as 5am in order to get on time to their jobs in the city. The checkpoints, nevertheless, did not allay residents' fear; bombs could yet detonate in traffic hold-ups and result in mass casualties.

State authorities also embarked on sensitization of citizens, urging them to report suspicious persons or objects to security agencies, whose help lines were widely circulated. The Nigerian Police, in particular in 2015, published *A Guide to Personal Security* and had copies distributed to citizens for enlightenment on general security matters. The booklet detailed actions to take to enhance security at home, workplaces and what to do in instances of encountering suspicious packages and explosive devices. Simulation drills were also conducted by security agencies to enhance coordination and improve response readiness and capability among relevant agencies in times of terror attacks in public places in the FCT. In early 2016, two of such simulation drills were coordinated by the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) on prompt response to terror attacks in public places in Abuja. One was conducted at Garki Mall on February 1, 2016 and the other at the International Conference Centre (ICC) on February 2, 2016. Sufficient awareness was raised among the public before the conduct of the simulation exercises to avoid panic among the already traumatized residents. Such simulation exercises have been replicated in several parts of the country, at airports, markets, etc.

Not surprisingly, the atmosphere of insecurity affected businesses, night clubs, recreation parks and malls which hitherto experienced high influx of patrons. Those places began to record low patronage as folks stayed away for fear of terror attacks. Indeed, the stop-and-search policy introduced at access points to these businesses took the fun out of recreation.

This study, therefore, focuses on the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) and its environs. For the purpose of this study, Nyanya, which is part of Nassarawa State, and Suleja, which is part of Niger State, would be included as environs of the FCT. The two satellite towns are contiguous to the FCT. The indiscriminate manner of the Boko Haram attacks

has shown that Abuja and its environs, such as Kuje, Nyanya or Suleja, remain targets. Young and old, women and children, rich and poor, military and civilians, have come within the orbit of the sect's bloody campaign. The manner of well-planned and executed attacks in the FCT instilled fear into the residents, who realized that even if the city was not experiencing attacks as intensely as Maiduguri, the epicenter of the sect's violence, each of the attacks in the FCT was planned to inflict the maximum casualty. Despite the government's assurances, the attacks obviously continued. In December 2015, the Federal Government claimed it has "technically defeated" Boko Haram militants. However, the Islamist sect has continued to successfully execute deadly attacks and even more audaciously, though no such attacks have been reported in the FCT.

This study intends, therefore, to analyze the trends and patterns of behavioral and psychological responses of FCT residents to the Boko Haram violence since the first attack on Abuja, in 2011. The study limits itself to the period (2011) when the first Boko Haram attack was executed in Abuja to the time (2015) when it was declared technically defeated. Accordingly, we shall sample the opinion of 200 FCT residents who were randomly selected, to empirically determine their responses patterns to Boko Haram violence. For the purpose of this study, the environs of the FCT include Abuja city center and the satellite towns of Nyanya, Suleja and Kuje.

In embarking on the study, we are conscious of the fact that the attacks by the Boko Haram Islamists in Abuja and its environs have imposed fear and acute sense of insecurity on the psyche of residents. The viciousness of the attacks in the FCT created a siege-like atmosphere, where residents are acutely aware that they are perennially in danger. Residents deliberately stayed away from places which seemed prone to terrorist attacks and where maximum impact could be achieved in the event of terror attacks, resulting in adverse effects on socio-economic life. This study, therefore, intends to crystallize how the residents have responded to both the fear and actual attacks of Boko Haram Islamists over the years. It analyses the pattern of reactions and responses of FCT residents to Boko Haram violence and how these propelled the government's actions. The research derives its impetus from the fact that it will contribute to the extant body of literature on terrorism and counter-terrorism and their implications on national security. The findings, therefore, will serve as an indicator of how much Boko Haram has succeeded in instilling fears in the residents, bearing in mind that invoking fear is the overall goal of all terrorism.

With the focus on how the FCT residents have responded to the Boko Haram violence since 2011, the study thus aims to achieve the following objectives, namely: (i) to explain why FCT is a target for Boko Haram, (ii) ascertain the extent to which security measures in the FCT have allayed the fear of the Islamists in the minds of residents, (iii) determine if the caliber or quality of the population of the FCT exerted any pressure on the State to up its responses to the Boko haram violence, (iv) analyze the response patterns of

FCT residents to the Boko Haram terrorism, (v) to determine if the responses of the residents contributed to the forestalling of Boko Haram violence in the FCT since June 2014 and (vi) to establish an empirical correlation between responses of residents and their public activities.

### **Boko Haram: A Background**

Different accounts have attempted to provide an insight into the early history of the Boko Haram Islamist sect in Nigeria- specifically striving to provide information into the group's early formative period, including the actual date it was founded (Okereke, 2011; Adibe, 2012; Alozieuwa, 2012; Uzodike & Maiangwa, 2012). The ambiguity beclouding the information on the origin of the group may not however be unconnected with the fact that not until it began its transformation into a violent group, the emergence of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria followed the pattern of the prevalent Alamajiri system in northern Nigeria. In that part of the country, Islamic scholars are usually prone to establishing Islamic education centers that target mainly street children who are taught the Islamic holy text, the Koran. Also called Moshalashi, these Islamic centers also serve as the purpose of doctrinal centers where the mallams feed their impressionable victims who are usually between the ages of three and 17 with their personal understanding and versions of Islam. Thus Boko Haram sprang up as a loose religious group formed around the teaching and preaching of the Islamic religion in that part of Nigeria. Although the credit for the formation of the group has generally been ascribed to Mohammed Yusuf, looking at it from the perspective of an entirely home-grown terror group, mention is often made also of a certain Abubakar Lawan who established the group first as Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization (SMYO) at the University of Maiduguri. At that preliminary stage, the SMYO operated merely as a Muslim evangelical group. Lawan would however later leave for the University of Medina for further studies, thus making way for the ascendancy of Yusuf to the leadership of the group. The period 2002-2003 have been speculated as the one when the Boko Haram was formed as a loose religious organization. Some accounts, however, put the date as the mid-90's, when the group's messages were said to have begun to spread publicly. This later account, however, brings into focus the international dimension of the origin of Boko Haram. The mid-90's coincided with the period when the Al-Qaeda founder, Osama bin Laden, made the famous statement to the effect that Nigeria had become ripe for a jihad. Invariably, this aspect, therefore, links the founding of the group to one Mohammed Ali, a Nigerian from Maiduguri, who was a student of Islamic Studies at the University of Khartoum, Sudan, between 1992 and 1996. According to this narrative, while at the university of Khartoum, Ali had come under the influence of bin Laden who gave him \$3 million to organize al-Qaeda cells in Nigeria. Ali was also said to have had military training in Afghanistan which was facilitated by Osama bin Laden (International Crises Group, 2014).

The common denominator in all the narratives about Boko Haram at its formative periods, and all through the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf, cast the group as non-violent. Yusuf was projected as someone imbued strongly with the conviction that a theocratic state within Nigeria, which was the ultimate aim of the group, was achievable without resort to violence. It was also said that Yusuf's approach, which they dismissed as been too soft, did not go down well with his two deputies, Abubakar Shekau and Aminu Tashen-Illim, both who were apostles of violent route to the installation of Sharia governance in Nigeria (International Crises Group, 2014). The violence with which the group became notorious with is thus alleged on the splinter group which was based in Yobe – Yusuf's home state, but whose allegiance laid with the two deputies. Such narrative created the doubt whether or not the sect's current level of radicalization is a function of the deaths of its initial leadership and subsequent clampdown by the State or the accession to its leadership of the taciturn psychopath, Abubakar Shekua, a Kanuri native, who boasts that "I enjoy killing anyone that God commands me to kill – the way I enjoy killing chickens and rams" (Alozieuwa, 2012, p. 2).

Prior to Yusuf's death in 2009, an event that is widely believed to have provoked the group to violence, certain incidents had occurred to betray the violence propensity of the Boko Haram sect. In late December 2003, about 200 members of Boko Haram had launched an attack on police stations and public buildings in the towns of Kanamma and Geidam in Yobe State. In early January 2004, Boko Haram also clashed with a local vigilante group while attempting to attack a police station outside Domba town, in Borno State, near the Chad border. Bags containing AK-47 rifles were recovered from sect members in that encounter. In September 2004, Boko Haram also launched an attack on police stations in Gwoza and Bama communities in Borno State, and, thereafter, took refuge in the Mandara Mountain along the Nigeria-Cameroon border. In October 2004, the group also attacked a convoy of 60 policemen in an ambush near Kala-Balge, on the Nigerian boarder with Chad. Those operations, whose purposes were to gain weapons, mostly AK-47 rifles preparatory to armed struggle (Olaposi, 2014), not only remove the veil over the non-violent pretentiousness of the group, they also occurred under Yusuf's leadership. And even if the violence perpetrated in Yobe within the aforementioned periods was executed by the faction led by Yusuf's deputies, it may be safe to speculate that those perpetrated in Borno were directly under Yusuf's supervision. Ibn Taymiyyah, from whom Yusuf drew his Salafist inspiration, was a fourteenth century Islamic scholar, theologian and logician who preached Islamic fundamentalism and is considered a "major theorist" for radical groups in the Middle East (Sergie & Johnson, 2015). In July 2009, Yusuf threatened reprisal attacks on Nigeria's security forces and issued ultimatum to the State preparatory to a campaign of vengeance against the security forces who had clashed with his members the previous month over crash helmet legislation violation. Some members of the group were lost to the stand-off. Towards the end of July, following a crackdown on the group at Yusuf's

base at the Railway Quarters in Maiduguri, large cache of arms was also found and a militant training ground discovered. Boko Haram responded with an uprising. Yusuf and some of his followers lost their lives eventually in the process. What is more? Many of Yusuf's members were part of the ECOMOG group, a political militia that was used by politicians in the state to struggle for political power. Alozieuwa (2015) has treated the culture of political militia in great details and therefore needs not be repeated all over again. But suffice it to state that Yusuf's ECOMOG brandished cutlasses, cudgels, knives and sticks and used same to terrorise residents of Maiduguri, ahead of and after the 1999 and 2003 elections.

It is also important to situate the militancy of the Boko Haram against the backdrop of the Sharia fever which swept across the 12 Northern between 2002 and 2003. In 1999, Mallah Kachallah rode to power with the support of the ECOMOG group on a deal to implement the Sharia legal code in the state. However, with the improper implementation of the Sharia in the state by Kachallah and disagreements between the later and his political godfather Ali Modu Sheriff, who allegedly was funding the ECOMOG group, Yusuf became disillusioned, particularly over the half-hearted implementation of the Sharia. With the advantage of the huge youth electoral bloc provided by the ECOMOG group, Yusuf backed Ali Modu Sheriff to upstage Kachallah and emerge Governor in exchange for stricter implementation of Sharia. Sheriff and Yusuf fell out after the latter reneged on his promise (International Crises Group 2014:12), leading to the removal from office of the Boko Haram members in Sheriff's government who were senior government officials including the Commissioner for Religious Affairs, Ustaz Buji Foi. Yusuf's disillusionment worsened. Subsequently Yusuf's group constituted itself into a nuisance in the state and Sheriff's attempt to rein in the group through the crash helmet legislation was resisted by the group. The stage was formally set for confrontation with the State.

In a sense, therefore, Boko Haram could be said to have started out as a fundamentalist Islamic sect intended to supplant government structures, which in its view, politicized, corrupted and bastardized proper implementation of *Sharia* in the North. In the place of such a corrupted system, it would install an Islamic regime where *Sharia* law will be applied to the fullest. The initial demands, following Shekau's emergence, included punishment for the security agents in whose hands Yusuf died and revenge for the arrest and detention of families of Boko Haram members. However, in many of the statements credited to him later on, Shekau never stressed the demand for the strict observance of Sharia in the states in the Northern region. Neither has the Boko Haram also neither asked for economic compensation from the Federal Government over those deaths, nor demanded for special social welfare package.

The Boko Haram sect, which eventually extended its reach into Cameroon, Niger Republic, and Chad, was a product of Islamic fundamentalism before forming alliance with global terror groups. While the group today has evolved into a terrorist organiza-



tion, it however started out as a religious group with *Salafi* millenarian beliefs, which assisted its evolution into Islamic militancy. Perhaps the manner of its evolution informed the seeming reluctance initially by the Nigerian government to designate it a terrorist organization. It was a religious group which canvassed for the full implementation of Sharia law, winning the sympathies of most Northern Muslims. The extra-judicial murder of Mohammed Yusuf and unleashing of federal troops against the sect in 2009 also pitched some sections of the populace against the government, which eventually made attempt at pacification by the arraignment of the policemen who allegedly carried out the execution. This support and the fact that then President Goodluck Jonathan government did not enjoy the support of the majority of Northerners, informed the prevarication over its designation as a terrorist organization, even when it already met the criteria for such listing. The rules of engagement which would allow for maximum military force could further fracture an already frosty relationship with some elements in the North. After much pressure, the Nigerian government eventually designated Boko Haram and its splinter group, Ansaru, as terrorist organizations in June 2013; the US followed in November. Despite being an offshoot of Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram later pledged allegiance to ISIS, which also started out as an al-Qaeda affiliate. The Global Terrorism Index report of the Institute for Economics and Peace cited Boko Haram and ISIS as responsible for 51 percent of deaths attributed to terrorists groups in 2014 (IEP, 2015). Boko Haram has however overtaken all terror groups to emerge the deadliest in the world with 7,512 fatalities in 2014, up from 6,644 fatalities in 2013 (IEP, 2015).

### **The Research Methodology**

According to Ogolo (1996), methodology describes the procedure to be followed in realising the goals and objectives of a research. For the purpose of this study, we shall rely on both primary and secondary data sources. These data will be subjected to content analysis, triangulated and interpretatively analysed. For our purpose, which is to examine how residents of the Federal Capital Territory have reacted to Boko Haram violence, the quantitative research methodology is used in this study. It involved the use of measurable data to formulate facts and uncover patterns in research. Our data collection method is, therefore, the descriptive survey. In this regard, the main instrument used to measure the relationship between the variables of response and Boko Haram violence is the questionnaire designed with the Likerts model. 200 questionnaires were distributed in all four locations and analysed quantitatively using the Statistical Packages for Social Sciences (SPSS) and Microsoft Excel. Face-to-face-interview is also used for the purposes of data collection. It is however important to note that a major fall-out of the Boko Haram violence in the FCT and indeed in Nigeria generally is that people became suspicious of issues that have to do with security. Some potential respondents were, therefore, unwilling to fill out questionnaires, whereas some agreed after much persuasion. Many were skeptical despite assurances that the information would be held

in the strictest confidence and is for academic purposes only. The study also made use of secondary sources of data.

### **Research Design**

In this section, we present a comprehensive analytical breakdown of the methods used in conducting the study. The study design was based on descriptive survey. Questionnaires respondents were randomly selected in the FCT. Data was collected quantitatively (through a survey) by the use of questionnaires, while four residents were also interviewed. These were complemented with qualitative data collected from published books, journals and reports on Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria since 2009. Collected data were analysed quantitatively using the Statistical Packages for Social Sciences (SPSS) and qualitatively using descriptive and content analysis.

### **Study Population And Sampling Technique**

Study population is the total number of people within the area the researcher intends to study, while sample population is derived from entire population. The FCT has an estimated four million residents living and working in both the central districts and the satellite communities up from 778,567 according to Nigeria's 2006 Census figures. For the purpose of this study, respondents to the questionnaires, and interviewees were randomly selected to reflect the two major demography compositions of the FCT, mentioned above.

### **Methods Of Data Collection**

The main instrument of data collection for this study is the questionnaire which has been designed to quantitatively assess how residents of the Federal Capital Territory have reacted to Boko Haram violence over the years. The questionnaire was used to collect data from the field. The questionnaire was divided into two parts, the first part extracted demographic data, while the second part contained questions which were derived from the research objectives as stated earlier. Specifically, some of the items sought to determine if the public information and security alerts circulated by the government establishment and the statutory security agencies significantly influenced how the FCT residents responded to the Boko Haram violence. The responses were ranked, on a scale of 1 to 4, in line with the Likerts model. Attempt was made to reach the one hundred and twenty (120) respondents across FCT.

### **Procedure For Data Analysis And Model Specification**

Empirical data collected and those retrieved from archival sources (secondary data) were analysed through the use of qualitative data analysis methods. Hence, data were subjected to interpretative analysis and triangulated in order to verify their accuracy.

cy. Data generated through questionnaires (primary data) were analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), from which the descriptive statistics (frequencies and percentages, tables and charts) were derived. The qualitative data generated literature review was subjected to content and interpretative analysis.

### **Justification Of Methods**

The methods for this study is justified by the reason of the fact that in the process of carrying out this research work, care was taken to ensure that the various rights and freedom of individual respondents were adequately respected and protected. No respondent was placed under duress, fear or favour of any sort; informed consent of individual respondents; secrecy and confidentiality of respondents, and the integrity of individual respondents were all respected. All these were emphasised in order to ensure truthful, reliable and quality information.

### **Hypotheses Formulation**

For the purpose of this study also, we shall formulate our hypothesis around two variables, namely the dependent and independent variables. For our purpose, the dependent and independent variables are 'Response' and 'Boko Haram Violence' respectively. Thus our hypotheses are follows:

**H<sub>1</sub>**: Boko Haram attacks in the FCT/neighbouring communities have made residents fearful.

**H<sub>0</sub>**: Boko Haram attacks in the FCT/neighbouring communities have not made residents fearful.

The findings of this study will serve as the basis to validly reject or accept H<sub>1</sub> and H<sub>0</sub>.

### **The Conceptual Discourse**

Terrorism, according to the US Department of Homeland Security is "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience," (US Department of Homeland Security, 2002). Bruce Hoffman (2006) defines it as: "...violence-or equally important, the threat of violence-use and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim" (p. 3). These definitions and several others reflect the similarities of 'violence' as tool deployed by terrorists and with the 'aim or intention' to induce fear. In other words, the objective of terrorism is to induce fear and this study focuses on how residents of the FCT have reacted to the threat of terrorist group, Boko Haram. Hoffman argues that the US Department of Homeland Security has the most encompassing definition for terrorism, as it highlights the threat as much as the actual violence and focuses on the target of society and government. Beyond the actual violent

acts, the far-reaching effect of terrorism is the psychological aftermath of creating an atmosphere permeated by fear and insecurity, where citizens live in fear of the unknown - a response pattern which this study examines on residents of the FCT. Due to this psychological aftermath, its violent nature and the misery its bloody actions entail, the word terrorism stirs strong emotions (Lindberg, 2010). Goldstein (2005) describes terrorism as a shadowy world of faceless enemies and irregular tactics marked by extreme brutality. Nigeria's Boko Haram has employed different tactics in its violent campaign on the populace, ranging from detonation of bombs, suicide bombings, random shootings, landmines, kidnappings, beheading on videos, etc.

However, the terrorist is fundamentally a rational actor and a "violent intellectual" ready and committed to using force in pursuit of his particular political goals (Hoffman, 2006). He thinks out his objective and then carefully plans how best to achieve it (Whittaker, 2007). In the taxonomy of violence, terrorism stands out as a policy tool of coercive intimidation whose ultimate aim is to change "the system" through violent acts (Hoffman, 2006, p. 37). An important objective for those terrorists who carry out the coercion strategy is to influence the public, not so much through articulate appeal as through intimidation and fear (Whittaker, 2007). Therefore, violence applied to achieve a political goal is in essence the fundamental characteristic that distinguishes terrorism from crime and other forms of violence (Hoffman, 2006).

Since the definition issue remains controversial, terrorism experts such as Laqueur (2004) and Hoffman (2006) find it useful to list certain distinctions as a path to definition. In addition to its ineluctable political dimension and deliberate violence, there are some cardinal criteria for describing the ontology of contemporary terrorism. Lindberg (2010) identifies and discusses some of these criteria:

- (i). It is about power: Terrorists want power; terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate it where there is very little, (Hoffman, 2006).
- (ii). It is systematic: The terrorist enterprise is a planned, calculated and indeed systematic act (Hoffman, 2006). Terrorism is a method, rather than a set of adversaries or the causes they pursue (Pillar, 2003). It is choreographed with an audience in mind - a concept epitomised in the celebrated statement by terrorism expert Brian Jenkins, "Terrorism is theatre" (cited in Hoffman, 2006, p. 32).
- (iii). It is designed to have the ripple effect of fear: Terrorism seeks to go beyond the immediate target victims; it seeks to have far-reaching psychological repercussions (Hoffman, 2006). The purpose of a terrorist attack is to instill fear on a wider scale in order to coerce others into giving in to their demands. The essence of terrorist operations is its indiscriminate attacks against civilians, with the intent of creating havoc and instilling fear and insecurity in society (Laqueur, 2004).
- (iv). It is rational: The terrorist strives to act optimally in order to achieve his goal in a clear demonstration of an entirely rational choice, often reluctantly embraced after

considerable reflection and debate, weighing costs and benefits before undertaking the murderous journey, (Cordesman, 2001; Lindberg, 2010).

Boko Haram, as a phenomenon, fits the identified attributes, as the sect uses terrorism for the propagation of its ideas and pursuit of its objectives. Crenshaw (1983) notes that terrorist groups usually have direct, physical connections with other terrorists groups in other countries, which extend to travel arrangements, funding and collaboration in executing attacks. Boko Haram was initially linked to Al-Qaeda and later the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Considering the pronouncements of the leaders of the group and targets of attacks, it can be said that though Boko Haram terrorism is majorly an internal security challenge, yet intelligence reports have indicated that its operations have been aided by the global jihadi movement. While its primary targets initially were the police, military and religious facilities and their operators, the August 26, 2011 attack on the UN House in Abuja indicated that Boko Haram has global jihadi ambition. Elements of Boko Haram have been found out to have received training from foreign militant groups, including North Africa-based Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The link with ISIS was also solidified by a video released on March 7, 2015, by Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau when he formally swore an oath of allegiance to the ISIS. In his pledge, Shekau publicly accepted the authority of ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and vowed to support him in times of “difficulty and prosperity”. Shekau further called upon “Muslims everywhere to pledge allegiance to the Caliph and support him”. On March 12, 2015, ISIS spokesman, Mohammed al-Adani ‘graciously’ accepted Shekau’s oath of allegiance in an audiotape recording. This marked the formalisation of a relationship between two of the deadliest Islamist extremist organisations currently in operation. According to the IEP’s Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2015, Boko Haram and ISIS together accounted for 51 percent of all deaths attributed to Islamist extremism in 2014. The report, which is a comprehensive study of the direct and indirect impact of terrorism in 162 countries, also lists the sect as the deadliest Islamist group in the world. It notes that Nigeria is the third terrorism most impacted country after Iraq and Afghanistan (IEP, 2015).

### **The Theoretical Framework: Psycho-Social Theory of Terrorism**

Terrorism, as Luis de la Corte (2007, 2014) has rightly noted, is a difficult topic. Its explanation may indeed be biased by political assumptions and social prejudices. However, every research process certainly needs to be substantially aided by the use of appropriate theories, concepts and constraints to elucidate and classify relationships among phenomena. As John Gaddis (1991) rightly observes, finding one’s way through unfamiliar terrain, generally requires a map of some sort. That map, in this endeavor, is correspondingly an appropriate theoretical framework. That is, a network of reasoning that embodies theories, concepts and assumptions about some observed events or phenomena and the explanations as to how these events and phenomena

are related to each other (Asika, 1991). Theory, as Brown (1975) has therefore noted, helps to determine consciousness. Appropriate theoretical framework will thus help in not only providing direction and focus to the study, but also provide the condition whereby specific hypotheses about causes and effects can be deduced and tested by their refutability. Nigerian scholar Aja-Akpuru (2007) has also noted, as every scientist knows that every theory is a guide and tool for the inter-operation and prediction of events, and outcomes. Yet no theory perfectly captures reality. Little wonder, Thomas Kuhn (1962) stresses that intellectual scientific advance consists of the displacement of one paradigm, which has become increasingly incapable of explaining new or newly discovered facts, by a new paradigm, which does account for those facts in a satisfactory manner. Even then, Kuhn asserts that to be accepted as a paradigm, although a theory must seem better than its competitors, but it needs not, and in fact never does explain all the facts with which it can be confronted. Whereas several theories attempt to explain the Boko Haram phenomenon in Nigeria, for our purpose, this study is premised on the psycho-social theory for explaining terrorism in relation to the political and ideological intentions of Boko Haram. Terrorism, in the first instance, is a matter of individual motivations, perceptions and deliberate choice to join a terrorist group, participate in acts of terrorism, and continue to engage in terrorist activity (Crenshaw, 1990b). It is therefore necessary to determine when and under what circumstances extremist groups choose to deploy terrorism.

De la Corte (2007), in applying the psycho-social theory to explain terrorism, presents its seven assumptions, as listed below:

- (i). Terrorism must not be seen as a syndrome, but as a method of social and political influence. For terrorists, it is about a social sphere of influence, where people attempt to influence the behavior or beliefs of other people. It is therefore a communicative tool, as spreading fear through violence has a communicative dimension. Terrorist violence is considered a means to direct people's attention to certain problems or publicize political or religious demands. The assumption is closely linked to the tactical utility of terrorism which provides explanations for why extremist groups find terrorism useful (Skjolberg & Lia, 2007) after attempts to make impact through non-violent struggle. Why would Boko Haram deploy terrorism? As stated in the introduction to this study, one of the founders, Mohammed Yusuf, had chosen the path of preaching and working with the state government to see to a creation on a theocratic state, governed by the ideals of Sharia law, even though the method was considered idealist. The sect later under a new leadership adopted the tool of violent terrorism, effectively drawing attention to its existence and cause. As Crenshaw (1990a) puts it, the decision to deploy terrorism stems from the 'useful agenda setting function' of terrorist acts. Modern mass media facilitates the spread of dramatic violence and tragedies, helping to amplify the psychological effects of

- terrorism. It could also be for vengeance, with extremists and states engaging in a cycle of attacks, and counter attacks, each to avenge their victims (Waldman, 2001).
- (ii). Attributes of terrorists are shaped by processes of social interactions, of like-minded persons. Joining a terrorist group could be influenced by a social political environment shared by family and friends; a person who was raised in an atmosphere of radical ideas and values has the potential to join an extremist organization, which propagates same values and ideas. Joining a terrorist organization could however also be a result of making contact and establishing relationship with others who share similar extremist political or religious ideas. It could however be unintentional, as some get recruited into terrorist organizations without realizing they would be deployed in carrying out acts of terrorism (Onuoha, personal communication, April 11, 2016<sup>1</sup>). In buttressing the assumption of social interaction, Sageman (2004) posits that personal paths, interactions and choices may lead young Muslims to become radical jihadists. In a research he conducted with 168 subjects, Sageman discovered that the act of joining a jihadist group could be unintentional, resulting from friendship with another person who is a radical jihadist. The research presented that 68 percent of the 168 said friendship was the main factor influencing joining extremists groups, while 14 percent said it was influenced by familial bonds.
- (iii). Terrorist organizations can be analyzed by analogy with other social movements: terrorist campaigns are the result of a long radicalization process of religious or political movements and, therefore, find that identification as part of a much larger community will help them fulfill their goals. This creates a social cohesion among them, promoting positive relationships and intra-group cooperation. As Tajfel predicts in his social identity theory, terrorists lose a sense of self, committing themselves to put the interests of the organization ahead of theirs, which could encourage willingness to suicide terrorism (cited in De la Corte, 2007, p. 2). They see the world as 'us versus them', as their bipolar worldview makes them develop negative prejudices towards people who are not part of their 'community' (Taylor & Louis, 2003). In striving to be part of a global jihad network of terrorists, extremist groups copy modes of violence (e.g. recording live beheadings) and plan their attacks in a manner to impress their allies, an aspect backed by the contagion theory of terrorism (Skjolberg & Lia 2007).
- (iv). Terrorism is only possible when terrorists have access to certain resources (materials, people and symbols). The possibility of any protest movement's emergence depends not just on the social situation, but also on the capability to mobilize resources to execute its campaign (McCarthy & Zaid, 1973). Terrorist campaigns therefore require materials (money, technology), people (militants, collaborators,

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1 Interview at the National Defense College, Abuja: April 11, 2016.

etc.) and symbols (clearly linked ideologies that motivate terrorist acts) (Waldman, 1997, cited in De la Corte, 2007, p. 3). A significant amount of time is spent in mobilizing these resources which may lead the terrorists to engage in armed robbery, kidnappings, extortion and other illegal acts (Ozdamar, 2008). They also design unique methods for recruitment strategies (Onuoha, personal communication, April 11, 2016) and for radicalization training programs (De la Corte, 2007).

- (v). The decision to sustain a terrorist campaign is always legitimized by an extreme ideology. Ideology, in this context, is a system of extremist beliefs and values that are shared by a terrorist organization and its allies. Terrorist organizations are always backed by an extremist ideology which provides justification for their violent actions. It is however necessary to point out that the ideology of an extremist group could also be embraced by others who are not involved in terrorist activities and do not support their violent acts.
- (vi). Every terrorist campaign involves strategic goals, but the rationality which terrorists apply to their violence is imperfect. This assumption is closely linked to the rational choice theory which posits that individuals always make logical decisions; that a rational actor, in this case, the terrorist, only chooses actions which he believes would best serve his purpose and satisfy his preferences. In other words, an action taken by a terrorist is the most effective according to the real situation he operates in. Regular citizens do not consider terrorists to be rational because their choice of action and level of violence exhibited do not seem justifiable, particularly since it is carried out against civilians. Scholars, however, emphasize that terrorists are rational, which is why they change strategies to adapt to changing situations and to react to their 'enemies', i.e the state, and citizens (Victoroff, 2005).
- (vii). The activities of terrorists partly reflect the internal features of their organization. The chances of terrorists acting in a rational way are not only affected by their mental attributes, but by the characteristics of their organizations. Blanco, Caballero and De La Corte (2004) identify two kinds of terrorist organizations' attributes that influence their actions: organizational structure and group dynamics.

The structure of any organization is equivalent to the formal pattern of social relations established based on roles and norms. There are two main structures to terrorist organizations: a hierarchical structure, such as the Italian Red Brigade, and a less hierarchical, flexible or decentralized structure (De la Corte, 2007). The hierarchical structure involves stronger leadership, which exhibits stricter control on followers, ensuring adherence to organizational rules and operational guidelines. According to Zanini and Edwards (2001), contemporary terrorist groups have adopted the decentralized, flexible and less hierarchical structures, which adapt better to trans-national terrorism campaigns. The newer groups, such as Al-Qaeda, have become the most active and they rely more on shared values and co-ordination mechanism to accomplish their goals, much more than hierarchical fiat. These less hierarchical groups are harder to



disband or dismantle, as neutralization of some cells, or networks do not necessarily have much impact on the entire group (De la Corte, 2007).

The group dynamics attribute is related to decision making process. As experimental studies have shown, human groups polarize attitudes and decisions much more than individuals. Group polarization, therefore, encourages highly risky behavior and action (Myers, 1978). Terrorist cells exhibit conditions that facilitate group polarization, such as deliberately reducing contact with persons who do not share similar extremist ideologies. Other group dynamics which facilitate terrorist activities include the norms and roles to which they adjust their behavior, the influence exerted by the leaders, and the material benefits and psychological rewards associated with terrorist militancy.

In adopting the psychosocial theory to explain the Boko Haram phenomenon, certain attributes are applicable: violence and fear. Brought on by Islamic fundamentalism in Northern Nigeria, the activities and violence of Boko Haram can however best be understood within the context of the global jihadi movement (Onuoha, 2011; Sergie & Johnson, 2015). The terrorism attribute of Boko Haram is, therefore, the outcome of its direct and indirect alliance with the global jihadi movement.

If the question is raised as to the main motive of Boko Haram, it will be safe to assert that the sect's real motive is to "purify" the Islamic religion and ensure that Islamic tenets and morals values are not swept away by the globalising wind of western civilisation and culture. While Boko Haram's attacks on police formations could be properly framed as the retaliatory or revengeful actions (for the death of Yusuf in police custody in 2009), the bombings of the UN House in Abuja, security facilities, churches and kidnapping could not be categorised as such, but rather an attempt to indicate that Boko Haram has a global link, and invariably boost its status within the global jihadi movement.

### **Data Analysis and Discussion**

For emphasis, the aim of this study is to examine how the FCT residents have responded to the Boko Haram violence since 2011. Specifically, the study aims at explaining the reasons why the FCT is a target for Boko Haram, ascertain the extent to which security measures in the FCT allayed the fear of Boko Haram in the minds of residents, analyze the response patterns of the FCT residents to the Boko Haram terrorism and determine if the responses of the residents contributed to the prevention of Boko Haram attacks in the FCT since October 2015. This section covers the presentation – analysis and interpretation of data, which was extracted from the reports of respondents from Abuja, Suleja, Nyanya and Kuje environs. The results of the statistical analysis are presented in this section following the order of research questions and hypothesis posited in the preceding section of the paper.

Also, four respondents from each of the locations under study were interviewed, after a random selection. The interview questions were summarized from the questionnaire,

to present a clearer picture of the opinion of the randomly – selected respondents on the subject matter.

**Overview of Data Collection**

Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 show the distribution of the samples used for this study organised according to locations, gender, age, level of education and marital status. Table 1 shows the distribution of Cohort samples according to location, age and gender. A total of 200 people responded to the questionnaire administered. Of this number, 135 (67.5%) are males, while 65 (32.5%) are females. The questionnaire was administered to residents within four locations in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) namely: Nyanya, Abuja, Suleja and Kuje, areas. From the Table, the highest numbers of responses were from male respondents in Abuja and Kuje residential areas with a total of 34 (17.0%). A further breakdown of the responses shows that the highest numbers of respondents were from the age bracket of 33 and 42, numbering 84 (42%). The least number were from those within the age range of 63 and above, numbering only 7 (3.5%). The youths amongst them were only 8 or 4% in number.

**Table 1:** Distribution of Cohort Samples According to Location, Age and Gender

Location			Age						Total
			13-22 Yrs	23-32 Yrs	33-42 Yrs	43-52 Yrs	53-62 Yrs	63 and Above	
Nyanya:	Gender	Female	1	4	7	1		2	15
		Male	0	6	12	17		0	35
	Total		1	10	19	18		2	50
Abuja:	Gender	Female	1	0	12	3	1		17
		Male	1	6	15	10	1		33
	Total		2	6	27	13	2		50
Suleja:	Gender	Female	1	3	10	1		1	16
		Male	1	5	11	16		1	34
	Total		2	8	21	17		2	50
Kuje:	Gender	Female	1	6	3	5	1	1	17
		Male	2	2	14	11	2	2	33
	Total		3	8	17	16	3	3	50

Table 2 depicts the distribution of samples according to level of educational attainment and marital status, moderated by gender. The highest numbers of responses were from respondents with post graduate diploma. Table 2 shows that a total of 56 (28%) respondents are males with HND/First Degree qualification. This is followed by 34 (20%) other males with Post Graduate Diploma. The least numbers of respondents are those with primary school certificate who are 4 in number. The highest numbers of females with HND/First Degree are 26 (13%). Majority of the respondents were married people. Of this number, 65 (32.5%) of them are females while other 132 representing 66% are males. Three (3) respondents representing 1.5% did not indicate their status.

**Table 2:** Distribution of Samples According to Level of Education, Marital Status and Gender

Gender			Marital Status				Total
			None	Married	Separated/ Divorced	Others	
Female	Level_Educ	0	0	1	0	0	1
		Secondary	2	3	1	0	6
		NCE/OND	3	3	0	1	7
		HND/First Degree	4	19	1	2	26
		Post Graduate	3	16	0	6	25
		Total	12	42	2	9	65
Male	Level_Educ	0	0	1	1	0	2
		None	0	0	0	1	1
		Primary	1	1	1	1	4
		Secondary	9	7	3	0	19
		NCE/OND	0	9	1	3	13
		HND/First Degree	11	39	3	3	56
		Post Graduate	3	24	3	7	37
		Total	24	81	12	15	132

As in Tables 1 and 2, Table 3 depicts the distribution of samples according to level of education, location and gender. Responses were received from four locations. Male respondents had the highest number with 135 or 67.5%. Also, people in this male group had the highest level of educational qualification of HND/First Degree and their number is 57. The female group had lower number comprising 65 respondents and 26 of them had HND/First Degree. Those with Post Graduate Diploma were 25 in number. Male respondents living in Nyanya area were highest in number with 35 or 17.5%, while female respondents living in Abuja and Kuje had the highest number of 17 or 8.5%.

**Table 3:** Distribution of Samples According to Level of Education, Location and Gender

Gender			Location				Total
			Nyanya	Abuja	Suleja	Kuje	
Female	Level_Educ	0	0	0	0	1	1
		Secondary	2	1	1	2	6
		NCE/OND	3	0	2	2	7
		HND/First Degree	7	7	5	7	26
		Post Graduate	3	9	8	5	25
		Total	15	17	16	17	65
Male	Level_Educ	0	0	0	0	2	2
		None	0	0	0	1	1
		Primary	1	1	1	1	4
		Secondary	9	2	5	3	19
		NCE/OND	7	3	2	2	14
		HND/First Degree	12	18	16	11	57
		Post Graduate	6	9	10	13	38
		Total	35	33	34	33	135

### **Research Question 1:**


#### **Does the political status of the FCT make it a target for Boko Haram attack?**

Research questions 1, 2 and 3 were used for computing a composite variable known as *political status*. The individual responses of the candidates on the three items were aggregated according to the five point Likert scale scores showing Strongly disagree – 1, Disagree – 2, Undecided – 3, Agree – 4 and Strongly agree – 5. The number of respondents who indicated *strongly agree* were 121, representing 60.5%. Also, 65 others were in agreement that the political situation of Abuja made it a target for Boko Haram. This number represents 32.5% of the total number of respondents. When this number is added to 66.5%, it translates to 93.0%. The number of cases in disagreement, as well as those that were undecided, is equal to 14 or 7%. By this result, it is clear that the majority of the respondents agreed that the position of Abuja as the Federal Capital of the country made it a target for Boko Haram violence. In the same way, the number of female respondents in agreement was 60 out of the total of 65, just as in the case of the males where 126 out of 135 were in agreement. This result is also an indication that there is significant agreement in the opinion of males and females with regards to why Abuja is a target for insurgency.

By its position as the seat of power of Government as well as the political hub of the nation, Abuja is placed at a disadvantage position when issues concerning revolt, insurrections and demonstrations come up. These occur when people are not satisfied with the government, perhaps as a result of the authorities not being able to meet their wishes and aspiration. They often express dissatisfaction through actions deemed against the law. When people affected by one concern or the other intend to make their feelings known to the government, the central seat of power often becomes the target, just like Abuja. It is no wonder, therefore, that Abuja became a target for Boko Haram. This description is further buttressed as in Figure 1 with the Bar Chart showing number of respondents and their levels of agreement on the political status of the FCT which makes it a target for Boko Haram attacks. The total bar in figure 1 shows that the male respondents had the highest number of responses who strongly agreed that the political situation of FCT made it a target for attacks.

**Table 5:** Showing Cross Tabulation of Respondents Scores on Reasons Why FCT is a Target for Boko Haram

Gender			Political_status_2				Total
			Disagree	Undecid-ed	Agree	Strongly Agree	
Female	Level_Educ	0	0	0	0	1	1
		Secondary	1	1	3	1	6
		NCE/OND	0	0	4	3	7
		HND/First Degree	0	2	12	12	26
		Post Graduate	0	1	3	21	25
		Total	1	4	22	38	65
Male	Level_Educ	0	0	0	1	1	2
		None	0	0	0	1	1
		Primary	0	0	2	2	4
		Secondary	0	0	10	9	19
		NCE/OND	0	2	9	3	14
		HND/First Degree	1	2	15	39	57
		Post Graduate	0	4	6	28	38
		Total	1	8	43	83	135



**Figure 1:** Bar Chart Showing Number of Respondents and their Levels of Agreement the political status of FCT, which makes it a target for Boko Haram attacks

**Research question 2:**

**Has the sect’s activities invoked fear in the residents of the FCT?**

Table 6 shows the level of agreement of respondents on whether or not the sect’s activities invoked fear on the residents of the FCT. Ethnicity played the role of a moderating variable in this research question. Since the people living in these four areas within Abuja are made up of Nigerians with diverse ethnic inclinations, it will be appropriate to examine the opinion of these various people to ascertain if they all have the same opinion or if they differ.

The respondents were grouped into four ethnic groups. Analysis of the response pattern, as indicated in Table 6, shows that respondents from other tribes, other than Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa, had the highest numbers of affirmative responses with 51.5%. Figure 2 buttresses this with the Bar Chart which shows the level of agreement of respondents by ethnicity and location.

**Table 6:** A Cross Tabulation of Respondents’ Scores on How Sects’ Activities Invoked Fear on the Residents of FCT by Location and Ethnicity

Ethnicity			Invoked_Fear				Total
			Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree	
Yoruba	Location	Nyanya		1	4	6	11
		Abuja		1	2	7	10
		Suleja		0	2	11	13
		Kuje		0	0	14	14
	Total		2	8	38	48	
Igbo	Location	Nyanya	0		3	6	9
		Abuja	1		1	8	10
		Suleja	0		0	15	15
		Kuje	1		0	17	18
	Total	2		4	46	52	
Hausa	Location	Nyanya		0	2	7	9
		Abuja		1	5	6	12
		Suleja		0	0	3	3
		Kuje		0	0	4	4
	Total		1	7	20	28	
Others	Location	Nyanya	2	2	4	13	21
		Abuja	1	1	5	11	18
		Suleja	0	0	1	18	19
		Kuje	0	0	7	7	14
	Total	3	3	17	49	72	




Figure 2: Bar Chart Showing Level of Agreement of Respondents by Ethnicity, Tribes and Location

**Research question 3:**


**To what extent have the security measures in FCT allayed the fear of Boko Haram from the minds of residents?**

Table 7 shows the cross tabulation of scores by respondents according to location and gender. The intention of research question 3 is to find out the extent security measures put in place in the FCT has helped in allaying fear of Boko Haram from the minds of residents. The number of female residents that indicated “strongly agree” was 11, while those that indicated “agreed” were 16 in number. This translates to 27 (13.5%) out of 99 females. The numbers of females in disagreement were 39, while those that were undecided numbered 33. Of the 99 female respondents, 50 (25%) of them were from Suleja area alone. On the other hand, a good number of male respondents were in agreement that measures taken so far has gone a long way in reducing fear amongst the residents of the area. The number of males in agreement were 64 (64%) out of 100 male respondents. The number of undecided cases among this group is 21 (10.5%). Of this number of male respondents, 35 (17.5%) are from Nyanya area alone. With 91(45.5%) respondents in agreement out of 200 and 54 (27%) undecided, it is clear that about 55 others still believe that the measures put in place are not enough to allay fears of residents. However, nearly half of the residents are in agreement with the

measures put in place so far. The question, therefore, is whether this number of people in agreement is sufficient enough to say that the measures so far put in place has gone a long way towards allaying fears in the mind of the residents. Since only 55 (27.5%) are in disagreement as against 45.5%, one can rightly say that the measures so far put in place has alleviated fear from the residents in the four areas of Abuja.

**Table 7:** Cross Tabulation of Scores by Respondents by Location and Gender

Gender			Allayed_Fear_2					Total
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree	
Female	Location	Nyanya	0	2	4	4	5	15
		Abuja	0	0	4	10	3	17
		Suleja	1	2	6	3	4	16
		Kuje	0	8	4	2	3	17
	Total		1	12	18	19	15	65
Male	Location	Nyanya	0	4	5	19	7	35
		Abuja	0	2	5	17	8	32
		Suleja	0	2	5	16	11	34
		Kuje	3	6	11	7	6	33
	Total		3	14	26	59	32	134



**Figure 3:** Showing Level of Agreement by Gender and Location



**Research question 4:**

**What are the responses of FCT residents to the Boko Haram terrorism?**

Table 8 shows the level of responses of the FCT residents to the Boko Haram terrorism. The table shows a cross tabulation of scores according to location and ethnicity. This analysis was grouped in this way in order to ascertain the views of the various ethnic groups within the four locations of FCT. The numbers of respondents within these four ethnic nationalities are: Yoruba – 48, Igbo – 52, Hausa – 28 and others – 72. The number of residents who responded in the affirmative on the Boko Haram terrorism was Yoruba (29), Igbo (35) Hausa (20) and others (41). The numbers when aggregated amounts to 125 or 62.5%. This result indicates that majority of the residents living within the four locations are conscious of the impact of terrorism.

The number of residents who did not agree on Boko Haram terrorism were 29 or 14.5%. Also, a good number of them were undecided about the Boko Haram terrorism and their number is 46 or 23% of the total population of respondents. What this means is that they were undecided as to whether the Boko Haram activities constitutes as acts of terrorism. Nevertheless, since the majority of 125 (62.5%) agreed, we can safely conclude that the activities of this sect really constitutes an act of terrorism.

**Table 8:** Cross Tabulation of Respondents’ Scores According to Location and Ethnicity

Ethnicity			Boko_Haram_Attack					Total
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree	
Yoruba	Loc	Nyanya	0	2	1	3	5	11
		Abuja	0	0	3	4	3	10
		Suleja	0	0	4	5	4	13
		Kuje	1	4	4	2	3	14
	Total		1	6	12	14	15	48
Igbo	Loc	Nyanya		0	1	6	2	9
		Abuja		0	1	9	0	10
		Suleja		0	5	5	5	15
		Kuje		4	6	4	4	18
	Total		4	13	24	11	52	
Hausa	Loc	Nyanya		0	2	4	3	9
		Abuja		1	3	6	2	12
		Suleja		0	0	1	2	3
		Kuje		0	2	2	0	4
	Total		1	7	13	7	28	
Others	Loc	Nyanya	0	4	5	10	2	21
		Abuja	0	1	3	8	6	18
		Suleja	1	3	3	8	4	19
		Kuje	2	6	3	1	2	14
	Total		3	14	14	27	14	72

The responses of the residents of the FCT to the Boko Haram terrorism can further be shown as in Figure 4. The figure shows the Bar Chart of responses of residents arranged according to location and ethnicity. The length of the bars is used in representing the level of responses. The levels of agreement or disagreement have been differentiated using the color bars.




Figure 4: Bar Chart of Responses of Residents according to location and ethnicity

**Research Question 5:**


**To what extent have the responses of the residents contributed to the prevention of Boko Haram attacks in the FCT since October 2015?**

Table 9 shows the number of respondents classified according to the ethnicity. The Hausa residents were the lowest in number amongst the residents, with 28 or 14%. The highest numbers of respondents were those from other tribes, with 72. The number of respondents who agreed that residents had contributed to the prevention of Boko Haram attacks in the FCT since October 2015 was just 31 or 15.5%. The number of respondents who were undecided was 68 or 34%. This means that the rest others representing 101 (50.5%) responded in disagreement. By this result, it means that the residents of FCT are of the opinion that they have not contributed much towards preventing the Boko Haram attacks in the FCT since 2014.

Figure 5 shows a descriptive representation of the residents’ response according to the level of agreement. The length of the bars represent the numbers of residents and their level of agreement or disagreement as to the contributions of the residents towards preventing attacks by the sect on the residents.

**Table 9:** Cross Tabulation of Respondents According to Ethnicity and Location

Location			Residents_of_FCT				Total
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	
Nyanya	Ethnicity	Yoruba	2	1	5	3	11
		Igbo	0	2	4	3	9
		Hausa	0	3	2	4	9
		Others	1	5	12	3	21
	Total	3	11	23	13	50	
Abuja	Ethnicity	Yoruba	2	0	3	5	10
		Igbo	0	4	3	3	10
		Hausa	0	4	6	2	12
		Others	0	3	10	5	18
	Total	2	11	22	15	50	
Suleja	Ethnicity	Yoruba		13			13
		Igbo		15			15
		Hausa		3			3
		Others		19			19
	Total		50			50	
Kuje	Ethnicity	Yoruba	0	8	6	0	14
		Igbo	1	4	12	1	18
		Hausa	0	2	2	0	4
		Others	2	7	3	2	14
	Total	3	21	23	3	50	




**Figure 5:** Bar Chart of Residents' Responses According to Ethnicity and Location

**Research question 6:  
Have Boko Haram’s activities affected the socio-economic and political lives of the FCT residents?**

Table 10 shows the residents responses on how the activities of the sect have affected the socio-economic and political lives of the people living in FCT. None of the respondents gave any affirmative answer. However, 79 or 39.5% of the respondents were undecided. Of this number, 54 (27%) of them were males. Many of the residents were of the opinion that the Boko Haram insurgency has not disrupted the social, economic or political life of residents of the areas. A total of 121 or 60.5% were in disagreement.

**Table 10:** Cross Tabulation of Respondents According to Location and Gender

Gender			Socio_economic_lifes_2			Total
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	
Female	Location	Nyanya	10	3	2	15
		Abuja	10	4	3	17
		Suleja	0	0	16	16
		Kuje	5	8	4	17
	Total	25	15	25	65	
Male	Location	Nyanya	22	11	2	35
		Abuja	19	7	7	33
		Suleja	0	0	34	34
		Kuje	6	16	11	33
	Total	47	34	54	135	



**Figure 6:** Bar Chart of Responses of Residents According to Level of Agreement, location and gender

**Hypothesis 1**

**H<sub>1</sub>:** Boko Haram attacks in the FCT/neighboring communities have made residents fearful

**H<sub>0</sub>:** Boko Haram attacks in the FCT/neighboring communities have not made residents fearful

Table 11 shows the one sample statistics carried out on the composite variable known as *Invoked Fear*. This variable is an aggregate of research questions 4, 5 and 6 bothering on how Boko Haram has invoked fear amongst the FCT residents. The minimum score expected from the three composite variables is 3, while the maximum score is 15. This composite variable *Invoked\_Fear* was later recoded to *Invoked\_Fear\_2* with a minimum score of 1 and a maximum score of 5. It is this later variable that is used for the final analysis. Of the 200 responses, one data which had incomplete data had the missing data replaced by the mean score from the distribution. The mean score generated from the 200 respondents is 4.6850 with a standard deviation of .65415. The standard error of mean is low with a mean of .04626. A test value of 5 representing the median score was calculated prior to carrying out the test. When the test value of 5 is subtracted from the calculated mean score of 4.6850, the mean difference of -.31500 is subjected to t-test.

The calculated t-test is = -6.810 at 199 Degree of freedom or 6.810 in absolute terms) is greater than the critical table value = 1.645. That is, t-calculated = 6.810 > t-critical= 1.645 at p < 0.05 is significant. Also p=.000 < 0.05 alpha level. By this result, it means that the hypothesis which stated that Boko Haram attacks in the FCT/neighboring communities have not made residents fearful should be rejected and the alternative hypothesis accepted.

**Table 11:** One-Sample Statistics of Invoked Fear

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Invoked_Fear	200	4.6850	.65415	.04626

**Table 12:** One-Sample Test on Invoked Fear Variable

	Test Value = 5					
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
					Lower	Upper
Invoked_Fear	-6.810	199	.000	-.31500	-.4062	-.2238

**Hypothesis 2**

**H<sub>1</sub>:** There is no significant relationship between responses of the FCT residents to the Boko Haram terrorism and the political status of the FCT.

**H<sub>0</sub>:** There is significant relationship between responses of FCT residents to the Boko Haram terrorism and the political status of FCT.

The intention of this hypothesis is to find out the relationship between the political status of FCT and the responses of the FCT residents towards Boko Haram attacks. Earlier in research question 1, a question was posed as to whether or not the political status of FCT makes it a target for Boko Haram attacks? This hypothesis is trying to establish a link between the political status of FCT and the responses of FCT residents towards the acts of terrorism. Attacks by Boko Haram on residents of the FCT depended on the political position of the FCT and so the political position of the FCT is the independent variable, while attacks by Boko Haram is the dependent variable as we earlier found out in response to research question 1. A simple regression analysis is used here in order to establish the level of relationship between these two variables.

Table 13 depicts the model summary of relationship between the political position of Abuja and responses of the FCT residents to Boko Haram attacks. The R represents the coefficient of relationship and this is equal to .164 or 16.4%. The R<sup>2</sup> represents the coefficient of determination or the percentage accounted for by the interaction of the two variables. This also means the contribution of the residents of Abuja to the Boko Haram attacks is 2.7%.

Since the F-change = 5.463 is greater than the critical F-ratio = 3.920 at 1, 198 degrees of freedom is significant. That is Significant F Change = .020 < p = 0.05 alpha level. Table 14 also depicts the coefficients of regression. The calculated t-value = 2.337 is greater than the critical t-value = 1.645 at p < 0.05 alpha level. Therefore, the hypothesis which stated that there is no significant relationship between responses of FCT residents to the Boko Haram terrorism and the political status of FCT should be rejected and the alternative accepted.

**Table 13:** Model Summary of Relationship between Political Position of Abuja and Responses of the FCT residents to Boko Haram Attacks

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.164 <sup>a</sup>	.027	.022	.64967	.027	5.463	1	198	.020

**Table 14:** Coefficients<sup>a</sup>

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1	(Constant)	4.138	.172		24.094	.000	3.799	4.477
	Boko_Haram_Attack_2	.105	.045	.164	2.337	.020	.016	.193

**Hypothesis 3**

**H<sub>0</sub>:** The security measures put in place by security agents have not significantly made residents of the FCT less fearful.

**H<sub>1</sub>:** The security measures put in place by security agents has significantly made residents of the FCT less fearful.

Table 15 shows the one sample statistics carried out on the composite variable known as Security Agents Actions. This variable is an aggregate of research questions 2 and 12 bothering on measures put in place by security agents and pressure on the part of security agents to protect the FCT residents. The minimum score from the two composite variables is 2 and the maximum score is 10 for respondents who scored the questionnaire as strongly agreed. This variable *Security\_Agents\_Actions* was used for the final analysis. The mean score generated from the 200 respondents is 7.9600 with a standard deviation of 1.5846. The standard error of mean is low with a mean of .11205. A test value of 8 representing the median score was calculated and used as the *prior* mean for carrying out the test. When this value is subtracted from the calculated mean score of 7.9600, the result yields a mean difference of -.0400 and this is subjected to t-test.

Table 16 shows that the calculated t-test is = -.357 at 199 Degree of freedom or .357 in absolute terms) is less than the critical table value = 1.645. That is, t-calculated = .357 < t-critical= 1.645 at p < 0.05 is not significant. This means that p=.721 > 0.05 alpha level. By this result, it means that the hypothesis which stated that the security measures put in place by security agents have not significantly made residents of the FCT less fearful should be rejected and the alternative accepted.

**Table 15:** One-Sample Statistics of Security Agents Actions in FCT

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Security_agents_actions	200	7.9600	1.58460	.11205

**Table 16:** One-Sample Test of Security Agents Actions

	Test Value = 8					
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
					Lower	Upper
Security_agents_actions	-.357	199	.721	-.04000	-.2610	.1810

### Data Analysis

Analysis of data was carried out using Statistical Packages for Social Sciences (SPSS) and Excel facility provided by the Microsoft Windows. Statistical tools such as cross tabulation, frequency counts and t-tests were used in providing answers to the six research questions and three hypotheses posed.

### Discussion

In selecting the psycho-social theory for the study, we attempted to provide an explanation to why Boko Haram chooses to unleash terrorism on residents of the FCT. In analyzing its actions, it was clear that the sect deliberately targeted Abuja because of its political status as the nation’s capital and as the gateway to the international community. Its choice of high profile targets, targets which were considered most secured (a military barrack, police force headquarters and the UN House) were also intended to boost its rating in the global jihadi network.

In deploying one of the most extreme forms of terrorism – suicide terrorism – the sect sent an unambiguous message to the residents, that it was declaring total war without rules, on civilians and the Nigerian State. The result was that fear was invoked in the residents, many of who started to lose confidence in the ability of the security agencies to protect them. More than 70 percent of respondents for this study admitted that they became fearful and insecure – feelings heightened because of the randomness of the adopted method of terrorism deployed in the FCT. It was clear that the each attack was meticulously planned for maximum impact and to inflict high casualty figures. Each attack left shock, fear and doubts in the minds of the residents. Residents became ‘forcefully’ conscious or aware of the impact of terrorism, and wanted security agencies to respond with all necessary might, to protect them. In such dire times, because of the level of threat perception, citizens are willing to overlook inadequacies of their government, demand concentration on enhancing security, and ridding the country of terrorism. This is also why issues of human rights violations or abuses by security agencies in the fight against terrorism, do not necessarily get the deserved attention, as safety remains the priority of citizens. Going by the findings of this study, it is, therefore, safe to emphatically state that Boko Haram achieved its political, ideological and psychological intentions in attacking the FCT.



This section covered the presentation of collated data, data analysis and discussion of the responses in relation to the study. Using tables and charts, we were able to determine the extent to which Boko Haram achieved its purpose of invoking fear in the residents of the FCT and its environs. This section analysed the responses to the items of the questionnaire, against the six research questions posited for the study. The results validated the main hypothesis of this study: that Boko Haram has made residents fearful.

### **Summary, Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations**

This study interrogates responses of residents of Federal Capital Territory to Boko Haram violence with a view to depicting, among other things, why Abuja is a target for Boko Haram, the extent to which the sect's activities have invoked fears in the residents of the FCT, the extent to which the security measures put in place by the statutory security agencies have allayed the fear of the sect in the minds of residents, the trends of the responses of the FCT residents to the Boko Haram terrorism, the extent to which the responses of the residents have contributed to the prevention of Boko Haram attacks in the FCT since October 2015 and if the Boko Haram's activities have significantly affected the socio-economic, political lives of the FCT residents. Data were drawn from scholarly literature, newspaper reports, articles and internet-based sources. Data on activities of Boko Haram terrorism were collected from secondary sources, while primary data were sourced through the instrumentality of questionnaires (200). Collected data were content-analyzed and some were subjected to interpretative analysis. The study found out that the fear of Boko Haram among the FCT residents has declined over the years, especially with the coming into power of the current administration of President Muhammadu Buhari. This is because the administration is considered to be winning the fight against the Boko Haram. It also found out that despite a number of successful Boko Haram attacks in the FCT, the economic, social and political sectors of the city have not been significantly affected. This implies that Boko Haram violence in the FCT has more media publicity than actual losses. Conversely, in the North East region where Boko Haram recorded more casualties and losses, such gargantuan losses have generally been under-reported.

It needs be noted that the struggle of the Boko Haram is instrumentally linked to some ideology, as members of the group hold the view that the creation of full Islamic regime in some northern states, within the Federation of Nigeria will ensure that economic injustice and social inequality will be minimized and that Islamic welfare packages would be accessible to an average Muslim in the region. In subsequent sections, we reviewed the concepts of terrorism and the perspective of insurgency and political violence in the development of Boko Haram. We also discussed Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism in global perspectives and the emergence of *Boko Haram* as a terrorist group. We specifically examined the historical trajectory of Boko Haram as an Islamic terrorist group. The historical survey reveals that Boko Haram, was very popular among economically

disadvantaged groups in the northern Nigeria, many of who enjoyed welfarist schemes set up by the leaders of the sect. Further, we presented the research methodology for this study, which employed the use of questionnaires (200) to test the perception of residents of the FCT to Boko Haram violence. Finally, we analyzed and discussed the responses we generated through the instrumentality of questionnaires, to validate the hypothesis of this study.

### **Findings of the Study**

These findings are based on the results of the assessment carried out on the responses of the FCT residents to Boko Haram violence between 2010 and 2015:

#### **• Question 1: Why did Boko Haram attack the FCT?**

The results indicated that the FCT is a target for the sect because of its political status, as a total of 93 percent of the 200 respondents, regardless of gender, location and ethnicity, agreed with the item.

#### **• Question 2: Has activities of the sect invoked fear in the residents of the FCT?**

The results indicate that more than 70% strongly agree that the terrorists activities of Boko Haram has made residents fearful, particularly because of the method of suicide terrorism and its random nature. This validates hypothesis 1, that the sect's activities have invoked fear in residents of the FCT.

#### **• Question 3: To what extent have security measures put in place in the FCT allayed the fear of Boko Haram from the minds of residents?**

The results indicate that despite the location, the majority of respondents are of the opinion that security measures put in place by the security agencies have alleviated some of the fear in the minds of the residents. It is however necessary to point out that this result is by a slim majority, with 55% agreeing while 45.5% disagree. Therefore, the hypothesis that measures taken by security agencies have somewhat alleviated the fear of Boko Haram activities, in the minds of the residents, should be accepted.

#### **• Question 4: What are the responses of the FCT residents to Boko Haram violence?**

The item sought to determine change in behavioral patterns of residents. The results indicate that majority (62.5%) believe that the activities of Boko Haram clearly constitutes acts of terrorism, with residents conscious of the impact of terrorism and having had to alter their lifestyles to some extent, such as deliberately avoiding crowded places. Most of respondents indicate that they avoid crowded places – an indication of a pervasive sense of fear. In the same vein, respondents reported that they remain security conscious whenever they visit market places. Also, the respondents hold the view that their rate of attendance at public social events like shows and concerts have reduced in the FCT, because of the fear of possible Boko Haram attack.

• **Question 5: To what extent have the responses of residents contributed to prevention of Boko Haram attacks since October 2015?**

The results indicate that while residents are conscious of the need for adopting personal security measures, they have not significantly contributed to the prevention of attacks in the FCT. Only 15.5% agree that residents, either by reporting suspicious movements or persons to security agencies, have helped to prevent attacks. It is necessary to point out that while 50.5% hold the opinion that residents have not contributed to prevention of attacks, 34% were undecided.

• **Question 6: Have Boko Haram's activities affected the socio-economic and political lives of FCT residents?**

The result for this item is interesting, as it indicates that despite the fear invoked in residents by the activities of Boko Haram and the opinion that measures taken by security agencies have not necessarily alleviated fear, the socio-economic and political sectors of the FCT has not been significantly affected. A total of 60.5% hold the opinion that socio-economic and political lives have not been affected, while 39.5% were undecided. No respondent believed socio-economic and political lives have been affected by Boko Haram violence. The implication of the foregoing is that although the fatality is huge, the economic, social and political sectors have not been seriously affected by the Boko Haram attacks. In effect, it can be said that Boko Haram attacks have more media popularity than having significant effect on the smooth functioning of the whole FCT.

Hypothesis 1 proposes that Boko Haram attacks in the FCT/neighboring communities have not made residents fearful. Analysis was carried out and the result revealed that the calculated t-test in absolute terms was 6.810 and this value was greater than the critical table value of 1.645 at  $p < 0.05$  alpha level. The result was significant at  $p = .000 < 0.05$  alpha level. Findings therefore revealed that the hypothesis which stated that Boko Haram attacks in the FCT/neighboring communities have not made residents fearful was rejected and the alternative hypothesis accepted. In other words, Boko Haram attacks in the FCT/neighboring communities have made residents fearful.

Hypothesis 2 sought to find out if significant relationship exists between responses of the FCT residents to the Boko Haram terrorism and the political status of the FCT.

The simple regression analysis carried out was to establish relationship between the political position of Abuja and responses of the FCT residents to Boko Haram attacks. The R represents the coefficient of relationship and this is equal to .164 or 16.4%. This means that the level of relationship represented by the correlation coefficient between the two variables was 16.4%. although this value is not high, but it is positive and significant. The F-Change = .020 was found to be less than the alpha level of .05 and again, the calculated t-value = 2.337 was greater than the critical t-value = 1.645 at  $p < 0.05$  alpha level. Findings therefore showed that the hypothesis which stated that there is

no significant relationship between responses of the FCT residents to the Boko Haram terrorism and the political status of the FCT was rejected and the alternative accepted.

Hypothesis 3 is about security measures put in place by security agents and if this has not significantly made residents of the FCT less fearful. With a calculated t-test = .357 in absolute terms, this is less than the critical table value = 1.645 at  $p < 0.05$  was not significant. By this finding, it means that the hypothesis which stated that the security measures put in place by security agents have not significantly made residents of the FCT less fearful was accepted and the alternative rejected.

## **Conclusion**

Arising from the foregoing, the study concludes that the emergence of Boko Haram terrorism has a historical trajectory which explains the religious, economic and political dimensions of the menace. Attacks in the FCT achieved their purpose, which was to give maximum international publicity to the activities of Boko Haram and instill fear in the residents. However, the attacks did not significantly affect social, economic and political spheres of the city. Based on this, the study submits that, fear responses of residents have subsided over the year especially with the coming of the Buhari administration on May 29<sup>th</sup>, 2015. Generally, Boko Haram capabilities to launch attacks have been largely contained militarily and now restricted to some areas in Borno State. At the same time, Boko Haram has lost its occupied territories due to sustained military operations.

Furthermore, the security forces have been effective in containing the spread of the Boko Haram group to the northern part of the region. This however, does not mean that the group does not have the capability of striking in other parts of the country. The fact that the number of successful Boko Haram attacks in the FCT has been significantly reduced over the years implies that the level of fear among FCT residents has been reduced.

Essentially, a study on Boko Haram cannot but mention its root causes. The struggle of Boko Haram Islamist group is majorly linked to poverty. This is because the group enlists the bulk of its members from the uneducated, poor and jobless young people in the streets in northern Nigeria. The best long term strategy against Boko Haram is therefore the deployment of non-military options. We hold the view that for such non-military options to be effective, there must be components that cater for the welfare of street children, also called *Almajiris* in the northern states, as their presence provided ready and easy recruitment pool for the sect.

## **Recommendations**

From the foregoing, the following recommendations are suggested in order to further root out all scintilla of fear in the mind of FCT residents. Basically, the fear response among the FCT residents is just the fruit of the root causes of the Boko Haram violence.

Therefore, these recommendations are aligned to the root causes of the menace of Boko Haram violence.

1. The Federal Government should commence the process of negotiating with the members of Boko Haram with a view of identifying and meeting any reasonable demands. Some of the members, particularly those who were lured into joining the sect, can be granted some form of amnesty, if they are willing. For starters in this process, the security officers who were responsible for the extra-judicial murder of Yusuf should be prosecuted and brought to justice.
2. The Federal Government should establish an agency or commission that will address the issue of pervasive poverty in the northern part of the country (especially the North East, the poorest zone in the country). This position has been supported by several stakeholders, who hold the view that a Ministry similar to the Niger Delta Ministry, should be established.
3. Government at all levels, federal, state and local, should create job opportunities for the citizens. The State governments especially those in the northern part should invest massively in agriculture in order to address paucity of lucrative jobs in the northern parts of the country.
4. The Federal and state governments should re-invigorate their commitment to the Universal Basic Education and ensure that every citizen has free access. While recent efforts of the Federal Government in establishing special *Almajiris* school, for the street children in the northern region in commendable, more of such schools should be established in every local community in the North.
5. The organized private sector should be engaged in the propagation and popularisation of entrepreneurship education in all states of the federation. The young people should be encouraged to become job creators and not job seekers. Micro credit facilities should be made available to young willing and able Nigerians that are ready to become self-employed or job creators.
6. Nigeria should mind its notoriously northern borders since it has been proven that most of the foreign elements in the Boko Haram insurgency exploit the porous nature of the country's northern borders to infiltrate into the country to engage in terrorism and other criminal activities.

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**APPENDIX A. Timeline of bombings in FCT**

DATE	Target/AREA	MODE OF ATTACK	CASUALTIES
<a href="#">December 31st, 2010</a>	Sani Abacha Barracks	bomb explosion	11 dead, several injured
<a href="#">June 16, 2011</a>	Nigerian Police Force Headquarters, Area 11	suicide bombing	6 dead, several injured
<a href="#">August 26, 2011</a>	United Nations House, Diplomatic Zone	suicide bombing	18 dead, 80 injured
<a href="#">December 25, 2011</a>	St. Theresa's Catholic Church, Madalla, Suleja	suicide bombing	35 dead, dozens injured
<a href="#">April 25, 2012</a>	Thisday Newspaper, Jabi	suicide bombing	9 dead, several injured
<a href="#">June 23, 2012</a>	Crystal Lounge Night Club, Wuse 2,	explosives	None
<a href="#">April 14, 2014</a>	Nyanya Motor Park, satellite town	explosives	100 dead, 243 injured
<a href="#">May 2, 2014</a>	Nyanya	explosives	19 dead, 60 injured
<a href="#">June 25, 2014</a>	Emab Plaza, Wuse 2	suicide bombing	21 dead, 17 injured
<a href="#">October 3, 2015</a>	Nyanya	explosives	2 dead, 19 injured
<a href="#">October 3, 2015</a>	Kuje Night market	explosives	13 killed, 20 injured

\* Total of 11 successful attacks by Boko Haram in the FCT as at October 2016